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CONTRIBUTIONS IN SOCIAL STRATIFICATION

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U.S. and British Perceptions of Class—Vanneman

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White Ethnics, Racial Prejudice, and Labor Market Segmentation
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RICHARD APOSTLE

IN THIS ISSUE

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SCOTT CUMMINGS is associate professor of urban studies, Institute of Urban Studies, University of Texas at Arlington. His interests include political economy, race and ethnic relations, minority economic development, and community and neighborhood organization. He received his Ph.D. in sociology from the University of Connecticut in 1972.

Erratum

Owing to an error in the printing process, two lines were repeated and two other lines were omitted on p. 253 of "Indicators of Sex Typing" by Otis Dudley Duncan (*AJS* 85 [September 1979]). The last five lines of text on p. 253 should read as follows:

respondent volunteered the remark, "Families should share duties." Since there was no systematic probing for reasons in the two surveys, few respondents could be classified as ideological on the basis of such remarks. There are, nevertheless, several examples of respondents who explicitly took account of situational factors.

Information for Contributors

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a self-addressed stamped postcard, containing the manuscript title, to obtain acknowledgment of manuscript receipt. No other acknowledgment will be sent.

7. Each article or research note submitted to the *AJS* must be accompanied by a check or money order for \$10.00, payable to The University of Chicago Press in U.S. currency or its equivalent by postal or express money order or bank draft. Papers will not be reviewed until this fee has been paid. The submission fee will be waived for student authors. Submissions from students should be accompanied by a faculty member's certification of their student status.

Format of References in Text: All references to monographs, articles, and statistical sources are to be identified at the appropriate point in the text by last name of author, year of publication, and pagination where appropriate, all within parentheses. Footnotes are to be used only for substantive observations. Specify subsequent citations of the same source in the same way as the first one; do not use "ibid.," "op. cit.," or "loc. cit."

1. When author's name is in the text: Duncan (1959). When author's name is not in text: (Gouldner 1963).

2. Pagination follows year of publication: (Lipset 1964, pp. 61-65).

3. For more than three authors, use "et al." For institutional authorship, supply minimum identification from the beginning of the complete citation: (U.S. Bureau of Census 1963, p. 117).

4. With more than one reference to an author in the same year, distinguish them by use of letters (*a*, *b*) attached to the year of publication: (1965*a*).

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Format of References: List all items alphabetically by author (providing the full list of multiple authors) and, within author(s), by year of publication, in an appendix titled "References." Examples follow:

Davis, K. 1963*a*. "Social Demography." Pp. 124-37 in *The Behavioral Sciences Today*, edited by Bernard Berelson. New York: Basic.


———. 1963*b*. "The Theory of Change and Response in Modern Demographic History." *Population Index* 29 (October): 345-66.

Goode, W. J. 1967. "The Protection of the Inept." *American Sociological Review* 32 (February): 5-19.

Moore, Wilbert E., and Arnold S. Feldman. 1960. *Labor Commitment and Social Change in Developing Areas*. New York: Social Science Research Council.

Sanford, Nevitt, ed. 1962. *The American College*. New York: Wiley.

Weber, Max. (1921) 1968. "Society's Problems." Pp. 12-16 in *Economy and Society*, edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich. New York: Bedminster.



Deadline: April 1, 1980

A CALL FOR PAPERS

for a Supplement to the *American Journal of Sociology* on Marxist inspirations in contemporary social research

Editors: Michael Burawoy and Theda Skocpol

This supplement is to contain primarily research-based articles that will demonstrate the fascination and fruitfulness of Marxist ideas in contemporary social research. The editors are looking for concrete studies that are conceived and executed within some Marxist tradition *or* address a problem distinctively raised by Marxist writers *or* test *or* develop Marxist ideas about a given aspect of social life. Papers may address topics in any of a wide range of areas, such as the class structures of advanced societies, the family, urban or community studies, the labor process, politics and the state, gender or race and ethnic relations, world capitalism or imperialism, transitions between modes of production, social history, and ideology *or* culture. Submissions will be welcome from both established and junior scholars in sociology and in history, economics, political science, and anthropology.

Procedures: Papers must be submitted for preliminary consideration no later than April 1, 1980. They may be no longer than 45 typewritten, double-spaced pages and should be prepared according to the "Information for Contributors" in the *American Journal of Sociology*. *Three copies* of each submission should be mailed *either* to Michael Burawoy, Department of Sociology, University of California, Berkeley, California 94720, *or* to Theda Skocpol, Department of Sociology, William James Hall, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138.

Papers will be reviewed by both editors, and those that appear potentially suitable will be sent anonymously for advisory review to one or two qualified referees. Papers may be accepted subject to substantive or stylistic revisions.

Class, Occupation, and Inequality in Job Rewards¹

Arne L. Kalleberg and Larry J. Griffin
Indiana University

This paper argues that within an economic system class and occupation are conceptually distinct positions. Class refers to control by some positions over others in a production system, and occupation refers to the functional differentiation of positions in a technical division of labor. The effects of measures of class and occupation on both economic and noneconomic rewards are analyzed using data obtained from two national samples of individuals. Class and occupation are found to have independent effects on both types of job rewards, and the commonly used measures of occupational position (Duncan's socioeconomic index [SEI], complexity/skill requirements of the occupation) do not adequately explain inequalities in job rewards associated with occupation. The implications of this analysis for the study of positional inequality in general are indicated.

That *positions* in an economic system are unequally rewarded represents a central problem for sociological analysis. Despite the theoretical significance of this question, empirical research on the subject has been conspicuously scarce. Instead, most research has focused on the complementary questions of (1) the mechanisms by which individuals are allocated to positions in the stratification structure and (2) the resultant consequences of these mechanisms for mobility and attainment. This literature has contributed greatly to our understanding of social inequality, especially its intergenerational reproduction, but, nonetheless, the primary thrust of this perspective has been devoted to the achievements of individuals; therefore, the issue of positional inequality has been beyond the scope of allocation studies.

It may be argued that an understanding of positional inequality is logically prior to an examination of allocative processes (cf., e.g., Burawoy 1977; Treiman 1977). We may legitimately ask whether attempts should be made to identify relevant positional differences in production systems and to determine how such differences affect the distribution of work rewards before we proceed with allocation studies. We believe that it is at least fruitful (if not necessary) to do so: only after the positional

¹ We wish to thank numerous colleagues at Indiana University, Johns Hopkins University, and the University of Wisconsin for their criticisms of the many earlier versions of this paper. We want especially to acknowledge the comments made by Robert Althauser, Martha Cook, Elton Jackson, David Snyder, and the reviewers of *AJS*, as well as the editorial assistance provided by Carolyn Mullins. We are, of course, responsible for any errors. This research was supported in part by a grant to the authors from the Spencer Foundation, Indiana University School of Education.

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sources of inequality are well specified will the pertinent allocative mechanisms be more completely understood. The nearly exclusive use in status attainment research of a single dimension of occupation to represent positional inequality, for example, ignores an important element of such inequality—that which exists among different classes. In an attempt to increase our knowledge of precisely which positions are important sources of social inequality, we examine in this paper the variations in rewards generated by both class and occupational differentiation. We argue that class and occupation represent conceptually distinct positions in production systems and that empirical research should therefore employ distinct indicators of these concepts. Although there may be some empirical overlap in measures of these concepts, we argue that their analytic separation should prove fruitful for the study of positional inequality. We explicitly adopt the view that an understanding of positional inequality requires the synthesis of several perspectives, and that an analysis based exclusively on class or occupation is inadequate for explaining the complexities associated with such inequality. Later in this paper, we present a series of empirical analyses designed to test several hypotheses deriving from our conceptualization of positional sources of inequality, an issue to which we now turn.

CLASS AND OCCUPATION AS SOURCES OF JOB REWARDS

Marxist scholarship posits that work-related inequalities are rooted in the structurally antagonistic class relationships that exist within a capitalist market economy—an economic system characterized by the private ownership of the means of production and extensive wage labor. Class represents positions in the social relations of production² and, within a system of production, is manifested by variations in control over the product and the activities of labor. Class differences, therefore, should affect both the distribution of rewards and the structure of work (Marx 1967). Recent empirical research has begun to document the influence of class position on economic rewards (e.g., Wright and Perrone 1977; Kalleberg and Griffin 1978; Robinson and Kelley 1979), though Marxian analysts suggest that class membership should also affect the degree to which the labor process facilitates personal fulfillment (Braverman 1974; Bowles and Gintis 1975; Marx 1964).

Testing these hypotheses presupposes a conceptual and operational definition of "class." We recognize that no consensus exists as to the most "correct" definition of class boundaries (see, e.g., discussions in Giddens 1973;

² Bowles and Gintis (1977, p. 223) define social relations of production as "the system of rights and responsibilities, duties and rewards, that governs the interaction of all individuals involved in organized productive activity." For a further discussion of the concept, see Gorz (1965).

Dahrendorf 1959); this is true even in the more circumscribed circles of Marxian theory (cf., e.g., Poulantzas 1975; Freedman 1975; Szymanski 1972; Wright 1976; and Ollman 1968). However, there is broad agreement, even among non-Marxists (e.g., Weber 1947), that ownership of productive property is a defining criterion of class position. Recent Marxian discussions, especially those by Wright (1976; Wright and Perrone 1977) and Carchedi (1975), have argued that control over the labor of others is also an important source of class differentiation. Following Wright (1976), we have cross-classified these two criteria of class boundaries to yield four distinct classes—employers, managers, workers, and the petty bourgeois (the latter are not included in our analyses). Employers both own the means of production and control the labor of others. Marxian theory (e.g., Marx 1967) would predict that employers appropriate part of the economic surplus produced by workers and managers, and, therefore, they obtain greater economic benefits than members of other classes. Managers are nonpropertied and salaried but are distinct from workers because they perform some of the production functions (i.e., supervision and organization of production) traditionally associated with capitalists. Because managers exercise administrative authority they should receive some of the surplus in the form of higher economic benefits.³ We hypothesize, then, that managers receive greater earnings than the individuals whose labor they control (i.e., workers, who do not own productive property and do not perform managerial functions).

Similarly, managers and (especially) employers, by virtue of their location in positions of organizational authority, have the power to define tasks, to use selectively a particular technology, to see the work process as a totality, and to be self-directive in their work. They should, therefore, experience greater fulfillment from work than members of the working class, who labor in tasks they do not define and exercise discretion only within the confines of their work roles (for greater detail on this argument, see Braverman 1974; Gordon 1972*b*; Marx 1964; Bowles and Gintis 1975). In view of the importance of fulfilling work to job incumbents (Quinn, Staines, and McCullough 1974), the largely untested but potentially powerful predictions of Braverman (1974) and other Marxists concerning the impact of class on this noneconomic job reward deserve careful scrutiny.

We have thus far discussed reward inequalities associated with class positions in capitalist (i.e., profit-making) organizations. Do such distinc-

³ Our treatment of managers as a distinct class recognizes the unique importance of managerial/administrative functions for the sustained existence and growth of large capitalist bureaucracies. We do not assume, however, that managerial behavior is independent of the desires of corporate owners or that the interests of owners and managers are divergent (e.g., Galbraith 1967). Indeed, we explicitly eschew this perspective, viewing managers as hired representatives of employers (see Zeitlin 1974; Wright and Perrone 1977).

tions have conceptual or predictive validity when we shift our attention to such organizations as hospitals, schools, and government bureaucracies; most of which are not profit-making entities? We believe, for several reasons, that class considerations are as salient for understanding inequalities in these noncapitalist organizations as they are in capitalist production and service bureaucracies.

First, "structural" Marxism (cf. Carchedi 1976; Wright 1978*b*; Poulantzas 1975) suggests that the fundamental purpose of most noncapitalist organizations is to insure the continued viability of the capitalist order. For example, social service organizations (health, education, and welfare agencies) supply the capitalist sector with an efficient, competent, and variously skilled labor force, thus reproducing necessary labor power across and within generations. Government bureaucracies develop and execute certain fiscal and monetary policies in order to maintain business confidence in the capitalist economy and thus reproduce an environment conducive to private investment and expansion. Ideological and cultural organizations inculcate within the general population those values and attitudes necessary for the legitimation of capitalist social relations and thus reproduce the normative structure of capitalist society. The important implication of this body of thought for our purposes is that, while this sector generally does not directly engage in production and distribution, it does, nonetheless, attempt to create the conditions necessary for the *reproduction* of capitalist social relations of production. Given this intimate linkage between capitalist and noncapitalist sectors, we argue that the social organization of work in most noncapitalist enterprises must necessarily reflect the social relations of production in capitalist firms. To organize work or to reward labor according to noncapitalist criteria would subvert the very purpose of this sector.

Using the above reasoning, some contemporary Marxists (see, especially, Wright 1978*b*; Carchedi 1976) argue that positions in the noncapitalist sector not only can be grouped into the same class categories we use in this paper, but also should be merged with similar positions in the capitalist sector for analytic purposes. Consider, for example, positions in state apparatuses. According to Wright (1978*b*), bourgeois positions involve control over the creation of public policy; managerial positions over the execution of policy; and worker positions over neither creation nor execution duties. Patterns of the social relations of control over and within state bureaucracies mirror the social relations of capitalist production in private enterprises. The bourgeois class, then, would include employer positions in the capitalist sector and bourgeois positions in the noncapitalist sector. In a similar manner, managerial and worker positions may be so defined.

Another manifestation of the structural linkage between capitalist and noncapitalist sectors provides the second rationale for our belief in the

importance of class distinctions in noncapitalist bureaucracies. Though perhaps not directly competing with capitalist enterprises, most noncapitalist organizations must nonetheless adhere to certain basic normative aspects of capitalist production—for example, those centering on work incentives, efficiency, and productivity—in order to remain financially solvent, a goal especially problematic in periods of shrinking public moneys and increasing public demands (O'Connor 1973). These necessities have led authorities in many noncapitalist organizations to adopt management practices (e.g., work rationalization, productivity quotas) and reward structures which are virtually indistinguishable from those long prevalent in profit-making firms (Braverman 1974; Patry 1978). The implication of these observations is that because noncapitalist organizations are embedded in the capitalist context, the social organization of work in these firms, especially differences in control over the product and process of labor, reflects capitalist production relations and has approximately the same consequences.

In contrast to the Marxian perspective, most contemporary stratification research has focused on occupation as the structural position associated with unequal rewards. Because occupations are positions involving similar technical activities, they have similar skill and training requirements. Occupational skill and training differentials, as well as the importance of the activity, may be responsible for the observed reward inequality associated with occupational position (Davis and Moore 1945), though alternative explanations centering on, for example, market strength (supply and demand) and occupational power abound (see Stolzenberg 1975; Form and Huber 1976; Bielby and Kalleberg 1977). In any case, the literature on socioeconomic achievement has demonstrated that occupational position, generally represented by a status or prestige score assigned to census categories, affects economic rewards even independently of the earnings-related personal characteristics of employed individuals (Duncan, Featherman, and Duncan 1972; Jencks et al. 1972; Sewell and Hauser 1975). Occupational activities also differ in complexity and in the level of self-direction allowed the individual (Kohn 1976; Kohn and Schooler 1973). Both of these occupational attributes affect noneconomic work rewards such as perceived power and lack of alienation (e.g., Kohn 1976; Tudor 1972; Blauner 1964), and, we hypothesize, should also influence fulfillment achieved in work.

Unfortunately, with only a few exceptions (e.g., Wright and Perrone 1977; Kohn 1976; Kohn and Schooler 1973), empirical studies have not attempted to consider simultaneously both class and occupational influences but have instead focused almost exclusively on one or the other, generally on occupation. Moreover, those studies which have considered both class and occupational influences generally have not considered the range of rewards associated with those positions. On the one hand, Wright (1978a; Wright and Perrone 1977) analyzed only income differences, altogether

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ignoring other job rewards tied to positional differences in the structure of production (e.g., fulfillment). Kohn (1976) and Kohn and Schooler (1973), on the other hand, studied the impact of ownership, hierarchical position, and occupational self-direction on general orientations toward self and society, but not on earnings or noneconomic job rewards *per se*.

We note several other limitations of studies that assess the influence of both class and occupation. First, the data used by Wright and Perrone (1977) contain no information on the status origins or mental ability of the respondents, variables known to affect earnings directly (Alexander, Eckland, and Griffin 1975; Griffin 1976). Also, because data on labor market experiences of the sampled adults are rather sketchy, Wright and Perrone could control only education, job tenure, age, and the occupational socioeconomic index (SEI); their conclusions regarding the main or interaction effects of class membership on income, therefore, must be tempered by the possibility that their regression equations are misspecified, a problem they readily acknowledge. Second, Kohn's analyses of class effects on alienation (1976) and on psychological functioning (Kohn and Schooler 1973) are based primarily on the differences between owners and nonowners. Though Kohn's findings are suggestive, his categorization groups together classes whose work-related routines and rewards may be quite unequal—owners, for example, include both employers and the petty bourgeois (i.e., those self-employed individuals who do not control the labor of others [see Marx 1967]) while nonowners include workers and managers.⁴ Finally, Wright (1978a) and Wright and Perrone (1977) utilized only one attribute of occupation in their analyses—occupational status. It is unlikely that any single dimension of occupational position captures all of the reward differences associated with occupational differentiation. Thus, in the studies by Wright and his associates, the general importance of occupation may be underestimated while the estimated impact of class may be artifactually inflated because of incomplete controls for occupational position.

In this paper, we attempt to overcome some of the limitations of previous research on positional inequality by integrating class analysis with a consideration of occupational differences to explain inequalities in both economic and noneconomic job rewards. Before discussing our results, we shall describe briefly the data and variables to be used in our analyses.

DATA AND VARIABLES

Data

The data come from two national samples, each of which offers certain advantages over the other. The first is the 1972–73 Quality of Employment

⁴ Kalleberg and Griffin (1978) present evidence which suggests that small employers obtain considerably more economic and noneconomic job rewards than do the petty bourgeois. Similar inequalities are observed between managers and workers.

Survey (QES) conducted by the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan. This survey, also used by Wright and Perrone (1977), is representative of the national employed civilian labor force meeting certain sample eligibility criteria (see Quinn and Shepard [1974] for a description of the survey and sampling procedures). These data were obtained through personal interviews with 1,496 persons living in housing units within the continental United States and the District of Columbia. As we noted above, these data contain no information on the status origins or mental ability of the respondents and very little detail on labor market experiences and training.

Fortunately, the second data set to be used in these analyses does contain information on these variables. It is a survey of a national sample of young adults who, as high school sophomores in 1955, participated in an Educational Testing Service Survey of students and who also responded to a 1970 follow-up (designated Explorations in Equality of Opportunity [EEO]; more detailed descriptions of the sampling procedures are available elsewhere [Alexander and Eckland 1973]). Although the population is not representative of the civilian labor force, most important variables operate in these data in a manner consistent with their operation in more representative studies (cf., Alexander, Eckland, and Griffin 1975; Griffin 1976; Griffin and Kalleberg 1979). A further utility of the EEO data is that the economic success measure available is annual earnings instead of, as in the QES data, annual income. Wright and Perrone (1977) suggested that income is the more appropriate indicator of economic attainment because such a measure includes class-sensitive sources of unearned income (e.g., that from property). We agree with their proposition entirely, but we also argue that if class membership also affects earned income considered alone, a hypothesis testable via the EEO survey, the arguments regarding inequality in *job* rewards receive added support.

We have limited these analyses to white males in order to avoid unwanted variation introduced by race and gender and because white males exhibit marked inequalities with respect to certain job rewards (see Wright and Perrone 1977). The sizes of the samples are 862 and 707 for the QES and EEO respondents, respectively.

Variables

Class.—Our primary rule for assigning individuals to the employing, managing, or working class is based on our earlier discussion of ownership and control (see Wright 1976; Wright and Perrone 1977; Carchedi 1975). The measures are based on two questions: Is respondent self-employed? Do you supervise anyone as part of your job? Individuals who responded "yes" to both were defined as "employers." Individuals who responded "no" to

both were defined as "workers." Managers were those who responded "no" to the first and "yes" to the second. We do not include petty bourgeois ("yes" to the first question and "no" to the second).

We also used additional criteria for handling ambiguous respondents or individuals whose work-related routines and rewards should theoretically be only minimally affected by their occupational and/or class positions.⁵ We emphasize that we do not assume that the three classes are internally homogeneous but that differences with respect to ownership and control represent the most salient qualitative distinctions for the purposes of class categorization. We also note that additional class categories may be utilized (e.g., petty bourgeois) or within-class distinctions may be developed (e.g., large and small employers, lower- and upper-level managers, proletarian and autonomous workers). In order to make our research as comparable as possible to Wright and Perrone's (1977), however, we limit our attention in this paper to the three categories described above. The sizes of the class groups in each data set are: employers (47-EEO; 108-QES), managers (361-EEO; 370-QES), workers (299-EEO; 384-QES).

Occupation.—We use several indicators of occupational position, the most general of which is the 1970 census detailed (three-digit) occupational categories. Our use of nominal, detailed census titles offers a major advantage for evaluating the extent to which occupational differentiation affects inequality in job rewards because this procedure isolates any and all differences among census occupational categories in job rewards. As a result, we can assess the general importance of census occupational categories rather than simply document the reward inequalities associated with a particular scaling of these categories. The census occupational categories,

⁵ We follow Wright and Perrone (1977) in assigning all teachers to the working class because the vast majority of teachers, while supervising or exercising authority over students, do not actually control the labor power of other employees. Military personnel are excluded entirely from our analyses, a common practice in stratification research, because their job behaviors and rewards are not directly determined by market forces and because inequalities are based on rank rather than directly on occupation or class (as we use the latter term here). We exclude clergy as well, partly for reasons similar to those which led us to exclude military personnel but also because we lack the information necessary to assign clergy unambiguously to particular classes. The majority of clergy in the EEO sample report that they supervise others and exercise authority on the job, but the unique nature of the clergy's clientele and job duties obscures the meaning of these responses. We cannot safely assume, as we could for teachers, that this supervision and authority are exercised over the institution's clients; nor could we assume that the referent is other employees' labor power. In combination with the considerable degree of nonmarket determination of work routines and rewards, this ambiguity led us to exclude the clergy from our analyses. In practice, these distinctions make little empirical difference. We also performed all analyses to be presented without imposing these restrictions; that is, teachers were allocated to classes on the basis of their responses to the items listed in the text or discussed below, and clergy and military personnel were included in the analyses and categorized according to their responses to these items. Differences between these results and those to be presented were minimal and nonsystematic.

however, do not simply identify positions on the basis of technical activity but also include elements of class differences in control (e.g., the occupations of proprietor and manager). This may also reflect reality since control relations are implicit in the existence of a division of labor: certain technical activities entail coordination, which suggests control relations in production systems.

This ambiguity led us to use also more direct measures of the differentiation of occupations. First, we use Duncan's (1961) SEI measure of occupational status (updated to 1970 census categories—see Featherman, Sobel, and Dickens [1975]), the most frequently employed index in stratification research. Status (or prestige), however, may not be the most conceptually appropriate measure of those attributes of occupations that generate different routines and training requirements, a point also noted by Duncan (1961, p. 144). Thus, we also use a set of five indicators which tap the complexity and skill levels of occupations, an operationalization more consistent with our theoretical definition of occupation. They include ratings of the degree of complexity of involvement with data, people, and things, and ratings assessing the relative cognitive development (General Educational Development [GED] scores) and relative training time (Specific Vocational Preparation [SVP] scores) necessary to perform adequately the occupational activity.⁶

Job rewards.—These represent the characteristics associated with work that provide benefits and utilities to the individual and that are obtained contingent on continued work performance. We analyze two types of rewards—economic success and fulfillment. The two do not exhaust the possible range of rewards but they have been of particular concern to social scientists interested in outcomes of the labor process (e.g., Edwards

⁶ The "complexity/skill" measures are based on the estimates, developed for some 21,000 titles in the *Dictionary of Occupational Titles* (DOT), of the occupation's typical level of functioning with data, people, and things, and of the skill needed by workers to achieve average successful occupational performance. In the EEO analyses we use scores aggregated to the (1970) census occupational level (from Temme 1975). Temme estimates for each of 584 census occupational-industrial groups the average scores on these variables associated with the DOT occupations within census categories. The 584 categories explain approximately 75% of the variation in each of these scores across the 21,000 titles (Temme 1975). In our analyses of the QES data, we use both scores aggregated to the (1970) census occupational level (tables 8 and 9) and scores assigned directly to DOT occupations. The latter measures have less within-occupation variation in complexity/skill than do the census measures. Although we have experimented with ways of combining these five variables into a single scale of complexity/skill, using them as separate regressors is both more general and sufficient for our purposes in this paper (these measures are described in detail in U.S. Department of Labor [1972]). Finally, we report results of analyses which include (in addition to the above measures) perceptions of respondents concerning the complexity of their occupational activities (EEO data only). These measures, similar to those used by Kohn and Schooler (1973), provide a partial control for the within-census occupation variation in complexity of work (see n. 19 below).

1975; Braverman 1974; Gordon 1972a). For the economic measure we use annual income (for the QES sample) or annual earnings (for the EEO sample). The concept, and thus operationalization, of "fulfillment" is less well developed. We believe that this concept necessarily derives its meaning within a value system that assumes certain types of work to be more fulfilling than others (e.g., Braverman 1974). This reward then represents the evaluation by job incumbents of particular facets of the organization of production; it is, therefore, a function of, but analytically distinct from, the objective content and structuring of work tasks. Although we recognize that fulfillment may have additional dimensions (Marx 1964, pp. 124-25),⁷ we follow primarily Braverman's argument that fulfillment is enhanced to the degree that a job is challenging and interesting and allows personal growth.⁸ The measures include items that represent psychological rewards obtained directly *from* task performance and not rewards *for* performance (e.g., earnings). In the QES data these items have exhibited high factorial validity (high intercorrelation among the items and low correlation with items that represent other job rewards). The measures comprising the fulfillment scales also are highly correlated ($\bar{X}_r = .479$ and $.561$ in the QES and EEO data, respectively) and internally consistent (coefficients α are $.73$ and $.79$, respectively). In analyses not shown here, we reestimated our regression equations using each item separately, with results entirely consistent with those to be reported.

Other variables.—We used variables that tapped respondents' social

⁷ The condition produced by the absence of fulfillment is similar to but not identical with Marx's (1964) concept of objective alienation, which refers to a worker's inability to own or control the production process, and does not necessarily correspond directly to the subjective measures of alienation used by Seeman (1959) and Kohn (1976). The concept of fulfillment rests heavily on the Marxian assumption that man achieves his human potential through creative, personally meaningful work (Marx 1964). This presupposes a certain definition of man which may not be generally applicable because some people may not value such activities (e.g., Goldthorpe et al. 1968). However, an instrumental view of work (i.e., viewing work primarily as a source of economic and other consumption-related rewards) may, in itself, be a consequence of a lack of fulfillment in that it may be a realistic response of workers to their relative inability to obtain fulfillment through work. It should be noted that we are concerned here with fulfillment from *work*; we are not making the assumption that work experiences necessarily affect feelings of fulfillment with life in general. Finally, we stress that fulfillment represents a type of intrinsic reward from work, not a subjective reaction to work. How individuals react to such rewards is a function of, among other things, their valuation of them (see the discussions in Kalleberg [1977]; Kalleberg and Griffin [1978]).

⁸ The following items were measures of fulfillment. (1) Growth: "I have an opportunity to develop my own special abilities" (QES); "The opportunities for personal growth on my job are poor" (reverse coded: EEO). (2) Challenge: "The problems I am expected to solve are hard enough" (QES); "My work is challenging" (EEO). (3) Interest: "The work is interesting" (QES); "Most of the time, my work is interesting" (EEO). The scale of fulfillment used in each data set represents a linear composite of the three respective items.

background, mental ability, schooling, and postschooling experiences and training. For both surveys we have data on educational attainment, job tenure, and work experience. In addition, for the EEO respondents we have data on status origins (father's occupation and education, mother's education, material possessions, parents' income), academic ability (measured in 1955), and vocational training (on-the-job, apprenticeship, company). These are used for control purposes only and we do not report the coefficients associated with these variables.

ANALYSIS

Class and Job Rewards

Our first analysis assesses the extent to which class differences in job rewards exist when both personal characteristics and occupational position are controlled. To use the three-digit codes, we enter occupational averages on the dependent variable as regressors, a procedure that is equivalent to the analysis of covariance (Kerlinger and Pedhazur 1973) and, thus, yields gross (or upper-bound) estimates of any and all census occupational differences. We can, therefore, assess the general importance of census differentiation rather than just the inequalities associated with particular scalings of these categories. Our estimates of the effects of class, then, will be lower than those reported by Wright and Perrone (1977) because we control for all differences in job rewards among census occupational titles. Finally, because the procedure partitions the variation in variables into their within- and between-occupational components, we also can evaluate the impact of class on rewards within census occupations without fear that such influences are contaminated by differences between these categories.⁹

Method.—Following Wright and Perrone (1977), we assessed class differentials in income (or earnings) by computing a “standardized” income (or earnings) gap, which represents differences in expected and/or observed incomes (or earnings) between the two groups being compared at the level of the independent variables of the most privileged class in our samples—employers (see Althausen and Wigler 1972). All regressors, therefore, are

⁹ Our use of the analysis of covariance assumes homogeneity of regression slopes within occupations, an assumption which we have not formally tested because the sample sizes were too small. We did, however, assess class differences in job rewards within five major occupational groups. These results (presented in tables 2, 3, and 6) cast doubt on the homogeneity assumption, but again small sample sizes even among these major occupational groups preclude a conclusive answer. We should note finally that we also used the analysis of covariance to control for any and all census occupational differences for all of our analyses within major occupational groups (e.g., we controlled for detailed occupational differences within the major group designated as “professionals”) and within sectors.

scaled as deviations from the mean values for the employing class.¹⁰ An analysis of covariance indicated that in both data sets class interacts with many of the personal characteristics and resources of the individual job holders, so in the equations used to compute the income (or earnings) gaps we used interaction terms (e.g., class \times education) and variables that specified the main effects of class and individual characteristics.¹¹

Generally, there were no statistically or substantively important class interactions in the prediction of fulfillment. Therefore, class differences in this job reward are evaluated simply by estimating the main effect of being in one class or another. Managers constitute the suppressed category in these analyses. We present only the standardized regression coefficients here since the fulfillment scales have no inherently meaningful metric. Let us now turn to the empirical results.

Results: economic success.—Table 1 presents the income gaps between employers and managers, between employers and workers, and between managers and workers, as evaluated by several equations. In general, the gaps are more pronounced in the QES data than in the EEO data. This is probably a function of differences in sample composition (the EEO workers, for example, are better educated, work in higher status occupations, and are younger, on the average, than are the QES workers) and in the measurement of our economic reward variable (see discussion above). Nonetheless, we see that the unadjusted differences (column 1) are substantial and in the predicted direction in both data sets; that is, employers have larger incomes (or greater earnings) than either managers or workers, while managers have an economic advantage over workers. Overall, employers' economic rewards are more than one standard deviation (not shown) larger than the workers' rewards.

Our estimates of class-induced economic inequalities do not change much

¹⁰ Since the regression coefficients associated with the remaining explanatory variables (e.g., education, job tenure) differ significantly across classes, the magnitudes of the "standardized gap" depend on the levels of the independent variables at which such between-class differences are being evaluated. While possibly arbitrary, the employer means are substantively meaningful (unlike, e.g., conventional intercepts, which are evaluated at zero values for all regressors), and their use allows us to answer the following important (and plausible) questions: What would the "average" worker or manager earn if his scores on all regressors were identical to those observed for the "average" employer? Is this *expected* attainment level of workers (or managers) significantly different from that of employers?

¹¹ To illustrate this standardization procedure, consider the equation: $\hat{y} = a + b_1 \text{EMP} + b_2 \text{WK} + b_3 \text{ED}' + b_4 \text{EMP} \times \text{ED}' + b_5 \text{WK} \times \text{ED}'$, where EMP and WK represent 0-1 dummy variables, ED' represents the deviation of the respondent's number of years of education from the mean education of employers, and EMP \times ED' and WK \times ED' represent interactions between ED' and the class dummies. Since managers are the omitted category, b_1 and b_2 represent the income gaps between managers and employers and between managers and workers, respectively. The gap between employers and workers may be calculated by a *t*-test for the difference between b_1 and b_2 .

TABLE 1
CLASS DIFFERENCES IN INCOME (QES, $N = 862$) OR EARNINGS (EEO, $N = 707$)

CLASS COMPARISONS	CONTROL VARIABLES															
	(1)None		(2) ^a		(3) ^b		(4) ^c		(5) ^d		(6) ^e		(7) ^f		(8) ^g	
	QES	EEO	QES	EEO	QES	EEO	QES	EEO	QES	EEO	QES	EEO	QES	EEO	QES	EEO
Employers vs. managers...	5,639**	3,225**	4,680**	2,676**	4,634**	2,701**	2,970**	4,479**	2,570**	2,775**	1,987**	1,302***	1,573*			
Employers vs. workers...	8,283**	4,504**	6,784**	3,961**	6,341**	3,946**	3,758**	6,078**	3,464**	3,351**	2,864**	1,387***	1,393***			
Managers vs. workers...	2,644**	1,279**	2,104**	1,285**	1,707**	1,245*	788****	1,599**	894***	576	877***	85	-180			
R ²145	.053	.303	.121	.316	.121	.232	.330	.139	.248	.444	.352	.435			

NOTE.—Variable abbreviations: EMP (Employer); WK (Worker); EDUC (Educational Attainment); EXP (Years of Work Experience); TEN (Length of Job Tenure); TRAIN (Vocational Training); SES (Socioeconomic Status Origins—Father's Occupational Status and Education, Mother's Education, Parental Income, Material Possessions); ABL (Academic Ability); SEI (Duncan's Socioeconomic Index); GED (General Educational Development); SVP (Specific Vocational Preparation). Set 1 variables (EMP, WK, EDUC, EXP, TEN, EMP × EDUC, EMP × EXP, WK × EDUC, WK × EXP, WK × TEN); set 2 variables (EMP, WK, SES, ABL, EDUC, EXP, TEN, TRAIN, EMP × SES, EMP × ABL, EMP × EDUC, EMP × EXP, EMP × TEN, EMP × TRAIN, WK × SES, WK × ABL, WK × EDUC, WK × EXP, WK × TEN, WK × TRAIN).

^a Equation: $\$ = f$ (set 1 variables).

^b Equation: $\$ = f$ (set 1 variables).

^c Equation: $\$ = f$ (SEI plus set 1 variables).

^d Equation: $\$ = f$ (Data, People, Things, GED, SVP plus set 1 variables).

^e Equation: $\$ = f$ (Data, People, Things, GED, SVP plus set 2 variables).

^f Equation: $\$ = f$ (Mean value of \$ for 1970 census occupational titles plus set 1 variables).

^g Equation: $\$ = f$ (Mean value of \$ for 1970 census occupational titles plus set 2 variables).

* $P = < .05$.

** $P = < .01$.

*** $P = < .10$.

**** $P = < .20$.

when we control for differences in job tenure, work experience, or educational attainment which exist across classes (column 2). The addition of occupational status (column 3) or occupational complexity and skill (column 5) to our regression equation only mildly reduces class differences in income or earnings in both the QES and EEO data. Controls for status origins, mental ability, and vocational training, variables which do exert notable effects on economic success (Griffin 1976), reduce the manager-worker difference to nonsignificance in the EEO data (column 6). Even with these extensive controls for a multitude of personal resources and considering *earned* income only, however, the employer-manager gap remains large and significant in the EEO data. These are important points: given that employers and, to a lesser degree, managers are more privileged with respect to almost all of these variables *and* given that the economic returns of these personal characteristics nearly always vary (interact) positively with class position, employers in both data sets receive considerably more money than either managers or workers, while managers, in the QES data, obtain more income than workers.

We have controlled for occupational status and complexity/skill differences across classes, but these are only two dimensions of occupational differentiation and perhaps not the most salient ones for assessing the net effect of class on economic rewards. Roughly 32% (EEO) and 36% (QES) of the variance in earnings (income) lies between census occupations, but status explains only 2% (EEO) and 12% (QES) of the (total) difference, while the complexity/skill measures explain only 5% (EEO) and 13%–14% (QES).¹² Hence, at most a third of the total census occupational differences in earnings or income is captured by either of these measures, and this only for the QES data. It is conceivable, therefore, that unknown and omitted census occupational differences are masquerading as effects of class. The data presented in columns 7 and 8 bear on this issue. There we present estimates of the importance of class after controlling for any and all differences among census categories. We see that the effect of class is reduced substantially but, more important, certain class-based inequalities remain, for the most part, statistically significant and non-trivial. Thus, employers annually receive between \$1,302 (column 7-EEO) and \$1,987 (column 7-QES) more than managers, and between \$1,387 (column 7-EEO) and \$2,864 (column 7-QES) more per year than workers. In both samples, the income gap between employers and workers is greater than one-half of a (worker's) standard deviation, even after netting out all census occupational differences which exist across classes. Similarly,

¹² The zero-order correlation between occupational status and earnings in the EEO data is rather low (.143), but consistent with that observed in Sewell and Eassey's (1975) sample of young Wisconsin men (see also Alexander et al. 1975).

managers generally obtain more income per year than workers, though these differences are more modest than those observed with respect to employers.

Before concluding that employers enjoy greater economic success than managers and workers as a result of ownership and authority, however, we need to consider whether these differences are due to these employers being members of particular occupational groups. It may be argued, for example, that only employers who also are professionals should be financially advantaged with respect to other classes. The data presented in table 2 address this issue. There we estimate income (or earnings) gaps among classes for five major occupational groups; the analyses performed and the occupational groups chosen were influenced by the relatively small sample size. The sizes and significance of the coefficients vary considerably depending on which sample, occupational group, or equation we consider, but, in general, we see that the class differences observed for the full sample also exist within four of the five major occupational groups. In the "Professional," "Managerial," and "Sales, Clerical" occupations, for example, employers generally obtain or earn more income than do the other classes, and managers generally receive greater economic rewards than do workers. (Note that the "worker" class category within the "manager" occupational group refers to the few persons designated as managers by the census classification but having no supervisory responsibilities.) These differences exist, moreover, when very stringent statistical controls are applied, including controls (column 5) for detailed census occupational differences which exist within major occupational groups (see n. 9 above).¹³ While many of the coefficients are not statistically significant, a condition due in large part to the small number of respondents in each group, most of the income or earnings contrasts are large enough to be substantively important and in the predicted direction. Thus, the data presented in table 2 strongly suggest that the financial advantages enjoyed by employers and, to some

¹³ As we noted above, equation specification was influenced by the number of respondents in each major occupational group. For example, there were no employers in the operative occupational group in the QES data, and very few employers in the craft occupations. Thus, we do not assess differences between employers and the other classes with respect to income within craft occupations in tables 2 and 3, given the number of interaction terms used to generate these comparisons. Since we did not use interaction terms in the fulfillment equations, however, we present employer comparisons in table 6, though the manager-worker differences are essentially the same when employers are dropped from the equation. Similarly, there were too few respondents in several of the groups in the EEO data to allow us to control in table 2 and in most of table 3 for the extensive array of personal characteristics represented by the "set 2" variables in table 1. For those groups with enough respondents, we did perform such analyses; the results obtained with these additional controls are quite similar to those presented in table 2. Finally, we want to note that in computing these class differences in income or earnings we used the standardization procedure described above. In the professional category, for example, all scores are scaled as deviations from the mean values of professional employers.

TABLE 2

CLASS DIFFERENCES IN INCOME OR EARNINGS WITHIN MAJOR OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS

CLASS COMPARISONS	CONTROL VARIABLES							
	(1) ^{None}	(2) ^a		(3) ^b		(4) ^b		(5) ^d
	QES	EEO	QES	EEO	QES	EEO	QES	EEO
Professionals (N = 135, QES; 231, EEO)								
EMP vs. MAN.....	8,291**	3,051*	6,237**	1,695	6,466**	1,499	7,064**	2,809***
EMP vs. WK.....	10,388**	4,719**	6,572**	3,567*	6,925**	3,282*	5,662**	3,886*
MAN vs. WK.....	2,097*	1,668**	335	1,872***	459	1,783***	-1,402	1,077
R ²193	.077	.403	.182	.407	.193	.510	.247
Managers (N = 172, QES; 126, EEO)								
EMP vs. MAN.....	4,816**	4,568*	5,160**	4,630*	4,881**	4,668*	4,955**	4,670*
EMP vs. WK.....	8,852**	5,437**	8,966**	6,526**	8,550**	6,554**	8,161**	8,798**
MAN vs. WK.....	4,036	869	3,806	1,896	3,669	1,886	3,843	3,491
R ²080	.074	.302	.238	.304	.238	.308	.282
Sales, Clerical (N = 98, QES; 80, EEO)								
EMP vs. MAN.....	7,391**	4,974*	6,519**	2,378	5,497**	2,278	4,479**	2,446
EMP vs. WK.....	8,741**	4,875**	8,110**	3,261**	6,776**	3,129**	6,241**	3,190**
MAN vs. WK.....	1,350	-99	1,591	883	1,279	849	1,762	744
R ²195	.075	.458	.394	.522	.400	.543	.473
Crafts (N = 189, QES; 141, EEO)								
MAN vs. WK.....	1,400**	885****	1,122*	880****	819	1,098***	1,670**	1,386*
R ²037	.020	.124	.062	.139	.075	.167	.115
Operatives (N = 146, QES; 66, EEO)								
MAN vs. WK.....	-57	-1,686****	548	-1,811****	520	-1,696	767	-1,494
R ²00005	.035	.132	.069	.134	.075	.204	.128

NOTE.—Variable abbreviations: EMP (Employer); WK (Worker); MAN (Manager). Set 1 variables (EMP, WK, EDUC, EXP, TEN, EMP × EDUC, EMP × EXP, EMP × TEN, WK × EDUC, WK × EXP, WK × TEN).

^a Equation: $\$ = f$ (set 1 variables).

^b Equation: $\$ = f$ (SEI plus set 1 variables).

^d Equation: $\$ = f$ (Mean value of $\$$ for 1970 census occupational titles plus set 1 variables).

* $P < .05$. ** $P < .01$. *** $P < .01$. **** $P < .20$.

^e Equation: $\$ = f$ (Data, People, Things, GED, SVP plus set 1 variables).

extent, by managers are not limited to a select group of individuals who happen also to be highly paid professionals; indeed, the class differences appear to be distributed throughout most of the occupational structure.

While most of the results presented thus far are impressively consistent across data sets, the inferences to be drawn from the EEO and QES samples do occasionally diverge on one important point, that being the manager-worker earnings differences: overall, these gaps are generally larger in the QES data. Such discrepancies across the two samples are probably a function of at least two identifiable factors: (1) The economic success measure contained in the EEO survey is, as we noted above, annual *earnings*, while in the QES data it is annual *income* (including unearned income). The QES managers may enjoy some unearned income advantages not shared by workers (see Blumberg [1978] for a discussion). Unfortunately, we lack comparable data to test this speculation. (2) The managers in the EEO sample are quite young (as are all of the men—about 30 years of age) and they may have not yet reached a point in their careers where they occupy relatively highly rewarded managerial positions. Once again data limitations preclude a direct test, but we can present some indirect evidence pertinent to this hypothesis.

Our working assumption is that many EEO managers, because of their youth, actually occupy nominal managerial positions; they may be simply supervisors or foremen and, therefore, exercise little, if any, real organizational authority. Even among the pool of relatively young managers, however, some may actually exercise managerial duties and these “real” managers may earn more than workers because of their occupancy in “real” authority positions. The EEO survey (but not the QES data) fortunately contains additional information which can be used to tap organizational authority and, therefore, to make finer distinctions between managers and workers. Organizational authority was assessed by two questions measuring “opportunities for making policy decisions” and “exercising leadership” in one’s job. Four response alternatives, ranging from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree,” were provided for each item. We redefine as *managers* those individuals who, in addition to having supervisory functions, also agree or strongly agree to *both* of the above statements. If the respondent stated that he supervised the work activities of others but did not agree that he made policy decisions *and* exercised leadership, he was reclassified as a worker.¹⁴ Our operationalization, therefore, assumes that managers (as

¹⁴ We also performed all analyses reported in tables 1 and 5 with four classes: employers, managers, workers, and supervisors. Supervisors were defined as individuals who supervised the labor power of others but did not report that they exercised administrative authority. Our analysis suggested that supervisors and (redefined) workers could be collapsed into a single category with no loss of essential information, a finding quite similar to that reported by Wright (1978a). Finally, we assessed the impact of supervisory status within the working class and found no main or interaction effects

we have redefined them) actually make decisions about the day-to-day activities of the enterprise as well as simply supervise the labor of others; this categorization probably more accurately taps the reality of managerial authority in capitalist firms (e.g., Galbraith 1967) and does reduce the number of men classified (in the EEO data) as managers from 361 to 242.

Table 3 presents the results we obtain with these redefined managers and workers. Not unexpectedly, given the greater authority possessed by these managers, the employer-manager earnings differences are reduced, but they are still quite consistent with those previously reported. And, as predicted, the earnings gaps between managers and workers are notably increased in the total sample and several of the major occupational groups (compare table 3 with tables 1 and 2). We note, however, that the earnings differences are altered only trivially for the professional and managerial occupational groups. This finding may suggest that the job activities performed by nonemployers in these relatively demanding and skilled occupations override the earnings consequences of their incumbency in organizational authority positions. Alternatively, it may be in these types of occupations that managerial perquisites not reflected in our earnings measure are most pronounced (see Blumberg 1978). Again, data limitations preclude us from adjudicating between these explanations. In any case, however, the general increase in the estimates of earnings differentials between managers and workers probably reflects the superiority of the organizational authority measure (when compared with the simple index of supervisory status) for capturing the economic rewards associated with actual managerial roles in production systems.

We argued earlier that the social organization of work should be comparable in capitalist and noncapitalist organizations and that class differences in income or earnings, therefore, should be observed in both sectors. Sector distinctions for the EEO data are based on a question tapping the respondent's employment situs. Noncapitalist employees are men working in educational or nonprofit research organizations, hospitals, social agencies, and federal, state, and local government bureaucracies. These categories include all possible noncapitalist employment locations ascertainable with these data. The capitalist sector includes self-employed individuals and those employed by family business, small private business, and large firms

worth reporting. We should note that we experimented with a variety of scalings and specifications of the policy decision and leadership items before deciding to use them as stated in the text. None of the alternative specifications produced results very different from those reported here. We used the items as we did because this specification generated the smallest number of managers, a condition which we believe best approximates the relatively centralized authority structures of most organizations.

TABLE 3
CLASS DIFFERENCES IN EARNINGS FOR TOTAL SAMPLE AND WITHIN MAJOR
OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS (Managers Redefined), EEO

CLASS COMPARISONS	CONTROL VARIABLES						
	(1) ^a	(2) ^b	(3) ^b	(4) ^c	(5) ^d	(6) ^e	(8) ^f
	Total Sample						
EMP vs. MAN.....	2,885**	2,141**	2,169**	2,470**	2,124*	2,369**	1,124****
EMP vs. WK.....	4,337**	3,921**	3,913**	3,855**	3,515**	3,516**	1,545****
MAN vs. WK.....	1,452**	1,780**	1,744**	1,385*	1,391*	1,147***	1,621***
R ²057	.128	.128	.235	.147	.252	.433
	Professionals						
EMP vs. MAN.....	2,853***	1,507	1,415	...	2,480***	...	592
EMP vs. WK.....	4,443*	3,338*	3,075*	...	3,882*	...	1,118
MAN vs. WK.....	1,590*	1,831***	1,660***	...	1,402***	...	526
R ²070	.195	.203257563

Note.—Variable abbreviations: EMP (Employer); WK (Worker); EDUC (Educational Attainment); EXP (Years of Work Experience); TEN (Length of Job Tenure); TRAIN (Vocational Training); SES (Socioeconomic Status Origins—Father's Occupational Status and Education, Mother's Education, Parental Income, Material Possessions); ABL (Academic Ability); SEI (Duncan's Socioeconomic Index); GED (General Educational Development); SVP (Specific Vocational Preparation). Set 1 variables (EMP, WK, EDUC, EXP, TEN, EMP × EDUC, EMP × EXP, EMP × TEN, WK × EDUC, WK × EXP, WK × TEN); set 2 variables (EMP, WK, SES, ABL, EDUC, EXP, TEN, TRAIN, EMP × SES, EMP × ABL, EMP × EDUC, EMP × EXP, EMP × TEN, EMP × TRAIN, WK × SES, WK × ABL, WK × EDUC, WK × EXP, WK × TEN, WK × TRAIN).

^a Equation: \$ = f (set 1 variables).

^b Equation: \$ = f (SEI plus set 1 variables).

^c Equation: \$ = f (SEI plus set 2 variables).

^d Equation: \$ = f (Data, People, Things, GED, SVP plus set 1 variables).

^e Equation: \$ = f (Data, People, Things, GED, SVP plus set 2 variables).

^f Equation: \$ = f (Mean value of \$ for 1970 census occupational titles plus set 1 variables).

^g Equation: \$ = f (Mean value of \$ for 1970 census occupational titles plus set 2 variables).

* P = <.05.

** P = <.01.

*** P = <.10.

**** P = <.20.

TABLE 3 (Continued)

CLASS COMPARISONS	CONTROL VARIABLES							
	(1) ^{None}	(2) ^a	(3) ^b	(4) ^c	(5) ^d	(6) ^e	(7) ^f	(8) ^g
Managers								
EMP vs. MAN.....	4,471*	4,496*	4,392*	...	4,545*	...	4,257*	...
EMP vs. WK.....	5,081**	5,548**	5,455**	...	5,696**	...	4,533**	...
MAN vs. WK.....	.610	1,052	1,063	...	1,151	...	276	...
R ²074	.231	.231275285	...
Sales, Clerical								
EMP vs. MAN.....	4,505***	1,085	1,104	...	1,158	...	-130	...
EMP vs. WK.....	5,137**	3,434**	3,340**	...	3,472**	...	1,994**	...
MAN vs. WK.....	.632	2,349	2,236	...	2,314	...	2,124	...
R ²080	.360	.362432465	...
Crafts								
MAN vs. WK.....	1,081***	1,184***	1,460*	...	1,626*	...	730****	...
R ²027	.091	.106139220	...
Operatives								
MAN vs. WK.....	-782	-1,164	-1,221	...	-1,673	...	-724	...
R ²002	.036	.045101128	...

or corporations. For the QES data, sector distinctions were based on 1960 detailed census industry codes. Noncapitalist employees are those working in the following industries: local, state, and federal public administration (codes 906–36), public utilities (codes 567, 568, and 569) and health services, hospitals, welfare and religious services, legal services, and educational services (codes 867–88). Despite the differences in criteria used to distinguish noncapitalist from capitalist sectors in the two data sets, the criteria are similar substantively and lead to similar results.¹⁵

In table 4 we present income and earnings gaps between managers and workers in the noncapitalist sector and gaps among employers, managers, and workers in the capitalist sector. (For the EEO data both definitions of manager are used.) As expected, the manager-worker gaps are pronounced in the noncapitalist as well as in the capitalist sector. These gaps are larger in the capitalist sector in the QES data, reflecting perhaps the greater opportunities managers in that sector have to obtain unearned income. However, the manager-worker earnings gap is greater in the noncapitalist sector when the more restrictive definition of managers is used (EEO data). These results support our argument that the class differences in economic rewards are not confined to the capitalist sector of production but that they also characterize noncapitalist employees.

The results thus far presented—which are based on very stringent statistical controls (e.g., for numerous personal resources and for any and all census occupational compositional differences),¹⁶ analyses within major occupational categories and by sector, and the use of earned income only in the EEO data—all appreciably strengthen and extend Wright's (1978a; Wright and Perrone 1977) conclusions about class membership and economic inequality. These data are also consistent with the notion that such inequalities stem from differences in control over the economic surplus pro-

¹⁵ It is theoretically possible for individuals in the noncapitalist sector to occupy positions of control comparable to those occupied by employers in the capitalist sector e.g., bourgeois locations [Wright 1978b]), but we are not able to make this distinction with these data. We must therefore assume that the noncapitalist portion of the managerial class does not include such bourgeois members.

¹⁶ It should be emphasized that our estimates of class differences when the occupational indicators are controlled are extremely conservative. If occupational differentiation serves to *transmit* the influence of class on job rewards (for the plausibility of this, see Braverman [1974]), our estimates of the direct effects of class (i.e., when occupation is controlled) are downwardly biased estimates of the total effects of class. Estimation of a model which posits occupation as intervening between class and rewards would yield reduced-form class estimates (i.e., direct *and* indirect through occupation) considerably higher than those reported in columns 3–8 of table 1. This potential specification problem is exacerbated when the detailed census occupational titles are used because, as we noted above, they contain elements of class.

TABLE 4

CLASS DIFFERENCES IN INCOME OR EARNINGS WITHIN CAPITALIST AND NONCAPITALIST SECTORS

CLASS COMPARISONS	CONTROL VARIABLES									
	(1)None		(2) ^a		(3) ^b		(4) ^c		(5) ^d	
	QES	EEO	QES	EEO	QES	EEO	QES	EEO	QES	EEO
Noncapitalist Sector (N = 139, QES; 163, EEO)										
Managers vs. workers . . .	1,796*	828***	1,796*	1,045***	1,795*	1,038***	1,215*	773***	855***	192
R ²033	.014	.200	.170	.221	.170	.266	.197	.293	.629
057209209	.284	.235	.308	.633
										.694
Capitalist Sector (N = 648, QES; 544, EEO)										
Employers vs. managers . .	5,568**	3,033**	3,795**	2,231*	3,707**	2,260*	2,600**	3,575**	2,263*	1,159***
	. . .	2,775**	. . .	1,762***	. . .	1,801***	2,214*	. . .	2,036*	957
Employers vs. workers . . .	8,421**	4,268**	6,647**	3,528**	5,922**	3,507**	3,277*	5,693**	3,140**	1,247***
	. . .	4,021**	. . .	3,392**	. . .	3,375**	3,394**	. . .	2,996**	1,496***
Managers vs. workers . . .	2,853**	1,235*	2,852**	1,297***	2,215**	1,247***	677	2,118**	1,120***	759
R ²155	.044	.333	.121	.349	.121	.241	.359	.138	.292
049126127	.238259	.334
									.257	.425
										.427

NOTE.—First line of entries under "EEO" represents definitions of "worker" and "manager," respectively, that are consistent with QES definitions; second line represents results obtained when the alternate definition of "managers" is used. Variable abbreviations: EMP (Employer); WK (Worker); EDUC (Educational Attainment); EXP (Years of Work Experience); TEN (Length of Job Tenure); TRAIN (Vocational Training); SES (Socioeconomic Status Origins—Father's Occupational Status and Education, Mother's Education, Parental Income, Material Possessions); ABL (Academic Ability); SES (Duncan's Socioeconomic Index); GED (General Educational Development); SVP (Specific Vocational Preparation); Set 1 variables (EMP, WK, EDUC, EXP, TEN, EMP × EDUC, EMP × EXP, EMP × TEN, WK × EDUC, WK × EXP, WK × TEN); set 2 variables (EMP, WK, SES, ABL, EDUC, EXP, TEN, TRAIN, EMP × SES, EMP × ABL, EMP × EDUC, EMP × EXP, EMP × TEN, EMP × TRAIN, WK × SES, WK × EDUC, WK × EXP, WK × TEN, WK × TRAIN).

^a Equation: $\$ = f$ (set 1 variables).

^b Equation: $\$ = f$ (SEI plus set 1 variables).

^c Equation: $\$ = f$ (SEI plus set 2 variables).

^d Equation: $\$ = f$ (Data, People, Things, GED, SVP plus set 1 variables).

^e Equation: $\$ = f$ (Data, People, Things, GED, SVP plus set 2 variables).

^f Equation: $\$ = f$ (Mean value of \$ for 1970 census occupational titles plus set 1 variables).

^g Equation: $\$ = f$ (Mean value of \$ for 1970 census occupational titles plus set 2 variables).

* $P = < .05$.

** $P = < .01$.

*** $P = < .10$.

**** $P = < .20$.

duced by the enterprise, a condition most favorable to employers and, somewhat more tentatively and less dramatically, to managers.¹⁷

Results: fulfillment.—We have now documented the economic advantage or liability accruing to different classes. We also hypothesized that inequalities in the degree to which one's job allows fulfillment should exist between classes. The data presented in table 5 suggest that this is, indeed, the observed pattern. Compared with managers (the suppressed category in this analysis), employers report that their jobs are more fulfilling while workers perceive that their jobs are less likely to help them achieve this valued reward. Class differences are maintained as we control for personal characteristics (column 2), occupational status (columns 3 and 4), and occupational complexity/skill (columns 5 and 6). Even when we control for all differences among census occupational categories, a procedure that yields an extremely conservative assessment of class position due to the artifactual relationship between class and census titles, both data sets still show that workers experience less fulfillment than managers (columns 7 and 8). Furthermore, the EEO data suggest that employers obtain greater fulfillment than managers even when this stringent statistical control is used.

We again performed the analyses within the five major occupational groups to see whether these results were limited to particular occupational categories (see table 6). Once again, the estimates of class inequalities vary by sample, occupational group, and equation specification, but the overall pattern is fairly consistent throughout the occupational structure; the reductions in sample sizes, of course, decrease the statistical significance of these coefficients. While the relationships tend to be larger in the QES data, a fact probably due to sample differences since the measurement of fulfillment was similar in both surveys, the QES and EEO analyses agree on essential points: employers experience more fulfillment from work than do the other classes, and managers generally perceive their jobs to be more fulfilling than do workers.¹⁸ These results are consistent with the Marxian

¹⁷ These class differences in income (or earnings) may be affected by fluctuations in the business cycle and therefore could be greater or smaller if the surveys had been conducted in other years. There are sizable annual variations in the share of national income accruing to labor and capital. The QES survey was taken in 1972–73, the best year for capital since 1969. The EEO survey was administered in 1970, a somewhat less advantageous year for capital (see U.S. Department of Commerce [1977]). These variations in macro-economic outcomes are quite consistent with the differing estimates of employer economic advantages as registered in two surveys, with the QES employers obtaining relatively greater economic advantages than the EEO employers.

¹⁸ In order to assess whether the generally smaller differences between managers and workers observed in the EEO data may be due to the weakness of the authority measure used to differentiate these two groups, we once again estimated these equations using the alternative indicators of manager and worker described above. As expected, the differences in fulfillment between managers and workers (and employers and workers) increase and are generally statistically significant in spite of the relatively small

thesis that membership in a subordinate class reduces one's opportunity for personal fulfillment through work. Workers are objectively alienated by virtue of their lack of ownership of the means of production and their lack of authority over how their work activities are structured; it is not surprising, then, that they find their jobs relatively unfulfilling (cf. Braverman 1974; Bowles and Gintis 1975; Gordon 1972*a*; 1972*b*).¹⁹

We also note that the differences in fulfillment between managers and workers are not restricted to employees of capitalist firms (see table 7). The results indicate that workers in the noncapitalist sector experience considerably less fulfillment than managers, and in some cases the differences are greater in the noncapitalist than in the capitalist sector. This class difference thus appears to be insensitive to whether or not these men are employed by profit-making employers, a finding consistent with our previous arguments regarding similarities in the organization of work in capitalist and noncapitalist sectors.²⁰

sample sizes. Workers report considerably less fulfillment from work than members of the other classes, even when stringent statistical controls for personal characteristics and a variety of occupational differences are introduced. This is the case even for the operatives category, an occupational group in which workers obtained greater earnings than managers in the EEO data. This result suggests that while workers in this category may be able to organize to obtain greater economic rewards than managers, such efforts do not provide them with greater noneconomic rewards such as control over the structure of their work activity (see Salpukas 1974). This analysis also indicated that the employer-manager difference in fulfillment has been reduced, which is consistent with the greater authority possessed by managers as we have redefined them. Nevertheless, these differences continue to be in the predicted direction in both the total sample and in each of the four major occupational groups analyzed.

¹⁹ We noted earlier that the within-census occupation variation in complexity may imply that occupational complexity has not been adequately controlled. This is compounded by differences in the measurement of class and occupational complexity: the former is based on direct statements by the respondent while the latter is based on scores assigned to an occupational title. To assess partially the consequences of this, we reestimated our models that used occupational measures (i.e., columns 4, 6, and 8 in tables 1 and 5) and included six indicators of the respondent's perceptions of the hours per day spent working with things, paperwork, ideas, and people and of the degree to which work is routine (EEO data only). These are thus direct measures of the nature of the occupational activity similar to those used by Kohn (1976; Kohn and Schooler 1973). For earnings, we find that the inclusion of these direct occupation measures increases slightly the employer-manager and the employer-worker gaps and decreases slightly the manager-worker gaps. For fulfillment, similar but more pronounced patterns are observed, reflecting the fact that complexity has a stronger relationship to fulfillment than to earnings. We conclude from this analysis that, at least for complexity, our use of census and DOT level measures provides a reasonable control for this dimension of occupation in assessing the effects of class.

²⁰ We also reestimated our equations in tables 4 and 7 using a definition of noncapitalist sector that includes only employees of state, local, and federal governments. In the QES data, the income gaps between managers and workers were generally greater than those reported in table 4 and the manager-worker differences were in all cases greater than those presented in table 7. In the EEO data, similar patterns are observed. Thus, the class differences reported in this paper exist even when a very narrow definition of the noncapitalist sector is used.

TABLE 5
CLASS DIFFERENCES IN FULFILLMENT (Standardized Coefficients)

CLASS CATEGORIES	CONTROL VARIABLES											
	(1) ^{None}		(2) ^a		(3) ^b		(4) ^c		(5) ^d		(6) ^e	
	QES	EEO	QES	EEO	QES	EEO	QES	EEO	QES	EEO	QES	EEO
Employers	.134**	.122**	.116**	.107*	.112**	.119**	.122**	.088*	.074*	.094*	.007	.064***
Workers...	-.286**	-.147**	-.258**	-.143**	-.191**	-.103*	-.089*	-.116**	-.156**	-.104*	-.120**	-.051***
R ²127	.045	.149	.075	.205	.111	.123	.148	.240	.160	.481	.438

NOTE.—In this analysis managers are the suppressed category. Variable abbreviations: EMP (Employer); WK (Worker); EDUC (Educational Attainment); EXP (Years of Work Experience); TEN (Length of Job Tenure); TRAIN (Vocational Training); SES (Socioeconomic Status Origin—Father's Occupational Status and Education, Mother's Education, Parental Income, Material Possessions); ABL (Academic Ability); SEI (Duncan's Socioeconomic Index); GED (General Educational Development); SVP (Specific Vocational Preparation).

^a Equation: F = f (EMP, WK, EDUC, EXP, TEN).

^b Equation: F = f (EMP, WK, EDUC, EXP, TEN, SEI).

^c Equation: F = f (EMP, WK, SES, ABL, EDUC, EXP, TEN, TRAIN, SEI).

^d Equation: F = f (EMP, WK, EDUC, EXP, TEN, Data, People, Things, GED, SVP).

^e Equation: F = f (EMP, WK, SES, ABL, EDUC, EXP, TEN, TRAIN, Data, People, Things, GED, SVP).

^f Equation: F = f (EMP, WK, EDUC, EXP, TEN, occupational mean on dependent variable).

^g Equation: F = f (EMP, WK, SES, ABL, EDUC, EXP, TEN, TRAIN, occupational mean on dependent variable).

* P = <.05.

** P = <.01.

*** P = <.10.

**** P = <.20.

TABLE 6
CLASS DIFFERENCES IN FULFILLMENT WITHIN MAJOR OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS (Standardized Coefficients)

CLASS CATEGORIES	CONTROL VARIABLES							
	(1)None	(2) ^a		(3) ^b		(4) ^c		(5) ^d
	QES	EEO	QES	EEO	QES	EEO	QES	EEO
Professionals								
Employer.....	.156***	.087	.164***	.057	.151***	.054	.119	.006
Worker.....	-.162***	-.073	-.153***	-.082	-.148***	-.083	-.181***	-.184*
R ²065	.015	.080	.026	.084	.026	.124	.092
Managers								
Employer.....	.218**	.116	.234**	.082	.216**	.138	.254**	.046
Worker.....	-.216**	-.108	-.210**	-.177	-.211**	-.167	-.190*	-.132
R ²116	.028	.126	.108	.129	.132	.132	.140
Sales, Clerical								
Employer.....	.111	.209***	.091	.224***	.035	.212***	-.037	.285***
Worker.....	-.349**	-.234***	-.315**	-.141	-.285**	-.133	-.329**	-.289
R ²166	.121	.207	.254	.287	.279	.362	.441
Crafts								
Employer.....	.038	.093	.016	.096	.022	.113	.008	.121***
Worker.....	-.219**	-.087	-.206**	-.053	-.182*	.010	-.229**	-.060
R ²052	.019	.067	.046	.073	.066	.134	.077
Operatives								
Worker.....	.039	-.112	.047	-.051	.061	-.070	.003	-.051
R ²002	.013	.096	.116	.122	.128	.163	.359

Note.—In this analysis managers are the suppressed category. Variable abbreviations: EMP (Employer), WK (Worker), EDUC (Educational Attainment); EXP (Years of Work Experience); TEN (Length of Job Tenure); SEI (Duncan's Socioeconomic Index); GED (General Educational Development); SVP (Specific Vocational Preparation).

^a Equation: $F = f(\text{EMP, WK, EDUC, EXP, TEN})$.

^b Equation: $F = f(\text{EMP, WK, EDUC, EXP, TEN, SEI})$.

^c Equation: $F = f(\text{EMP, WK, EDUC, EXP, TEN, Data, People, Things, GED, SVP})$.

^d Equation: $F = f(\text{EMP, WK, EDUC, EXP, TEN, occupational mean on dependent variable})$.

* $P < .05$. ** $P < .01$. *** $P < .001$. **** $P < .20$.

TABLE 7
CLASS DIFFERENCES IN FULFILLMENT WITHIN CAPITALIST AND NONCAPITALIST SECTORS

CLASS COMPARISONS	CONTROL VARIABLES									
	(1) None	(2) ^a		(3) ^b		(4) ^c		(5) ^d		(3) ^e
	QES	EEO	QES	EEO	QES	EEO	EEO	QES	EEO	EEO
Noncapitalist Sector										
Workers.....	-.260**	-.157***	-.268**	-.171*	-.262**	-.165***	-.141***	-.199**	-.191*	-.182*
R ²068	.242**	...	-.246**	...	-.241**	-.232**	...	-.250**	-.252**
025	.110	.081	.181	.083	.116	.319	.159	.194
059111113	.148181	.221
										.579
										.594
Capitalist Sector										
Employers...	.162**	.156**	.142**	.137**	.135**	.153**	.165**	.097**	.119*	.133*
072***057077***	.087***055	.066***
Workers.....	-.288**	-.178***	-.267**	-.161**	-.187**	-.103*	-.089***	-.160**	-.101*	-.091***
R ²147	.369**	...	-.359**303**	-.306**	...	-.304**	-.312**
069	.161	.080	.210	.130	.149	.240	.158	.177
159166194	.215219	.242
										.436
										.460
										.465

NOTE.—In this analysis managers are the suppressed category. First line of entries under "EEO" represents definitions of "worker" and "manager," respectively, that are consistent with QES definitions; second line represents results obtained when the alternate definition of "managers" is used. Variable abbreviations: EMP (Employer); WK (Worker); EDUC (Educational Attainment); EXP (Years of Work Experience); TEN (Length of Job Tenure); TRAIN (Vocational Training); SES (Socioeconomic Status Origins—Father's Occupational Status and Education, Mother's Education, Parental Income, Material Possessions); ABL (Academic Ability); SEI (Duncan's Socioeconomic Index); GED (General Educational Development); SVP (Specific Vocational Preparation).

^a Equation: F = f (EMP, WK, EDUC, EXP, TEN).

^b Equation: F = f (EMP, WK, EDUC, EXP, TEN, SEI).

^c Equation: F = f (EMP, WK, SES, ABL, EDUC, EXP, TEN, TRAIN, SEI).

^d Equation: F = f (EMP, WK, EDUC, EXP, TEN, Data, People, Things, GED, SVP).

^e Equation: F = f (EMP, WK, SES, ABL, EDUC, EXP, TEN, TRAIN, Data, People, Things, GED, SVP).

^f Equation: F = f (EMP, WK, EDUC, EXP, TEN, occupational mean on dependent variable).

^g Equation: F = f (EXP, WK, SES, ABL, EDUC, EXP, TEN, TRAIN, occupational mean on dependent variable).

* P = <.05.

** P = <.01.

*** P = <.10.

**** P = <.20.

The results concerning both economic success and fulfillment are perhaps more striking when we consider the organizational and occupational compositions of the various classes. All of our employers may be designated as small employers because they employ fewer than 50 persons (e.g., Wright 1976). Thus, we are not comparing the rewards of owners of large corporations, which would be markedly higher than those obtained for employers in these data, with those of other classes. Additionally, about half of the individuals in the managerial class as originally defined are actually bottom-line managers or foremen and supervisors, a condition which operates to reduce the job reward disparities between managers and workers. We should note, finally, that members of the working class, as we originally defined that social group in this paper, are not limited to lower-status blue-collar or industrial workers. Roughly 30%–40% of the men labeled as working-class are professional, technical, and kindred workers or clerical and sales workers. Were we to contrast the rewards of the employing and managerial classes with those obtained by the industrial proletariat, class induced inequalities in work rewards would be much larger than those reported here.

We have interpreted these effects of class in Marxian terms, but there is at least one other explanation for the observed patterns. The functional theory of inequality (e.g., Davis and Moore 1945) might suggest that the reward differences encourage employers (and, to a smaller extent, managers) to perform the necessary capitalist functions of risk taking, technological innovation, and production organization. We argue that these perspectives are not necessarily inconsistent (see Stinchcombe [1968] for a discussion of Marxian functionalism) and, in fact, believe that *both* are operative to an unknown degree. That is, employers may actually exploit the working class, but the benefits from such exploitation may (1) induce individuals to become employers and (2) provide the incentives to employers to behave in ways which stimulate economic growth and well-being. The utility of the Marxian view, we argue, is its potential for explaining theoretically, within the context of a market economy, *why* there are particular economic and noneconomic consequences associated with production roles deemed more or less functionally important by a capitalist society.

While we cannot here adjudicate empirically between Marxist and functionalist views of inequality, we can state that the class differences in income cannot be reduced to the additive effects of ownership and authority. The economic advantages accruing to those who only exercise organizational authority (i.e., managers) are, at best, modest (cf. the relatively small differences in income or earnings observed for managers vs. workers). Similarly, we have documented elsewhere that ownership in the absence of authority (i.e., the petty bourgeois) yields no financial benefits beyond those enjoyed by the working class (Kalleberg and Griffin 1978). It is the *interaction* of ownership and authority which produces the largest economic

advantages, and this is central to a Marxian conception of the effects of class.

Occupation and Job Rewards

The Marxist class categories are necessary but not sufficient for explaining the positional sources of inequality in economic and noneconomic work outcomes: occupational differentiation also affects these job rewards independently of class. Tables 8 and 9 show that considerable variation in both rewards lies between census occupational titles, even after controlling for class and a variety of characteristics of individuals. Interestingly, earnings or income appears to be less dependent on occupational position than is fulfillment. Several researchers have offered interpretations of the net relationships between occupations and rewards (see, e.g., Bielby and Kalleberg 1977; Form and Huber 1976; Stolzenberg 1975), but limitations in our data prevent us from evaluating them here. However, we are certain that occupational status is not the major explanation for these inequalities; even before other variables are controlled, SEI accounts for only 2%–12% of the variation in rewards (tables 8 and 9, column 1). Thus, status captures, at most, only about a third of the total variance among census occupations, and this only for the QES income data. And at most about a quarter of the variation in fulfillment which lies between census titles can be explained by Duncan's SEI measure. Occupational status may be a reward of work (e.g., Blau and Duncan 1967), perhaps because it indicates the prestige of occupational incumbents, but it is a poor proxy for either income (or earnings) or intrinsic work rewards such as fulfillment.

Furthermore, occupational differences in these rewards are not explicable primarily by the complexity of the occupational activity and its associated skill requirements. Our five variables representing complexity and skill levels of census occupations account for only about 35% of the total variance in income (QES), and a maximum of 43% of the variance in fulfillment (QES), that lies between census occupations (tables 8 and 9, column 1). The effects of complexity and skill on economic rewards are consistent with a neoclassical economic interpretation (e.g., Stolzenberg 1975), while their effects on fulfillment may be explained by the positive relationship between complex work and the ability of workers to exercise self-direction, a condition that leads to fulfillment (e.g., Kohn 1976; Kohn and Schooler 1973). These explanations are totally consistent with our results, though it is clear that they are only partial reasons for why occupations vary in these rewards.

In tables 8 and 9 we also present estimates of occupational differences in job rewards within each of the three classes. We see that considerable variation in both rewards lies between census occupational titles in all three

TABLE 8
PROPORTIONS OF VARIATION IN INCOME OR EARNINGS EXPLAINED BY
OCCUPATIONAL MEASURES (Total Sample and Class Groups)

OCCUPATIONAL MEASURE	CONTROL VARIABLES						
	(1)None		(2) ^a		(3) ^b		(4) ^c
	QES	EEO	QES	EEO	QES	EEO	EEO
Total Sample ^{d,e}							
1970 census occupation titles....	.361	.320	.222	.273	.135	.235	.210
SEI.....	.115	.020	.065	.009	.014	.001	.000
Complexity/skill ^f128	.049	.061	.031	.018	.018	.019
Complexity/skill.....	.141080	.029	.027	.018	.017
Workers ^d							
1970 census occupation titles....	.603	.488421	.441	.391
SEI.....	.119	.001025	.000	.000
Complexity/skill ^f126	.029049	.028	.028
Complexity/skill.....	.134	.045053	.038	.038
Managers ^e							
1970 census occupation titles....	.414	.375283	.321	.284
SEI.....	.086	.024006	.004	.001
Complexity/skill ^f112	.077037	.080	.066
Complexity/skill.....	.142	.059048	.088	.059
Employers							
1970 census occupation titles....	.203	.467104	.434	.192
SEI.....	.066	.053036	.031	.076
Complexity/skill ^f084	.227061	.270	.133
Complexity/skill.....	.101053

NOTE.—Variable abbreviations: EMP (Employer); WK (Worker); EDUC (Educational Attainment); EXP (Years of Work Experience); TEN (Length of Job Tenure); TRAIN (Vocational Training); SES (Socio-economic Status Origins—Father's Occupational Status and Education, Mother's Education, Parental Income, Material Possessions); ABL (Academic Ability); SEI (Duncan's Socioeconomic Index).

^a Controls are: EMP, WK.

^b Controls are: EMP, WK, EDUC, EXP, TEN, EMP × EDUC, EMP × EXP, EMP × TEN, WK × EDUC, WK × EXP, WK × TEN.

^c Controls are: EMP, WK, SES, ABL, EDUC, EXP, TEN, TRAIN, EMP × SES, EMP × ABL, EMP × EDUC, EMP × EXP, EMP × TEN, EMP × TRAIN, WK × SES, WK × ABL, WK × EDUC, WK × EXP, WK × TEN, WK × TRAIN.

^d First line of entries under EEO represents definitions of worker and manager, respectively, that are consistent with QES definitions (see text for details).

^e Second line of entries under EEO represents results obtained when the alternate definition of manager is used (see text for details).

^f First line of entries under QES represents complexity/skill measures aggregated to the level of 1970 census occupation categories; second line represents results obtained when complexity/skill measures assigned to DOT occupations are used (see n. 6 for details).

TABLE 9
PROPORTIONS OF VARIATION IN FULFILLMENT EXPLAINED BY OCCUPATIONAL
MEASURES (Total Sample and Class Groups)

OCCUPATIONAL MEASURE	CONTROL VARIABLES						
	(1)None		(2) ^a		(3) ^b		(4) ^c
	QES	EEO	QES	EEO	QES	EEO	EEO
Total Sample ^{d,e}							
1970 census occupation titles....	.453	.424	.343	.389	.333	.363	.360
SEI.....	.122	.074	.065	.336	.056	.312	.310
Complexity/skill ^f194	.117	.104	.063	.098	.036	.040
Complexity/skill.....	.195105	.044	.095	.020	.024
				.098		.073	.077
				.077		.053	.057
Workers ^d							
1970 census occupation titles....	.546	.608531	.543	.519
SEI.....	.090	.556083	.504	.497
Complexity/skill ^f145	.084145	.024	.026
Complexity/skill.....	.145	.063139	.017	.022
		.165104	.103
		.136087	.089
Managers ^e							
1970 census occupation titles....	.514	.437485	.416	.422
SEI.....	.081	.355062	.338	.348
Complexity/skill ^f120	.034096	.016	.015
Complexity/skill.....	.131	.017108	.003	.003
		.089067	.068
		.061042	.047
Employers							
1970 census occupation titles....	.139	.374149	.325	.292
SEI.....	.015	.040016	.041	.052
Complexity/skill ^f044	.078059	.046	.084
Complexity/skill.....	.055058

NOTE.—Variable abbreviations: EMP (Employer); WK (Worker); EDUC (Educational Attainment); EXP (Years of Work Experience); TEN (Length of Job Tenure); TRAIN (Vocational Training); SES (Socioeconomic Status Origins—Father's Occupational Status and Education, Mother's Education, Parental Income, Material Possessions); ABL (Academic Ability); SEI (Duncan's Socioeconomic Index); GED (General Educational Development); SVP (Specific Vocational Preparation).

^a Controls are: EMP, WK.

^b Controls are: EMP, WK, EDUC, EXP, TEN.

^c Controls are: EMP, WK, SES, ABL, EDUC, EXP, TEN, TRAIN.

^d First line of entries under EEO represents definitions of worker and manager, respectively, that are consistent with QES definitions (see text for details).

^e Second line of entries under EEO represents results obtained when the alternate definition of manager is used (see text for details).

^f First line of entries under QES represents complexity/skill measures aggregated to the level of 1970 census occupation categories; second line represents results obtained when complexity/skill measures assigned to DOT occupations are used (see n. 6 for details).

classes, though there are notable class differences. For both rewards in both data sets, for example, the amount of variation that lies between occupational titles is greatest for workers, and generally more pronounced for managers than for employers. The degree to which occupational status and complexity/skill capture the variation between census titles in economic or noneconomic rewards varies substantially by class and equation specification, but in no case are these attributes of occupations solely responsible for the inequalities in rewards between census titles.

We should interpret these census occupational differences in rewards by class with a degree of caution. Such comparisons are affected by the varying numbers of occupational titles in the census classification system that are associated with the class categories and by differences in the sizes of these categories. We have also noted the ambiguities associated with the census titles. Nevertheless, we can conclude that occupational differences are important, in varying degrees, for explaining inequalities in job rewards within each of the three classes. Further, we suggest that occupational differences in general are theoretically more relevant for understanding differences in job rewards in some classes than others. Differences in occupational position are a major force stratifying the working class (e.g., Freedman 1975; Sweezy 1972; Wachtel 1975), and, to the extent that occupational differences are related to authority positions within organizations, the managerial class. Inequalities in rewards among employers, however, should theoretically be due more to the capital, industrial, and firm differences associated with the ability of employers to control the markets for their goods and to the degree of collective action by employees which may threaten this control. These differences are not likely to be captured as well with our occupational measures or with our national surveys of individuals.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The analyses presented in this paper were based on the theoretical argument that class and occupation represent analytically distinct positions in production systems. Class refers to positions defined by the social relations of ownership and authority, while occupation denotes technical activities within a division of labor. This distinction is consistent with Marxist theory (see Wright [1976] for an elaboration) and contrasts with the (at least implicit) assumption generally made in stratification research that class and occupation are defined in terms of each other. Vanneman and McNamee (1978) also assess the effects of class on job rewards, for example, but operationalize class via occupational groups. Such a procedure is consistent with the view which sees the occupational structure as determining the class structure (e.g., Weber 1947), but this perspective makes it impossible to examine seriously the relations between class and occupation

and the unique ways in which each affects the distribution of rewards. We have argued that, while these two social positions are interrelated, it is necessary to define and operationalize class and occupation as distinct concepts in order to study their net effects on job rewards and ultimately to study how class and occupation affect each other.

If it is indeed the case that class and occupation represent distinct positions within the economic structure, then at least two competing perspectives offer potential explanations for the relationship between these structural positions: Marxist and (for lack of a better term) technological determinist. Bell (1973) and Galbraith (1967) provide cogent expositions of the latter view and present a view of stratification which favors the influence of technique. Some Marxists, however, argue that class factors are theoretically prior and that occupational differentiation is explicable in terms of the class structure. Occupation is thought to be endogenous to class in that the structure of activities in a technical division of labor is ultimately dependent on the control relations among positions in the capitalist organization of production. Braverman (1974), for example, has argued that occupational definitions as well as work structures should properly be understood as an outcome of class relationships. We believe the evidence on these issues is too sparse and impressionistic to decide between these two perspectives and we remain agnostic as to the causal relationship between class and occupation. We do not equivocate, however, in our argument that both class and occupation represent distinct and important sources of inequality and that *both* are necessary to understand the positional sources of job rewards.

Our results suggest the utility of the Marxist class categories for explaining within-occupational inequalities in both economic and noneconomic job rewards. We found that employers obtain greater economic rewards than either managers or workers, even when a variety of personal characteristics and occupational measures are controlled. This supports the arguments advanced by Wright and Perrone (1977) and extends them to include differences in earnings as well as income.²¹ Our results regarding economic differences between managers and workers were weaker and less consistent, though we did find some evidence that managers enjoy modestly greater economic benefits than workers. With respect to fulfillment, we found that

²¹ For simplicity and for consistency with Wright and Perrone, we used income (earnings) instead of log income (log earnings) as our economic success measure. To assess the implications of this choice, we reestimated all our equations (QES data) using log income. While the sizes of the coefficients for the class measures obtained using log income differed slightly in a few cases from those reported in tables 1 and 2, the pattern of relationships was essentially the same; our substantive conclusions regarding class effects on economic rewards thus appear to be insensitive to whether income or log income is the dependent variable. The substantive correspondence between log earnings and actual earnings in the EEO data has already been noted (e.g., Griffin 1976, 1978).

employers are advantaged when compared with managers and (especially) workers, while workers report significantly less fulfillment than managers. We have interpreted these inequalities in rewards among classes as reflecting differences in ownership and authority among these groups.

Our results suggest further that the Marxian class categories are not sufficient for explaining inequalities in job rewards: considerable inequality is also produced by occupational differentiation. We found this to be true for fulfillment as well as earnings or income. These differences, however, were not explained solely on the basis of either the status of the occupation (as reflected by Duncan's SEI measure) or the complexity of the occupational activity and its associated skill requirements. Further, considerable variation in both occupational activities and the effects of occupation on rewards exists within classes, though occupational differences appear more pronounced for the working and managing classes than for employers. We have documented the fact that SEI and complexity/skill affect rewards within classes, but have not addressed the question of what else about occupations accounts for the remainder of the occupation-reward relationship.

These results therefore provide evidence for the utility of both a conceptual and an operational distinction between class and occupation for the purposes of explaining positional sources of inequality in job rewards. Further, an elaboration of the arguments developed in this paper may prove useful for the development of an empirically based theory of positional inequality. In the interest of the development of such a theory, it is instructive to point out some of the limitations of our analysis. First, our findings are based on secondary analyses of data collected for purposes other than those of this paper and this may have particular importance for our measurement of class differentiation. We relied on the categorization developed by Wright and Perrone (1977) but more elaborate conceptualizations of class within the Marxian perspective are available elsewhere (e.g., Wright 1976). These should be rendered empirically tractable and used in subsequent class analyses of inequality. However, it should be noted that medium-sized surveys of the general population, such as those utilized in this paper, need to be supplemented by data from alternative sources in order to assess more precisely class differences in rewards. In particular, data on owners and managers of large corporations are needed to assess differences among members of the employing and managing classes.

Second, greater attention must be paid to the correspondence between the theoretical conception of occupation and the categories and measures used in empirical examination of hypotheses about occupation and work rewards. We noted, in particular, the ambiguities associated with the census occupational scheme. Kohn's (1976) strategy of obtaining detailed and precise data on the actual technical activities performed by job incumbents is one possible solution to this problem. In any event, such definitions of

occupation as "a distinct social position defined in terms of characteristic activities in the socioeconomic realm" (Horan 1978, p. 534) are far too general because they neither adequately distinguish occupation from class nor allow evaluations of the variety of ways in which different work activities are defined and structured in particular organizations.

Third, the data available in this study for measuring noneconomic rewards are rather sparse. More attention should be devoted to conceptualizing and rigorously measuring the domain of job rewards in general and noneconomic rewards in particular. This would facilitate the study of "trade-offs" between economic and noneconomic rewards that are made by members of class and occupational groups.

Finally, attempts should be made to understand more precisely within-class differences in job rewards. We have provided evidence that occupational characteristics affect rewards within classes, but nonoccupational variables that were beyond the scope of this paper should also be used to represent additional sources of within-class *positional* inequality. Such theoretically important variables include the degree of labor organization and militancy and the size and industrial affiliation of the firms which employ these managers and workers. The incorporation of such variables would supplement the present analysis and would help identify other sources of the heterogeneity in rewards within the broad class categories used here.

Consideration of these issues of positional inequality has direct implications for questions of individual achievement. First, since occupation is but one structural position associated with unequal rewards, allocation studies should also begin to focus on the social processes which sort and select people to different class positions. An exclusive concern with occupational attainment will only delay our understanding of the mechanisms responsible for allocating individuals to positions which affect their material and psychological well-being (see Griffin and Kalleberg 1979). Second, Duncan's SEI measure has only limited utility for explaining the variation in job rewards attributable to occupational differentiation. Occupational status, therefore, should neither be equated with occupational position nor, given its small association with the noneconomic rewards studied here, be viewed as an acceptable proxy for such rewards. Third, our analysis suggests that certain issues may be most fruitfully studied within specified classes, a general concern raised by labor market segmentation theorists. For example, if occupation is most salient for the rewards of workers and managers, then issues of occupational attainment are most relevant for members of these theoretically defined populations.

In conclusion, we stress the complementary nature of questions of positional inequality and of allocative processes. We have focused our attention here on inequality which is structured among class and occupational positions in a system of production. Nevertheless, only by a simultaneous in-

vestigation of individual differences and positional differences will we be able to approach a full accounting for the social and economic inequality currently existing in American society.

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U.S. and British Perceptions of Class¹

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This research tests one aspect of the widely held belief that Americans are less class conscious than Europeans. Analysis of subjective class placements in the United States and Great Britain indicates that there is virtually no difference in the way social structural position is used to define middle- or working-class placement. The lack of any statistically significant interactions suggests that class is as clearly perceived in the United States as in Great Britain. The conventional wisdom about differences in the class consciousness of the two societies is probably the result of the substantial differences in the class basis of party affiliation and voting. Given the similarities in the perception of class, the political differences would be better explained by structural differences in the party systems than by psychological differences in the voters themselves.

At least since Tocqueville, part of the accepted wisdom about the United States has been that it lacks a well-developed class consciousness such as can be found in the labor movements of Europe. Bottomore (1965, p. 51) summarizes the familiar argument that the United States has "an inherited ideology of classlessness." Ossowski ([1957] 1963) has attributed this classlessness to a belief in the American Creed and its associated image of society as a "scheme of gradation." Such a graded hierarchy is incompatible with the bounded or dichotomous model of class. These observations and others like them accept as proven that class divisions are not well *perceived* in the United States.

These observers are, of course, not blind to the structural inequalities in the United States. Indeed, it is the existence of these "objective" inequalities which makes the psychological and cultural differences from Europe seem especially noteworthy. For instance, even when Lipset and Bendix (1967) thought they had found no differences in mobility rates between Britain and the United States, they still endorsed the idea that there were significant *psychological* differences because of the United States' "ideological egalitarianism." Treiman and Terrell (1975) in another mobility study

¹ I would like to acknowledge the work of Lynn Cannon, who was responsible for creating the combined American four-survey file, and Benjamin To, who developed the British file and completed the first cross-national comparisons. Support for this research was provided by grants from the National Science Foundation (74-20753) and the Research Board of the Graduate College of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Data were provided by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR).

also cite the common belief that class is less salient in the United States, although in a foresighted footnote they acknowledge that this belief rests on virtually no rigorous empirical research. Kahl (1957, p. 174) has also noted the lack of systematic evidence for this widely held belief.

The research reported first in this paper attempts such an empirical assessment. The weight of the evidence suggests that there is, in fact, little difference in class perceptions between Britain and the United States. At least in the separation of a working class from a middle class, the popular U.S. and British definitions are remarkably similar.

Yet the results should not be interpreted as still another instance of the substantial "homogenization" of industrial societies. Belief in that convergence, supported in part by the high cross-national correlations of prestige rankings (e.g., Hodge, Treiman, and Rossi 1966), is perhaps just as misplaced as the belief in the United States' unique classlessness. The research reported in the second half of the paper demonstrates considerable *structural* differences between the two societies, particularly in their political party systems. The greater class structuring of British politics is probably the source of the belief in greater class consciousness, but the results suggest that the structural differences may arise without any underlying psychological differences.

This paper concentrates on the more cognitive aspects of class consciousness: the perception of class positions. More elaborate analyses (e.g., Giddens 1973; Mann 1973) identify the perceptions of class as only the lowest of several levels of class consciousness. But if class perceptions are the lowest level, then they are also the most fundamental. Unless one sees society as divided into well-defined classes, one can hardly develop positive identification with one class or hostility to the other, much less imagine some alternative social structure. Nevertheless, the conclusions from this research must be limited to the question of British-U.S. differences in class perceptions. Possibilities about differences at other levels of class consciousness will be considered only briefly.

The strategy invoked to detect cross-national differences in class perceptions relies on a comparative analysis of responses to the familiar subjective class-placement question (Centers 1949; Campbell et al. 1960). In spite of the common interpretation of this question as an index of class identification, it can be interpreted also as only a simple *cognitive* judgment. Responses to the question are instances of how people assign the descriptive labels "middle class" or "working class" to specific social actors—in this case to themselves. Affective identification would require further evidence (see Landecker 1963). As in most recent cognitive research (see, e.g., the collection in Shepard, Romney, and Nerlove 1972), the stimulus characteristics that determine the cognitive judgments can be inferred from the empirical relationships of the stimulus characteristics (e.g., education,

income, occupation) with the class placements. Thus, if class is more clearly perceived in Britain, the relationship of subjective class placement to its structural antecedents, particularly to *class* indicators, ought to be stronger. But, if the empirical relationships are similar in the two countries, class labels are being assigned according to the same rules, and there is no noticeable difference in the ability to identify people's class membership on the basis of their structural position.

This strategy extends the work of the earlier class-placement literature, which also used the strength of the association between social structural position and class placement as an index of the clarity of class self-perceptions. Hodge and Treiman (1968, p. 541), for instance, interpret a squared multiple correlation of .196 as evidence of a "failure of class consciousness to crystallize around economic groups." (But see Jackman and Jackman 1973.) The important question then becomes how the strength of this association varies across social contexts. Vanneman and Pampel (1977) make an attempt in this direction by comparing strengths of association across 16 industries. But since class has more societal than organizational referents, a more promising direction to investigate is the comparison of class perceptions across national contexts.

METHODS

The most critical requirement for cross-national survey analysis is to select equivalent samples responding to equivalent questions that are coded into equivalent categories. This must be done without so standardizing the methods that each society's distinctive characteristics are eliminated for the sake of equivalency (see Burawoy 1977). Fortunately, the studies utilized in this research employed quite comparable designs. Where problems of comparability remain (or are inherent in the nature of the national differences), the preferred resolution should be to utilize multiple specifications in order to obtain some rough estimate of the bias introduced by either too little or too much standardization.

The countries compared in this research are the United States and Great Britain. This particular comparison offers both advantages and disadvantages. The research can benefit from a rich background of literature in each country on both class perceptions and political behavior as well as specific cross-national comparisons between the two (e.g., Treiman and Terrell 1975). Another important advantage is the common language. While translation problems are always difficult in cross-national research, they are especially problematic in research which depends so heavily on class labels. Other methods (see, e.g., Laumann and Senter 1976) may be better suited to studying class perceptions without utilizing class labels. The disadvantage of the British-U.S. comparison is that the two societies may not

be different enough (see, e.g., Mann 1973). However, this is not a major problem for this research since the second half of the paper demonstrates quite substantial differences at the political level that are not found at the social psychological level.

Statistical analyses.—The British-U.S. comparison is based on the statistical relationships of the same set of stratification variables (class, education, income, occupational prestige) with each of three cognitive-behavioral variables (subjective class placements, party affiliation, and voting). Class placements are a dichotomy, party affiliation resembles a linear scale, and voting is a three- or four-category classification; three somewhat different techniques are best suited for regressing these three dependent variables on the stratification variables.

Probit analysis is used with the dichotomous class-placement variable. The results can be interpreted in much the same manner as conventional linear regression, but probit analysis avoids the erroneous assumption of linear relationships entailed with least-squares methods (including multiple-classification analysis). Instead a more plausible S-shaped curve is fitted. Log-linear techniques, often used for categorical data, are also less appropriate than probit analysis because the analysis seeks to estimate the *continuous* relationships of class placements with years of schooling, occupational prestige, and income. With the substantially unilinear party affiliation variable, ordinary least squares is suitable to estimate the relationships with the stratification variables. With the inherently nominal classification of the voting analysis, discriminant function analysis is used to order the voting alternatives so as to maximize the relationships with the stratification variables.

Only for the class-placement analysis is the dependent variable a sufficiently comparable measure in the two countries to justify the pooling of the two samples for an "analysis of covariance" design. For the party-affiliation and voting comparisons, separate country analyses are computed, and the different results will be described but are not tested for statistical significance.

Class placements.—The questions about class self-placement are virtually identical for the two countries. Both were preceded by a "class awareness" question (see Campbell et al. 1960, p. 343), and all respondents regardless of their answers to the class-awareness question were asked to place themselves in the working or middle class.²

² Part of the British sample was asked an *open-ended* class-placement question which was then coded into working- and middle-class categories. These respondents were supposed to have been eliminated from the analysis, but a programming error allowed them to remain. Subsequent analysis showed that there was no difference between the open-ended and forced-choice formats in determining the relationship of class placement to the social structural variables, so the open-ended responses were kept in the sample for this and the subsequent political analyses.

Party affiliation.—Party-affiliation questions were similar in each country, although strength of party identification was indicated by three categories in Britain (“very strongly,” “fairly strongly,” and “not very strongly”) and only two in the United States (“strong” and “not very strong”). To improve comparability, the two strong categories were collapsed for the British data.

The biggest difference between the two countries is the three-party system in Britain. Approximately 10% of the British electorate identify with the Liberal Party. Two different approaches were used to accommodate the British system. The simplest approach, but the one requiring the greatest assumptions, was to code the Liberal Party identifiers, along with non-affiliators, at the midpoint of a scale that ranged from strong Labour Party affiliation to strong Conservative Party affiliation. A similar scale was constructed from the U.S. data with independents scored at the midpoint. These roughly equivalent party-affiliation scales could then be regressed on the class and status variables in each country. A second approach went to the other extreme of requiring as little equivalence as possible by using discriminant function analyses on all the possible class-affiliation categories in each country. Since the results of the two analyses were quite similar and since a discriminant analysis is reported for the voting data, only the results from the simple regression are reported for party affiliation.

Although the party-affiliation scale is scored in a seven-interval code for both countries, the British variance is far larger than the U.S. variance (see table 1), and it is impossible to be certain how much of this apparent difference in polarization is due to stronger party affiliation in Britain and how much is an artifact of the differences in question wording. Both standardized and unstandardized coefficients are reported, therefore, since comparison of the unstandardized coefficients would assume, probably incorrectly, equivalence of measures across the two countries, but the standardized coefficients equate variances across countries, probably an overcorrection that eliminates the stronger British polarization. However, either set of coefficients is adequate for the broad kinds of comparisons to be made in this research.

Voting.—Several national elections are encompassed by the surveys in each of the countries. Since voting is, by definition, a nominal response, discriminant function analyses were employed to examine the impact of the class and status measures.³ In Britain four categories were used: Labour, Conservative, Liberal, and no vote. In the United States only three categories were used: Democrat, Republican, and no vote, except for 1968

³ The dangers of arbitrarily assigning these categories to a Left-Right continuum have been well documented by Ogmundson (1975) and will be apparent in the results presented below. The discriminant function analysis may be the most appropriate method to avoid any a priori coding of political parties.

when a fourth category was included for a Wallace vote. The British surveys include voting for elections in 1964, 1966, and 1970. The U.S. data include the 1968 (Humphrey-Nixon) and 1972 (McGovern-Nixon) elections. To expand the range of elections, retrospective data on the 1964 (Johnson-Goldwater) election are also analyzed. Each election is analyzed and reported separately.

Stratification measures.—The principal class division used in this study is the manual/nonmanual dichotomy.⁴ This division has been the one most often employed in earlier research on class placement (Centers 1949; Dalia and Guest 1975) and on political affiliation (Alford 1967; Butler and Stokes 1969). This usage follows Weber ([1921] 1968) and a long tradition of class analysis (e.g., Lockwood 1958; Goldthorpe et al. 1969; Giddens 1973). Although there is substantial doubt that this dichotomy now describes the most significant class division in the labor force (see, e.g., Hamilton 1972; Braverman 1975; Poulantzas 1975; Wright 1976), it is a kind of "common denominator" for the other proposed class analyses. The debate over the proper class lines is not unimportant, but an evaluation of all the possible models would distract us from the main purpose of the cross-national comparison. Since the analysis controls for education, income, and occupational prestige differences, we can be confident that the coefficient for the dichotomy reflects some true class division and not just correlated status differences (see Dahrendorf 1959).

Occupations are assigned prestige scores developed by Siegel (1971), as in most of the past research on class placement (Hodge and Treiman 1968; Jackman and Jackman 1973; Vanneman and Pampel 1977). This procedure relies on the now well-validated assumption that the U.S.-derived scores are not substantially different from British rankings (Hodge et al. 1966).

Income data are available only for the total family income in the United States and for the head of household or respondent in Britain. The U.S. family income data are multiplied by 0.8 to approximate head-of-household income (see Lebergott 1964), but some doubt must remain about the comparability of these effects. For both countries, income is coded to the mid-point of the survey codes and then translated to 1967 U.S. dollar equivalents by adjusting for the prevailing exchange rate ($\$2.80 = \pounds 1$) and for changes in the consumer price index. The logarithm of this number is used in the analysis because it seems reasonable that class placements reflect proportional rather than absolute increases in income.

Education is also difficult to make equivalent across the two countries.

⁴ The manual/nonmanual dichotomy was coded in both countries according to the U.S. Census classification, assigning all service workers to the manual category. The U.S. classification differs in minor respects from the British system (e.g., postal clerks and railway conductors are nonmanual in the U.S. system but manual in the British system, and police officers are manual in the U.S. system but nonmanual in Britain).

Treiman and Terrell (1975) found that in Britain the *type* of schooling (secondary-modern vs. grammar and public schools) and post-secondary education (e.g., teachers' college, technical college, and even night school) had effects on occupational attainment. In accounting for middle-class placement, these qualitative distinctions ought to be included in the model along with the common scale for years of education. The problem is to construct comparable qualitative measures from the U.S. data. The solution followed here is to seek rough equivalents in the U.S. educational data where possible and elsewhere to add the remaining British variables separately. (The comparability of the educational variables proves to be less troublesome than first expected since the effects of the "qualitative" schooling variables are surprisingly small and, where significant, not very different in the two countries.) Four dummy variables have been created to estimate the effects of these qualitative differences in education. Trade-oriented postsecondary schools include night schools and apprenticeships in Britain and "vocational and technical training programs" in the United States (ICPSR 1975, p. 184-85). Two college dichotomies have been created: one for both countries which distinguishes any type of college education, and one for Britain which distinguishes university education from teachers' or technical colleges. Finally, for Britain, the kind of secondary schooling is dichotomized into the secondary-modern track versus the "elite" track (grammar school, public school). No equivalent U.S. variable can be constructed, although if the data were available it would be interesting to test whether the U.S. "prep" school, admittedly a more limited phenomenon, might not have the same class-defining characteristics as the British grammar and public schools (cf. Mills 1956; Domhoff 1967).

Samples.—The U.S. data are derived primarily from four election-year surveys (1966, 1968, 1970, and 1972) undertaken by the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan. The British data are from three surveys (1963, 1964, and 1966; supplemented in the voting analysis by 1970 reinterviews) which were part of the "Study of Political Change in Britain 1963-1970" (Butler and Stokes 1969).

Several restrictions are placed on the samples to achieve equivalence and analytic clarity. Since much of the analysis focuses on the role of the occupational structure, the samples are restricted to those persons currently in the labor force or whose husbands are in the labor force. Because labor force participation is not fully reported for British widows⁵ and because the sample of persons over 65 who are still in the labor force is especially unrepresentative of that age group, the analysis is restricted to the 21-65

⁵ In what must be one of the worst examples of the implicit sexism of our social science research, for female respondents, the husband's labor force participation was reported as the head-of-household data, even when the husband was dead (ICPSR 1972, p. 384).

age range. Because minorities present special problems for research on class perceptions (Jackman and Jackman 1973; Goyder and Pineo 1974), the analysis is restricted to whites in each country, there being insufficient non-whites in the British sample for an adequate comparison.

Sex differences also present problems in research focusing on occupation. There are, as we shall see, important differences between men's and women's jobs with regard to class structure. Also, married working women present the problem of two occupations in the household, both of which seem to affect class placements (Ritter and Hargens 1975). The approach taken here is to divide the sample into two overlapping subsamples: one of employed men and wives of employed men, and a second subsample of women in the labor force. For the former sample, the man's occupation is utilized in the analysis, while for the latter the woman's own occupation is utilized whether or not she was married. Both men and women are included in the first sample since the men's use of their own job for class self-placement is not very different from wives' use of their husband's jobs for self-placement. And both married and unmarried women are included in the second sample since there is little difference in the effect of their own occupation on class self-placement.

The resulting sample includes 3,538 U.S. and 3,512 British employed men and wives of employed men, and 1,236 U.S. and 1,085 British employed women. These are not, however, the effective degrees of freedom for the analysis since respondents are weighted according to the demands of the sampling design (ICPSR 1972, p. iii) and the requirements of this research.⁶

RESULTS

Subjective class placement.—For each variable, table 1 reports either percentages or means and standard deviations, separately for each country. There are significant differences between Britain and the United States on all class and status variables, although the income differences are by far the largest. While the U.S. sample is almost evenly divided between middle-class and working-class identifiers, in Britain the working-class identifiers outnumber the middle-class identifiers by more than two to one. These differences are more pronounced than but not essentially different from the

⁶ In each country weights were added so that each survey year was weighted equally (to the harmonic mean of the respective samples [Winer 1971]). The British study presented an additional problem of the use of panel study respondents in the yearly surveys so that the original total of 5,652 responses reflects only 2,922 distinct individuals. While it might be justified to ignore the lack of independence among reinterviewed persons, a conservative estimate was utilized by weighting all British data by a factor of 0.517 to reflect the true number of respondents. A final adjustment was made so that the U.S. and British data would be weighted equally in the analysis, by weighting each country's data to the harmonic mean of the two countries' weighted sample sizes.

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TABLE 1
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR U.S. AND BRITISH SAMPLES

	EMPLOYED MEN AND THEIR WIVES		EMPLOYED WOMEN	
	United States	Great Britain	United States	Great Britain
% middle-class identifiers.....	47.0	26.3	49.6	31.5
Party affiliation.....	-.33 (1.97)	-.42 (2.53)	-.38 (1.98)	-.01 (2.58)
% Democrat/Labour vote:				
Election 1.....	53.0	47.0	55.1	39.2
Election 2.....	27.2	50.1	30.3	42.6
Election 3.....	29.8	41.3	27.3	31.8
% Nonmanual employment.....	55.5	34.1	64.4	48.8
NORC prestige.....	43.6 (13.9)	38.3 (13.7)	39.4 (14.1)	32.1 (13.1)
Income (1967 \$U.S.).....	8,389 (4,771)	2,891 (1,492)	6,754 (4,423)	2,291 (1,327)
Education (in years).....	12.3 (2.1)	10.7 (1.3)	12.3 (2.0)	10.9 (1.3)
% postsecondary technical schools	12.7	27.2	16.3	23.3
% college.....	37.5	18.4	31.1	12.6
% elite secondary.....	N.A.	19.0	N.A.	18.7
% elite college.....	N.A.	3.6	N.A.	2.2
N.....	3,538	3,512	1,236	1,085

NOTE.—Standard deviations in parentheses; N.A. = not available.

1948 data reported by Buchanan and Cantril (1953). Among the nine nations they studied, Britain had a very low rate of middle-class identification, while the U.S. rate was slightly below average.

The greater middle-class identification in the United States is more than explained by the higher status of the U.S. sample. When all the class and status variables are controlled in a probit analysis on class placement for the pooled sample (table 2), the country coefficient shows Britons to be *more* likely to identify with the middle class. It actually requires more education, income, and occupational prestige to be middle class in the United States than in Britain. That is, comparing people from the U.S. and Britain with the same occupation, education, and income, it is the British who are more likely to place themselves in the middle class. The likely explanation is the control for the substantial reported differences in income between the two countries. These income differences probably exaggerate the differences in standard of living between Britain and the United States. If the income variables in each country are recalculated as a proportion of that country's mean income (i.e., if country differences in income are ignored), Britain again becomes somewhat less middle class (-0.304) than the United States.

The pooled sample results in table 2 reflect the same patterns found in earlier research (see Vanneman and Pampel 1977). For men's occupations, both class and occupational prestige have independent and significant ef-

TABLE 2
PROBIT ANALYSES OF MIDDLE-CLASS PLACEMENT
FOR THE POOLED SAMPLES

	Coefficient	Standardized	t
Employed Men and Their Wives			
Manual/nonmanual4407	.216	9.59
NORC prestige0113	.159	5.41
Income (log of \$U.S.)5402	.392	10.35
Education (in years)1352	.241	8.50
Technical schools0648	.025	1.15
College2333	.096	2.88
Country2625	.131	5.80
Employed Women			
Manual/nonmanual1237	.061	1.53
NORC prestige0121	.174	3.22
Income (log of \$U.S.)2914	.238	4.45
Education (in years)1713	.311	5.90
Technical schools0651	.026	.67
College3967	.164	2.61
Country1685	.084	2.13

fects, although *the class variable is somewhat stronger*. Subjective class placements are determined to some extent by position in the class structure and not just by rank along a status scale. For women's jobs, however, there does not appear to be any class division.⁷

The most important results are the "analysis of covariance" comparisons of coefficients for the two countries (table 3). For convenience, separate coefficients for each country have been computed from the main effect and interaction terms, although the *t*-statistic reported reflects the significance of the interaction term. We can develop a better understanding of the size of the British-U.S. differences by translating the coefficients reported in table 3 to estimates of the percentage point increases that would result from a given change in each of the stratification variables. (Since the relationship is not linear, this slope has to be evaluated at a particular point on the curve. For convenience, we will calculate the estimates at the 50% probability point, at which an individual would have equal probabilities of being placed in the middle or working class.) Among the employed men and their wives, a nonmanual position increases the probability of middle-class placement 16 percentage points for the U.S. sample and 18 percentage points for the British. This is a negligible and nonsignificant difference. If class lines are less apparent to U.S. workers, there is little evidence of it

⁷ Other analyses, not reported in detail here, experimented with alternative definitions of class divisions but failed to find any significant relationship for women's jobs. Including clericals with manual workers did not improve the relationship of the class dichotomy for women's jobs ($b = 0.045$), although it did for men's jobs ($b = 0.536$).

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TABLE 3
PROBIT ANALYSES OF MIDDLE-CLASS PLACEMENT BY COUNTRY

	United States	Great Britain	t (diff)
Employed Men and Their Wives			
Manual/nonmanual.....	.408	.461	.57
NORC prestige.....	.011	.010	-.36
Income (log of \$U.S.).....	.472	.660	1.70
Education (in years).....	.140	.121	-.49
Technical schools.....	-.028	.100	1.08
College.....	.232	.172	-.35
Elite secondary.....	N.A.	.128	1.21
Elite university.....	N.A.	.041	.16
Employed Women			
Manual/nonmanual.....	.046	.203	.94
NORC prestige.....	.014	.009	-.69
Income (log of \$U.S.).....	.296	.304	.05
Education (in years).....	.049	.341	4.52
Technical schools.....	.214	.066	-.72
College.....	.736	.287	-1.38
Elite secondary.....	N.A.	.057	.31
Elite university.....	N.A.	-.576	-1.25

in these data. The association of manual work with the working class and nonmanual work with the middle class is nearly as strong in the United States as in Britain. And in both societies, the association is made only for men's occupations.

Occupational prestige, income, and education also have similar consequences for class placements in the two societies. A 14-point prestige difference in a man's occupation (approx. 1 SD) would increase the probability of middle-class placements by 6% in both countries. A 50% rise in income would increase middle-class placements by 8% in the United States and by somewhat more, 11%, in Britain. Another year of school would increase middle-class placement by 6% in the United States and 5% in Britain. Over and above the effects of additional years of school, college experience would increase middle-class placement by 9% in the United States and 7% in Britain (8% if the college was a university, not a teachers' or technical college). Technical training would not increase middle-class placement in the United States (in fact, the estimate is that it would decrease by 1 percentage point), but in Britain the increase would be only 4 percentage points, a nonsignificant difference. Public and grammar school education in Britain would directly increase middle-class placement by only 5 percentage points, a nonsignificant effect. Most of the effect of this elite secondary training is probably mediated through subsequent occupational and income gains.

For employed women there are also small and nonsignificant differences in the effects of class, occupational prestige, and income. Education does present some differences, however. Middle-class placement is more responsive to an additional year of school among British women (a 13 percentage point increase). The U.S. women are less concerned with the quantity of schooling (only an estimated 2 percentage point increase per year) than with having college experience (an enormous 29 percentage point increase as against 11 percentage points for British women) or even technical training (an 8 percentage point increase for the U.S. women, 3 percentage points for the British women).

But the striking result in table 3 is the overall similarity of effects in both countries. For the employed men and their wives *none* of the interaction effects are significant, and for the employed women only years of education is different. Nor are the two qualitative schooling variables that could be scored only in Britain statistically significant. When all the interaction terms are added to the model, the difference in the likelihood χ^2 statistics is not significant for the employed men and their wives, $\chi^2 (8) = 6.43$, $P > .50$, but is just significant for the employed women, $\chi^2 (8) = 17.89$, $P < .05$.

The overall similarity of the results supports the interpretation that the distinction between the middle class and the working class is made as easily in the United States as in Britain. Indeed, the cognitive rules used in relating objective position to subjective placement are almost identical. An additional year of education or a proportional raise in income will increase the likelihood of middle-class placement as much in the United States as in Britain.

Party affiliation and voting.—Unlike the class-placement data, there are substantial differences between Great Britain and the United States in the political analyses. The greater *class* appeal of the British party system is evident in table 4. The most striking differences are found in the manual/nonmanual class coefficients. Among employed men and their wives, dichotomous class is *four times* more important for party affiliation in Britain than in the United States. Among the employed women, class has substantial effects in Britain but none in the United States. Even the comparison of the standardized coefficients reveals a far greater relationship of class position and party affiliation in Britain than in the United States. The standardized coefficients also show that in Britain the class position of employed men is easily the strongest determinant of party affiliation, while in the United States education is as important as the manual/nonmanual division.

Among the employed men and their wives, higher income also seems to be more strongly related to Conservative affiliation in Britain than to Republican affiliation in the United States. Among the employed women,

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TABLE 4
REGRESSIONS ON PARTY IDENTIFICATION BY COUNTRY

	UNITED STATES		GREAT BRITAIN	
	Coefficient	Standardized	Coefficient	Standardized
Employed Men and Their Wives				
Manual/nonmanual.....	.276**	.070	1.063**	.197
NORC prestige.....	.007*	.048	.010	.055
Income (log of \$U.S.).....	.068	.020	.604*	.102
Education (in years).....	.066	.068	.190**	.086
Technical schools.....	.038	.058	.202	.034
College.....	.250	.058	.234	.030
Elite secondary.....	N.A.	N.A.	.275	.042
Elite university.....	N.A.	N.A.	-.686**	-.093
R ²042132	...
Employed Women				
Manual/nonmanual.....	-.265	-.064	.596*	.115
NORC prestige.....	.013	.090	.018	.091
Income (log of \$U.S.).....	-.0430	-.016	-.126	-.027
Education (in years).....	.084	.083	.240	.119
Technical schools.....	.356	.067	.418	.067
College.....	.032	.007	.769	.095
Elite secondary.....	N.A.	N.A.	-.992	-.056
Elite university.....	N.A.	N.A.	.269	.041
R ²021109	...

* $P < .05$.

** $P < .01$.

income is not important for party affiliation in either country. In each country occupational prestige is either nonsignificant or less important than the class dichotomy; there do not appear to be any marked differences between the two countries.

The differences in education relationships also appear less substantial than the class and income differences. Although few of the education variables have statistically significant relationships, this is somewhat misleading since the "education effect" is spread over multiple measures. If we ignore the type of schooling (i.e., the dummy variables) and include in the model only the number of years of education, the education coefficient is significant for both countries in all the subsamples. There are complex differences, however. The *unstandardized* coefficient for years of education is larger in Britain than in the United States, indeed approximately three times as large. The *standardized* coefficients for years of education are smaller in Britain than in the United States because of the larger American variance in education and the smaller variance in strength of party affiliation. Thus, while one additional year of schooling leads Britons further toward a strong Conservative affiliation than it leads Americans toward Republican affilia-

tion, one standard deviation of years of schooling accounts for somewhat less of the variance in party affiliation in Britain than in America.⁸

Table 4 also shows that the multiple correlation of party affiliation with the entire set of class and status variables is much stronger in Britain than in the United States. The comparison confirms our expectations that the British party system is more stratified than the U.S. system.

Since stratification position is closely related to subjective class placement in both societies but to party affiliation only in Britain, it is not surprising that subjective class placement also is related to party affiliation only in Britain. If the class-placement dichotomy is added to the regressions reported in table 4, it has a substantial effect for British employed men and their wives ($b = 1.55$) and British employed women ($b = 1.87$). The standardized coefficients are 0.276 for the employed men and their wives and 0.337 for the employed women, both coefficients by far the largest in their equations. Thus, subjective class placement is *the most important determinant* of party affiliation in Britain. In the United States it is difficult to show that the same class-identification variable has any effect at all on party affiliations. The coefficients for U.S. employed men and their wives (0.10) and for employed women (0.22) are both less than twice their standard errors, and the standardized coefficients (0.025 and 0.055, respectively) are negligible.

The data on voting (table 5) show even more telling differences between the two party systems. In Britain, party voting is arrayed along the status hierarchy in the expected manner, with Conservative voters at the top and Labour voters at the bottom. Liberal Party voters are, sociologically, quite close to Conservatives, and the nonvoters are positioned between the two major parties. The pattern is quite consistent across the three elections. But the U.S. pattern is altogether different. In the United States neither party captures the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder, although George Wallace came close in 1968. The major social division in the U.S. electorate is between voters and nonvoters. The typical working-class response in the United States is to abstain. This is most noticeable in the 1972 election in which there was *almost no difference* between McGovern and Nixon voters on the first discriminant function defined by the class and status measures.

The discriminant function coefficients provide further evidence of the greater class orientation of the British party system. Among the data for employed men, the class dichotomy has consistently stronger effects in Britain than in the United States. Among the employed women the differ-

⁸ The importance of education for U.S. party affiliation is also understated because of substantial nonlinearities on the dependent variable revealed in the discriminant function analysis. The two "Independent" groups that lean toward the Republican and Democratic parties are especially well educated.

ences are less marked (partly as a result of the anomalous negative coefficient in the small sample for the 1970 election).

The class orientation of British voting is even clearer when the self-placement variable is added to the voting analysis. The results need not be reported in detail since the pattern of the coefficients is similar to the results reported in table 5. But in Britain, the subjective class factor has independent explanatory power of its own. The addition of class placement substantially increases the canonical correlation for all three elections in both British subsamples with the exception only of the small sample of employed women for the 1970 election. (Among employed men and their

TABLE 5
DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION ANALYSES OF VOTING

	GREAT BRITAIN			UNITED STATES		
	1964	1966	1970	1964	1968	1972
Employed Men and Their Wives						
Centroids:						
No vote.....	-.211	-.082	-.062	-.477	-.534	-.546
Labour/Democrat.....	-.363	-.350	-.418	.014	.037	.171
Conservative/Republican.....	.465	.516	.438	.320	.366	.180
Liberal/Wallace.....	.386	.382	.061	...	-.363	...
Discriminant coefficients:						
Manual/nonmanual.....	1.262	1.456	1.509	1.004	.522	.207
NORC prestige.....	.006	.015	-.011	-.008	.009	.027
Income.....	.802	.546	.798	.776	.906	.820
Education (in years).....	.093	-.019	-.235	.165	.331	.261
Technical school.....	.005	-.163	.994	-.667	-.420	-.095
College.....	.586	.526	-.122	.359	-.439	-.132
Elite secondary.....	.648	.906	.958	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Elite university.....	-1.101	-1.202	-0.873	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Canonical.....	.363	.364	.357	.261	.341	.297
df.....	988	856	517	1,507	2,148	1,118
Employed Women						
Centroids:						
No vote.....	-.273	-.487	-.569	-.673	-.519	-.590
Labour/Democrat.....	-.476	-.473	-.467	.174	.177	.187
Conservative/Republican.....	.525	.568	.355	.331	.201	.219
Liberal/Wallace.....	.373	.848	.761	...	-.252	...
Discriminant coefficients:						
Manual/nonmanual.....	1.114	.888	-.238	.276	.819	.462
NORC prestige.....	-.016	-.025	.009	.028	-.000	.001
Income.....	.333	.320	.345	1.150	.696	.713
Education (in years).....	.026	.248	.345	-.080	.241	.474
Technical school.....	.667	1.215	.563	.085	.233	-.880
College.....	1.314	1.109	1.261	.249	-.152	-.868
Elite secondary.....	1.167	.691	.637	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Elite university.....	.261	.691	-3.201	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Canonical.....	.428	.483	.446	.363	.290	.332
df.....	243	188	105	389	835	442

wives the increases are from .363 to .411 in 1964, from .364 to .423 in 1966, and from .357 to .393 in 1970; among employed women the increases are from .428 to .472 in 1964, from .483 to .552 in 1966, and from .446 to .450 in 1970.) In contrast, class self-placement adds relatively little to the already weaker discriminant analysis of U.S. voting. (Here the increases among employed men and their wives are from .261 to .263 in 1964, from .341 to .342 in 1968, and from .297 to .298 in 1972; among employed women the increases are from .363 to .370 in 1964, from .290 to .299 in 1968, and from .332 to .341 in 1972.)

The discriminant function coefficients for subjective class also document the importance of class feelings for British voting. In five of the six British analyses, the standardized class-identification coefficient is the largest of the nine standardized coefficients. The unstandardized coefficients are 1.334, 1.458, and 1.182 for the employed men and their wives; and 1.290, 1.509, and 0.293 for the employed women. These are all larger than the coefficients for "objective" class position—that is, the manual/nonmanual dichotomy. More important, they are far larger than the comparable U.S. coefficients which are 0.260, 0.175, and -0.107 for the employed men and their wives; 0.486, 0.656, and 0.627 for the employed women.

In summary, the subjectively felt class division appears to be the single best predictor of partisan affiliation and voting in Britain. It both mediates some of the effects of the structural variables and contributes independently. In the United States, however, class feelings play hardly any independent role in recent voting.

DISCUSSION

The analysis of the subjective class placement responses provides no evidence of differences in the clarity of social definitions of working-class and middle-class position. Class, occupational status, income, and education have the same relative importance in each society in determining class placements. The relationship between objective position and subjective placement is as strong in the United States as in Britain.

In contrast to the results on class perceptions, we have found substantial evidence of political differences. Similar differences have been noted before by Alford (1967). It is clear that the British party system is more closely linked to socioeconomic position in general, and to the class structure in particular. Britons affiliate with political parties and vote in a far more "class conscious" manner than do U.S. citizens.

Together, these two results suggest that the greater class structuring of British politics cannot be explained by any greater ability of Britons to think of themselves in class terms. Classes are as sharply defined in the U.S. consciousness as in the British. The difference is just that U.S. workers

do not translate their recognized class positions into votes at the polls as do Britons.

The problem of the more marked class structure of British politics remains to be explained. Why is British voting more class conscious if British voters are not? While alternative interpretations will be discussed below, the most straightforward conclusion is that the sharper class division in British politics owes more to the *structure* of the party system itself than to the consciousness of the voters. That is, we ought to seek explanations of political behavior directly in the dynamics of political institutions; inferences about the motivations of the actors are likely to be mistaken in attributing psychological differences. The more critical differences lie in the opportunities for class action provided by the political structures.

Such an explanation would still be consistent with most "personality" and social structure models of social behavior. In such models, behavior is determined jointly by a psychological predisposition and structural opportunity. *Both* are necessary for a given outcome. Conversely, and this is the point that is often neglected, *lack* of any given behavior may be the result of either inadequate structural opportunity or insufficient psychological predisposition. Opportunity without predisposition or a predisposition without a structural opportunity will have equivalent observable results. Without additional evidence it is impossible to decide which is the missing component.

This has been the problem with many explanations of cross-national differences in political behavior. The difficulties arise when we try to attribute the lack of class voting in the United States to the lack of motivation among the individual voters. U.S. voters *seem* not to be class conscious because they rarely vote or organize politically along class lines. But it may not be the psychological predisposition which is lacking; it may be only that no opportunity to express the predisposition is provided.

The present research cannot resolve this issue, but it can eliminate some of the more simplistic psychological explanations of the lack of class politics in the United States. In particular, people in the United States do not seem any less clear about their class position than the British. In this limited sense, they appear equally "class conscious."

A more likely explanation seems to be that the U.S. political system does not provide the necessary alternatives for U.S. voters to express their class identifications. Such an explanation is supported by the varying levels of class voting in different national elections (Guest 1974). Some contexts elicit more class voting than others. But in some elections the class issues are so swamped by other factors—personalities, images, foreign involvements—that there are few class issues dividing the candidates, or at least few that would be apparent to the voters. It seems unlikely that class consciousness, at least as that concept is used in most analyses, would

fluctuate so dramatically between elections. It is more reasonable to conclude that a sufficient reservoir of class consciousness exists in the population, to be tapped or not as fits the occasion.

Two major limitations inherent in this analysis must now be considered. The first arises from the conceptualization of the class structure employed in the research, especially the restriction to middle class and working class as answers to the class-placement question. The second concerns other levels of class consciousness beyond the basic perceptions studied here.

This analysis of class perceptions has been constrained by the alternatives provided by the survey questionnaire—"middle-class" and "working-class." We have assumed that these are meaningful labels for the respondents, an assumption strengthened by the evidence that the vast majority of respondents will use these labels in systematic ways if asked to do so. The problem lies less in the validity of the two labels included in the analysis than in the omission of other class divisions that may indeed prove to be more salient in Britain. In particular, the British-U.S. differences that we are seeking may not occur along this middle-working division at all but might still be observed if respondents were asked to identify a more elite category or a dominant or ruling class. This intriguing question must go unanswered for now because we can look only at topics covered by existing data. But the data we have pertain to a matter that is not trivial. The popular definition of the working class is basic to the social identification of the progressive forces in industrial societies. Confusion over the boundaries or even the existence of a working class has been blamed for the lack of a genuinely socialist alternative in the contemporary United States. But the research reported here suggests that the structural position of the working class is perceived in basically the same way in the United States as in Britain. We can speculate that other perceptual differences do exist between the two societies, but in the reasonably accurate data we have we cannot find evidence for such a difference.

We also must consider other aspects of class consciousness that might still explain the political differences between British and U.S. voters. While there may be no cross-national differences in class perceptions, the politically important differences may be found only at the more fully developed levels of class consciousness. Landecker (1963), for instance, stresses the difference between cognitive and affective components of class consciousness. The present research has addressed the issue of cognitive differences only. It may be that, while class position is as clear to U.S. and British workers, Britons invest more affect in class identification.

However, the available data bearing on this question provide no support for British-U.S. differences at the affective level. One wave of the British survey and three waves of the U.S. survey included a question which asked respondents whether they felt close to their chosen class or not much closer

to people in that class than to people in other classes. Slightly over half of the respondents in each country reported feeling closer to their chosen class. But the British employed men and their wives were only 3.8% more likely to feel closer and British employed women only 3.5% more likely than their U.S. counterparts. Neither difference is statistically significant.

Another dimension of class perceptions sometimes included in studies of class consciousness is class awareness or salience, the degree to which survey respondents think of themselves in class categories. In this research, the British and U.S. samples were asked whether they thought of themselves as belonging to a class. Previous research using this question (Guest 1974) has linked such awareness to support for more "liberal" or collective-governmental strategies of social change as opposed to dependence on individual efforts. But there is no evidence of any substantial British-U.S. differences in class awareness either. If anything, U.S. respondents describe themselves as slightly more class aware than Britons (67.0% vs. 59.0% among employed men and their wives, 68.7% vs. 59.5% among employed women). Both differences are statistically significant. (A more complete log-linear analysis, not reported in detail here, shows that the greater class awareness in the United States is confined to the middle-class identifiers only.) Again, the data provide no support for higher levels of class consciousness in Britain.

Cross-national differences in other levels of class consciousness, such as those described by Giddens (1973) and Mann (1973), might be investigated with appropriate empirical research. For instance, the size of the relationship between subjective class placements and a wide range of political attitudes would provide some evidence of the "totality" of class considerations in each society. Differences in conceptions of an alternative social order are also subject to empirical testing. But at both these levels adequate data do not exist now. Our conclusions, therefore, must be limited to the simpler levels of class consciousness. While it might still be possible to maintain a hypothesis of psychological difference if we resorted to these other aspects of class consciousness, it is important to note that much of the earlier speculation on U.S. differences referred either implicitly or often explicitly to the poor perception of class in the United States. This argument is no longer tenable given the results reported here; U.S. workers recognize their position in the working or middle class at least as well as Britons.

The disjuncture between structural inequality in the United States and Americans' seeming indifference to class has long presented one of the intriguing paradoxes in the interface between society and the individual. Mills (1962) has set the agenda:

The fact that men are not "class conscious" at all times and in all places does not mean that "there are no classes" or that "in America everybody

is middle class." The economic and social facts are one thing. Psychological feelings may or may not be associated with them in rationally expected ways. Both are important, and if psychological feelings and political outlooks do not correspond to economic or occupational class, we must try to find out why, rather than throw out the economic baby with the psychological bath, and so fail to understand how either fits into the national tub." [Mills 1962, p. 317]

This way of framing the paradox has been endorsed by such different observers as Lipset and Bendix (1967) and Bottomore (1965).

Yet, the more detailed cross-national comparisons suggest that the problem has been wrongly conceptualized from the first. A paradox does indeed exist, but not the one usually posed. For it appears that, in terms of intergenerational mobility (Treiman and Terrell 1975) or political partisanship (tables 4 and 5), the United States is less rigidly structured than Great Britain. But this *weaker class structuration* (Giddens 1973) seems not to entail a less clear perception of one's class position. *This* paradox suggests two conclusions about the role of class perceptions in contemporary society. First, such phenomena as mobility and political partisanship may be far less important in facilitating class perceptions than was first supposed. Instead, class perceptions may be determined quite directly by the class system itself, in which case there is no need to disparage ordinary workers' abilities to recognize the system of privilege surrounding them. Second, we need to question assertions of causation in the other direction: that clarity of class perceptions is the major cause of greater political or social polarization. We should recall once again that the social phenomena of intergenerational mobility or party organization need not depend on individual-level psychological processes but have a social dynamic of their own that is best understood *sui generis*.

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Labor Unionism and Racial Income Inequality: A Time-Series Analysis of the Post-World War II Period

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In this paper the effects of labor unionism on the degree of interracial and intrarace income inequality in the post-World War II period are investigated. Two opposing theoretical positions are outlined: the first views unionism as a means of maintaining the favorable economic status of whites to the detriment of nonwhites, whereas the second position views unionism as a manifestation of the consciousness of the working class in capitalistic society. The former point of view predicts that gains in unionism will lead to heightened between-race inequality but reduced within-race inequality. The latter suggests that such increases will produce declines in both between- and within-race inequality. Using a national aggregate time series for the 1947-74 period, this study found more support for the white-protectionist than for the class-consciousness interpretation.

Conceptually, inequality can be decomposed into between-race and within-race components. This paper is directed toward determining the degree to which changes in labor unionism have affected these elements of income inequality. Specifically, I wish to investigate whether labor unionism in the postwar period has tended to reduce income disparity between whites and nonwhites as well as among whites and nonwhites.

In brief, there are two different views of the effects of unionization on income inequality. First, it can be argued that unions have acted as a mechanism protecting the social interests and economic status of white labor from competition and work instability due to the vagaries of the economic order. If this view is correct, it is reasonable to anticipate that unionization would have the effect of increasing inequality between races although decreasing inequality among white laborers. The second position holds that labor unionism is a worker's movement to protect labor from exploitation at the hands of capitalists. From this perspective, conditions of increased unionization reflect gains in worker solidarity which should yield economic benefits to both white and nonwhite labor. If this view is accurate, it would be predicted that unionization would reduce income inequality both within and between races. This paper will try to evaluate the relative merits of these two hypotheses as applied to the post-World War II period in the United States.

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UNIONISM AS WHITE PROTECTIONISM

In an attempt to explain the economically inferior position of blacks in capitalist society, especially their high rate of unemployment, Bonacich (1972, 1975, 1976) has advanced a "split labor market" hypothesis.¹ Her perspective involves the interrelationships among profit-maximizing capitalists, numerically superior and more expensive white labor, and cheaper black labor. For historical reasons a wage differential exists between black and white workers. Faced with increased labor militancy among whites, capitalists turn toward the cheaper supply of minority labor in order to maximize profit margins. White workers, threatened with having their position undermined, attempt to protect their interests by constructing barriers which segregate and isolate blacks in the labor market. One of the prime mechanisms for accomplishing this goal is the labor union. Unions, therefore, become instrumental in maintaining the privileged position of whites in the labor market.

For the most part the American labor movement has been a white man's movement dedicated to improving the status of skilled labor in the crafts, and it has shown a marked antipathy toward nonwhite workers and the problems of nonwhites (Estey 1976, pp. 74-75; Hill 1967, 1969; Jacobson 1968; Kain 1969; Marshall 1965, 1977; Olson 1970; Wolters 1970). This trend was especially prevalent in the early days of the movement, and particularly characteristic of the American Federation of Labor (AFL). While part of this hostility was undoubtedly attributable to simple race prejudice, it was exacerbated by employers' use of black strikebreakers in the Great Steel Strike of 1919 as well as in numerous lesser-known labor disputes early in this century (Bonacich 1976). Whether because of racism or labor antagonism, blacks and other minorities were often either prohibited from joining union ranks altogether or relegated to membership in segregated locals. In addition to such exclusion and segregation, many unions discriminated by maintaining segregated seniority lines codified into collective-bargaining contracts and by refusing to admit minorities into apprenticeship training for the crafts (Hill 1967, 1969; Marshall 1965). Thus there was a tendency to deny nonwhites the protective cover of union contracts as well as to erect barriers hampering their access to skilled jobs. And in certain sections of the country, notably in the South, unions sought to replace skilled black artisans in the crafts with white labor (Hill 1967; Marshall 1965).

The movement's antipathy toward nonwhite labor was based not only

¹ Although not entirely dissimilar, Bonacich's "split labor market" hypothesis should not be confused with the theory of the dual economy (Averitt 1968; Beck, Horan, and Tolbert 1978), with labor market segmentation theory (Edwards, Reich, and Gordon 1975), or with internal-external labor market theories (Doeringer and Piore 1971; Spilerman 1977).

on racial prejudice and hostility to "scab" labor, but also on the AFL's antagonism toward industrial unionism and resistance to organizing low-skilled and unskilled labor in general (Olson 1970). Since nonwhites have been concentrated in the lesser skilled jobs, their incorporation into the labor movement has been inextricably bound to the growth of industrial unionism. With the creation of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) in 1937, nonwhites had a more viable entrée to organized labor, and by 1945 6.7% of the CIO membership was black as opposed to 3.4% of the AFL (Kain 1969). While the generally more liberal attitude of the CIO toward nonwhites is well documented (Hill 1967; Hutchinson 1967; Jacobson 1968; Kain 1969; Marshall 1965; Olson 1970), it is only since the merger of the CIO with the AFL in 1955 that nonwhites have formed an alliance, albeit uneasy at times, with the mainstream of organized labor (Hill 1967; Hutchinson 1967; Marshall 1965).

Even in more recent times, however, the racial practices of unions have been questioned (Hutchinson 1967; Jacobson 1968; Marshall 1965). Jacobson (1968) notes that the AFL-CIO refused to endorse the 1963 civil rights march on Washington and also denied support for affirmative-action policies, although it did advocate passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (Hutchinson 1967). Marshall (1965, pp. 53-85) has documented in some detail the stormy relations between the NAACP and the AFL-CIO in the early 1960s. Referring to organized labor a decade ago, Jacobson (1968, p. 12) writes, "It [the AFL-CIO] has been unable to meet the special needs and problems of the Negro working class because it cannot truly recognize its existence. Left to its own resources, it cannot eliminate discriminatory practices within the house of labor since it refuses to acknowledge how widespread they are." Further he comments (Jacobson 1968, p. 21), "There is little room to doubt that a high percentage of the American working class—above all, the industrial proletariat, many of them union members—is violently racist." Similarly, Hutchinson (1967, p. 423) notes that "discrimination . . . occurs in some degree in virtually every trade union in the United States." Discussing the contemporary scene, Marshall (1977) has pointed out that while unions may not ordinarily create discrimination, they can use discrimination to segregate nonwhites into less desirable jobs, thus protecting whites from competition for better employment. In Marshall's view many unions represent, then, a mechanism for preserving whites' monopoly control over job availability and job status.

The "white protectionist" position outlined here argues that labor unionism has helped maintain the privileged position of white workers vis-à-vis minority workers. If this interpretation of the evolution of the labor movement is correct, we should find that increases in unionization are associated with increases in interracial income inequality. Further, since labor

unions are primarily associations of lower-income workers, it would be expected that gains in unionization would tend to reduce the income inequality among all whites.

UNIONISM AS WORKING-CLASS SOLIDARITY

The second perspective is based on a neo-Marxist interpretation of class relations in capitalistic society, especially the continuing conflict between capital and labor (Hill 1974; Reich 1971; Szymanski 1976). The fundamental postulate of the neo-Marxist position is that capitalists benefit from any and all divisions among the working class and that, regardless of their source, such cleavages tend to yield economic advantage to the capitalist class through the weakening of working-class solidarity (Cain 1976; Gordon 1972; Marshall 1974). Racism and racial discrimination are viewed as just one of the means for creating disharmony among white and nonwhite workers (Beck 1979; Cain 1976; Cherry 1977; Marshall 1974; Reich 1971). Baron (1975, p. 203) summarizes this "divide and conquer" hypothesis: "... management can use racial divisions to foster antagonisms among its employees and to weaken the bargaining position of its work force as a unit."

From the neo-Marxist perspective, labor unionism is seen as the articulation of working-class self-interests. When they are able to organize, workers can strengthen their collective position relative to employers and thereby gain economic advantage by forcing upward the price of labor. This suggests that when there is strong class solidarity—high union membership—the economic status of all workers should be increased. Hence, from the point of view of the neo-Marxists, we are led to anticipate that gains in unionization will be associated with decrements in both interracial and intraracial income inequality.

Hill (1974) has investigated the "divide and conquer" hypothesis using cross-sectional secondary data on 63 Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA). He reports significant positive zero-order correlations between the degree of unionization and average nonwhite family income as well as between unionization and the ratio of nonwhite family income to white family income—his measure of racial income inequality. These zero-order relationships are consistent with the neo-Marxist hypothesis that heightened worker solidarity reaps benefits for both white and nonwhite workers and thereby reduces inequality between races. Pursuing the analysis with multiple regression techniques, Hill finds that the significant relationships between unionization and nonwhite income remain intact even after controlling on several social and economic characteristics of the SMSAs. The relationship between unionization and the racial income ratio disappears, however, when controlling on the average nonwhite family

income and the characteristics of the metropolitan areas. This latter finding does not, however, invalidate the basic conclusion that interracial income disparities are less in highly unionized urban labor markets than in markets less unionized.

Although not approaching the unionization question from a Marxist point of view, Ashenfelter (1972) finds, utilizing cross-sectional data from the 1967 Survey of Economic Opportunity, that there is suggestive evidence that the presence of industrial unionism reduces the inequality between races, whereas the presence of craft-oriented unions tends to be associated with greater interracial inequality. In fact, he argues that there is little difference in inequality between markets organized by craft-oriented unions and the nonunionized markets. Nevertheless, after considering several bodies of data, Ashenfelter (1972, p. 461) concludes that there is ample evidence that the degree of racial income inequality is consistently less in union-controlled labor markets than in nonunionized markets. These results are consistent with those of Hill (1974), and they generally support the view that unionization strengthens worker solidarity and thereby produces economic gains for both white and nonwhite workers.

Further evidence is provided by data compiled by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (1972) from the 1971 Current Population Survey. The first part of table 1 presents the ratio of median annual earnings of male union workers to male nonunion workers by race. These ratios show that whites in blue-collar occupations and nonwhites, regardless of occupation, derive clear benefits from union membership insofar as their median earnings are superior to nonunionized male workers. The second part of table 1

TABLE 1
MEDIAN ANNUAL EARNINGS OF YEAR-ROUND, FULL-TIME
WAGE-AND-SALARY MALE WORKERS, 1970
A. RATIO OF MEDIAN EARNINGS:
UNION TO NONUNION WORKERS

	White Males	Nonwhite Males
All occupations.....	.98	1.31
Blue-collar occupations.....	1.18	1.42

B. RATIO OF MEDIAN EARNINGS:
NONWHITES TO WHITES

	Unionized Workers	Nonunionized Workers
All occupations.....	.83	.62
Blue-collar occupations.....	.85	.70

SOURCE.—Compiled from data published by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (1972).

gives the ratios of median earnings of nonwhite male workers to white male workers by union membership. These summary data suggest that although unionized nonwhites do not have earnings parity with unionized whites, they enjoy a relatively better economic status than nonunionized nonwhites: in the blue-collar occupations unionized nonwhites receive 85% of the earnings of unionized whites, while among the nonunionized, nonwhites earn only 70% of the earnings of whites. These cross-sectional data suggest that not only are nonwhite union workers better off than their nonunion counterparts, but there is less earnings discrepancy between white and nonwhite workers among the unionized than among the non-unionized.

While these data are consistent with the class-consciousness hypothesis, they are far from being conclusive and cannot be accepted uncritically. First, there is no *a priori* rationale for evaluating white-nonwhite inequality at only one point, the median, on the earnings distribution: a broader, more comprehensive measure is demanded if the major hypothesis is to receive a robust test. Second, it is exceptionally hazardous to reach conclusions concerning social processes based on analyses of static cross-sectional data: longitudinal data must be brought to bear on the issue if we are to understand the dynamics of stratification.

The white-protectionist and worker-solidarity arguments outlined above provide two opposing interpretations of the labor movement. While historical materials seem to support the former view, more recent cross-sectional research tends to favor the latter explanation. An attempt to clarify these issues will be made by examining a nationally aggregated time series for the post-World War II period.

DATA AND MEASUREMENT

The basic data employed in this paper are an annual time series of summary statistics of unionization and income inequality at the national level for the period 1947-74. The measure of unionization is the percentage of nonagricultural employment belonging to labor unions (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1975*a*; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 1977). The primary indicators of inequality are computed from the distributions of total money income for males 14 years old or older, 1948-74 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1977). The within-race components are taken as the Gini coefficients for the distributions of white and nonwhite male total incomes, whereas the between-race component is assessed by the Index of Dissimilarity computed between these two distributions. It should be noted that this indicator of interracial inequality differs considerably from the one often used. Many investigations of discrimination use the ratio of median nonwhite income to median white income as a measure of racial income inequality. This procedure has the obvious fault of assessing racial differ-

ences at only one point on the income distribution, the fiftieth percentile. The Index of Dissimilarity does not have this liability since it reflects racial discrepancies throughout the income distribution. (See U.S. Bureau of the Census [1970a] for a discussion of the index.)

In addition to the measurement of inequality among males, I also utilize summary data computed from the distributions of total money income for families, 1947-74 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1970a, 1970b, 1971, 1972, 1973, 1975b, 1976a, 1976b, 1977). Within-race inequality is measured by the Gini coefficients for the distributions of total income for white and nonwhite families, while the between-race component is measured by the Index of Dissimilarity between these two distributions.

Before progressing further, two issues demand explicit discussion: first, should the time series be lengthened; and second, should unionization be decomposed into separate time series for "craft" and "industrial" unions.

The restriction of the analysis to the postwar period deserves some justification. It could be argued that the time series should be expanded, since the most dramatic growth periods in unionization in this century took place after the passage of the Wagner Act in 1935 and again during the war years, 1941-45. However, this is not possible, since annual data on income are not available by race for the prewar period. Thus, although there are published data on unionization extending to 1897, measures of the dependent variables are limited to the postwar years. But even if such data were available, it would be questionable whether the 1941-45 period should be included in the expanded series given the atypical and rather unique circumstances of labor during the war years.

As for the second issue, historically the distinction between craft and industrial unions has been considered important for a variety of reasons, not the least of which was the more liberal disposition of the latter toward minority labor. This suggests the vitality of decomposing unionization into separate time series for craft and industrial unions. While such a strategy would seem worthwhile, there are several reasons why this course was not pursued.

First, it is not at all obvious how such a decomposition would fit into the class-consciousness perspective. That position argues that labor unionism represents a manifestation of working-class solidarity, and that increases in solidarity will lead to less inequality. One of the major proponents of this perspective, Szymanski (1976), makes no conceptual distinction between craft and industrial unions vis-à-vis the unionization-as-worker-solidarity issue. If one agrees with Szymanski, there is little ground for believing that the class-consciousness interpretation is more valid for industrial unions than for craft unions. Therefore, there is little theoretical justification from the class-consciousness position for such a decomposition.



Second, the distinction between craft and industrial unions has become increasingly blurred in the postwar period, especially after the merger of the CIO with the AFL. In 1975, for example, of the 57 unions affiliated with the AFL-CIO's Industrial Union Department, almost half (30) were also affiliated with one or more of the AFL-CIO's Trade Union Departments (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 1977). Furthermore, there has been a dilution of the craft-industrial distinction through the creation, often by merger, of new unions which do not fall clearly into either camp. The 1968 merger of the Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of America with the United Packinghouse, Food, and Allied Workers, or the merger of the Cigar Makers' International Union with the Retail, Wholesale, and Department Store Union in 1974, are but two recent illustrations of craft-oriented unions being absorbed by industry-oriented unions. Another example of this dilution is the 1972 merger of two craft-oriented unions, the Lithographers and Photoengravers International Union and the International Brotherhood of Bookbinders to form the Graphic Arts International Union, an affiliate of the AFL-CIO's Industrial Union Department. Between 1955 and 1977 there were 30 mergers within the AFL-CIO structure itself (AFL-CIO 1977, 2:51-52), and 57 total mergers within organized labor (Dewey 1971; Janus 1978).

In addition to mergers, the situation is further muddled by the stormy internal politics of the AFL-CIO. Even a cursory inspection of AFL-CIO rolls in the postwar period will show a legacy of expulsions, affiliations, disaffiliations, title changes, and disbandings. Two of the most notable of these were the 1957 expulsion of the 1,338,000-member International Brotherhood of Teamsters and the 1968 withdrawal of the 1,325,000-member United Automobile Workers. In brief, then, it is debatable whether the traditional distinction between craft and industrial unions remains as viable as it once was, and at best the distinction has often become obscure. Second, even if the distinction has conceptual relevance, it is not clear that it would be possible to effectively operationalize the dichotomy.²

And last, even in the early days of the labor movement, only a relatively small fraction of the total number of unionists was affiliated with industrial unions. Even at the peak of its relative strength in 1937, the CIO had only one member for every 1.6 members in the AFL, and by 1955 when they merged, the AFL had over twice as many members (Troy 1965,

² Even cross-sectional studies of unionization and discrimination have not dealt with the proposed craft-industrial division adequately. While Hill (1974) makes the distinction between craft and industrial unions in his conceptualization of the relationship between unionization and inequality, he is unable to maintain this division and resorts to using undifferentiated aggregate unionization in his empirical analysis. Similarly, in his study of discrimination and unionism, Ashenfelter (1972) sorts workers according to whether or not they are employed in a "craft dominated" industry rather than by the nature of the union itself.

p. 9). It would not be unfair, therefore, to characterize the American labor movement in this century as one dominated by AFL-styled unionism; thus to hypothesize about unionism in the United States is, by implication, to make hypotheses about craft unionism.

In sum, for the reasons outlined above I have not attempted to decompose unionization into separate time series and will take the aggregate level of unionization as the major independent variable in the analyses.

TRENDS IN UNIONIZATION AND INEQUALITY

Figure 1 presents the trends in union membership, both in absolute numbers and as a percentage of nonagricultural employment, for the 1947-74 period. These data show clearly that while there has been an overall upward trend in the number of union members the degree of unionization of the work force has been declining. Specifically, since 1954, when there was a peak in relative membership of 34.7%, the percentage of nonagricultural employees belonging to labor unions has declined to 25.8% in 1974; yet the absolute number of members has grown by 3,177,000 workers over this same period (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1975a; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 1977). Thus the observed decline in the relative strength of unions is due to the rapid growth of the labor force associated with the lightly unionized segments of the industrial economy and is not attributable to any decrement in the number of workers in union ranks.

Figure 2 displays the trends in inter- and intrarace income inequality among males in the postwar period. As can be seen from this graph, since 1951 there has been a general decline in the levels of interracial income in-




FIG. 1.—Union membership, 1947-74




FIG. 2.—Inter- and intrarace income inequality, 1948-75

equality. The trends for intrarace inequality are, however, more complicated. Income inequality among white males and nonwhite males increased from 1951 through 1959 for nonwhites and from 1951 through 1961 for whites and has been more or less stable since. While the general patterns for whites and nonwhites have been similar, figure 2 shows that there has been greater variation in the inequality trend for nonwhites. This is consistent with the view that the aggregate status of nonwhites is more sensitive to cyclical influence than is the aggregate status of whites.

From a comparison of the trends in figures 1 and 2 it would appear that declines in unionization have been associated with lowered levels of interracial inequality. This apparent covariation is opposite to what would be expected under the class-consciousness hypothesis. That is, from that perspective we are led to anticipate an inverse relationship between unionization and interracial inequality rather than the observed positive association. From both the class-consciousness and white-protectionist perspectives, however, we expect an inverse relationship between unionization and intrarace inequality. A comparison of figure 1 and figure 2 seems to support this hypothesis, insofar as declines in unionization appear to covary with moderate increases in intrarace inequality, especially among nonwhite males.

While figures 1 and 2 visually display the trends in unionization and inequality in the postwar period, they provide little firm evidence on how these factors have interrelated over time. To address this issue, and to attack more directly the issues raised earlier in this paper, a time-series relationship between inequality and unionization must be specified.

SPECIFICATION OF A MODEL

A natural specification of a regression model in which to explore the relationship between inequality and labor unionism would be:

$$\text{INEQUALITY}_t = \alpha + \beta_1(\% \text{UNIONIZATION}_{t,t-1}) + \beta_2(\text{TREND}_t) + u_t, \quad (1)$$

where TREND_t is a time trend variable and u_t is a random disturbance. The inclusion of the trend variable has the effect of removing the linear time trend from the data such that β_1 is the linear effect of unionization on detrended measures of intra- and interracial inequality. Furthermore, the trend variable can be interpreted as a proxy for excluded variables which have linearly affected inequality over time. Since there is little a priori reason to anticipate whether unionization should have a contemporaneous or a lagged effect on inequality, the regression should be estimated twice: once with the contemporaneous value of unionization being the predetermining variable and once with the lagged value. This renders the least constrained test of the hypotheses.

While the specification above has the virtue of simplicity, there may be factors which affect both inequality and unionization but which have been excluded from the regression. If such excluded factors are linearly related to time, their effects will be absorbed by the trend variable, as noted above. However, if these factors are not related to time, their exclusion could result in a spurious relationship between inequality and unionization, thereby biasing the analysis. Any excluded variable which is either strongly positively or strongly negatively associated with both inequality and unionization would tend to bias the results toward the white-protectionist position. On the other hand, if the factor is positively associated with one but negatively related to the other, the bias would favor the class-consciousness interpretation. A prime candidate for such an excluded variable is the state of the economy.

In their study of the American labor movement since 1900, Ashenfelter and Pencavel (1969) found that one of the factors influencing union growth is the workers' assessments of the benefits to be derived from union membership. They contend that during inflationary times, when prices are rising faster than real dollar wages, workers join unions in the hope that collective bargaining will raise real wages and thereby profit the workers by restoring their lost purchasing power. On the other hand, when prices are stable, or even declining, there is less inducement to join because the benefits are more obscure and the costs of membership higher. Therefore it is reasonable to anticipate that the general state of the economy will be correlated with unionization because historically it has been during inflationary growth periods that unions have increased their membership.

As for inequality, it has often been noted that minority labor tends to improve its economic status during times of economic expansion and tight labor markets (Tobin 1965; Masters 1975). During growth periods in the economy, employers are less likely to engage in discriminatory practices since the costs of discrimination are greater. The net result is that minority labor experiences an increase in economic status and an improvement in its relative position vis-à-vis white labor. Thus it would be expected that the degree of inequality will also be associated with the general state of the economy.

In sum, it is likely that the general economic conditions which are associated with growth, inflationary pressure, and tight labor markets will be correlated with both unionization and inequality. Thus to reach a reasonably unfettered assessment of the effects of labor unionism on inequality, and to avoid possibly spurious conclusions, it is necessary to control on general economic conditions. While there are a variety of possible indicators which could be employed, I elect to utilize two measures comparable to those employed by Masters (1975) and Ashenfelter and Pencavel (1969): the aggregate unemployment rate (%UNEMP) and the annual change in the Consumer Price Index (Δ CPI).³ The final regression model is, therefore, composed of the degree of unionization, changes in the Consumer Price Index, aggregate rate of unemployment, a time trend, and a random disturbance.⁴

$$\text{INEQUALITY}_t = \alpha + \beta_1(\text{UNIONIZATION}_{t,t-1}) + \beta_2(\% \text{UNEMP}_t) + \beta_3(\Delta \text{CPI}_t) + \beta_4(\text{TREND}_t) + u_t. \quad (2)$$

While the specification above is not complex, there is some evidence that it is unlikely that major variables have been excluded from the model. Anticipating the empirical findings somewhat, I will show that in most instances these predetermining variables account for the largest share of the variance in inequality. This significantly reduces the likelihood of having excluded important variables which are unrelated to time or to general economic conditions.

³ Ashenfelter and Pencavel (1969) use the rate of change in prices while the absolute change is employed here, $\Delta \text{CPI}_t = (\text{CPI}_t - \text{CPI}_{t-1})$, where CPI_t is the Consumer Price Index for year t (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1976c).

⁴ Although I argue that aggregate unemployment should be controlled in the regressions, a counterargument could be made. One of the ways which unionization can indirectly affect inequality is through stabilizing the demand for labor and hence reducing inequality. If this specification is correct we would not want to control on unemployment since such a tactic could lead to the erroneous conclusion that unionization has little or no effect on inequality. I replicated the analyses presented in the text deleting the unemployment variable from the regressions. The results of these additional analyses were substantially identical to those presented here. This obviates the counterargument.

ANALYSIS: MALE INCOME

The regressions were first estimated using an ordinary least-squares solution, but the generally low values of the Durbin-Watson statistics suggested nontrivial positive autocorrelation among the residuals. Although the ordinary least-squares estimators of the coefficients remain unbiased in the presence of autocorrelation, there is biased estimation of their variances, which most commonly results in an inflation of the coefficients' *t*-ratios (Hanushek and Jackson 1977, pp. 141-78). To avoid this potential problem I reestimated, by generalized least squares, each regression assuming a significant first-order autocorrelation.⁵ For completeness the ordinary least-squares and first-order autoregressive estimates of each coefficient are presented.

Table 2 gives the effects of unionization on within-race male income inequality and between-race male income inequality. From the results presented here it is evident that unionization has a slight inverse relationship with the degree of income inequality among white males. This finding is expected and consistent with both the white-protectionist and the class-consciousness perspectives outlined previously. The relationship may have resulted from gains in unionization increasing the economic status of lower-income white males thereby reducing the dispersion of white male incomes. This effect is not, however, very strong. A 10-point increase in unionization results in only a 0.03-point decline in the Gini coefficient for white males. While the relationship meets the criterion for significance and is in the expected direction, its small magnitude certainly suggests that unionization has not been a major factor in reducing income inequality among white males in the post-World War II period.⁶

There is evidence from both the ordinary least-squares and autoregressive estimates in table 2 that gains in unionization have modestly increased the extent of inequality among nonwhite males. This may reflect the tendency for unionization to benefit only the most skilled nonwhite males, thus increasing the relative dispersion of nonwhite incomes. This interpretation would be consistent with Villemez and Wiswell's (1978) findings that over the past two decades the decreasing black-white inequality is largely due to gains made by those at the top of the black income distribution. This effect is, however, not very substantial: a 10-point change in labor unionism, lagged one year, yields an approximately 0.07-point gain in the Gini coefficient for nonwhite males. The diminutive magnitude of this effect demonstrates that unionization has had only a small, albeit

⁵ The first-order autoregressions were estimated using a two-stage generalized least-squares procedure which is publicly available in the SAS software package (Barr et al. 1976).

⁶ A coefficient is considered substantively significant if it is statistically significant at the .10 level.

TABLE 2
REGRESSIONS OF RACIAL COMPONENTS OF MALE INCOME INEQUALITY ON UNIONIZATION AND CONTROL VARIABLES

COMPONENT	% UNIONIZATION					TREND _t	$\hat{\rho}^a$	\bar{R}^2
	CONSTANT	t	t-1	%UNEMP _t	Δ CP1 _t			
Ordinary least-squares solutions:								
Within-race components:								
White Gini coefficient.....	.485*	-.003*004*	-.135*	.000	.3031	.8701*
Nonwhite Gini coefficient.....	.426*	...	-.001	.002*	-.147*	.001*	.4160	.7645*
Between-race component:	.235*	.004*009*	-.125	.003*	.4322	.7640*
Index of dissimilarity.....	.132*007*	.005*	-.140*	.004*	.5075	.7859*
First-order autoregressive solutions:								
Within-race components:								
White Gini coefficient.....	18.152	.619*	...	-.548	-5.376	-.357*	.2039	.8837*
Nonwhite Gini coefficient.....	34.568*135	-.454	-9.177	-.510*	.1100	.8787*
Between-race component:								
Index of dissimilarity.....	.492*	-.003*003*	-.124*	.000	.2915	.8212*
Within-race components:	.405*000	.001	-.132*	.001*	.3659	.6715*
White Gini coefficient.....	.334*	.001008*	-.136*	.002*	.4110	.6735*
Nonwhite Gini coefficient.....	.150*007*	.005*	-1.138*	.004*	.4506	.6848*
Between-race component:								
Index of dissimilarity.....	14.422	.728*	...	-.571	-5.427	-.319*	.1940	.8436*
	37.072*059	-.436	-9.615	-.531*	.0994	.8576*

NOTE.—Contemporaneous and lagged regressions are for the period 1948-74.
^a Estimate of the first-order autocorrelation coefficient. Coefficients greater than |.35| indicate nontrivial correlation.
 * Significant at the .10 level.

statistically significant, impact on the inequality in the distribution of non-white male incomes.

As for the degree of inequality between races, the results in table 2 reveal that unionization has tended to be associated with increased racial income differences. A 10-point change in unionization is predicted to result in a 6.19–7.28-point change, depending on whether one takes the ordinary least-squares or the autoregressive estimate, in the Index of Dissimilarity between white and nonwhite male incomes. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that unions have served as a means for protecting the economic status of white labor to the relative detriment of nonwhite male workers. There is certainly no evidence in table 2 to bolster the hypothesis that unionization has reduced racial income differences as predicted by the neo-Marxist perspective.

ANALYSIS: FAMILY INCOME

While the usage of family income as a dependent variable is of dubious value in investigating the effects of unionization on labor market discrimination (Ashenfelter 1970, p. 415), it is worthwhile to see if changes in the level of union activity have produced effects altering the economic condition of white and nonwhite families, themselves relevant socioeconomic units. Furthermore, the use of family income inequality will facilitate comparison of the time-series analysis with the cross-sectional results reported by Hill (1974), who also used the family as the unit of analysis.

Table 3 gives the ordinary least-squares and first-order autoregressive estimates of the effects of unionization on the components of inequality for family incomes after controlling on changes in the Consumer Price Index and aggregate unemployment. These summary data reveal that there has been no relationship between changes in unionization and the degree of income inequality among nonwhite families, nor has there been any significant effect of unionization on the degree of inequality between white and nonwhite families. There is evidence, however, that gains in unionization have led to declines in the inequality among white families, although this effect is rather small. A 10-percentage-point increase in unionization is translated into a modest 0.03-point reduction in the Gini coefficient for white families. While this relationship exceeds normal criteria for statistical significance, it seems to lack overwhelming substantive importance because of the small magnitude of the unionization coefficient.

Whereas previously it was found that unionization tended to exacerbate the inequality between white and nonwhite males, the results in table 3 suggest that unionization has not produced any similar effects on the inequality between white and nonwhite families. There are a variety of hy-

TABLE 3
REGRESSIONS OF RACIAL COMPONENTS OF FAMILY INCOME INEQUALITY ON UNIONIZATION AND CONTROL VARIABLES

COMPONENT	%UNIONIZATION					TREND _t	$\hat{\rho}^a$	\bar{R}^2
	CONSTANT	t	t-1	%UNEMP _t	ACPI _t			
Ordinary least-squares solutions:								
Within-race components:								
White Gini coefficient.....	.460*	-.003*004*	.002	-.002*	.4275	.6856*
	.440*	...	-.003*	.003*	-.047	-.002*	.2007	.5855*
Nonwhite Gini coefficient.....	.346*	.000009*	.071*	-.001	-.2618	.6383*
	.376*	...	-.000	.007*	.050	-.001	-.0450	.4295*
Between-race component:								
Index of dissimilarity.....	38.425*	.025304	-7.001	-.515*	.3628	.8574*
	32.796*215	.018	-9.853	-.464*	.3933	.8616*
First-order autoregressive solutions:								
Within-race components:								
White Gini coefficient.....	.458*	-.003*004*	.004	-.002*	.4175	.5907*
	.417*	...	-.002*	.003*	-.044	-.001*	.1950	.5047*
Nonwhite Gini coefficient.....	.357*	.000010*	.070*	-.001*	-.2593	.7498*
	.372*000	.007*	.049	-.001	-.0399	.4524*
Between-race component:								
Index of dissimilarity.....	40.682*	-.015089	-6.184	-.519*	.3628	.7563*
	33.858*207	-.182	-9.815	-.457*	.3813	.7636*

NOTE.—Contemporaneous regressions cover period 1947-74; lagged regressions are for the period 1948-74.
^a Estimate of the first-order autocorrelation coefficient. Coefficients greater than [.35] indicate nontrivial correlation.
 * Significant at the .10 level.

potheses which could be formulated to explain this outcome, but let us first take a closer look at the measurement of interracial inequality.

It is possible that the indicator of between-race inequality, the Index of Dissimilarity, is too global a measure of racial income discrepancies and lacks sensitivity because of aggregating income differences over the entire range of incomes. To overcome this potential complication, I did additional analyses by regressing the ratio of nonwhite family income to white family income evaluated at the upper limits of the twentieth, fortieth, sixtieth, and eightieth percentiles on the degree of unionization, aggregate unemployment, changes in the CPI, and a time trend.⁷ Table 4 presents the ordinary least-squares and first-order autoregressive estimates of the coefficients for these regressions. As can be seen from these results, there is empirical evidence from both statistical solutions that unionization has reduced the income ratio at the twentieth and fortieth percentiles. Thus gains in the level of unionization have been associated with a declining relative position of nonwhite families. This relationship exists, however, only for families at the lower end of the income distribution. There is no evidence in table 4 that the extent of unionization has had any significant impact on the degree of interracial inequality at either the sixtieth or eightieth percentiles. This is not altogether surprising, since it would be anticipated that few high-income families, of either race, would contain workers covered by union contracts.

In sum, the regressions using the Index of Dissimilarity measure of between-race inequality, table 3, showed that unionization had little impact on inequality between nonwhite and white families; yet the results presented in table 4 contradict this result insofar as at two specific points of comparison, the twentieth and fortieth percentiles, gains in unionization have led to heightened interracial inequality. These findings suggest the conclusion that unionization has not had any particularly significant effects on the overall degree of inequality between white and nonwhite families, but to the extent to which unionization has had an impact, this has been to increase racial differences among families relegated to the lower income levels. This conclusion is consistent with the evidence presented in table 2 concerning the role of unionization in increasing inequality between white and nonwhite males. That is, the results seem to provide support for the hypothesis that unionization has been a mechanism for protecting the economic interests of white labor. This effect of unionization has had its greatest impact on male income inequality, although there is some evidence that it has also affected inequality among family units, at least at the lower income levels.

⁷ These ratios were obtained by dividing the upper limit of each fifth of the nonwhite income distribution by the upper income limit of each fifth of the white family income distribution.

TABLE 4
REGRESSIONS OF FAMILY INCOME RATIO AT DIFFERENT PERCENTILES ON UNIONIZATION AND CONTROL VARIABLES

	NONWHITE/WHITE INCOME RATIO	% UNIONIZATION					TREND _t	$\hat{\rho}^a$	\bar{R}^2
		CONSTANT	t	t-1	%UNEMP _t	Δ CPI _t			
Ordinary least-squares solutions (by percentile):									
20th.....		.841*	-.012*	...011*	-.012*	.043	.003	.0496	.8089*
		.798*	...	-.011*	-.010*	-.137	.004*	.1137	.8074*
40th.....		.795*	-.007*	...010*	-.018*	-.022	.003*	.2016	.8047*
		.850*	...	-.010*	-.011*	.004	.002	.1641	.7596*
60th.....		.609*	-.001	...011*	-.011*	.005	.005*	.4953	.7589*
		.638*	...	-.002	-.005	.188	.004*	.5086	.7429*
80th.....		.450*	.004	...002	-.008*	.157	.009*	.0004	.8621*
		.508*002	-.005	.298*	.007*	.0696	.8638*
First-order autoregressive solutions (by percentile):									
20th.....		.840*	-.012*	...012*	-.012*	.046	.003	.0476	.7937*
		.830*	...	-.012*	-.011*	-.158	.003*	.1050	.8399*
40th.....		.782*	-.007*	...015*	-.015*	-.015	.002	.2008	.7397*
		.809*	...	-.009*	-.009*	-.006	.002	.1475	.7036*
60th.....		.623*	-.002	...001	-.006	-.029	.004*	.4899	.5814*
		.501*001	-.001	.126	.005*	.5850	.5655*
80th.....		.450*	.004	...002	-.008*	.157	.008*	.0000	.8621*
		.516*002	-.005	.296*	.007*	.0692	.8482*

NOTE.—Contemporaneous regressions cover period 1947-74; lagged regressions are for the period 1948-74.
^a Estimate of the first-order autocorrelation coefficient. Coefficients greater than |.35| indicate nontrivial correlation.
 * Significant at the .10 level.

DISCUSSION

Two opposing viewpoints on the effects of labor unionism on interracial and intrarace income inequality have been presented. The first position holds that unions are an articulation of the desire of whites to monopolize control of labor supply and represent organized barriers preventing nonwhites from undermining the favorable labor market position of white workers. This interpretation is bolstered by a wealth of historical evidence of the *de jure* and *de facto* discriminatory practices of unions, especially in the first half of this century. This perspective leads to the hypothesis that increases in labor unionism will result in greater income inequality between whites and nonwhites, but less inequality among white workers.

On the other hand, other investigators, many of whom write from a neo-Marxist perspective, have argued for a social class interpretation whereby the movement is seen as a manifestation of the awakening class consciousness of labor. Labor unionism is, then, the representation of the workers' growing awareness of their common exploitation by employers in capitalist society. The degree of unionization becomes a reflection of worker unity, and gains in labor solidarity are expected to be translated into economic advantages for all the working class. As a result, the neo-Marxist point of view anticipates that increases in unionism will yield decrements in interracial and intrarace income inequality.

The time-series analysis provides more support for the white-protectionist argument than for the neo-Marxist position insofar as declines in unionization produce less income inequality between white and nonwhite males. Furthermore, there is evidence that decreases in unionization tend to reduce the inequality between white and nonwhite families at the lower income levels, although no support could be found for such effects among higher-income families. This pattern may reflect a racial differential among low-income families in the likelihood of secondary wage earners securing employment in unionized labor markets. Even though the direction of these relationships is clear, their small magnitude is striking. In this regard the findings are consistent with those reported by Ashenfelter (1973, p. 111), who notes that unionism has not been a major factor affecting the inequality between black and white workers.

From either theoretical approach we are led to expect that gains in unionization will reduce inequality among white workers, and we find such a relationship for white males and for white families, although the effects are small. This latter relationship may be attributable to a propensity for secondary wage earners in low-income white families to find employment in more heavily unionized labor markets.

As for inequality among nonwhites, gains in unionism are associated with increasing inequality among males but have no discernible influence on the inequality among families. This may be due to unions affecting

primarily the most skilled males, which would have the effect of increasing the dispersion, and hence inequality, of nonwhite male incomes. Furthermore, if for nonwhite families male income represents a relatively smaller proportion of total family income, increasing inequality among males would not necessarily be translated into greater inequality among families.

While much of the previous discussion has been couched in terms of "gains" in unionization, historically labor unions have not been increasing in relative size, but declining, as noted above. It is possible that the effects, however modest, found here are not due to changes in unionism per se but are the result of gains in the relative size of the nonunionized component of the labor force. From this point of view the analysis may say more about what labor unions have failed to do than about what they have accomplished. By failing to penetrate and organize more successfully the growth of labor markets, unions seem to have been ineffectual in extending their protection to white workers in these markets.

CONCLUDING ANALYSIS AND COMMENTS

Framed in broad terms, to the degree that labor unionism is an appropriate proxy for worker solidarity, the analysis shows that declines in solidarity have not been accompanied by corresponding increases in interracial income inequality as the neo-Marxist model would have predicted. On the other hand, insofar as unionism represents a monopolistic organ of white labor, the results demonstrate that there has been a moderate trend for declines in unionization to be translated into reductions in between-race income inequality.

While these findings are consistent with the white-protectionist position, it could be argued that the union movement is changing. It would be possible to reconcile the historical investigations of Bonacich (1972, 1975, 1976) and others, the cross-sectional research of Hill (1974) and Ashenfelter (1972, 1973), and the results of this analysis by contending that the labor movement is not static but in an evolutionary process of change. If labor unions are in such a process, and if this change is one of encouraging the greater participation of minorities in the labor movement, conditions could be such that recent cross-sectional studies find that unionism reduces interracial inequality while historical and trend studies tend to show the reverse.

While data on the racial characteristics of union members are fragmentary, there is some evidence of greater minority participation in the mainstream of the American labor movement. Ashenfelter (1972) estimated that 23% of black workers were union members in 1967, and data compiled by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (1972) estimate that as of 1970 26.2% of the nonwhite, nonagricultural employment was in unions.

From these sources it would seem reasonable to believe that about one out of every four nonwhite workers was protected by union coverage as of the late 1960s, and this most certainly represents an increase over 1945, when there were only about 700,000 blacks in the combined ranks of the AFL and the CIO (Kain 1969). Thus there is evidence that the postwar period has seen a greater proportion of minority labor in the labor movement. This lends support to the notion that the labor unionism of the past few years may be very different from the movement in the years directly following the Second World War.

This change-of-effect hypothesis can be explored empirically by forming a regression model in which unionization is permitted to have different effects depending on time period. Clearly, in such a model the choice of period is crucial. While it is not intuitively obvious what that choice should be, using the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Bill seems to be a logical starting point. This additional hypothesis is tested by estimating a regression model with two unionization terms,

$$\begin{aligned} \text{INEQUALITY}_t = & \alpha + \beta_1(\% \text{UNIONIZATION}_t^{1948-63}) \\ & + \beta_2(\% \text{UNIONIZATION}_t^{1964-74}) \\ & + \beta_3(\% \text{UNEMP}_t) + \beta_4(\Delta \text{CPI}_t) \\ & + \beta_5(\text{TREND}_t) + u_t, \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

where INEQUALITY_t is the income inequality between nonwhite and white males, $\% \text{UNIONIZATION}_t^{1948-63}$ is the degree of unionization for the pre-Civil Rights Bill period, and $\% \text{UNIONIZATION}_t^{1964-74}$ is the annual level of unionization in the post-Civil Rights Bill period.⁸ If the effect of labor unionism has changed over the years, we should find $\beta_1 \neq \beta_2$; in fact, if this hypothesis is correct we should discover that β_1 is positive while β_2 is negative. This would indicate that the more recent pattern has been for labor unionism to reduce racial inequalities in income.

Using an ordinary least-squares solution, the estimates of the parameters in the model above are (standard deviations in parentheses):

$$\begin{aligned} \text{INEQUALITY}_t = & 23.243 + 0.481(\% \text{UNIONIZATION}_t^{1948-63}) \\ & (12.22) \quad (0.34) \\ & + 0.431(\% \text{UNIONIZATION}_t^{1964-74}) \\ & (0.37) \\ & - 0.707(\% \text{UNEMP}_t) \\ & (0.38) \\ & - 6.588(\Delta \text{CPI}_t) - 0.325(\text{TREND}_t) \\ & (13.01) \quad (0.11) \\ \bar{R}^2 = & .8824 \quad \hat{\rho} = .1605 \end{aligned}$$

⁸ The $\% \text{UNIONIZATION}_t^{1948-63}$ is coded equal to the level of unionization in year t if $1948 \leq t \leq 1963$, zero otherwise. Likewise, $\% \text{UNIONIZATION}_t^{1964-74}$ is coded equal to the level of unionization in year t if $1964 \leq t \leq 1974$, zero otherwise.

These results show that contrary to the change-of-effect hypothesis, there is no evidence that the effects of labor unionism differ materially between periods: the coefficient for the post-Civil Rights Bill period differs from that for the pre-1964 years only in the second decimal place. While these findings do not rule out the possibility that the more recent effects of unionism have been to reduce racial inequality, they do suggest that such effects must be of very recent origin.

In this regard three recent trends are significant: the growth of unionism among "white-collar" occupations, a rise in the percentage of women and minorities in union ranks, and an increase in unionization in the non-manufacturing sector, especially among the distributive and service-producing industries (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 1977; Estey 1976). Clearly these are interdependent since much of the union increase in the past two decades has been in industries which have large numbers of white-collar women workers. The growth of the American Federation of Teachers, the Civil Service Employees Association, the Communication Workers of America, the National Education Association, and the Retail Clerks International Association is illustrative. These very recent trends may signal a significant alteration in the basic composition of the labor movement in the United States. Regardless of the nature of the relationship between unionism and minorities in the past, it seems likely that this relationship may be qualitatively different now and into the future. Unfortunately, there are insufficient longitudinal data available to permit further comment on these trends.

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Indianapolis and Beyond: A Structural Model of Occupational Mobility across Generations¹

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Several aspects of Rogoff's classic mobility study (1953) which have influenced subsequent research are reviewed. Recently developed log-linear techniques are used to estimate the "densities" associated with intergenerational occupational moves. A structural model derived empirically from Rogoff's data for Marion County, Indiana, from 1910 to 1940, is applied to an intergenerational mobility matrix from a 1973 national sample, accounting for five-sixths of the baseline association. The results confirm the fundamental invariance of mobility trends documented by previous research. Net mobility patterns apparently reflect a mental-manual division among occupations, with the more "traditional" service sectors and farming falling in between, rather than a hierarchical status dimension.

Numerous studies have documented a fundamental temporal invariance in the transmission of occupations and social status across "generations." Notwithstanding an overall "upgrading" of the occupational distribution over time, the limited evidence bearing on changes in the dependence of occupational destinations on social/occupational origins in the United States indicates no systematic trend over the past 60–70 years (e.g., Rogoff 1953; Blau and Duncan 1967, pp. 67–113; Duncan 1965, 1966, 1968; Tully, Jackson, and Curtis 1970; Hauser and Featherman 1973, 1974; Hauser, Koffel, Travis, and Dickinson 1975; Baron 1977; cf. Featherman and Hauser 1976; Hauser, Featherman, and Hogan 1977).² These results have

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² However, a recent replication and extension of Blau and Duncan's (1967) study concludes that "with minor exceptions the evidence consistently shows a temporal decline in the strength of association between occupational origins and destinations. . . . Thus, among American men a reduction of obstacles to occupational change appeared to be a long-term and continuing tendency" (Featherman and Hauser 1978, p. 136).

focused attention on the salience of *continuity* in mobility patterns—rather than change—as a concomitant of industrial development (Hauser, Dickinson, Travis, and Koffel 1975; Burawoy 1977).

Natalie Rogoff's *Recent Trends in Occupational Mobility* (1953) was the first major empirical study to report this finding and to explore its substantive implications. Rogoff collected data on fathers' and sons' occupations for residents of Marion County, Indiana, who applied for marriage licenses there between 1905 and 1912, or between 1938 and 1941 (see Rogoff 1953, chap. 2). Her analysis and conclusions have profoundly influenced subsequent developments in conceptualizing and measuring mobility (Tyree and Hodge 1978). The Indianapolis mobility study is thus an extremely appropriate benchmark against which to examine what advances have been made in studying the structure of intergenerational occupational mobility since Rogoff's seminal analysis. This paper first reviews Rogoff's study and outlines a strategy for measuring intergenerational mobility flows among occupations. The analysis then proceeds in three steps. First, the results of a reanalysis of Rogoff's Indianapolis data (Baron 1977) are summarized. Next, the correspondence between these findings and contemporary mobility trends at the national level is examined. Finally, the dimensions of "mobility space" revealed by these analyses are considered—that is, the relationships among occupational groups as indexed by intergenerational movement among them.

ROGOFF'S ANALYSIS: CONCEPTS AND MEASURES

As Rogoff notes in her preface, the primary focus of her inquiry was methodological (1953, p. 17). Her major concern is that "if movement within the occupational structure is more restricted for some social groups than for others, this can be seen only by controlling the effect of mobility changes due to changes in the occupational structure" (Rogoff 1953, p. 30).

She constructs a set of measures which purport to separate contributions made to total mobility by the marginal distributions of origins and destinations from the "social distance" mobility which reveals "barriers, restrictions, and rigidity in the social structure" (Rogoff 1953, p. 30).

Rogoff's analysis assumes that her "social distance mobility ratio" (R_{ij}) provides a standard metric for comparing actual and expected mobility which is not confounded by the marginal distributions. However, many investigators have demonstrated that R_{ij} does not furnish such a metric and confounds "main" and "interaction" effects (Blau and Duncan 1967, pp. 93–97; Duncan 1966; Hauser 1978; Pullum 1975; Tyree 1973; White 1963; Yasuda 1964). Moreover, R_{ij} is merely a "residual" from the independence model; the "effect" associated with net (im)mobility should

be determined from the parameters of a model designed to measure that effect, not from the failure of the model to do so.

According to Rogoff, "Occupational mobility is studied as an index of the relative 'openness' of a social structure" (1953, p. 19). However, operationalizing societal "openness" in terms of the amount of intergenerational mobility focuses attention on the attainment of *individuals* (rather than on the structure of occupational *positions*) and prompts dubious extrapolations from the observed distribution of intergenerational occupational movement to multifaceted conclusions regarding "social mobility and social justice" (Goldthorpe and Hope 1972, p. 37).³

This paper approaches the mobility table as a "map" of occupational regions whose "distances" and contours are to be described in terms of the patterns of movement among them.⁴ In addition to the effects associated with social origins and occupational destinations, the "predisposition" toward intergenerational movement between (or persistence within) *situses* is an important feature of the occupational and social structure (as well as of the material and psychological experiences of individuals). Accordingly, this map is drawn by measuring the "density" or net (im)permeability of intergenerational moves. Our concern with the so-called structural effects of origins and destinations is thus contingent on our attempt to model simultaneously the underlying structure of mobility flows. "Structural" effects should be conditioned on the assignment of cells to various homogeneous regions of the mobility table, instead of treating the table as a conceptual and statistical whole by equating the structural *effects* with the row and column *marginals* (for a similar argument, see Hope [1978], p. 33).

A set of log-linear techniques developed recently by Hauser (1978) involves precisely such a partitioning of the mobility table. Thus, in addition to overcoming certain methodological inadequacies of the "independence" model, this class of models also suits a conceptualization of intergenerational mobility "regimes" as indices of the relations among occupational positions.

³ Perhaps this individualistic bias is symbolized by references to structural mobility as "forced" (Broom and Jones 1969). Moreover, marked increases in "circulation" might occur which substantially equalize access to occupations across all categories of social origins, but which are at odds with the preferences and aspirations of individuals (e.g., the case of post-World War II Hungary as documented by Simkus [1977]). It is not clear how one would evaluate societal "openness" in this instance from the above perspective. (For an explicit attempt to model mobility tables in a manner analogous to regression models of status attainment, see Duncan [1979].)

⁴ Similar imagery is employed by Carlsson (1969, chap. 8). As he notes, to the extent that occupational mobility indexes "social" mobility, the "space" of interest is actually hierarchical.

THE MODEL

The modeling procedures extend log-linear techniques for analyzing multi-dimensional contingency tables (e.g., Bishop, Fienberg, and Holland 1975; Fienberg 1970; Goodman 1969, 1972). Quasi-independence models are specified which impose a third latent "dimension" on a two-dimensional mobility table by aggregating cells into the levels (mobility regimes) which constitute this design matrix. For a full exposition of these techniques, see Baron [1977]; Hauser [1978].)

Denote the observed frequency in the (i,j) th cell of the intergenerational mobility matrix (with dimension $I \times J$) by X_{ij} . Each such (i,j) pair is assigned to one of K subsets of the mobility table. Let this partition be represented by H_k ($k = 1, 2, \dots, K$). Then

$$\begin{aligned} E[X_{ij}] = m_{ijk} &= \alpha\beta_i\gamma_j\delta_k = \alpha\beta_i\gamma_j\delta_k \quad \text{for } (i,j) \in H_k \\ &= 0 \text{ otherwise,} \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

subject to the normalization constraints that

$$\prod_i \beta_i = \prod_j \gamma_j = \prod_k \delta_k^{n_k} = 1,$$

where n_k is the number of cells allocated to the k th level.

Here, α corresponds to a "grand mean" effect, β_i is the effect of the i th row (origin status), γ_j is the j th column (destination) effect, and δ_k is a "level" effect. A common interaction parameter (δ_k) is therefore shared by all cells assigned to the k th level of the design. The δ_k correspond to the "relative densities" associated with the cells in the table. Note that the model embodies no assumptions about ordinality in the occupational categories.⁵

Frequencies under the model may be estimated using Fay and Goodman's (1973) ECTA computer program (Everyman's Contingency Table Analyzer). The likelihood ratio test statistic has a χ^2 distribution with, in general, $(K - 1)$ fewer degrees of freedom than the simple independence model. For convenience, if the logarithms of the quantities in equation (1) are denoted with asterisks, the model may be rewritten

$$m_{ijk}^* = \alpha^* + \beta_i^* + \gamma_j^* + \delta_k^* \quad \text{for } (i,j) \in H_k, \tag{2}$$

with the constraint that

$$\sum_i \beta_i^* = \sum_j \gamma_j^* = \sum_k n_k \delta_k^* = 0.$$

Adopting the notation of Goodman (1970), the model of interest may be labeled $(P)(S)(H)$, where P = father's occupation, S = son's occupation,

⁵ However, the techniques applied here are based on Goodman's (1972) elaboration of various models of "quasi-independence" which usually *does* assume ordered row and column classifications (cf. Goodman 1979, p. 806).

A Model of Occupational Mobility

and H = the levels to which the cells in the table are assigned under the model. Thus, this is a model of statistical independence, conditional on the allocation of all cells to levels of H_k .⁶

Two quantities derived from this model are of particular interest. Let the expected frequencies obtained from the model in equation (1) be denoted by

$$\hat{m}_{ij} = \hat{\alpha}\hat{\beta}_i\hat{\gamma}_j\hat{\delta}_{ij}. \quad (3)$$

Then the "errors," expressed as natural logs of the ratios of observed to expected frequencies, may be defined as

$$\ln(e_{ij}) = \ln(X_{ij}/\hat{m}_{ij}) = \ln X_{ij} - \ln \hat{m}_{ij}. \quad (4)$$

From equations (3) and (4) it follows that

$$X_{ij} = \hat{\alpha}\hat{\beta}_i\hat{\gamma}_j\hat{\delta}_{ij}e_{ij}.$$

Rearranging terms yields

$$R_{ij}^* = X_{ij}/(\hat{\alpha}\hat{\beta}_i\hat{\gamma}_j) = \hat{\delta}_{ij}e_{ij}. \quad (5)$$

R_{ij}^* denotes the "mobility ratio" for the model. The R_{ij}^* may also be expressed conveniently in additive form:

$$\ln(R_{ij}^*) = \ln X_{ij} - \ln \hat{\alpha} - \ln \hat{\beta}_i - \ln \hat{\gamma}_j = \ln \hat{\delta}_{ij} + \ln e_{ij}. \quad (6)$$

Thus, $\ln(R_{ij}^*)$ is composed of two quantities: the common interaction or "level" effect associated with all cells in the k th level of the design matrix, and the within-level error associated with each cell.⁷

ROGOFF REVISITED: A SUMMARY

In reanalyzing Rogoff's Indianapolis data, mobility "maps" were drawn inductively. Supplemented by certain "priors" (e.g., the expectation of high "density" along the main diagonal), the statistical apparatus described above was applied in an iterative search procedure of the sort frequently employed in mobility studies and exploratory data analyses in general. Given this exploratory strategy, one must resist the temptation to "overfit" the data by attending to insignificant details, and one should control the urge to ascribe great importance to test statistics (and their nominal significance levels), since numerous implicit tests have been per-

⁶ The parameters from this model can be estimated by calculating the (log) expected frequencies under the (P) (S) (H) model, which are then regressed on three vectors of dummy variables denoting the row, column, and level of the cell to which each expected frequency corresponds. The resultant coefficients may then be deviated from the grand mean (rather than omitted categories) for ease of presentation and interpretation.

⁷ Hence, by definition $\ln e_{ij} = 0$ if a cell is the only element in a level of the design matrix.

formed.⁸ A model was adopted when major modifications clearly threatened substantive validity, parsimony, or goodness of fit, and where minor revisions did not appreciably affect the portrait of mobility structure obtained.

On the basis of tests utilizing hierarchical log-linear models (Baron 1977, p. 42), the Indianapolis data were found to have an essentially symmetric and temporally homogeneous interaction structure. An initial nine-level symmetric design matrix was derived from iterative specifications fit to data "smoothed" over time and across the main diagonal (i.e., expected frequencies under a model which constrained the interactions between fathers' and sons' occupations to be symmetric and temporally invariant). The resultant model (not, incidentally, the best-fitting one) was accepted because of its interpretability, parsimony, and close fit.

Relaxing the assumption of symmetry revealed several conspicuous asymmetries in mobility flows which warranted minor modifications of the initial model. The final nine-level design matrix (with three asymmetries) is presented in figure 1. For convenience, the levels have been ranked from relatively "most dense" (i.e., those cells into which net inflow, as measured by the R_{ij}^* , is the greatest) to "least dense," labeling them from 1 to 9, respectively; the lowest numbers represent the "easiest" moves, while the

Occupational category	Sons										
	Fathers	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1) Professional		1	3	3	4	8	7	9	7	7	6
2) Semi-professional		3	1	4	5	8	6	9	7	5	7
3) Proprietors, managers and officials (PMO)		3	4	2	4	8	6	8	5	6	5
4) Clerical and sales		3	4	4	3	8	6	8	6	6	7
5) Skilled labor		8	8	8	8	7	7	9	9	8	8
6) Semi-skilled labor		7	6	6	6	7	4	6	6	5	6
7) Unskilled labor		9	9	8	8	9	6	3	6	6	8
8) Protective service		7	7	5	6	9	6	6	3	7	5
9) Personal service		7	5	6	6	8	5	6	7	3	5
10) Farming		6	7	5	7	8	6	5	5	5	1

High density (levels 1-4)

Medium density (levels 5-7)

Low density (levels 8-9)

FIG. 1.—Nine-level model of the structure of intergenerational mobility in Marion County, Indiana, 1910–40. The model contains three asymmetries: the (4,1), (2,4) and (7,10) cells.

⁸ For a discussion of simultaneous test procedures for a series of hypotheses pertaining to quasi-independence in contingency tables, see Goodman (1971).

highest depict relatively large distances between the origin and destination categories.

Figure 1 also graphically portrays the important structural features of the model by grouping the nine levels into three broad classes—cells which are of relatively high density (levels 1–4), moderate density (5–7), and low density (8–9). The table reveals four basic rectangular “provinces”: a domain of high density within the white-collar sector; two regions of moderate density pertaining to movement between service and farm occupations on the one hand and white-collar occupations on the other; and a large territory characterizing movement among semiskilled and unskilled laborers, service workers, and farmers as “moderate” and persistence in those sectors as “high,” relative to exogenous influences. These provinces are separated by several “gullies” indicating blockages to intergenerational movement (a) between skilled occupations and all others except semiskilled labor and (b) between white-collar employment and unskilled labor.⁹

The global results of various reanalyses of Rogoff’s data utilizing the model in figure 1 are summarized in table 1. For each influence on the mobility process analyzed (time, race, nativity, and/or age), table 1 shows the proportion of the G^2 under the conditional independence (baseline) model¹⁰ accounted for by various models including “mobility parameters” for each region of figure 1 which (a) are invariant across subtables or (b) depend on the time period, race, nativity status, and/or age cohort involved.

These results underscore the virtual lack of variation in mobility regimes over time and by race, nativity status, and age, after having fit a model to the data which specifies the relative “distances” among occupational situses. The results show mobility patterns to be fundamentally invariant—a single configuration of relationships among origin and destination statuses accounts for virtually all of the baseline association between fathers’ and sons’ occupations. Moreover, once this interoccupational nexus has been specified, the so-called structural effects which have received substantial attention in recent studies (e.g., Hauser, Dickinson, Travis, and Koffel 1975) are found to be less consequential: relative to the parameterization

⁹ Under the model of figure 1 movement of unskilled laborers’ sons to the farm is also “blocked”; however, there are few observations in this cell in either time period.

¹⁰ That is, in which the marginal distributions of fathers’ and sons’ occupations vary by each variable but are independent of one another. For example, let P = father’s occupation, S = son’s occupation, T = time, A = age, and H = design matrix of figure 1. Then in the analysis of Rogoff’s table disaggregated by age and time, the baseline model is $(PAT) (SAT)$, and the model with invariant densities is $(PAT) (SAT) (H)$. The models $(PAT) (SAT) (HT)$, $(PAT) (SAT) (HA)$, $(PAT) (SAT) (HA) (HT)$, and $(PAT) (SAT) (HAT)$ correspond to variation in densities by (1) time, (2) age, (3) main effects of time and age, and (4) main effects for time and age, plus an age \times time interaction, respectively.

TABLE 1
PROPORTIONS OF BASELINE ASSOCIATION (under Hypothesis of Conditional Independence) ACCOUNTED FOR BY
"MOBILITY DENSITY" PARAMETERS OF FIGURE 1* FIT TO ROGOFF'S (1953) INDIANAPOLIS DATA
(*N* = 20,145)

	VARIABLE			
	Time†	Race	Nativity‡	Age§
Baseline <i>G</i> ²	4,796.02 (162)	47,965.43 (98)	93,555.17 (324)	93,609.45 (486)
Invariant set of level parameters ("densities") (%)	95.91 (154)	99.68 (91)	99.51 (316)	99.36 (478)
Densities allowed to vary by (%).....	Time: 96.38 (146)	Race: 99.76 (84)	Time: 99.53 (308)	Time: 99.39 (470)
			Nativity: 99.55 (308)	Age: 99.38 (462)
			Time, nativity: 99.57 (300)	Time, age: 99.42 (454)
			Time×nativity: 99.59 (292)	Time×age: 99.46 (438)

Source.—Adapted from Baron (1977, pp. 81, 103, 113, 126).

Note.—Numbers in parentheses are degrees of freedom.

* In the analysis of mobility by race (whites vs. blacks, 1940), Rogoff's tables are categorized differently. The model employed in this analysis is an eight-level version of figure 1 adapted slightly to the coarser scheme of occupational classification in these tables.

† 1910 vs. 1940.

‡ Sons of native fathers vs. sons of foreign-born fathers.

§ Under 24, 24–30, or over 30 years of age.

of figure 1, changes in the occupational distributions of fathers and sons by time, race, nativity status, and/or age exercise extremely small net effects (see Baron 1977, pp. 81, 103, 113, 126).¹¹

To what extent are these relationships characteristic of present-day national mobility trends? The remainder of this paper examines the correspondence between the Indianapolis results and mobility trends among the 1973 Occupational Changes in a Generation II (OCG II) sample of the U.S. male civilian labor force.

ROGOFF REPLICATED: INTERGENERATIONAL MOBILITY IN
THE UNITED STATES, 1973

In order to extend and validate these reanalyses of the Indianapolis data, mobility from father's occupation to son's current occupation was examined in the OCG II survey, a stratified, multistage cluster sample of males in the U.S. civilian noninstitutional population and aged 20-64 as of March 1973 (see Featherman and Hauser 1975).

Perhaps the major impediment to a satisfactory replication of Rogoff's survey is the inescapable fact that the Indianapolis data "do not constitute a probability sample from a well-defined actual universe" (Duncan 1966, p. 69). Selecting some subsample of the OCG survey which might be valid for comparisons with the Indianapolis survey (from the standpoint of sampling) would virtually guarantee that any conclusions for the national sample would be substantively meaningless. Accordingly, no such subsample has been selected.

Certain discrepancies arise in comparing the Indianapolis and the OCG II data bases. For example, fathers' occupations in the OCG data were determined from reports by sons recalling (approximately) their sixteenth birthdays, while Rogoff utilized marriage license applications. Moreover, somewhat different criteria were used to exclude cases from each sample. Perhaps it is overly optimistic to suppose that the various discrepancies "cancel" one another; nonetheless, I have not gerrymandered the contemporary American mobility experience, as represented by the OCG sample, by attempting to duplicate certain unfortunate idiosyncracies of Rogoff's sample design.

The detailed procedures used to replicate Rogoff's 10-category scheme of occupational classification are described in the Appendix. Sons' current occupations and fathers' occupations were assigned to one of Rogoff's 10 occupational categories using three-digit 1960 census occupation codes (U.S. Bu-

¹¹ The largest structural effects are associated with temporal variation in fathers' and sons' occupations in the gross comparison between the 1910 and 1940 tables. Even in this instance, variation in the net effects of origins and destinations by time accounts for only 18% of the baseline association.

reau of the Census 1960). All occupations allocated explicitly by Rogoff to one of her 10 categories were assigned to that category. Otherwise, occupational titles appearing within one of the broad census categories corresponding to Rogoff's situses (e.g., "clerical and sales workers") were assigned to that group. However, certain titles could not be mapped on this basis. For example, since there is no distinction between "professional" and "semiprofessional" categories in the 1960 census codes, white-collar occupations that did not appear in Rogoff's sample had to be labeled (semi)professional on an ad hoc basis. These decisions were made by mapping the ambiguous title to some "functionally equivalent" occupation occurring in Rogoff's categorization.

RESULTS

Table 2 presents the marginal distributions for fathers' and sons' occupations in the OCG data, along with the corresponding marginals from the temporally smoothed Indianapolis data. The two data sets are strikingly similar in the distribution of fathers across occupational categories. The most notable exceptions are skilled and semiskilled labor—the former apparently constitutes a smaller proportion in the OCG than in the Rogoff sample, while the opposite is true for semiskilled employment. One would expect the two distributions of social origins to summarize approximately the same set of occupational experiences pertaining to fathers between 1910 and 1940.¹² Thus, their strong correspondence indirectly validates the scheme of occupational classification used to replicate Rogoff's analysis.

Unfortunately, there is no way to determine the extent to which differences in the distribution of sons' occupations reflect (a) idiosyncracies of the Indianapolis labor force, (b) "structural change" between the 1910–40 period and the present, or (c) discrepancies in the methodologies of the two studies. According to the 1970 census, Indianapolis currently mirrors the national labor force (as depicted by the OCG survey) fairly well.¹³ Nonetheless, some differences between Indianapolis and the American occupational structure remain—such as the smaller proportion of proprietors and the larger amount of clerical and sales employment in Marion County—which may illustrate certain unique features of Indianapolis's economic and social structure.

¹² Admittedly, there is some disparity. Men in the OCG sample were born between 1909 and 1953 and thus celebrated their sixteenth birthdays between 1925 and 1969.

¹³ The distribution of males employed in Marion County, 1969, by occupational category is: professional and semiprofessional, 15.09%; proprietors, managers, and officials, 11.58%; clerical and sales, 16.89%; skilled labor, 20.91%; semiskilled labor, 21.23%; unskilled labor, 5.73%; protective service, 1.94%; personal service, 6.28%; farming, 0.36% (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1973, table 122).

TABLE 2
ROW AND COLUMN PERCENTAGES: OCG II AND TEMPORALLY SMOOTHED INDIANAPOLIS MOBILITY DATA

	CATEGORY OF ROW OR COLUMN*									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Indianapolis:										
Rows (fathers).....	4.22	.93	12.19	8.69	27.05	12.21	9.81	1.99	1.46	21.44
Columns (sons).....	4.65	2.47	6.89	20.14	27.02	21.99	9.48	1.62	3.52	2.23
OCG II:										
Rows (fathers).....	5.23	1.61	11.41	8.89	19.83	17.10	6.53	2.09	4.61	22.71
Columns (sons).....	10.79	4.25	15.06	12.53	21.65	19.36	6.09	2.23	3.87	4.19

* (1) Professional; (2) semiprofessional; (3) proprietors, managers, and officials; (4) clerical and sales; (5) skilled labor; (6) semiskilled labor; (7) unskilled labor; (8) protective service; (9) personal service; (10) farming.

Table 3 presents observed frequencies, multiplicative "mobility ratios" (see equation [5]), and additive cell "errors" (see equation [4]) under the model of figure 1 applied to the OCG data.¹⁴ Under the hypothesis of statistical independence, $G^2 = 3855.44$ ($df = 81$), while the value of G^2 under the structural model is 636.55 ($df = 73$). While a significant proportion of the baseline association remains unexplained, the eight additional parameters estimated under this specification capture 83.5% of the "variance" under independence. Although the independence model is admittedly a dubious baseline against which to compare the design matrix, there is no clear alternative. The amounts of "explained" and "residual" variation are both substantial. Given the disparities between the sample from which the model was derived and that to which it has been applied, and the multiplicity of factors which militate against a close fit, these results seem to provide extremely persuasive evidence of the relevance of the Indianapolis mobility experience to contemporary trends in the national labor force.¹⁵

The values of R_{ij}^* generated from this replication must not be taken too seriously, however, as there is appreciable error associated with the model's fit. Thus it is perhaps most instructive to examine the instances in which net (im)mobility among the OCG men is poorly estimated by the Indianapolis model. Ignoring very small cells, the largest contributions to the value of our residual G^2 are, with few exceptions, concentrated in three locations: along the main diagonal; in the white-collar sector; and in the farm categories.¹⁶ Inheritance among members of the PMO category warranted its own level in the Indianapolis sample but not in the OCG replicate, in which the relevant value of R_{ij}^* is almost identical with the densities associated with moves from PMO and semiprofessional origins to the professions.

The model considerably overestimates inheritance, especially in the professional, semiprofessional, semiskilled, and unskilled categories; persistence in farming is substantially underestimated. Except for moves from the professional to the PMO situs, white-collar mobility is consistently and appreciably underestimated by the parameterization derived from Rogoff's

¹⁴ Observed frequencies in table 2 have been weighted to reflect underlying population counts and scaled downward to compensate for sampling variability and departures from simple random sampling in the OCG II survey.

¹⁵ Under the symmetric nine-level model (Baron 1977, p. 50), $G^2 = 652.58$ ($df = 73$). The three major asymmetries in mobility flows in Indianapolis thus appear to characterize recent national trends as well. Since these asymmetries isolated originally for Indianapolis could have been irrelevant to the current national experience, the superior fit of the asymmetric version further substantiates the model's generality.

¹⁶ The most important exceptions are: (a) moves from protective service to professional occupations, from the latter to personal service, from unskilled to semiskilled labor, and from personal to protective service; and (b) moves from the "proprietors, managers, and officials" (PMO) to semiskilled category. In the case of a, the model substantially underestimates mobility, while the opposite is true of b.

TABLE 3

OBSERVED FREQUENCIES, "MOBILITY RATIOS," AND CELL "ERRORS" UNDER MODEL OF FIGURE 1 FIT TO OCG II MOBILITY DATA

FATHERS		SONS									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	
1. Professional.....	358.96 6.05 (-1.13)	93.07 3.41 (.46)	186.13 2.10 (-.03)	153.83 1.84 (.11)	137.54 .69 (-.04)	85.04 .67 (-.08)	26.57 .60 (-.03)	16.11 .95 (.27)	36.48 1.33 (.61)	12.04 .97 (.02)	
2. Semiprofessional.....	63.25 2.75 (.24)	39.46 3.73 (-.62)	61.27 1.78 (.07)	45.62 1.41 (.42)	55.44 .72 (0)	45.67 .93 (-.02)	14.51 .84 (.32)	5.84 .89 (.20)	9.01 .85 (-.09)	.86 .18 (-1.40)	
3. Proprietors, managers, and officials	416.92 2.65 (.20)	130.37 1.80 (.09)	659.63 2.81 (0*)	409.38 1.85 (.11)	341.98 .65 (-.11)	240.86 .71 (-.28)	71.70 .61 (-.17)	38.20 .85 (-.09)	74.26 1.02 (.07)	28.82 .87 (-.06)	
4. Clerical and sales.....	303.02 2.30 (.06)	112.49 1.86 (.12)	385.49 1.96 (.17)	366.78 1.98 (-.09)	287.10 .65 (-.10)	229.26 .81 (-.15)	74.18 .75 (.04)	45.17 1.21 (.24)	61.89 1.02 (.07)	15.06 .55 (-.28)	
5. Skilled labor.....	420.50 .83 (.14)	194.29 .83 (.14)	617.55 .81 (.12)	536.37 .75 (.04)	1,161.20 .68 (-.06)	771.38 .71 (-.02)	210.46 .55 (-.10)	92.47 .64 (.04)	139.54 .59 (-.19)	49.09 .46 (-.44)	
6. Semiskilled labor.....	261.63 .83 (.14)	142.99 .99 (.04)	419.11 .89 (.06)	436.70 .99 (.04)	890.32 .84 (.15)	970.46 1.44 (-.14)	235.08 1.00 (.05)	100.02 1.12 (.16)	123.63 .85 (-.09)	36.29 .55 (-.54)	
7. Unskilled labor.....	76.11 .53 (-.15)	29.27 .44 (-.33)	151.22 .70 (-.03)	133.10 .65 (-.09)	339.54 .70 (.13)	383.29 1.24 (.27)	151.59 1.40 (.44)	37.89 .92 (-.03)	60.36 .90 (-.05)	18.56 .61 (-.16)	
8. Protective service.....	64.19 1.42 (.67)	15.29 .73 (.01)	66.50 .98 (.06)	61.60 .96 (.02)	91.42 .60 (-.02)	77.83 .80 (-.17)	25.34 .75 (-.24)	21.12 1.63 (-.28)	16.80 .80 (.10)	1.32 .14 (-1.90)	
9. Personal service.....	76.57 .82 (.12)	46.96 1.09 (.16)	129.52 .93 (-.02)	132.21 1.00 (.06)	186.24 .59 (-.19)	205.23 1.02 (.10)	78.45 1.12 (.16)	32.93 1.23 (.53)	79.98 1.85 (-.16)	7.18 .37 (-.93)	
10. Farming.....	240.48 .55 (-.55)	94.28 .47 (-.44)	507.39 .78 (-.18)	373.46 .61 (-.18)	1,086.86 .74 (.03)	1,084.79 1.16 (.20)	399.91 1.22 (.27)	80.71 .65 (-.36)	217.25 1.08 (.15)	717.63 .83 (.13)	

NOTE.—Top entry for each cell is its observed value. Intermediate numbers are "mobility ratios" (i.e., R_{ij} in eq. [5]), expressed in multiplicative (antilog) form. Additive errors (residuals from scale row, col., and level effects) are shown in parentheses; see eq. (4). Dividing each observed value by the antilog of the corresponding cell error will reproduce the expected frequency (within rounding error).

* Fitted exactly under model.

data. Finally, actual mobility to and from the farm is below that predicted by the model, although errors associated with farm destinations are probably inflated because of the sparsity of several cells.

Table 4 shows the row, column, and level parameters for the model of figure 1 applied to the OCG data, along with the corresponding parameters for Rogoff's data smoothed over time. The findings here, as throughout, reveal a fundamental congruence in the effects of origins, destinations, and densities between the two samples but also highlight some significant and interesting differences. While there are several large discrepancies in the absolute magnitude of effects, the relative "pushes" and "pulls" associated with each category of "supply" and "demand" are extremely similar across data sets. The row effects in the OCG and Rogoff data exhibit a zero-order correlation of .935; the correlation between sets of column parameters is .913. Thus the relative influences of categories of origin and destination are markedly comparable between the two data sets.

Table 4 reveals some major differences between the OCG and Indianapolis data regarding intergenerational "shifts" in the effects associated with each occupational category.¹⁷ These are indicated by the ratios of column to row effects. (Large positive [negative] values indicate substantial "growth" ["decline"] in an occupational situs.) Both data sets imply essentially identical patterns in semiprofessional employment, skilled and unskilled labor, protective service, and farming: the semiprofessions evince the same large amount of expansion; farming is characterized by precipitous contraction; and skilled and unskilled labor and protective service are shown to be relatively stable across "generations" in both sets of parameters.

While net "demand" associated with professional employment far outstripped "supply" in the OCG data, the two effects are more nearly equal in the Indianapolis results. The opposite pattern applies to semi-skilled labor, which appears relatively stable in the national sample and exhibits much stronger demand than supply forces in Marion County. In the case of the PMO category, the Rogoff data yield a portrait of intergenerational decline, while the OCG findings suggest an increase across generations in the net effect associated with that situs. The reverse is true of personal services, which exhibit a much stronger effect as a destination than as an origin status in the experiences of Rogoff's cohorts of men; the OCG data, however, show a diminution in the marginal effect of this category across generations. Finally, while the column parameters for clerical and sales occupations far exceed those for rows in both sets of results, the

¹⁷ As Duncan (1966) has argued, shifts in the effects associated with "origins" and "destinations" in a mobility table regrettably provide a less than adequate portrait of "labor force transformations."

TABLE 4
PARAMETERS (in Additive Form) FOR THE MODEL OF FIGURE 1: OCG II and TEMPORALLY SMOOTHED INDIANAPOLIS DATA

FACTOR	CATEGORY OF ROW, COLUMN, OR LEVEL									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
OCG II Data (Grand Mean = 4.661; N = 21,148)										
Rows (father's occupation).....	-.771	-1.719	.204	.025	1.377	.895	.119	-1.040	-.316	1.227
Columns (son's occupation).....	.193	-.584	.596	.536	1.406	.956	-.095	-1.060	-.579	-1.370
Levels (density).....	1.933	1.031	.772	.504	-.075	-.053	-.322	-.330	-.490	..
Ratio of column to row effect.....	2.62	3.11	1.48	1.67	1.03	1.06	.81	.98	.77	.07
Indianapolis Data (Grand Mean = 4.211; N = 20,147)										
Rows.....	-.682	-2.035	.424	.076	1.909	.607	.643	-.923	-1.387	1.367
Columns.....	-.503	-.858	-.145	1.273	1.988	1.360	.498	-1.173	-.430	-2.008
Levels.....	2.303	1.672	1.064	.655	.150	-.088	-.403	-.560	-.749	..
Ratio of column to row effect.....	1.20	3.24	.57	3.31	1.08	2.12	.87	.78	2.60	.03

excess is substantially smaller in the OCG sample. (The row and column percentages in table 2 reveal essentially similar patterns.)

It is tempting to interpret many of these discrepancies as evidence of "structural changes" in the labor force occasioned by demographic, economic, and social transformations throughout this century. Yet other differences between these "push" and "pull" effects across data sets (e.g., regarding clerical and sales jobs) are not easily explained in this way and suggest that unique aspects of Indianapolis's population, labor force, and social structure may have occasioned idiosyncratic trends in intergenerational occupational distribution.¹⁸ However, one must be mindful of the methodological pitfalls involved in treating these ratios of marginal effects as indices of generational change (Duncan 1966); accordingly, these comparisons should be regarded as speculative.

Variation among row or column parameters provides one additional piece of information which bears indirectly on the differences in "occupational structure" revealed by the marginal effects for each sample. A widely dispersed set of parameters indicates a good deal of differentiation among occupational categories in their relative pushes and pulls. This variability can be assessed by taking the sum of squared row or column parameters (SS) in table 4. For the Indianapolis data, $SS(\text{rows}) = 13.86$ and $SS(\text{cols.}) = 14.27$; in the OCG replicate, $SS(\text{rows}) = 8.99$ and $SS(\text{cols.}) = 7.26$. Thus, while the differentiation among occupations in their net effects appears relatively stable across generations in each data set, there is a considerably more varied set of origin and destination effects in Rogoff's sample than in the 1973 national data. This might manifest (a) the greater heterogeneity of the national occupational structure, resulting in a less skewed distribution of fathers and sons among sities in the OCG sample, and/or (b) a "leveling" over time in the supply and demand forces associated with various occupational classes as the transition to a service economy has reduced the proportionate marginal effects associated with industrial labor.¹⁹

¹⁸ For example, this particular anomaly probably reflects Indianapolis's disproportionately large fiduciary, commercial, credit, insurance, and retail trade sectors (see Duncan et al. 1960, pp. 406-7), which endow its labor force with much larger relative "pulls" toward clerical and sales occupations than the OCG's national average.

¹⁹ The variation among level parameters is also considerably narrower in the OCG sample than in Rogoff's, perhaps suggesting a less variegated "mobility regime" in the contemporary American occupational structure. While this may reveal (as one reviewer suggested) a "weakening" in the dependence of destinations on origins, it may also be a methodological or statistical artifact. Recall that the value of δ_k for each level depends on the magnitude of the row and column parameters pertaining to the cells at that level, which are in turn related to the configuration of counts *within* each level. Hence, the distribution of sparse cells in the Rogoff and OCG II data may underlie the discrepant ordering and spacing of density effects in this replication. Finally, these results may merely convey the extent to which certain areas of the Indianapolis mobility tables—especially the sparsest ones—were "overfitted."

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This paper has approached intergenerational mobility as one index of the relationships among occupational positions, focusing on the net "exchange" among occupational situses. From this perspective, exchange is a social process of principal substantive importance; thus, it warrants explicit modeling of the sort described herein, instead of being regarded conceptually and statistically as a residual phenomenon.

Our knowledge about mobility across generations obtained by studying Marion County from 1910 to 1940 (Baron 1977) allows us to say considerably more about recent national trends than one might initially expect given the complications of sampling, geography, and temporal change. That a "map" of Indianapolis's occupational "mobility space" accounts for 83.5% of the comparable territory in the 1973 OCG sample suggests that linkages among occupational situses exhibit a striking generality and temporal stability (cf. Hauser, Koffel, Travis, and Dickinson 1975; Tyree and Smith 1978).

Nonetheless, this analysis reveals substantial differences between the earlier Indianapolis experience and present-day national patterns. Mobility to and from the farm, movement among white-collar positions, and net tendencies toward immobility were found to diverge significantly from the results based on Rogoff's data. Moreover, the effect parameters associated with origins and destinations reveal important differences between the two studies in the relative pushes and pulls exerted by occupational groups in the mobility process. In summary, the present findings reaffirm Duncan's observation that "it is well to bear in mind that invariance with regard to some aspects of the mobility process is compatible with variation in other aspects" (1966, pp. 76-77).

If intergenerational movement is one indicator of the relationships among occupational situses—as suggested above—what are the contours of "occupational space" revealed by these analyses? Numerous studies have concluded that occupational status or prestige is the major dimension underlying mobility distances. For example, Klatzky and Hodge's (1971) canonical analysis of the 1962 OCG I intergenerational mobility tables showed SES to be the central factor in the relationship between origins and destinations. Blau and Duncan's (1967, pp. 67-75) smallest space analysis of inflow and outflow indices of dissimilarity from these same tables also revealed a principal dimension corresponding closely to the socioeconomic rank order of occupational groups.

These representative inquiries utilized measures of similarity among occupational situses which reflect (in part) the marginal distributions of fathers' and sons' occupations. Accordingly, it is not altogether surprising that a status dimension emerges as central. Patterns of occupational transformation across generations undoubtedly have effected a real "upgrading" of the

labor force, in large measure because of the ever-greater importance of education in the process of allocating individuals to occupational roles (cf. Blau and Duncan 1967, p. 113). It is interesting that education also typically exercises the strongest effect in regression equations relating indices of status and prestige to socioeconomic characteristics of occupations (e.g., Siegel 1971, p. 196). Both as a component of status/prestige scales and as an influence on labor force transformation, the effect of education probably reflects the increasing differentiation of occupations in terms of skill and knowledge, and the existence of an increasingly credential-oriented labor market which operationalizes these attributes in terms of schooling.

Yet some of the status dimension embedded in the marginal trends is probably an artifact of procedures for classifying occupations which were explicitly designed to capture this change toward a hierarchical occupational structure increasingly differentiated in terms of "skill" and "social standing" (Conk 1978; Braverman 1974). Lacking a conception of the *technical* division of labor among occupations, classification schemes came to depend heavily on the sociocultural divisions which occupations were presumed to manifest. The same cultural definitions underlying popular evaluations of occupations (e.g., in status and prestige scales) apparently figured prominently in the evolution of occupational classification schemes. In short, part of the importance of SES documented by previous research may be attributable to a somewhat tautological methodology which grouped occupations in terms of the socioeconomic attributes of their incumbents (rather than by task requirements or skill), thereby virtually guaranteeing a portrait of "structural change" which reflected this presumed status upgrading of occupations (Conk 1978; also see Hope 1978, pp. 23-24).

The present analysis, however, has not focused on structural changes but has sought to determine what relations among occupational groups are revealed when these "marginal" effects are disentangled from net tendencies toward (im)mobility.²⁰ For this reason, perhaps it is not startling that the R_{ij}^* presented here do not confirm the status/prestige interpretation of other investigators. Figure 2a reproduces the smallest space array derived from the model in figure 1 applied to the temporally smoothed Indianapolis data (see Baron 1977, pp. 64-67), a portrait with which the OCG results (figure 2b) are overwhelmingly consistent. The triangular matrices of mobility ratios analyzed in these figures are composed of the average of the mobility ratios for each off-diagonal cell and its transpose, weighted by the number of cases in each cell. Note that because the models which generated these mobility ratios fit the data so closely, the patterns of inter-

²⁰ Indeed, the flawed "Rogoff ratios" (which are not "freed" of the margins) do reveal an underlying status dimension when computed for the Indianapolis and OCG II tables.




FIG. 2.—*a*, Two-dimensional smallest space plot of mobility ratios under asymmetric model (figure 1) applied to Indianapolis data smoothed over time. *b*, Two-dimensional smallest space plot of mobility ratios under asymmetric model (figure 1) applied to OCG II data.

occupational distance revealed by the smallest space plots are the same as those posited (and obtained) under the structural model (see figure 1 and table 3). Thus the smallest space technique simply provides a convenient alternative way of representing the distances among occupational categories as indicated by the R_{ij}^* .

Instead of a graded status hierarchy, this representation suggests an occupational structure divided into two broad sectors, connected by a group of "traditional" situses which are somewhat atypical of the industrial division of labor. The cluster at the top of figure 2a is composed of white-collar occupations characterized by mental labor and by control over information, capital, others' labor power, and other instruments of production, although some recent analyses (e.g., Braverman 1974; Glenn and Feldberg 1977) have stressed the "proletarianization" of clerical and sales jobs. Protective service might also be included in this cluster insofar as policemen, firemen, and others in this category, in contrast to other service workers, manifest substantial "developed skill, knowledge, and authority in the labor processes of society" (Braverman 1974, p. 367). All categories of industrial labor fall at the bottom of figure 2a (with wide dispersion among them), suggesting an internally differentiated "underclass" of manual workers.

Two occupational situses—personal service and farming—are situated between these clusters of "head" and "hand" occupations, illustrating the somewhat contradictory and transitional position of these "traditional" forms of employment within the modern occupational structure. As Braverman (1974, chap. 20) suggests, much of the conventional social science wisdom about the unskilled character of employment in these two groups reflects the insensitivity of occupational classification schemes to historical changes in the nature of service and farm employment. Furthermore, both categories are extremely heterogeneous. Some personal service workers merely produce commodities in the form of services to capitalist elites (servants, janitors, chauffeurs, etc.), while others perform jobs that resemble "mental" labor in most respects. Rogoff's "farm" classification is equally heterogeneous, apparently including farm owners and farm workers. Thus the location of farming and personal services in the region between white- and blue-collar occupations may bespeak the admixture of jobs embraced by those categories, as well as the extreme differentiation of skills among farmers and servants. However, in the OCG II data (figure 2b), farming is located near unskilled labor, suggesting a greater affinity between agrarian and blue-collar labor in the recent national experience than in Rogoff's sample.

Admittedly, this interpretation is a coarse simplification of these figures, which are rather ambiguous (especially for the national data). Others might wish to proffer somewhat different stories about these results, but the moral seems inescapable: there is clearly no graded dimension of status or prestige

in these spatial arrays; rather, the major contrast (especially for the national data) appears to involve a tightly woven "mental" or white-collar sector, on the one hand, and all other occupational situses—highly differentiated among themselves—on the other. I have stressed the contrast between mental, manual, and "traditional" situses because it seems to be the most consequential—substantively and empirically.²¹ Indeed, Conk (1978) argues that census officials perceived the dichotomy between "head" and "hand" work as fundamental within the modern industrial order, inspiring the bureau's various attempts to classify occupations between 1870 and 1940. The present results substantiate this perception, demonstrating the centrality of the head-hand distinction throughout the period spanned by the Rogoff and OCG II studies.

A variety of mechanisms, structural and social psychological, could operate to produce and maintain such a mobility regime. The father's occupation reflects the material and psychological conditions impinging on the son's development and attainment. The propensity to end up in a mental or manual job may be transmitted by the objective resources and/or by the personal traits, experiences, values, and aspirations the son inherits as a consequence of his socioeconomic background.

These findings could manifest some normative consensus about the nature of work in industrial society, centering on the distinction between white- and blue-collar jobs. Of course, this should not preclude the possibility that this portrait of mobility space reflects more objective features of social organization (cf. Featherman, Jones, and Hauser 1975). Braverman (1974, p. 126) argues that the "separation of hand and brain is the most decisive single step in the division of labor taken by the capitalist mode of production." Indeed, the results of this research are not incompatible with recent analyses stressing the relationship between occupational mobility patterns and the development of class relationships (e.g., Parkin 1971; Giddens 1973). Rather than indicating commonalities across time and space in the

²¹ The interpretation offered here is also corroborated by various cluster analyses (single-link and complete-link) which reveal a predominant white-collar cluster in both data sets (cf. Vanneman 1977). These results do suggest, however, that the remaining occupational situses cannot be clustered in an equally reliable and unambiguous fashion. Furthermore, this account of "mobility space" is by no means complete. In fact, the coefficients of alienation corresponding to the one- and two-dimensional solutions for figure 2a are .313 and .162, respectively, while for figure 2b the values are .331 and .129. Thus a two-dimensional representation apparently provides a less than full account of the spatial relations among occupational categories. While my discussion has not ascribed an interpretation to the second dimension of these arrays, if a line is drawn between the cluster of white-collar categories, on the one hand, and unskilled labor, on the other, the resultant axis might be construed as representing some dimension of "task complexity," "intellectuality," "educational requirements," or the like. Note that this axis is not orthogonal to the head-hand dimension discussed above.

social evaluation of occupational status, enduring patterns of intergenerational movement among occupational statuses may reflect structural continuities in the division of labor in terms of which classes may be identified.

APPENDIX

Replicating Rogoff's Occupational Classification in the OCG II Survey

All respondents aged 20–64 in the experienced civilian labor force as of March 1973 were included in the sample (see Featherman and Hauser 1975). Each respondent's current occupation and his father's occupation (as of the son's sixteenth birthday) were cross-classified, after each was allocated to one of Rogoff's 10 categories by mapping three-digit 1960 census codes (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1960, pp. xv–xx) as follows.

1. Professional—all “professional, technical, and kindred workers” except those coded below as “semiprofessional.”

2. Semiprofessional—artists and art teachers (014), athletes (015), authors (020), chiropractors (022), dancers and dancing teachers (070), designers (072), dieticians and nutritionists (073), draftsmen (074), editors and reporters (075), entertainers²² (101), farm and home management advisers (102), foresters and conservationists (103), funeral directors and embalmers (104), librarians (111), musicians and music teachers (120), professional and student professional nurses (150–151), personnel and labor relations workers (154), photographers (161), public relations men and publicity writers (163), radio operators (164), recreation and group workers (165), religious workers (165), social and welfare workers (171), sports officials and instructors (180), surveyors (181), technicians (185–192), therapists and healers²³ (193).

3. Proprietors, managers, and officials—all “managers, officials, and proprietors, except farm” and insurance adjusters, examiners, and investigators (321).

4. Clerical and sales—all “clerical and kindred workers” (except 321) and “sales workers.”

5. Skilled labor—all “craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers” except members of the armed forces (555).

6. Semiskilled labor—all “operatives and kindred workers.”

7. Unskilled labor—all “laborers, except farm and mine.”

8. Protective service—all “protective service workers” (850–860) and members of the armed forces (555).

²² Not elsewhere classified.

²³ Not elsewhere classified.

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9. Personal service—all “private household workers” and “service workers, except private household” (excluding protective service workers).

10. Farming—all “farmers and farm managers” and “farm laborers and foremen.”

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Cultural Orientations, Institutional Entrepreneurs, and Social Change: Comparative Analysis of Traditional Civilizations¹

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This paper analyzes the impact of cultural orientations on the patterns of change of some of the major types of "traditional" social and political systems. Offering a theoretical framework and analytical tools for the analysis of the relations between "ideas" or "culture" and social structure, the study is intended also to contribute to analysis of the relations between the dynamics of historical civilizations (defined usually in cultural or symbolic terms) and the dynamics of social and political systems. Last, it is intended to contribute to a reappraisal and reorientation of comparative studies in general and comparative-institutional ones in particular. The first of three sections distinguishes among three ideal-typical patterns of change in traditional civilizations: coalescent, partially coalescent, and noncoalescent. These are differentiated both according to the degree of change in major institutions, in the structure of power, and in the economic sphere, and according to the extent to which the actual processes of change tend to coalesce. The second section explores underlying causes of the variations in patterns of change. Particular attention is paid to cultural orientations, institutional structures, and the role of elites. The final section applies the analytic framework to selected traditional societies and civilizations exhibiting the three patterns of change. Social and cultural linkages are explored in three types of regime: imperial and imperial-feudal (the Chinese, Russian, and Byzantine Empires; Western European civilization), city-state and tribal federation (ancient Greece and certain Near Eastern societies), and patrimonial (Buddhist, Hindu, and Islamic civilizations).

I. MAJOR PATTERNS OF CHANGE IN HISTORICAL SOCIETIES

In this paper I analyze the major patterns of change within "historical" social and political systems and the conditions which give rise to the variations among these patterns. The main purpose is to provide a theoretical

¹ This is part of a larger work on comparative civilizations. A preliminary approach to this article appears in Eisenstadt (1978). In a somewhat different form it has been presented both as a series of lectures in the fall of 1978 at Harvard University, under auspices of its Center for Middle Eastern Studies, and in a course on comparative civilizations given with Joseph Fletcher. I am indebted to Professor Fletcher for illuminating comments and queries. The research on which this work is based has been supported by a grant from the Ford Foundation.

framework for analyzing the relations between "ideas" or "culture" and social structure, a long-standing problem in the history of sociology which has been resurrected in recent theoretical controversies in the social sciences in general and in sociology in particular (Eisenstadt and Curelare 1976 and 1977, chaps. 9 and 10). The paper consists of three sections. The first briefly characterizes and illustrates three types of change—coalescent, partially coalescent, and noncoalescent. These are differentiated both according to the degree of change in major institutions, in the structure of power, and in the economic sphere, and by the extent to which the actual processes of change—especially rebellions, religious or intellectual heterodoxies, and central political conflict and institution building—tend to coalesce.

The second section examines underlying causes of those variations in patterns of change. Particular attention is paid to cultural orientations, institutional structures, and the role of elites in providing linkages between the cultural and institutional spheres. The final section explores the applicability of the analytic framework to selected traditional societies and civilizations. The latter include the civilizations of antiquity, such as the Greek and Near Eastern, and the so-called higher civilizations, such as Chinese, Islamic, Christian, Buddhist, and Hindu. (See table 1 for a classification of the types of social change and the societies illustrative of them.)

Most of the classical, as well as the more modern, analysts of social change—evolutionary and Marxist alike—tend to depict it as a transition between stages. They write as if the transition from one stage or type of social system to another involved both concomitant changes in all institutional spheres—political, social, economic—and a radical break with the past (Eisenstadt 1978, chap. 1). Moreover, they assume that such a revolutionary process takes place through a combination of the major types of

TABLE 1
THREE MAJOR PATTERNS OF SOCIAL CHANGE IN HISTORICAL SOCIETIES

Type of Regime	Type of Change	Specific Society
Imperial and imperial-feudal	Coalescent: high and relatively high levels	Abbasid and Ottoman Empires Western and central Europe Byzantine Empire
	Coalescent: lower level	China Russia
Exceptional city states and tribal federations	Partially coalescent: coalescence between processes of change but short-lived institutionalization of change	City states of antiquity Near Eastern tribal federations
Patrimonial	Noncoalescent: low level of coalescence between processes of change and institutionalization of change	South and Southeast Asia Ancient Near East Most Islamic societies

collective action—rebellions, intellectual or religious heterodoxies, and central political struggles.

However, a closer, even if as yet very superficial, look at the historical evidence clearly indicates that these characteristics are not true of the processes of social change and transformations that took place in many civilizations in their "historical," "traditional" periods. In different civilizations and historical settings a variety of combinations of continuity and change in different spheres of institutional life took place. In only very few societies have changes taken place through the combination of rebellions, heterodoxies, central political struggle, and institution building envisaged in the "revolutionary" model. Similarly, in different civilizations a variety of combinations formed among different movements of change and followed their own course toward change and transformation.

A closer look at the historical evidence indicates that three major patterns of change—each with some very important subvariants—can be identified.

The Pattern of Coalescent Change

One pattern of change is characterized by a relatively high degree of coalescence both in the outcomes of change in major institutional spheres and in the processes of change. This pattern can be identified in the Chinese Empire (Balazs 1964; Elwin 1973; Hucker 1969; Reischauer and Fairbank 1960, chaps. 2–10); in the Byzantine and Russian Empires (Pipes 1975; Ostrogorsky 1956; Seton-Watson, 1952); in some, but only some, of the Islamic states (Gibb 1962; Lewis 1950; Muir 1924; Shaban 1970; Turner 1974)—especially the Abbasid and to a smaller extent the Ottoman Empires (Inalcik 1973; Itzkowitz 1972; Sourdél 1970; Wittek 1938)—and in medieval and early modern western and central Europe (Beloff 1954; Bloch 1961; Hintze 1975; Lindsay 1957).

Two outstanding features characterize change in these societies. First, changes and restructuring of the major collectivities (political, religious, and national) and of institutional frameworks (the economic, the religious, and that of social stratification) tended to accompany a high degree of restructuring of the political system itself. Second, strong connections developed between changes in the bases of access to power and its symbols and the various movements of protest and central political struggle. Within the political struggle there emerged a high level of organization and ideological articulation of the issues.

Variations within the Pattern of Coalescent Change

Within this broad pattern there developed several important subvariants which can be distinguished according to first, the degree of coalescence be-

tween changes in the major institutional domains and changes in the major movements of protest and conflict; and, second, the degree of continuity of any given political regime. In the case of discontinuity, the nature of the outcome is significant, above all whether it entailed a breakdown or a transformation (with differing degrees of violence) of the regime.

The Chinese, Russian, Byzantine, and Islamic Empires.—Among these societies the Chinese and the Russian Empires were characterized by the lowest degree of coalescence. The Chinese evinced a very long and the Russian a much shorter period of continuity, but in both cases the outcome of discontinuity was violent revolutionary transformation.

The major types of protest and political conflict in the Chinese Empire—rebellions, the development of provincial governors into relatively semi-autonomous warlords, and conquests by foreign dynasties—did not usually exhibit a distinctly new level of political articulation. Most rebellions provided only secondary interpretations of the prevailing value structure and did not create any radically new orientations. The political orientations of the military governors and warlords were likewise set within the existing frameworks of values and political attitudes. Although they strove for greater independence from, or for seizure of, the central government, they envisaged but rarely the establishment of a new type of political system (Dardess 1973; Eisenstadt 1969; Feuerwerker 1975; Michael 1955; Parsons 1957; Wakeman 1977).

Similarly, the major heterodoxies—Taoism, Buddhism, and especially the various secondary Confucian schools—worked within the prevailing social framework, or tended toward withdrawal from it. The only close relation between ideological struggles and changes in the central elite groups and actual policies of the center developed in some of the orthodox Confucian controversies among the central elites. However, these changes were usually limited to the center and to the upper echelons of the bureaucracy and of the literati (Nivison and Wright 1959; Dubs 1939; Liu 1959).

The closest relation between changes in political regime and in strata formation that developed in the Chinese Empire was the one common to all imperial societies; it involved the political changes connected with changes in the relative strength and standing of free peasants against would-be aristocratic elements. But in China (in contrast, for instance, to the Byzantine Empire), even this connection manifested itself more on the level of rulers' policies than of political articulation of these strata. Similarly, the great urban and commercial developments under the Sung, though associated with changes in the policies of the government, were not correlated with changes in the mode of impingement of urban and commercial groups on the center (Kracké 1955).

In Imperial Russia (Pipes 1975; Seton-Watson 1952) the center was able for a relatively long period to maintain far-reaching segregation among

local rebellions, religious movements and developments, and conflicts at the center itself. The center, from at least the period of Peter the Great, was strongly oriented to modernization. It generated far-reaching processes of economic and social change but tried to control and to minimize the development of any autonomous political expressions and organization.

The Byzantine Empire was characterized by a relatively high degree of coalescent change in internal restructuring, especially with respect to changes in the strength of Imperial and aristocratic rulers and the free peasantry. But the very intensity of this struggle was among the causes of the ultimate demise of this empire (Ostrogorsky 1956). Among the Imperial systems that developed within the Islamic realm, the Abbasid and Fatimite ones (Lewis 1950; Shaban 1970) evinced a pattern rather close to the Byzantine model. The Ottoman Empire followed the Byzantine system, its direct predecessor, more closely, except that breakdown in the Ottoman Empire was connected with a (relatively nonviolent) revolutionary transformation.

Western and central European societies.—Within the European—especially the western and central European—societies (Beloff 1954; Bloch 1961; Forster and Green 1970; Hintze 1975; Le Goff 1968; Lindsay 1957; Tilly 1975) there developed a high degree of coalescence of change and restructuring of political regimes and other institutional domains, as well as coalescence of movements of protest, religious heterodoxies, and political struggle and their mutual restructuring. Thus, changes within any one institutional domain often impinged on other domains, and most significantly on the political sphere. These changes gave rise to the continual mutual restructuring of these spheres, which did not, however, necessarily coalesce into a unified political or cultural framework. The close connection among movements of rebellion, heterodoxies, and political struggle was accompanied by the tendency of various elites to engage in activities oriented to center formation and to combine such activities with institution building in the economic, cultural, and educational spheres.

As compared with the pure imperial systems, the imperial-feudal western European societies were characterized by much less stability of regimes, by constant changes in regime and collectivity, and by continual restructuring of centers. At the same time, however, they evinced a much greater capacity for institutional innovation cutting across different political and national boundaries and centers.

The Partially Coalescent and Noncoalescent Patterns of Change

A second pattern of change, the partially coalescent, requires only brief mention. It was prevalent in certain exceptional city-states and Near East-

ern tribal federations, notably in some Greek and Roman city-states of antiquity and in ancient Israelite and Islamic tribal federations. The distinguishing characteristic is a high level of coalescence among the processes of change but short-lived institutionalization of coalescent changes in the major institutional spheres (Ben-Sasson 1976, p. 1; Ehrenberg 1960; Eisenstadt 1971*a*, chap. 6; Fuks 1974; Gomme 1951; Heuss 1973).

A third pattern of change, which may be termed noncoalescent, will be treated more fully. It is found above all in patrimonial societies (Bendix and Roth 1971; Eisenstadt 1973) of the ancient Near East (Moscati 1962) and South and Southeast Asia (Resink 1968; Steinberg 1971) and in most Islamic (Turner 1974) societies. It is characterized by a low level of coalescence both in the institutionalization of change in the major institutional domains and in the processes of change.

In most of the societies belonging to this third pattern even the more dramatic or far-reaching changes in the principles and boundaries of regimes and of other collectivities and institutions, despite obvious mutual impingement, did not tend to coalesce. Each element tended to change in relative independence from the others, or, conversely, some elements evinced a relatively high level of continuity while important changes took place in the others. Similarly, within these societies there developed a low degree of connection between changes in political regimes on the one hand and restructuring of principles of access to power in the economic and social spheres on the other.

Far-reaching changes in these political regimes were usually combined with personal or dynastic changes involving shifts in the relative hierarchical standing of different families, ethnic groups, or regions; in the boundaries of the respective polities; in the concrete contents of symbols of legitimation which upheld the special virtue of the rulers; or in policy orientations of the rulers. Such changes were also often connected with the emergence of new economic or religious groups—but these changes rarely gave rise to or were directly connected with the restructuring of the principles of access to political power. At most, as already indicated above, they were connected with shifts in the policies of the rulers.

Similarly, the kingdoms, tribal organizations, and city-states that developed in these societies with patrimonial characteristics were also compatible with the development of relatively widespread economic systems, based on interstate commerce and even agricultural markets, which cut across their political boundaries and survived the demise of the regimes. Accordingly, far-reaching changes in technological or economic activities and in institution building and modes of production, though often contributing indirectly to crises of various patrimonial regimes, did not necessarily coalesce with such changes.

This pattern of change was very closely related to a low level of connec-

tion or coalescence or a high level of segregation among different types of movements of protest and conflict, that is, between rebellions and heterodoxies, between them and the central political struggle, as well as between all of these processes and the processes of institutional innovation, above all in the economic and cultural spheres. Concomitantly this pattern of change was closely connected with a low level of ideological expression of issues of political struggle and of political activities.

Variations within the Noncoalescent Pattern

Buddhist and Hindu societies.—Within this broad pattern several variants can be distinguished according to the degree of complexity and the degree of embeddedness in relatively “archaic,” “local” frameworks and culture. In the relatively “simple,” less differentiated regimes, such as some of the earlier Near Eastern or early South Asian societies, the demise of the political regimes could also entail the disappearance of whole “peoples,” as well as of their specific religion. At the same time, however, the connection of changes in some broader ethnic, linguistic, and above all economic systems with those in the political field was here, in many cases, very weak.

In contrast stand the more complex and differentiated regimes, especially those connected with the higher civilizations and above all with other-worldly religions such as Hinduism and Buddhism (Bechert 1966–68; Biardeau 1972; Daas 1978; Dumont 1970*a*, 1970*b*; Harper 1964; Pardue 1956; Sarkisyanz 1965; Tambiah 1976) and to some degree Zoroastrianism. Within these regimes there usually developed greater distinctiveness of “ethnic,” national, cultural, and above all religious collectivities and institutions and of economic frameworks, as well as of frameworks of social stratification. They tended to persist or change without direct connection to changes in political regimes. At the same time, connections developed between changes in the religious and civilizational frameworks and changes in the political and economic institutions—although these connections were much weaker than in societies where the more coalescent type of change predominated.

Several variations can be discerned in the development of weak connections. In the (Theravada) Buddhist (Bechert 1966–68; Pardue 1956; Tambiah 1976) realm rebellions tended to have relatively well-articulated millenarian orientations that sometimes became connected with political groups. This process often gave rise to the construction of new symbols and dimensions in the definition of the political local community, adding to the definition a broader orientation which sometimes served as the basis and framework for the crystallization of specific symbols and boundaries of

national communities. Accordingly, these "national" collectivities often evinced, as did the religious traditions, a much greater continuity than the respective political regimes. But these movements did not generate parallel distinctiveness in the political centers of the respective societies, in the relations between these centers and their periphery, or in the criteria of access to political power. Nor did they produce far-reaching restructuring of other institutional spheres.

In India, within the framework of the Hindu civilization there developed some more complex movements of change in the relation between rebellion and heterodoxy on the one hand, and broader institutional changes on the other hand. Many of India's movements of change were related to specific broad caste categories or groups, and they generated changes in institutional spheres in which these caste groups were especially active.

Throughout Indian history these specific characteristics of the processes of change encouraged a strong propensity for piecemeal innovation within different institutional spheres—that is, the redefinition of political boundaries, changes in technology and in levels of social differentiation, some restructuring of the economic sphere, and changes in social and economic policies as well as in the religious sphere itself, the latter manifest above all in the development of new movements and sects (Dumont 1970a; Gordon 1969; Kolff 1971; Singer and Cohn 1968; Thapar 1978).

The religious movements often became closely connected with major structural components of the processes of change in Indian society, particularly with the processes of regional and caste change and caste mobility, the crystallization of new caste groups, and continual restructuring of caste activities and of political boundaries. But these processes were in only a few cases connected with the restructuring of the political systems or of the relations between the political and economic sphere and the religious spheres.

Sunni Islam.—A special pattern of connection between movements of change and changes in different institutional spheres developed also within most of the Islamic (Sunni) societies (Laoust 1965; Lewis 1973, pp. 217–36). Despite the strong ideological emphasis inherent in Islam on the merging of the political and the religious realm, these societies were characterized by a low level of coalescence of movements and processes of change.

Various religious sects and popular movements developed frequently in these societies, but the religious check on the political authority was weak in stable regimes since there was no machinery other than revolt for enforcement. Hence numerous sects and movements either were aimed at the destruction of the existing regime and the establishment of a new and pure one or were politically passive.

And yet, because of the tendency toward coalescence inherent in the ideology of Islam, there developed, at least in the geographical heart of

Islam, a dynamic of change that went beyond the typical segregative pattern and tended more toward coalescent patterns of change. This was manifest in attempts to reestablish the Islamic ideal of the pure religious-political community—the Ummah. This tendency was activated only in very special patterns in periods of establishment of new political regimes, either of imperial systems (the last and most enduring of which was the Ottoman Empire) or of semitribal ones, like those in the Maghreb (Gellner and Micaud 1972; Gellner 1969) or even lately among the Swat (Ahmed 1976). It tended to subside soon after the establishment of a new regime.

Accordingly, we witness in Islamic history—above all in the heartland of Islam—a constant shift between the upsurge of almost totalistic political-religious movements that aimed at complete transformation of the political regime through such illegitimate means as assassination and rebellion and the strong otherworldly attitude and political passivity that helped to maintain the despotic character of existing regimes.

II. ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK: CULTURAL ORIENTATIONS, CENTER-PERIPHERY RELATIONS, AND STRUCTURE OF ELITES IN THE HISTORICAL CIVILIZATIONS

The preceding discussion presented a broad picture of some of the major patterns of change in “traditional” historical societies. Each pattern was shown to have developed primarily in a certain broad type of regime: coalescent change in imperial and imperial-feudal societies, partially coalescent change in some rather exceptional city-states and tribal federations, and noncoalescent change in patrimonial and related societies (see table 1). Questions naturally arise about the conditions accounting for the three patterns and for their relationship to the respective types of regime.

Understanding of the patterns of change relies heavily on the fact that each type of regime is characterized by different constellations of the variables considered relevant to the process of social change. Such variables include cultural orientations, political ecological settings, some aspects of the structure of centers and of center-periphery relations, the structure of social hierarchies and strata formation, the nature of major collectivities, and basic characteristics of the major elites or institutional entrepreneurs (Barth 1963; Eisenstadt 1971c). For our analysis of the relations among these institutional and cultural variables, one crucial aspect of a society is the degree of symbolic problematization inherent in the cultural orientation.

Symbolic problematization refers to the degree to which the premises and givens of human existence are questioned rather than accepted. It refers also to the degree to which the basic premises of a given tradition are expressed in abstract as against concrete ways and to the degree to

which there exists a tendency within a civilization to question these premises according to some principle. This concept is somewhat akin to C. Geertz's definition of rationalization: "The tendency to pose the basic problems of the major symbolic spheres in terms of growing abstraction of their formulation, of growing logical abstraction of their formulation, of growing logical coherence and general phrasing" (1973, p. 171).

The major distinctions among the cultural orientations predominant in the societies under study entail different degrees of problematization, of questioning the premises of a given culture. The distinctions lie in four related areas: (1) a perception of tensions between the transcendental and the mundane order; (2) the mode of resolution of such tension (in Weber's terms, the bases of salvation), above all whether it is "other worldly," this worldly, or a combination; (3) the degree of commitment to the cosmic and cultural orders; and (4) the degree of similarity or connectedness between the attributes of salvation and those of the basic primordial ascriptive communities.

A second crucial factor in differentiating the three broad types of regime is the extent to which the institutional structure, the collectivities, and the major elites enjoy autonomous symbolic definitions. Their autonomy remains most limited when they are absorbed or embedded in broader ascriptive collectivities or networks. Of notable importance here are the degree of symbolic and institutional distinctiveness of the center vis-à-vis the periphery and the degree of symbolic articulation of social hierarchies and collectivities. The most relevant aspects of the structure of the major elites are (1) the degree of their institutional differentiation and autonomy; (2) the relations between them and broader ascriptive groups and strata; and (3) the concomitant autonomy of the institutional professional, legal, or communicative frameworks within which these entrepreneurs are active. Such symbolic articulation and autonomy are not to be equated with specialization and differentiation in terms of the social division of labor.

The depiction in Part III of social change in the three types of regime focuses on more specific components of the relations among institutional structures, collectivities, elites, and cultural orientations. Analytic consequences of these relations are detailed here before turning to specific illustrations.

Symbolic Problematization, Structure of Elites, and Patterns of Change

Analysis indicates that a high-level articulation of political struggle and coalescence of movements and patterns of change is strongly related to four

factors: a high degree of symbolic and institutional distinctiveness of the center from the periphery, along with expression of strata consciousness; a multiplicity of autonomous elites in general and secondary elites in particular; a high level of tension between the transcendental and the mundane order; and a relatively strong this-worldly conception of the resolution of this tension and/or a high level of commitment to both the cosmic and the social orders.

The key to this correlation lies in the close relation between the degree of symbolic problematization in the cultural sphere and the degree of symbolic and institutional distinctiveness of the institutional order. The major elites or institutional entrepreneurs constitute the most important linkage, first between the cultural orientations and the symbolic articulation of the major institutional spheres and second between these and the processes of change that develop within the historical societies.

Three important institutional mechanisms influence the way in which such elites shape the institutional order. First is the degree of availability of "free" resources or activities not entirely embedded in ascriptive units, such as families, communities, or guilds. These free resources serve as the bases for the structuring of new institutional centers, hierarchies, and collectivities. Second comes the development of broad markets which cut across ascriptive units. And third is the development of alternative conceptions of social, political, or cultural order which differ from the existing one, not only in the sense of the reversal of existing arrangements (Gluckman 1963, chap. 3) but also in the possibility of going beyond them.

Cultural Orientations Influencing Symbolic Articulation and Problematization

Analysis indicates that different constellations of cultural codes, as carried by different types of elites, generate different institutional patterns in general and patterns of change in particular.

The more an orientation to symbolic problematization, in particular perceived tension between the transcendental and the mundane order, becomes institutionalized, the more it generates tendencies toward the development of free resources, a relatively wide scope of markets, alternative conceptions of social order, and increasing autonomy of the major elites or institutional entrepreneurs.

In turn, the autonomous elites often serve as activators of the alternative conceptions of social order and organizers of the free resources. They link together resources and activities from different spheres and potentially give them new expression and new directions. Linkages among such elites or

institutional entrepreneurs serve to connect different types of rebellion and to combine changes in different institutional spheres.

Cultural Orientations Influencing Patterns of Change:
Other-worldly Orientations

Even within civilizations with a high level of symbolic problematization, exemplified in a perception of tension between the transcendental and the mundane order, many differences in institutional contours and in processes of change can be identified. To explain these differences two concepts mentioned above are of special importance. One is the distinction between this-worldly and other-worldly resolution of the tension between the transcendental and the mundane orders (i.e., the choice of a mode of salvation). The second, cutting across the first, is the relation between the attributes or foci of the resolution of this tension (the attributes of salvation) and the attributes of the major primordial ascriptive collectivities.

The level of generalization of resources, the scope of different markets, and the symbolization of institutional spheres, as well as the emergence of alternative conceptions of social order, tend to be least developed when the focus of salvation is on other-worldly rather than this-worldly activities. Similarly, the possibility of linking the free resources generated and directing them into new institutional channels is greater insofar as there exists a close relation between the attributes of salvation and those of the major ascriptive (ethnic or national) communities.

An emphasis on other-worldly resolution of the tension between the transcendental and the mundane order tends to generate broad markets and distinctive centers in the religious sphere, but not in other institutional spheres, and only weak connections between free resources in the religious sphere and in other spheres.

The articulators of the models of cultural order, while autonomous in their religious activities, are, from the point of view of "mundane" institutional activities, embedded in broader ascriptive collectivities (as are the political and economic elites). Hence, they do not develop many nonreligious autonomous activities or orientations or the ability to create new types of institutional complexes. As we shall see, the segregation of the internal dynamics of these mundane spheres from the dynamics of the cultural and religious centers is greater insofar as the foci of the other-worldly resolution of the tension between the cosmic and the mundane order is dissociated, as in Buddhism, from the major ascriptive, primordial communities. It is smaller, as in Hinduism, when there exists a closer relation between the other-worldly attributes of salvation and the major attributes of the basic ascriptive groups.

Cultural Orientations Influencing Patterns of Change: This-worldly
and Combined This- and Other-worldly Foci of Salvation

In contrast, the conception of a high level of tension between the transcendental and the mundane order, along with some emphasis on this-worldly activities, tends to generate a high level of free resources, a wide scope of markets, extensive articulation of institutional spheres, and a large variety of alternative conceptions of social and political order.

The perception of this tension gives rise to, or at least is associated with or carried by, autonomous elites. Societies of this kind tend to develop multiple coalitions of autonomous elites who can mobilize free resources and channel them in new directions. Given the potentially mutual orientations of such institutional entrepreneurs, the directions of change may coalesce.

Within this pattern different varieties develop according to the specific content of the cultural orientation. The content varies according to (1) the degree of interweaving or segregation of this-worldly and other-worldly foci of salvation (a problem inherent in most high civilizations and religions), (2) the degree of institutional spread of the foci of this-worldly resolution of the tension between the transcendental and the mundane order, and (3) the relations between the major attributes or foci of the resolution of the tension and the basic attributes of the principal ascriptive collectivities.

The weaker the emphasis on the other-worldly realm (as in China) and the more the focus of salvation is this worldly and pertains to a single institutional area (as in both China and Islam), the stronger the tendency for the multiplicity of potentially autonomous elites—especially articulators of models of cultural and social order and political elites—to be brought together within a single social framework exhibiting little internal differentiation. This phenomenon is best illustrated by the Chinese literati. Such a structure generates only a limited scope of free resources and markets even if symbolization of the dominant institutional spheres is relatively strong. The flow of resources among markets will be relatively restricted—most of the free resources are directed toward the center (Skinner 1977). Concomitantly, in such situations the different elite activities will find very weak independent bases for the autonomous mobilization of resources; hence, the potential for internal transformability tends to be relatively small.

The stress on a single institutional focus of this-worldly salvation was common to China and Islam (in Islam the focus was the political-military) and gave rise to a similar structure of entrepreneurs and to limitations to the society's transformative capacities. But in Islam there existed also a very strong other-worldly emphasis (usually segregated from the this-world-

ly one) that generated a relatively strong conception of an alternative social and political order and the special type of sectarian political dynamics characteristic of that civilization.

The more institutionally segregated the relations between this-worldly and other-worldly foci of salvation that are symbolically interwoven (as in Russia), the more a situation tends to arise in which the different elites, instead of merging, become increasingly segregated. They retain, however, powerful mutual orientations as well as powerful orientations to the center. Hence, such situations are characterized by wider markets and a free flow of resources, albeit under stricter control from the center. There also exist stronger tendencies toward institution building as well as impingement on the center, which can be checked only by coercive measures.

At the same time, the close symbolic interweaving of the foci of salvation creates a potent and potentially articulate conception of alternative social orders. The segregation of different movements of protest and elites which yet retain some mutual orientations tends to assure relative longevity of the regime. But when the regime can no longer be maintained violent upheaval can result, carried out by some of the elites recognized in revolutionary movements.

In contrast to all the foregoing cases, in western Europe the potential for transformation of the social order was highest owing to a tight interweaving of this-worldly and other-worldly foci of salvation and a relative multiplicity of this-worldly arenas that served as the loci of such conceptions. These orientations to salvation generated a rich variety of conceptions of alternative social orders as well as different autonomous elites and coalitions between them. Hence, there developed a multiplicity of ways in which free resources could be organized and directed and linked.

The comparison between Europe and Islam brings out the importance of the second variable mentioned in the section on other-worldly orientations, namely, the degree of association between the attributes of salvation and the attributes of the basic ascriptive collectivities, an association that was very weak in Islam and very strong in Europe. The stronger that association, the more channels exist for the flow of resources, and the stronger are the bases of solidarity of various entrepreneurs.

Cultural Orientations, Ecological Conditions, and Variability of Patterns of Change

The institutional implications of different cultural orientations may work out in different ways in different concrete political-ecological settings. Ecological-political settings influence the availability of resources in different markets by determining (1) the scope and relative importance of markets

within and across the political units of a society and (2) the relative importance of internal versus external markets.

The comparison between the Byzantine and the Russian Empires on the one hand, and the western European imperial-feudal patterns and the Islamic and Hindu civilizations on the other, shows that in imperial systems there developed relatively compact markets within each empire, while in the western European and Islamic cases (as well as the Indian one) there developed crosscutting markets.

In all these societies, however, the predominant markets were internal and generated great reservoirs of resources to be reorganized and redirected. These markets enhanced the institution building and transformative capacity within their respective societies. In imperial societies these activities were ultimately controlled by the political elite. In the imperial-feudal system, the structure of the crosscutting markets and the linkages between them were greatly influenced by the multiplicity of elites which often cut across political boundaries. In all societies the nature of such linkages depended heavily on some of the characteristics of these elites which were analyzed above.

Some differences can be discerned between societies in which compact markets predominate and those in which crosscutting ones predominate. In societies with a high level of compactness of markets the central controlling mechanisms constitute an easy target for the impact of the processes of change. This often creates a situation of an all-or-nothing struggle, and the possibility of a breakdown within such regimes inevitably increases. As against this, crosscutting markets generate greater possibilities for multiple ways of restructuring the different institutional spheres.

In contrast to both the compact and crosscutting internal markets, heavy dependency on external markets minimizes the possibility of institutionalization of change. This holds even when there is a relatively high degree of coalescence of rebellions, heterodoxies, and central political struggle and thus the development of transformative tendencies. This pattern is illustrated by the exceptional city-states and tribal federations. The intensification of political struggle has often led to the demise of these systems and their incorporation in various ways in other societies.

The explanation of this special pattern of change lies in the fact that such societies attempted to maintain, in their respective international systems, standards of institutional activities which were more appropriate to "bigger" societies with wide internal markets (Eisenstadt 1977). Hence these societies tended to specialize in working for different kinds of external markets while keeping the level of their internal specialization much lower. The combination of this level of resources with the relatively low organizational capacities of the elites explains the relative difficulties in long-range institutionalization of their potential transformative capacities.

Let us turn now to an exploration of the processes outlined above as they appear in the three types of regime in which the three different patterns of change developed.

III. SOCIAL AND CULTURAL LINKAGES IN THREE TYPES
OF REGIME: IMPERIAL AND IMPERIAL-FEUDAL, CITY-STATE
AND TRIBAL FEDERATION, AND PATRIMONIAL

Cultural Orientations, Center-Periphery Relations, and Structure of
Elites in Imperial and Imperial-Feudal Societies

Part I identified imperial and imperial-feudal societies as those within which the pattern of coalescent change developed. Two major characteristics of center-periphery relations in the imperial societies—and to a large extent also in the imperial-feudal ones—were first, a high level of distinctiveness of their respective centers (Shils 1975), and second, continuous attempts of the centers not only to extract resources from the periphery but also to permeate it and to reconstruct it according to their own premises. The political and, to some degree, the cultural-religious centers in these societies were conceived as autonomous foci of the charismatic elements of the sociopolitical and often also of the cosmic cultural order. These centers—political, religious and cultural—were the foci and loci of the various great traditions that developed in these societies as distinct from local traditions. The permeation of the periphery by the centers was discernible in their development of widespread channels of communication and in their attempts to break through the ascriptive ties of the groups on the periphery.

Closely connected to this type of center-periphery relation is the development in these societies of a high articulation among symbols of country-wide social hierarchies, some political consciousness of these hierarchies, and a high degree of ideological symbolization and mutual orientation among the major religious, political, and even ethnic and national collectivities. Although each collectivity tended to develop a relatively high degree of autonomy, they also constituted mutual referents for each other (e.g., being a good “Hellene” was identified with citizenship in the Byzantine state, and vice versa [Eisenstadt 1969, 1978]). This high degree of symbolic articulation and distinctiveness of the major institutional aspect is closely related, in these imperial and imperial-feudal societies, to certain types of cultural orientations.

Most of these empires developed in close relation to some of the great civilizations or traditions in the history of mankind, such as the special Chinese blend of Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism; the Christian tradition in its variety; and the Islamic one. All of them developed cultural

frameworks both symbolically and organizationally distinct from the political, ethnic, and national spheres.

Most of these civilizations shared several basic cultural orientations or codes which distinguished them from some of the other civilizations emerging in the same period—the 1st millennium B.C. (*Daedalus* 1975; Voegelin 1954–56). First, they were characterized by a conception of a high level of autonomy and distinction of the cosmic (religious) and mundane orders and by a strong emphasis on the necessity of linking the transcendental sphere and the mundane order. Second, although they shared this emphasis on the tension between the cosmic and the mundane world with other civilizations, such as the Hindu and Buddhist, they included some kind of this-worldly activity as a bridge between the transcendental-cosmic and the mundane world, or in Weber's terminology, as a focus of salvation. Third, there developed within these civilizations a strong emphasis on the commitment of various sectors of the population to either the cosmic or the social order and a relatively autonomous access of at least some groups to the major attributes of one order or the other.

These cultural orientations and this structure of centers and of center-periphery relations were very closely related to differences in the structure of the major elites or institutional entrepreneurs.

Most of the elites in the imperial and imperial-feudal societies had autonomous resource bases and potentially autonomous access to the center and to each other. This was true above all of articulators of the cultural and social order, political elites, and to a smaller degree the representatives of different collectivities and the economic elites. Moreover, within these societies, there developed a multiplicity of secondary elites. It was these various elites, with their impingement on the centers and the periphery alike, that shaped various movements of protest and of political activities and struggle within them. Any type of elite—"primary" and "secondary" alike—could become a starting point of movements of protest or of political struggle with a higher level of organizational and symbolic articulation.

Let us proceed now to analyze some of the variations within the imperial and imperial-feudal societies, starting with the constellation of relations among cultural orientations, center-periphery relations, structures of elites, and patterns of change that developed in the Chinese Empire.

The Chinese Empire.—China's Confucian-Taoist-Buddhist-Legalist tradition, as compared with monotheistic religions, was characterized by a somewhat weaker stress on the tension between the transcendental and the mundane order; a very weak conception of a historical-transcendental time dimension; a strong this-worldly focus on overcoming this tension; and a relative openness in its formulation as well as in its accessibility to broader strata (Balazs 1964; Nivison and Wright 1959; Schwartz 1975; Wright 1953, 1960). This ideology was very closely tied to the political

framework of the Chinese Empire, which was legitimized by the Confucian symbols. Those symbols and the Confucian ethical orientation found their natural place and framework, their major referent, within the empire.

The Chinese tradition was probably the most this worldly of all the great traditions. The thrust of the official Confucian-Legalist framework was the cultivation of the sociopolitical and cultural orders as the major focus of cosmic harmony. It emphasized this-worldly duties and activities within the existing social frameworks—the family, broader kin groups, and imperial service—and stressed the connection between the proper performance of these duties and the ultimate criteria of individual responsibility. Of course, the tradition also emphasized individual responsibility along with a strongly transcendental orientation, but this responsibility was couched largely in terms of the importance of the political and familial dimensions of human existence.

The Chinese tradition stressed also a basic affinity between the symbols of the center and the status identities of the peripheral groups. Orientation to the center and to participation in it constituted an essential component of the collective identity of many local and occupational groups.

All these orientations greatly influenced the structure of the Chinese center and of the major elites and strata in Chinese society. The center was an absolutist one in terms of both political and cultural orientations. The imperial center, with its strong Confucian orientation and legitimation, was the sole distributor of macrosocietal prestige and honor. Various social groups or strata did not develop autonomous, independent status orientations except on a purely local level; the major, almost the only, wider orientations were bound to the political-religious center (Balazs 1964; Eisenstadt 1971*b*; Lapidus 1975*b*; Michael 1955).

Of crucial importance in the linkage between the center and the periphery in general and in the process of strata formation in particular was the structure of the major group or stratum linking the imperial center to the broader society—the literati (Balazs 1964; Ho 1962; Kracke 1953; van der Sprenkel 1958), that is, all those who took the Confucian examinations or studied for them. This elite was a relatively cohesive congeries of individuals and quasi groups that shared a cultural background enhanced by the examination system and by adherence to Confucian classical teachings and rituals.

The stratum of literati constituted a source of recruitment to the bureaucracy and combined within itself the activities of political elites and of articulators of models of cultural order. This elite enjoyed close relations with the leaders of collectivities (the heads of family and of wider kinship groups) and exercised a virtual monopoly over access to the center. The organizational framework of the literati was almost identical with that of the state bureaucracy (which recruited 10%–20% of all the literati); ex-

cept for some schools and academies it had no organization of its own. This elite, which was relatively widespread, was in principle recruited from all strata, even from the peasantry, even though in fact most literati were recruited from the gentry. Thus, unlike its Russian counterpart, it maintained relatively close solidary relations with most groups of the society.

The Russian and Byzantine Empires.—A different constellation of cultural orientations, structure of elites, and structure of centers and center-periphery relations developed in the Russian and Byzantine Empires (and in the Abbasid, Fatimite, and Ottoman Empires).

Within the late (post-Mongol) Muscovite variant of Christian civilization (Pipes 1975; Seton-Watson 1952), the center succeeded in attaining a relatively high degree of subordination of the cultural to the political order, and a relatively low degree of autonomous access of the major strata to the principal attributes of the social and political orders. The political sphere became the monopoly of the rulers. The economic sphere became less central, and economic activities were left, insofar as they did not impinge directly on the center, to their own autonomous development. The broader strata were granted autonomy in other mundane—primarily economic—activities, without being permitted to imbue them to any large extent with wider meanings in terms of the basic parameters of the cultural-religious spheres.

To this end, the center vigorously segregated access to the attributes of the cosmic order (salvation) from access to the attributes of the political and social orders. Religious heterodoxies became either other-worldly oriented or dissociated from the political sphere, or both. Sometimes, however, as in the case of the true believers, they impinged to a degree on the economic sphere (Gerschenkorn 1970).

The major mechanism through which the center attained its goals was forced segregation of the political elites, who were also the articulators of the cultural order, from the economic and educational elites and the articulators of the solidarity of the major ascriptive collectivities (Eisenstadt 1971*b*, chap. 6; Raeff 1966).

The Byzantine Empire did not experience such a traumatic process as the Mongolian conquest which created in Russia the precondition for the weakening of the autonomous orientations and structures of the major active strata. Hence, the Byzantine center was never able to segregate this-worldly and other-worldly orientations of different groups, strata, and elites to the same extent as the Russian center, even though such attempts were often made. Likewise, although the religious supremacy of the emperor over the patriarch was the official doctrine of the Byzantine Empire and church (Hussey 1937; Ostrogorsky 1956), cultural-religious orientations did not become as totally subjugated to the political sphere as happened

in Russia. The church, oriented as it was toward other worldly activities, never became as fully controlled politically as the Russian church.

Similarly, different strata such as the aristocracy and the peasantry had relatively more autonomous access to the center. In addition, Byzantine society was characterized by a high level of autonomy of secondary elites and of linkages among them and the broader strata (Charanis 1940-41; 1951a, 1951b).

Western European civilization: Cultural orientations and structural pluralism.—A still different set of relations among cultural orientations, center-periphery relations, structure of secondary elites, and patterns of change developed in the imperial and imperial-feudal structures of medieval and early modern (western and central) Europe (Hintze 1975; Thrupp 1967).

European civilization was characterized by a very high number of cross-cutting cultural orientations and structural settings. The symbolic pluralism, or heterogeneity, of European society was evident in the multiplicity of traditions—the Judeo-Christian, the Greek, the Roman, and the various tribal ones—out of which its own cultural tradition crystallized. The most important among Europe's cultural orientations was an emphasis both on the autonomy of the cosmic, cultural, and social orders and on their interrelatedness. This was defined in terms of the tension between the transcendental and the mundane order. Also important was an emphasis on ways of resolving this tension through a combination of this-worldly (political and economic) and other-worldly activities (O'Dea, O'Dea, and Adams 1975; Heer 1968; Troeltsch 1931).

These symbolic orientations became connected with a very special type of structural-organizational pluralism. The type of pluralism Europe exhibited differed greatly from the one that could be found, for instance, in the compact Byzantine (or Russian) Empire. In the Byzantine Empire pluralism was manifest in a relatively high degree of structural differentiation within a relatively unified sociopolitical framework in which different social functions were apportioned to different social categories. The structural pluralism that developed in Europe was characterized, above all, by a combination of steadily increasing levels of structural differentiation, on the one hand, and constantly changing boundaries of collectivities, units, and frameworks, on the other.

Among these collectivities and units there did not exist a clear-cut division of labor. Instead, they were in constant competition over their respective standing with regard to the attributes of the social and cultural orders; over the performance of the major societal functions—be they economic, political, or cultural—and over the very definition of the boundaries of ascriptive communities.

The combination of these cultural orientations and structural conditions

generated in Europe several basic institutional characteristics (Bloch 1930, 1961; Brunner 1968; Cam 1954; Praver and Eisenstadt 1968) the most important being: (1) multiplicity of centers; (2) a high degree of permeation of the periphery by the centers and of impingement of the periphery on the centers; (3) a relatively small degree of overlap of the boundaries and restructuring of class, ethnic, religious and political entities; (4) a comparatively high degree of autonomy of groups and strata and of their access to the centers of society; (5) a high degree of overlapping among various status units, together with a high level of countrywide status (class) consciousness and political activity; (6) a multiplicity of cultural and functional (economic or professional) elites enjoying a relatively high degree of autonomy, a high degree of crosscutting, and a close relationship with the broader more ascriptive strata; (7) a relative high level of autonomy of the legal system with regard to other integrative systems, especially the political and the religious spheres; and (8) a high degree of autonomy of cities as centers of social and structural creativity and identity formation (Brunner 1968, pp. 213-41; Weber 1958).

Cultural Orientations, Center-Periphery Relations, and Structure of Elites in Exceptional City-States and Tribal Federations

As indicated above, societies in which the partially coalescent pattern of change developed included the Greek (and Roman) city-states of antiquity and the Near Eastern, especially the Israeli and Islamic, tribal federations (Ben-Sasson 1975, p. 1; Eisenstadt 1971a, chap. 6). The cultural orientations prevalent within them were a perception of some degree of tension between transcendental and mundane orders, some strong this-worldly conception of the proper way of resolving this tension, and a relatively high level of commitment to the cultural and social order.

In all of these societies the center-periphery relations were characterized by a growing symbolical and structural difference between the center and the periphery and by mutual impingement. But the structural difference between the center and periphery was not fully institutionalized in special frameworks. The lack of full institutionalization of the centers could be seen in the city-states in the fact that most members (citizens) of the larger community could also participate in the center. Although many groups could only participate to a limited degree, such limitations were not dissimilar from the social distinctions made within the periphery.

The most important structural outcome or derivative of this combination of structural differentiation, of structurally and symbolically distinct center, and of overlapping of membership between the center and the periphery, was the relatively slight development of an autonomous elite.

Cultural Orientations, Center-Periphery Relations, and Structure of Elites in Patrimonial Societies

As opposed to the imperial and imperial-feudal societies, the major patrimonial societies, in which the noncoalescent pattern of change developed, were characterized by a relative lack of the symbolic and structural distinction between center and periphery. Patrimonial societies also showed a higher degree of status segregation, a lower degree of countrywide "class" consciousness and of symbolic articulation of the major types of collectivities (Eisenstadt 1973*b*; Heine-Geldern 1956; Schriecke 1957), a strong tendency to narrow status association, and a low degree of autonomy of the major types of elites. The cultural orientations predominant in these societies were either a low level of distinctness and tensions between the transcendental and the mundane order, or a high level of distinctness but one in which the focus of the resolution of tension was other worldly. The latter orientation involved a low level of commitment to the sociopolitical and even to the cultural order and a tendency to accept those orders as given.

In addition, these societies were characterized by a relatively low level of symbolic articulation of different collectivities as well as of their major elites. The elites were also deeply embedded within the ascriptive groups.

Variations in patrimonial societies: Buddhist and Hindu civilizations.—The most important variants developed within those patrimonial city-state and tribal regimes which were related to "religions" or traditions connected to the great traditions that emphasized the strong other-worldly conceptions of salvation such as Buddhism (Bechert 1966–68; Harper 1964; Pardue 1956; Tambiah 1976) and Hinduism.

These great traditions and their local variations were carried by relatively autonomous, often international, elites such as the Buddhist Sangha—and to a smaller degree the Zoroastrian clergy—the like of which could not be found among the little traditions of most other regimes within which there developed patterns of relatively noncoalescent change. These elites created centers that, in the religious sphere, were distinct from their own periphery as well as special interlinking networks between these centers and the periphery—between the great and little traditions.

But, given the strong other-worldly emphasis of these great traditions, the cultural orientations did not generate parallel distinctiveness in the political centers of the societies connected with them or in the relations between these centers and their periphery, nor did they tend to produce far-reaching restructuring of other institutional spheres. True enough, the autonomous cultural religious groups, especially the Sangha in Buddhist societies, often participated in political life. The basis of this participation was their organizational dependence on the rulers and the rulers' quest for

legitimation. But such participation was set mostly within the frameworks of the various patrimonial regimes, in which these elites often became very powerful politically.

The situation in the Hindu civilization of India was rather different. Like Buddhism, which started as a heterodox sect within Hinduism, the latter was an other-worldly great civilization; yet its negation of the mundane world was not as total as that of Buddhism (Biardeau 1972; Brown 1966; Daas 1978; Dumont 1970*a*, 1970*b*).

Hinduism, as most fully articulated in the Brahmanic ideology and symbolism, is based on a strong emphasis on the tension between the transcendent and the mundane order—tension that derives from a perception that the mundane order is polluted in cosmic terms. This pollution can be overcome either through total renunciation or through ascriptive ritual activities and adherence to the arrangement of social activity in a very complicated hierarchical order reflecting an individual's standing in the cosmic order. The hierarchical order emphasizes the differential ritual standing of basic primordial kinship and territorial social units (the *jatis*). In all these ways it has a much more direct relation to worldly activities than Buddhism (Cohn 1971; Dumont 1970*b*; Heesterman 1964; Mandelbaum 1970; Singer and Cohn 1968; Srinivas 1966; Thapar 1978, pp. 40–63).

The distinctive cultural-religious center, the ideological core of which was the Brahmanic ideology and symbolism which developed in India, consisted of a series of networks and organizational-ritual subcenters—pilgrimages, temples, sects, schools—spreading throughout the subcontinent, often cutting across political boundaries (Cohn 1971; Singer 1959; Singer and Cohn 1968).

The religious center or centers became very closely associated with the broad, ethnic Hindu identity (even more closely associated than the religious symbols and symbols of political community in Buddhist societies). The vague, general, yet resilient boundaries of Hindu ethnic identity constituted the broadest ascriptive framework within which the Brahmanic ideology was worked out.

At the same time, however, as in the other other-worldly religions, the major center of Hinduism was not political. Although there arose in India small and large states and semi-imperial centers, there did not develop any single state with which the cultural tradition was identified (Heesterman 1971). Accordingly, center-periphery relations in most Indian principalities and kingdoms did not differ greatly from such relations in other patrimonial regimes, city-states, or tribal federations. The various political centers, though organizationally more compact than the ritual centers, were not continuous—regimes and kingdoms rose and fell—nor did they serve as major foci of Indian cultural identity. This fact gave Indian civilization its internal strength and explained its capacity to survive under

alien rule (Fox 1971; Heesterman 1957, 1964, 1971; Morrison 1970; Sinha 1938).

The relative independence of the cultural traditions, centers, and symbols of identity from the political center was paralleled by the relative autonomy of the social structure with its complex of castes and villages and its networks of cultural communication (Béteille 1965; Ishwaran 1970; Mandelbaum 1970).

Within these social groupings and networks there developed the major types of institutional entrepreneurs and elites, political and economic entrepreneurs on the one hand, and articulators of models of cultural order and of the solidarity of different ascriptive groups on the other. Their entrepreneurial activities were structured by the two fundamental aspects of Indian social life. These activities were rooted in and defined by the combination of ascriptive primordial and ritual characteristics; at the same time, such definitions contain very strong emphasis on the proper performance of mundane activities (Neale 1969; Rudolph, Rudolph, and Singh 1975; Morrison 1970).

Variations in patrimonial and sultanic societies: The Islamic civilization.—A rather special pattern of relations among cultural orientations, center-periphery relations, and institutional entrepreneurs developed in the Islamic civilization (Gibb 1962; Von Grunebaum 1946, 1954; Hodgson 1974; Holt, Lambton, and Lewis 1970; Lewis 1950, 1973).

The most important cultural orientations that crystallized in Islam were the distinction between the "cosmic" transcendental realm and the mundane one and the stress on overcoming the tension inherent in this distinction by total submission to God and by this-worldly—above all, political and military—activity; the strong universalistic element in the definition of the Islamic community; the principle of autonomous access of all members of the community to the attributes of the transcendental order, to salvation, through submission to God; the ideal of the *ummah*—the political-religious community of all believers distinct from any ascriptive, primordial collectivity; and the ideal of the ruler as the upholder of the ideal of Islam, of the purity of the *ummah*, and of the life of the community (Gibb 1962; Von Grunebaum 1948, 1954).

Of special importance from the point of view of this analysis is the fact that in the Islamic realm the original vision of the *ummah* assumed complete convergence between the sociopolitical and the religious community. The original Islamic state developed out of conquest motivated by a new universal religion and borne by conquering tribes; therefore, in this initial state of conquest the identity between polity and religion was very great. Similarly, many of the later (such as the Abbasid and Fatimite) caliphs came to power on the crest of religious movements, legitimized themselves in religious terms, and sought to retain popular support by stressing the

religious aspect of their authority and by courting the religious leaders and religious sentiments of the community. Political problems (e.g., determination of proper succession and the scope of the political community) originally constituted the main theological problems of Islam. But owing to widespread Moslem conquest, to the tensions between tribal conquerors and conquered peoples, to the emphasis on total submission to God, as well as to the strong ideological dissociation between the universal Islamic community and primordial local or ethnic communities, after the initial attempts of the first caliphs and the beginning of the Abbasid Caliphate, the ideal of a common political and religious community was never realized. Accordingly, there developed in Islamic polities a growing dissociation among the political communities, the religious elites, and the various local communities and institutional spheres, albeit with a strong latent religious-ideological orientation toward the unification of these spheres (Gibb 1962, pp. 3-33; Lapidus 1975*b*; Spuler 1970; Turner 1974).

The identity of the religious community was forged out and upheld mainly by the Holy Law (Sharia) as annunciated and developed by the religious leaders (the *ulema*) and enforced by the rulers. Between the *ulema* and the rulers there developed a very peculiar relation in which the *ulema* became politically passive or subjugated to the rulers—even though relatively autonomous in the performance of their legal-religious functions (Schacht 1970).

This combination gave rise to the very high degree of symbolic and organizational autonomy of the political elites; to the relatively high symbolic autonomy—but only a minimal organizational one—of the religious elite; and to a growing separation of the two. The religious leadership was heavily dependent on the rulers and did not develop into a broad, independent, and cohesive organization. Religious groups and functionaries were not organized as a separate entity; nor did they constitute a tightly organized body—except when organized by the state, as in the Ottoman Empire (Gibb and Bowen 1957, chaps. 8-12; Itzkowitz 1972).

The strong ideological dissociation of the universal Islamic community and the different primordial communities resulted in a weak solidarity between these communities and the political and religious articulators of the cultural model of Islam.

In imperial and patrimonial Islamic systems alike, the combination of religious orientations, structure of elites, and the relations between elites and local ascriptive communities gave rise to some unique types of ruling groups, especially to the military-religious rulers who emerged from tribal and sectarian elements. It gave rise also to the system of military slavery which created special channels of mobility—such as the *gulan* system in general and the Mameluke system and Ottoman *deoshime* in particular,

through which the ruling group could be recruited from alien elements (Ayalon 1951; Itzkowitz 1972; Miller 1941; Wittek, 1938).

Similarly, except in the case of so-called missionary orders that established new regimes, there developed but few structural linkages between the political elites and the articulators of cultural models and economic entrepreneurs (though often there were close family relations among some of them).

IV. A BRIEF CONCLUSION

Limitations of space preclude more extended analysis of the three types of regime. It is to be hoped, however, that the illustrations used here will serve the reader as evidence of the theoretical validity of Part II. The analytic framework presented there, resting as it does on study of the cases presented in Part III, offers conclusions about the various constellations of cultural orientations and structural characteristics that crystallized in major traditional civilizations. In turn, Parts II and III provide theoretical and empirical answers to the questions mentioned at the outset of Part II, questions about the conditions underlying the three patterns of change treated in Part I and their relationship to specific types of regime.

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Multiple Victimization in American Cities: A Statistical Analysis of Rare Events¹

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Poisson and negative binomial models are applied to the number of multiple victimizations reported in the National Crime Surveys. The negative binomial but not the Poisson model is shown to be compatible with the data. The negative binomial model is consistent with the hypothesis that the probability of being victimized is constant over time and does not depend upon the number of prior victimizations, but that not all persons, businesses, and households have the same probability of being victimized. This interpretation can be used to estimate the probability of being victimized conditional upon the number of victimizations experienced in an observation period and to estimate the maximum correlation between independent variables and the number of victimizations experienced in a given time interval. Regardless of the interpretation, the analysis shows that victimization rates are not unduly affected by small numbers of persons having unusually high rates. Researchers using large data sets are likely to find similar patterns between victimization counts and independent variables using either rates or probabilities to measure victimization.

During the past decade, victimization studies have shown that a number of persons, businesses, and households were repeatedly victimized more often than would be expected by chance alone. Using the National Crime Survey reports for eight American cities, Hindelang, Gottfredson, and Garofalo (1978) showed that the number of persons and households experiencing multiple victimizations was considerably higher than it would be if every person and household had the same constant chance of being victimized. Using victimization data from a much smaller survey in England, Sparks, Genn, and Dodd (1977) showed that the number of multiple victimizations could not be accounted for by Poisson or by negative binomial

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models. They concluded that victimization should be measured by calculating the probability of being victimized one or more times rather than by calculating the average victimization rate. Rates can be inflated by a relatively small number of persons, households, or businesses with an unusually high number of victimizations whereas the probability of being victimized one or more times cannot be inflated by such persons, households, or businesses.

This paper applies both Poisson and negative binomial models to victimizations recorded in some of the largest cities in the United States. The data suggest that multiple victimization can be adequately accounted for by negative binomial models. The influence on victimization rates of small numbers of persons experiencing relatively large numbers of multiple victimizations is shown to depend upon the parameters of the negative binomial model. Research implications of that model are drawn. The discussion begins by showing the inadequacy of the simple Poisson model.

THE SIMPLE POISSON MODEL APPLIED TO VICTIMIZATION RESEARCH

The simple Poisson model is based upon the assumptions that (1) the probability of being victimized is the same for all persons (businesses, households, etc.) and (2) the probability of being victimized does not depend upon the number of previous victimizations. Under this model, persons who experience a high number of victimizations are merely unlucky. For example, persons who have experienced 10 victimizations in one year are considered as likely to be victimized in the next year as those who did not experience any victimizations.

Using the Poisson model, the probability of experiencing X victimizations during some set time period, where X represents the random variable and x represents the values it can assume, may be expressed as:

$$\text{prob}(X = x) = e^{-\lambda} \lambda^x / x! . \quad (1)$$

For later comparisons with the negative binomial, this formula can also be written in iterative form as:

$$\text{prob}(X = 0) = e^{-\lambda} \quad (2)$$

and

$$\text{prob}(X = x) = \text{prob}(X = x - 1) \lambda / x \quad \text{for } x \geq 1 . \quad (3)$$

The λ in these equations is the Poisson parameter to be estimated from the observed data. Its maximum likelihood estimate is the mean or average rate. In victimization research, the average yearly rate for a particular crime is usually small, ranging from about 0.01 to 0.40.

Equation (3) shows that few multiple victimizations are likely to occur

under Poisson models with low mean rates. One way to see this is to note that the probability of having $X + 1$ victimizations is $(X + 1)/\lambda$ times smaller than the probability of having X victimizations. For small values of λ , this means that the probability of having many victimizations is very small. For example, if λ equals 0.10, a common value in burglary victimization, the probability of experiencing one victimization is 10 times smaller than that of experiencing zero victimizations, and the probability of two victimizations is 20 times smaller than the probability of one victimization, or 200 times smaller than the probability of zero victimizations.

The inability of the Poisson model to account for multiple victimizations is illustrated in table 1, which displays the unweighted count of burglaries recorded and those expected under a Poisson and a negative binomial model for the National Crime Survey of criminal victimization in 26 American cities during one year. The table shows that the Poisson model is not compatible with the observed data. For example, the Poisson model suggests that only three households should experience four or more burglaries whereas the data show that 155 households experienced this many burglaries. In sharp contrast, the negative binomial model suggests that 163 households should experience this many burglaries. The χ^2 goodness-of-fit test statistic shows that the Poisson model is not compatible with the data, but that the negative binomial model has an astoundingly good fit.

TABLE 1
OBSERVED AND EXPECTED NUMBER OF BURGLARIES IN 26 CITIES UNDER
A POISSON AND A NEGATIVE BINOMIAL MODEL
(National Crime Survey Data, 1974-75)

NUMBER OF VICTIMIZATIONS	OBSERVED FREQUENCY	EXPECTED FREQUENCY FOR EACH MODEL*	
		Poisson Model	Negative Binomial Model
0.....	231,656	228,080	231,656
1.....	23,720	29,946	23,755
2.....	3,895	1,966	3,819
3.....	655	86	688
4.....	120	3	131
5.....	25	0.1	26
6.....	5	0.0	5
7.....	3	0.0	1
8.....	1	0.0	0.2
9.....	1	0.0	0.1
χ^2	9,089.2	6.1
Degrees of freedom....	...	2	4
Mean.....	.131	.131	.131
Exponent k468

* For nine burglaries the expected number includes the occurrence of more than nine burglaries.

THE NEGATIVE BINOMIAL MODEL

The negative binomial model depends upon two parameters: a mean, m , and an exponent, k . The probability of having exactly x victimizations during some set period of time may be expressed as (Anscombe 1959):

$$\text{prob}(X = x) = \left(1 + \frac{m}{k}\right)^{-k} \frac{\Gamma(x+k)}{x! \Gamma(k)} \left(\frac{m}{m+k}\right)^x, \quad (4)$$

where Γ represents the gamma function.²

The difference between the negative binomial and the Poisson models can be seen by comparing them in their iterative forms. The iterative form of the negative binomial model may be written as:

$$\text{prob}(X = 0) = \left(1 + \frac{m}{k}\right)^{-k}, \quad (5)$$

and

$$\text{prob}(X = x) = \left[\text{prob}(X = x-1) \frac{m}{x}\right] \left(\frac{x+k-1}{m+k}\right) \quad \text{for } x \geq 1. \quad (6)$$

The part of expression (6) within brackets is identical to the iterative formula for the Poisson model because m equals λ , the mean rate of occurrence in the population. Thus, the greater number of multiple victimizations predicted in the negative binomial than in the Poisson model is largely due to the last term within parentheses, which depends explicitly on the parameter k .

The effect of this term can be understood by considering various values of X . If X equals one, the expression is always less than one (assuming the mean is greater than zero). This means that, relative to the number of cases of no victimization, proportionately fewer cases of single victimization are expected under the negative binomial than under the Poisson model. For the data set in table 1 this term equals 0.78. If $X = 2$, the last term, $(x+k-1)/(m+k)$, usually exceeds one (k is usually less than one and m is usually between 0.01 and 0.40). For example, this term equals 2.45 for the values of m and k in table 1, showing that the probability of having two burglaries instead of one is about two and one-half times higher in the negative binomial than in the Poisson model. The value of this multiplier increases linearly with increases in X . In table 1, it equals 4.12, 5.79, and 7.46 when X equals 3, 4, and 5, respectively. The overall differences between the negative binomial and the Poisson increase geometrically, however, because the differences at each step are multiplied together to obtain

² The gamma function of n , $\Gamma(n)$, equals the integral between 0 and infinity of X for the expression: $e^{-X} X^{n-1}$. Furthermore, $\Gamma(n+1) = n\Gamma(n)$. If n is an integer, then $\Gamma(n+1) = n!$.

the probability of any exact number of victimizations. In table 1, the probability of five burglaries compared with the probability of zero burglaries is 341 times higher in the negative binomial than in the Poisson model, $(0.78) (2.45) (4.12) (5.79) (7.46) = 341$.

The Poisson model can also be viewed as a special case of the negative binomial model. As k becomes large, the probability of zero victimizations, expression (5), tends toward e^{-m} , the Poisson probability of zero victimizations. The probability of X victimizations, expression (6), tends to $\text{prob}(X = x - 1) m/x$, which is the Poisson probability of X victimizations. Thus, as k tends to infinity the negative binomial cannot be distinguished from the Poisson model. A formal proof is given by Feller (1968, p. 281).

PARAMETER ESTIMATION

As was noted above, the maximum likelihood estimate of m is the observed mean. The mean is easy to calculate and is readily interpretable.

Unlike m , the maximum likelihood estimate of k is computationally difficult to obtain.³ For small values of m and k , Anscombe (1959, fig. 1) showed that a very efficient estimate \hat{k} (frequently over 98% efficient) can be obtained by estimating k from the observed proportion of zero victimizations. This was done in this report by applying Newton's iterative method of finding roots (Wendroff 1969) to the following reexpression of formula (5):

$$\frac{1}{k} + \frac{\ln(1 + \hat{m}/k)}{\ln(n_0/N)} = 0, \quad (7)$$

where n_0 is the observed number who were not victimized, N is the total sample size, m is the average rate, and \ln is the natural logarithm function. The iteration was halted when the summation of the terms on the left-hand side of expression (7) was less than 5×10^{-7} .

The large sample variance of \hat{m} (Anscombe 1959) equals:

$$\text{var}(\hat{m}) = \frac{1}{N} \left(m + \frac{m^2}{k} \right), \quad (8)$$

³ Anscombe (1959, p. 367) states that the maximum likelihood estimate of k is the root of the following equation in X :

$$N \ln \left(1 + \frac{\hat{m}}{X} \right) = \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} n_j \left(\frac{1}{X} + \frac{1}{X+1} + \dots + \frac{1}{X+j-1} \right),$$

where N is the total sample size, \ln is the natural logarithmic function, \hat{m} is the observed rate, and n_j is the observed number of persons experiencing exactly j events.

and the variance of \hat{k} equals:

$$\text{var}(\hat{k}) = \frac{\left(1 - \frac{m}{m+k}\right)^{-k} - 1 - k\left(\frac{m}{m+k}\right)}{N\left[-\ln\left(1 - \frac{m}{m+k}\right) - \frac{m}{m+k}\right]^2}. \quad (9)$$

Asymptotically, \hat{m} and \hat{k} are independent of each other.

POISSON PROCESSES UNDERLYING THE NEGATIVE BINOMIAL DISTRIBUTION

The negative binomial model is of particular interest because it can arise from Poisson processes. If either (1) the probability of being victimized is the same for *all* persons (businesses, households, etc.) but depends upon the number of prior victimizations, or (2) the probability of being victimized remains constant over time but is not necessarily the same for all persons (households, businesses), then the number of victimizations for the total population follows the negative binomial distribution (Feller 1943). The first case represents a contagion model wherein the occurrence of the first victimization either increases or decreases the subsequent chances of being victimized. Contagion models are sometimes used to study the diffusion of innovations. For examples, see Coleman (1964) and Coleman, Katz, and Menzel (1966). The second case represents heterogeneity in the distribution of the chances of being victimized in the population. These models frequently appear in accident-proneness studies. (Other models that are compatible with the negative binomial distribution but do not appear to be substantively related to victimization are discussed in Anscombe [1959].)

The simple contagion model has little intuitive appeal as an underlying explanation of multiple victimization. Under this model, the chances of being victimized would have to increase with each victimization. It may be more plausible to assume that persons have different victimization rates that remain constant over time than to assume their chances of being victimized increase with each victimization.

Differences in rates would occur if victimization rates were related to variables like life-style, and if life-style variables remained fairly constant over time. For example, persons who regularly leave their homes unattended during working hours are presumably more likely to be burglarized than those who always remain home. Persons who commute through high crime areas are more likely to be robbed than those who never enter such areas. Hindelang, Gottfredson, and Garofalo (1978) present a discussion of how victimization rates may depend upon life-style variables. Following the life-style interpretation, the negative binomial model will be interpreted

here as having arisen from a series of Poisson models wherein the victimization rate for any person is Poisson, but the rate that defines the Poisson model varies by individual. Such models are known as compound Poisson models.⁴

Greenwood and Woods (1919) and Greenwood and Yule (1920) were the first statisticians to investigate compound Poisson models. They assumed that the parameter λ of the simple Poisson model was a random variable that followed the Pearson type III distribution. This distribution is proportional to a χ^2 distribution with $2k$ degrees of freedom (Anscombe 1959). Depending upon the values of m and k , the distribution may be highly skewed like a backward letter J or it may be hump shaped. The type III distribution was chosen to represent the distribution of λ by Greenwood and Yule (1920) because it is mathematically easy to work with and because it can assume a wide variety of shapes. Newbold (1927) showed that the assumption that λ follows the Pearson type III distribution held up remarkably well with a variety of accident data. Since Newbold's work, most investigators (e.g., Chambers and Yule 1941; Greenwood 1950; Arbous and Kerrich 1951; Ehrenberg 1959; Green and Martin 1973) have assumed that λ follows this distribution.

The type III distribution is illustrated in figure 1, which displays density functions of burglary victimization rates for five of the largest cities in the United States.⁵ The density functions were obtained by estimating the negative binomial parameters m and k for each city and by substitution of these parameters into the following type III density function (Arbous and Kerrich 1951, p. 403):

$$f(\lambda, m, k) = \frac{(k/m)^k}{\Gamma(k)} \lambda^{k-1} e^{-(k/m)\lambda} . \quad (10)$$

The mean, m (listed first), and the exponent, k (listed second), were estimated as (0.12, 0.50), (0.15, 0.51), (0.15, 0.60), (0.08, 0.36), and (0.09, 0.38) in Chicago, Detroit, Los Angeles, New York, and Philadelphia, respectively. Figure 1 suggests that if the distribution of household burglary rates followed the type III distribution in each city, then in all five cities most households would have had very low chances of being burglarized whereas relatively few households would have had high chances of being

⁴ Intuitively, it would be desirable to integrate this compound model interpretation with a contagion interpretation because one hopes that being victimized decreases the chances of subsequent victimization. Such an integration is beyond the scope of the present paper and has not, to my knowledge, appeared in the statistical literature.

⁵ The height of the density function is adjusted to the scale of the abscissa so that the area under the curve (function) integrates to one. The reader should focus on the shape of the curve rather than on the exact numerical value of the function for any value of the abscissa.

burglarized. The density functions appear to be quite similar even though the average rate ranged from 0.08 in New York to 0.15 in Detroit.

The flexibility of the type III distribution is illustrated in figure 2, which displays density functions of the burglary victimization rates for four age groups of black households in Chicago. The mean, m , and the exponent, k ,




FIG. 1.—Probability density functions of burglary rates in five cities, NCS city samples, 1974.




FIG. 2.—Probability density functions of victimization rates for black persons in Chicago by age, NCS city samples, 1974.



were estimated as (0.24, 2.8), (0.18, 1.5), (0.14, 0.76), and 0.12, 1.0) for age groups 16–24, 25–34, 35–49, and 50 and over, respectively. Assuming victimization rates followed the type III distribution, figure 2 suggests that for elderly blacks, most households had relatively low rates whereas relatively few households had high rates. This reflects the general pattern shown in figure 1. However, the density functions for younger blacks were hump shaped, indicating that a larger portion of younger black households had higher rates than older households. The graphs in figure 2 appear to be consistent with one's intuition of how burglary rates might be related to exposure. If the density function of time spent away from home (representing the household's exposure to burglary) looked similar to the density functions in figure 2, graphs like figure 2 might be used to support the exposure theory. Certainly, one expects younger persons to be absent from home more than older persons.⁶

THE FIT OF THE NEGATIVE BINOMIAL MODEL TO OTHER NATIONAL CRIME SURVEY DATA SETS

The negative binomial model was applied to a number of data sets from the National Crime Survey to test its applicability to victimization data. The data sets included unweighted counts of household burglaries and personal crimes (including crimes of rape, aggravated assault, simple assault, robbery, and larceny with contact) in five of the largest cities in the United States, and counts of business robberies and burglaries in a national sample taken in 1975. Summaries of the sampling schemes used in the city and national samples can be found in Garofalo and Hindelang (1978). The observed and expected numbers of household burglaries and personal victimizations in Chicago, Detroit, Los Angeles, New York, and Philadelphia are presented in table 2. The expected number of burglaries was very close to the observed number in all cases. The negative binomial model could not be rejected at the .05 level of significance in any city for burglary. It could only be rejected at the .05, but not at the .01, level for personal victimization in Detroit. These results are usual because even models with a good fit are normally found to be statistically significant with large samples.

The observed and expected numbers of business robberies and burglaries are presented in table 3. The χ^2 statistics show that the negative binomial fitted the robberies but not the burglaries. The lack of fit for burglaries appears to be due primarily to differences in the observed and expected

⁶ The pattern displayed in figure 2 was not identical in all five cities. It could not be determined whether the relationship of victimization rates to age differed by city, or whether differences were largely due to small sample sizes. The variance of the mean was relatively small, but the variance of the exponent k was large when the city samples were broken simultaneously into four age and two racial categories.

TABLE 2

OBSERVED AND EXPECTED NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLD BURGLARIES AND PERSONAL VICTIMIZATIONS
IN FIVE CITIES USING NEGATIVE BINOMIAL MODELS
(National Crime Survey Data, 1974-75)

NUMBER OF VICTIMIZATIONS	OBSERVED AND EXPECTED NUMBER OF VICTIMIZATIONS BY CITY*									
	Chicago		Detroit		Los Angeles		New York		Philadelphia	
	Observed	Expected	Observed	Expected	Observed	Expected	Observed	Expected	Observed	Expected
Burglary:										
0.....	9,576	9,576	8,385	8,379†	9,197	9,197	9,236	9,236	9,335	9,335
1.....	939	935	976	990	1,101	1,097	593	588	679	681
2.....	133	137	183	174	173	175	61	70	97	91
3.....	19	22	35	34	27	30	14	10	9	14
4.....	6	4	5	7	4	5	2	2	3	2
5.....	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	0
10.....	1	0
χ^2		3.04		1.08		.37		3.12		1.24
Degrees of freedom.....		2		2		2		1		1
Mean.....		.121		.154		.149		.077		.091
Exponent k498		.507		.599		.364		.376
Personal:										
0.....	22,099	22,099	19,237	19,237	20,083	20,083	19,600	19,600	21,064	21,064
1.....	1,328	1,320	1,231	1,216	1,028	1,020	935	931	971	979
2.....	175	188	175	196	137	146	94	101	147	138
3.....	37	32	36	38	25	26	14	13	21	24
4.....	5	6	14	8	6	5	2	2	3	2
5.....	3	1	3	2	1	1
6.....	1	1	1	0
9.....	1	0
χ^2		1.81		8.35		1.28		1.04		1.04
Degrees of freedom.....		2		2		2		1		2
Mean.....		.077		.085		.066		.057		.061
Exponent k265		.244		.215		.279		.197

* For expected victimizations the last number in each column includes larger numbers of victimizations as well as the number in the same row. For example, "1" in the column for burglaries in Chicago indicates that one household is expected to have five or more burglaries.

† For zero victimizations the expected number should exactly equal the observed number. It does not in this cell because of numerical rounding in the iterative solution.

TABLE 3

OBSERVED AND EXPECTED NUMBER OF BUSINESS BURGLARY AND ROBBERY
VICTIMIZATIONS USING NEGATIVE BINOMIAL MODELS IN THE NATIONAL
CRIME SURVEY OF BUSINESS VICTIMIZATIONS (1975)

NUMBER OF VICTIMIZATIONS	BURGLARIES		ROBBERIES	
	Observed Frequency	Expected Frequency*	Observed Frequency	Expected Frequency*
0.....	36,422	36,422	38,961	38,961
1.....	2,283	2,261	453	441
2.....	563	559	66	80
3.....	164	173	18	19
4.....	31	59	3	5
5.....	21	21	2	1
6.....	12	8	2	.4
7.....	2	3	2	.2
8.....	1	1
9.....	1	.4
10.....	3	.2
12.....	2	.0
13.....	1	.0
20.....	1	.0
χ^2		22.2		3.2
Degrees of freedom....		4		2
Mean.....		.109		.0174
Exponent k144		.0323

* The last number in this column includes larger numbers of victimizations as well as the number in the same row. For example, ".2" in the column for robberies indicates that .2 of one business is expected to experience seven or more robberies.

number of businesses experiencing four burglaries. This comparison contributed 60% to the χ^2 statistic. Despite this, the negative binomial model does an excellent job of describing these data sets. This raises an interesting question. Since the negative binomial model can arise from a summation of Poisson distributions (Feller 1943), is it possible to break the samples down into homogeneous groups wherein the probability of being victimized is the same? In this case, the probability of being victimized would follow a Poisson process for the members of each group.

Within each of the five cities, victimization counts for burglary were broken into combinations of age (16–24 years, 25–34 years, 35–49 years, 50+ years) and race (white, black). The victimization counts for personal victimization were broken into age and sex groups. Analyses of the NCS city data have shown that personal victimization is closely related to age and sex, and burglary victimization is closely related to age and race (Hindelang 1976; Blumberg and Ranton 1978; Hindelang et al. 1978; Nelson 1978). Persons who were divorced or separated were not included in the personal victimization rates because they have considerably higher rates than persons in other marital statuses. A summary of the fitting of negative binomial and Poisson models to these data sets is presented in table 4.

TABLE 4

A SUMMARY OF THE FITTING OF NEGATIVE BINOMIAL
AND POISSON MODELS TO 40 BURGLARY AND 40
PERSONAL VICTIMIZATION DATA SETS

COMBINATIONS OF MODELS FITTING THE DATA SETS		NUMBER OF DATA SETS FOR EACH TYPE OF VICTIMIZATION	
Negative Binomial Models	Poisson Models	Burglary Victimizations	Personal Victimizations
Yes.....	No	15	12
No.....	No	1	1
*.....	No	17	21
*.....	Yes	3	0
*.....	*	4	6
TOTAL.....	...	40	40

NOTE.—The data sets consisted of eight combinations of age (categories 16-24, 25-34, 35-49, 50+) and sex for personal victimization in five cities and of eight combinations of age and race (categories black and white) in the same five cities for burglary victimizations. Models were considered to fit the data if their *P* value was greater than .05.

*The fit of these models could not be determined because there were not enough multiple victimizations to test the models. Expected frequencies were aggregated to have at least three expected victimizations in each cell of the table used to calculate χ^2 test statistic.

Table 4 shows that the number of victimizations for these breakdowns followed the negative binomial, but not the Poisson model. The negative binomial model satisfactorily fitted 27 out of 29 data sets that had enough multiple victimizations to test its fit. In sharp contrast, the Poisson model satisfactorily fitted only three out of 70 data sets that had enough multiple victimizations to test its fit.⁷ These patterns suggest that persons and households in the same general demographic categories did not have the same chance of being victimized. Sparks et al. (1977) also found that the Poisson model did not fit England's victimizations when they were analyzed by demographic groups. These findings suggest that if victimization depends upon exposure to potentially victimizing situations, exposure must vary within age and race, and age and sex demographic groups. Perhaps the life-style exposure hypothesis can be tested by seeing whether victimization rates are Poisson for persons and households with the same degree of exposure.

In a similar manner, the national business data were analyzed by type of business (retail, wholesale, and service) to test whether rates were Pois-

⁷ Neither model could be tested on all 80 data sets because not all data sets had enough multiple victimizations. In order to test models in contingency tables it is necessary to have at least one more cell than degrees of freedom used to estimate the parameters of the model. The negative binomial model uses three parameters (the sample size, *m*, and *k*) and the Poisson model uses two parameters (the sample size and λ). Therefore the negative binomial model was not tested on data sets wherein the expected number of two or more multiple victimizations was less than three.

son for each type of business. The analysis showed that the negative binomial fitted the data in three out of four data sets that had enough multiple victimizations to test the model, whereas the Poisson did not fit the data for any of these four data sets. The one case wherein the negative binomial could be rejected at the .05, but not at the .01, level occurred for burglaries of service industries. The deviation resulted from an overestimate of the number of businesses with four burglaries. This suggests that in the earlier analysis of business burglaries the negative binomial model may not have fitted because the burglaries of service businesses did not fit the model. A reanalysis showed that the burglaries of nonservice businesses followed the negative binomial model quite closely.

Thus far, the analysis has shown that the negative binomial did an excellent job of fitting various victimization data sets. The rest of the paper focuses on what this means for the study of victimization.

RATES VERSUS PROBABILITIES

One of the questions that motivated this research was to learn whether victimization rates were overly high owing to a few persons (households, businesses) with an unusually high number of multiple victimizations. This question can now be answered by examining the characteristics of the negative binomial distribution and by observing rate patterns in the victimization data sets previously analyzed.

In order to establish whether a rate is due to multiple victimizations it is necessary to estimate some standard against which it can be compared. One such standard would be to calculate the rate if the data followed the Poisson model. This can be done by solving for the λ rate parameter in the Poisson model for the observed probability of no victimizations (eq. [2]). For example, table 1 shows that 0.89 of all households were not burglarized. If burglary followed a simple Poisson model, the mean rate could be estimated by solving for λ in the equation $e^{-\lambda} = 0.89$. In this case, the mean rate would equal 0.116. This shows that the observed rate in table 1, 0.131, was inflated by 13.4% over the hypothetical Poisson rate. This inflation can be attributed to households with unusually high numbers of multiple burglaries.

The ratio of the observed to the hypothetical Poisson rate may also be expressed in terms of the parameters of the negative binomial distribution (assuming the negative binomial describes the observed data):

$$\begin{array}{l} \text{Ratio of observed rate} \\ \text{to the rate if the} \\ \text{data were Poisson} \end{array} = m / \left[k \ln \left(1 + \frac{m}{k} \right) \right] \quad (11)$$

Multiple Victimization

This ratio increases as m increases, but decreases as k increases. Therefore the observed rate increases relative to the Poisson rate as the period of time victimizations are observed increases, because as the length of time increases, the mean rate for the entire period increases but k remains constant (Arbous and Sichel 1954).

An estimate of the magnitude of the inflation in rates due to multiple victimizations for a year's exposure can be obtained from the data sets previously analyzed. Using the five city data, the burglary rates were from 10% to 15% higher than the expected Poisson rate. The increase ranged from 2% to 36% when these data were broken down by race and age groups. (The rate increased by less than 23% in 38 out of 40 of these comparisons.) The personal victimization rates were from 10% to 17% higher than the Poisson rate when the rates were aggregated for each city, and were from 3% to 24% higher when the rates were broken down into sex and age groups. The national business data showed that the burglary rate was 34% higher than the Poisson rate and the robbery rate was 25% higher. In general, these data show that the observed rate was inflated by less than 40% due to multiple victimizations. In personal and household victimizations, the rate was usually inflated by less than 20%.

Thus it appears that these rates were usually not inflated a great deal because of persons (businesses, households) suffering unusually large numbers of multiple victimizations. As longer periods of victimization histories are examined, the amount of inflating due to persons with unusually high numbers of victimizations is expected to increase.

Instead of focusing on absolute levels of victimization, most of the research using the National Crime Survey has focused on how demographic variables influence victimization rates. Thus, instead of focusing on how much rates are inflated because of high-risk persons, it may be more important to ask whether investigators are likely to get different results by analyzing rates as opposed to probabilities. This question can be partially answered by correlating the rate of burglary with the probability of being burglarized for the 40 burglary data sets (the breakdown of burglary by race and age in five cities) and by correlating the rate of personal victimization with the probability of being victimized for the 40 personal victimization data sets. (Recall that rates reflect the number of multiple victimizations because they include counts of all victimizations whereas probabilities ignore multiple victimizations because they only include counts of persons who were victimized at least once.) The correlation between burglary rates and probabilities equaled 0.986 and the correlation between personal victimization rates and probabilities equaled 0.996. These results suggest that correlates of victimization are likely to be the same regardless of whether

rates or probabilities are used to measure victimization during a one-year period.

Even though the analysis of rates and that of probabilities are likely to produce similar findings, there appear to be several reasons for preferring rates to probabilities. First, rates reflect the total number of victimizations whereas probabilities only show what proportion of persons (households, businesses) suffered one or more victimizations. Because law enforcement agencies respond to each reported victimization, regardless of whether the same persons had reported previous victimizations, rates appear to be better suited to criminal justice applications. Second, probabilities have an upper bound of one but rates do not have an upper bound. Data having an upper bound are frequently harder to analyze than unbounded data. Third, the rate is one of the parameters of the negative binomial distribution. Once k is estimated, many features of the distribution of victimizations are known.

These considerations do not rule out analysis of probabilities though. Persons may want to know the chances of being victimized at all, rather than knowing the average number of victimizations per person. With small data sets, probabilities might even be preferred because they cannot be influenced by a few persons with an unusually high number of victimizations whereas rates can. In general, victimization measures must be chosen to be appropriate for the analysis and the size of the data sets. The present research suggests that for large data sets, like the National Crime Survey, analyzing rates may be more insightful and applicable than analyzing probabilities.

ESTIMATING FUTURE VICTIMIZATIONS

Once the parameters of the negative binomial model are estimated, it is possible to estimate the probability of being victimized in the next time period conditional on the number of victimizations in the current time period. This is done by dividing the probability of obtaining exactly X victimizations in the current time period and Y in the next, by the probability of obtaining X victimizations in the current time period. Arbous and Sichel (1954) showed that the probability of X victimizations in the present time period and Y in the next, assuming the same negative binomial distribution with parameters m and k , operates independently in both time periods and that both negative binomial distributions were generated by the same compound Poisson process, may be expressed as:

$$\text{prob}(X = x, Y = y) = \left(\frac{k}{k + 2m}\right)^k \frac{\Gamma(y + x + k)}{\Gamma(k)y!x!} \left(\frac{m}{k + 2m}\right)^{y+x}. \quad (12)$$

From this, they showed that the probability of having B or more victimizations in the next time period given x in the present period can be expressed as:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{prob}(Y \geq B | X = x) \\ = 1 - \left(1 - \frac{m}{k + 2m}\right)^{x+k} \frac{1}{\Gamma(x+k)} \sum_{y=0}^{B-1} \frac{\Gamma(y+x+k)}{y!} \left(\frac{m}{k+2m}\right)^y. \end{aligned} \quad (13)$$

This formula can be easily rewritten in iterative form to obtain the probability of exactly Y victimizations in the next period conditional on X victimizations in the current period. The probability of having no victimizations in the next period equals:

$$\text{prob}(Y = 0 | X = x) = \left(1 - \frac{m}{k + 2m}\right)^{x+k}, \quad (14)$$

and the probability of Y victimizations, where Y is greater than zero, equals:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{prob}(Y = y | X = x) \\ = \text{prob}(Y = y - 1 | X = x) \left(\frac{y+x+k-1}{y}\right) \left(\frac{m}{k+2m}\right). \end{aligned} \quad (15)$$

The chances of experiencing future victimizations can also be evaluated by estimating the unobservable rate λ based upon the number of victimizations experienced in the observation period and upon the parameters m and k . Arbous and Kerrich (1951) showed that the expression $2(k/m + 1)\lambda$ is distributed as a χ^2 random variable with $2(k + X)$ degrees of freedom, where X represents the number of victimizations experienced in the observation period. This expression shows that the expected value of λ equals the expected value of a χ^2 random variable with $2(k + X)$ degrees of freedom divided by the constant $2(k/m + 1)$. Because the expected value of a χ^2 random variable equals its degrees of freedom, the expected rate for persons experiencing x victimizations equals $(k + x)m/(k + m)$.

Table 5 presents the expected rate as well as the probability of being victimized one or more times for the burglary data in table 1. Households that were not victimized are hypothesized to have a rate of about 0.10, which is lower than the average rate of 0.13. Households that experienced one victimization are estimated to have a rate of about 0.32.

The probabilities of being victimized one or more times in the next period provide some intuition of what it means to be multiply victimized. Homes that were victimized one or more times were at least three times more likely to be victimized than homes that were not victimized. However, homes that were repeatedly victimized were not necessarily going to be

TABLE 5

EXPECTED BURGLARY RATE AND THE
PROBABILITY OF EXPERIENCING ONE OR
MORE BURGLARIES IN THE FOLLOWING
YEAR BASED ON A NEGATIVE BINOMIAL
MODEL OF BURGLARY IN ONE YEAR IN
26 CITIES (National Crime Survey Data,
1974-75)

Observed Number of Burglaries This Year	Expected Rate	Probability of Experiencing One or More Burglaries Next Year
0.....	.10	.09
1.....	.32	.25
2.....	.54	.39
3.....	.76	.50
4.....	.98	.59
5.....	1.20	.66
6.....	1.41	.72
7.....	1.63	.77
8.....	1.85	.81
9.....	2.07	.85

NOTE.—The fit of the negative binomial model is displayed in table 1. The mean equaled .131 and the exponent k equaled .468.

victimized again—for example, homes that were burglarized six times had better than a 25% chance of not being victimized in the next period.

Table 5, in conjunction with table 1, can also be used to estimate the effect of certain crime programs on overall victimization programs. For example, suppose it were possible to offer some type of police protection or education to households that suffered an unusually large number of burglaries and, through this program, to reduce the rate of these households to the rate of households that did not experience any burglaries in the year the data were gathered. Suppose such a program were aimed at households that experienced four or more victimizations in the 26 cities represented in table 1. The projected crime rate under this program can be estimated from the proportions in table 1 and the rates in table 5. Under this program, 89% of the population (this equals the proportion of households that experienced 0, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 victimizations in table 1) would have a rate of 0.103, 9% would have a rate of 0.322, $1\frac{1}{2}\%$ would have a rate of 0.541, and $\frac{1}{4}$ of 1% would have a rate of 0.760. This program would reduce the overall rate from 0.131298 to 0.131187. In other words, it would have virtually no effect on the overall burglary rate in these cities. This reinforces the earlier finding that the rate of burglary in these cities was not unduly affected by relatively few households having unusually high rates.

CORRELATION OF AN INDEPENDENT VARIABLE WITH THE OBSERVED NUMBER OF VICTIMIZATIONS

Newbold (1927) showed that the correlation of each person's unknown rate λ with an independent variable, Z , can be expressed as:

$$r_{\lambda,Z} = \frac{r_{Z,X}}{\sqrt{\frac{m}{m+k}}}, \quad (16)$$

where the observed number of victimizations, X , follows the negative binomial distribution defined by parameters m and k , and where the negative binomial distribution was generated by a compound Poisson process. To illustrate this equation, suppose that a variable Z were perfectly correlated with unknown rate λ for each person. In this case, the observed correlation of Z with X could not exceed $\sqrt{m/(m+k)}$. For example, the observed correlation between Z and X could not exceed 0.47 in table 1. This means that if some variable, say exposure, were perfectly correlated with the chance of being victimized, it could explain at most 22% of the variance in victimizations experienced in a one-year period. The only way to increase this correlation would be to increase the ratio of m divided by $m+k$. This can be done by gathering data over a longer period of time. This low correlation shows how hard it may be to find strong relations between the number of victimizations and independent variables when victimizations are recorded for one-year periods.

TRANSFORMATIONS: NUMBER OF VICTIMIZATIONS

One serious problem with analyzing the absolute number of victimizations is that the distribution of the number experienced by each person, X , is highly skewed. Anscombe (1948) showed that the distribution of X (for small k and small m) can be made more nearly normal by analyzing X' , instead of X , where:

$$X' = \ln(X + \frac{1}{2}k). \quad (17)$$

This transformation magnifies differences between having relatively few victimizations but masks differences between having relatively large numbers of victimizations. It is congruent with the intuition that differences between experiencing one victimization and experiencing none should be considerably larger than, say, the difference in experiencing six victimizations as against five.

TRANSFORMATIONS: RATES AND VARIANCE CONSIDERATIONS

Partially because of the skewness problem of analyzing the absolute number of victimizations, investigators have usually analyzed how victimization

rates differ for various groups of persons. In order to compare rates it is frequently necessary to estimate the variance of the estimated rate in each group. Assuming the victimizations within each group follow the negative binomial distribution with parameters k and m , equation (8) shows that the variance of the estimated rate equals $1/N (m + m^2/k)$, where N is the total number of persons sampled in each group. If k is bounded below by m (it was for all data sets analyzed in this paper) and by infinity above, the variance of the estimated mean, \hat{m} , ranges between m/N and $2m/N$, depending upon the value of k . This shows that the variance in estimated rates increases with the mean and decreases with the sample size.

Frequently, it may be better to analyze the logarithm of the rate rather than the rate itself. Elsewhere I have shown (Nelson 1978) that for some independent variables, at least, victimization rates were linear in the logarithmic scale but not in the nonlogarithmic scale. The variance of the natural logarithm of the rate may be approximated (using a one-term Taylor expansion) by:

$$\text{var} [\ln(\hat{m})] = 1/\text{number of victimizations} + 1/Nk. \quad (18)$$

If k is bounded by m and infinity, then the variance of the logarithm of the rate is bounded by $1/(\text{number of victimizations})$ and $2/(\text{number of victimizations})$. In other words, the variance of the logarithm of the rate decreases primarily with the absolute number of victimizations.

The scale used to analyze rate differences depends upon the purpose of the analysis. The above variances show how heterogeneity in the analysis of variance of rates may depend upon how the rates are defined, upon the parameters m and k of the negative binomial distribution, and upon the sample size.

SUMMARY

The negative binomial model appears to be a very promising tool for understanding and analyzing multiple victimizations. Without making any assumptions about the process that generated the model, its parameters may be used to show how rates are inflated by persons, households, or businesses suffering an unusually high number of victimizations, how the number of victimizations can be transformed to create a distribution that is closer to the normal distribution than is the original distribution, and how the variance of victimization rates can be estimated. If a compound Poisson model generated the negative binomial distribution, the parameters of the negative binomial distribution can be used to estimate what proportion of the population had various rates, to predict future rates dependent upon the number of victimizations experienced in an observation period, and to estimate the

maximum correlation between the rate for each person and hypothetical independent variables.⁸

The compound Poisson interpretation of the negative binomial model is compatible with the life-style exposure theory of victimization formulated by Hindelang et al. (1978). Under this theory, the chances of being victimized depend upon how often people expose themselves to potentially victimizing situations. The theory emerged by noting that victimization rates were higher for persons who presumably spent more time in places where crimes were likely to occur than for persons who spent more time at home. For example, the NCS data show victimization rates were higher for younger than for older persons, for males than for females, and for single than for married persons.

In this framework, the compound Poisson model suggests that persons with the same degree of exposure to victimizing situations should have the same chance of being victimized. The compound Poisson model interpretation extends this theory by suggesting that being victimized does not affect a person's life-style enough in a short period to reduce the chances of being repeatedly victimized. However, this does not necessarily mean that people retain the same rate over long periods of time. The consistently higher rates for younger than for older persons found in the NCS suggest that the chances of being victimized primarily decrease with changes in life-style associated with aging, such as becoming married, raising families, developing careers, and spending more time with older persons. In regard to the last point, Hindelang et al. (1978) suggest that older persons tend to have lower rates than younger persons partially because younger persons have much higher offending rates. Therefore, association with older persons decreases the chances of being victimized.

The analysis of victimization rates by various combinations of demographic variables suggests further that exposure is not coterminous with simple combinations of demographic variables. Recall that NCS data were divided into age, sex, and racial groupings to learn whether persons having the same demographic characteristics had the same victimization rate. The analysis showed that simple Poisson models were not compatible with the data within these groupings but that negative binomial models were. If exposure were the same for all persons within each group, the simple Poisson model would have accurately described the number of multiple victimizations within each group. The lack of fit by the simple Poisson model suggests that exposure varied for persons with the same demographic characteristics.

The methodology of fitting simple Poisson and other stochastic models

⁸ Further discussion of the consequences of negative binomial models may be found in Newbold (1927), Arbous and Kerrich (1951), Arbous and Sichel (1954), and Ehrenberg (1959).

to the number of persons experiencing zero, one, two, etc., events may be helpful in understanding the relationship of group and individual rates in a variety of sociological problems. For example, delinquency, publication, and birthrates are frequently broken down by combinations of demographic variables. Investigators often assume that persons within each group have the same rate. This may or may not be a reasonable assumption. If the number of multiple events were consistent with the number of multiple events expected under simple Poisson models, then the data would support the use of the group rate as an estimate of the individual rate. However, if the number of multiple events were not consistent, it might be unreasonable to use the group rate as an estimate of the individual rate. In such cases, one would want to examine other models, such as the negative binomial, to explain the distribution of multiple events and to search for other variables to explain differences in rates for persons within each group.

Although the negative binomial model fitted the NCS data exceptionally well, this does not necessarily imply that a compound Poisson model generated the reported number of victimizations. In fact, the compound Poisson model seems counter to common sense in that one would expect a person who was victimized to alter his or her life-style to decrease the chances of being victimized. Further research, preferably using longitudinal data, is needed to verify whether being victimized is independent of the chances of being revictimized. If it is not independent, then new and more complex models may be needed to explain why the negative binomial model accounted accurately for the number of multiple victimizations.

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Autonomy in a Social Topology¹

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My purpose here is to define and illustrate a concept of "structural autonomy" based on recent developments in network analysis. The concept is stated in terms of the pattern of relations defining a network position, and it incorporates aspects of oligopoly from economics and group-affiliation from sociology. Eight hypotheses are derived from the proposed concept. These hypotheses concern the effects on autonomy of aspects of the pattern of relations defining a network position, the places in social structure where cooptive relations should appear (as well as places where they should not), and the increase in autonomy that can be expected from effective cooptation. Numerical illustration is provided. As a useful research site, firms in manufacturing industries of the 1967 American economy are treated as structurally equivalent actors, and total profits in an industry are taken to be a result of the relative autonomy of firms in separate industries. The autonomy hypotheses are used to explain relative industry profits and strategies for coopting other firms. Those industries with high structural autonomy tend to have high profits. Firms in an industry tend to purchase other firms in mergers patterned to coopt constraints on the industry's structural autonomy.

As members of society, you and I can be considered to occupy positions defined by a complex pattern of relations with other actors in society. Our patterns of relations serve to bind each of us to society via its other members through a division of labor reflecting an interdependency of one actor on another. Beyond the mere increase in the density of exchanges among members of society, division of labor ensures that patterns of relations develop such that as societal members we are stratified across jointly occupied statuses defined by interlocking role-sets. Recent developments in network analysis focusing on actors' positions in systems give algebraic meaning to this well-known metaphor. We can describe, in a fairly rigorous manner, the social structure of a multiple network system in terms of

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existing static patterns of relations between statuses in the system. Still problematic, however, is the manner in which freedom from societal constraint operates in terms of the static structure of a system so captured. How does occupying a particular status in society determine freedom from constraint? More specifically (in a network sense), how does the pattern of relations defining an actor's "position" in a system determine his autonomy, that is, his ability to pursue and realize interests without constraint from other actors in the system.² My purpose here is to propose a concept of structural autonomy.

AUTONOMY AS A STRUCTURAL CONCEPT

The Social Topology of Relational Structure

I assume that the social structure of a system of actors is cast as a "social topology." Three ideas are central to such a representation: position, distance, and equivalence (see Burt 1976, 1977*b*, 1977*d*, 1978, for details). A "position" is defined as a pattern of relations to and from an actor within a system of actors. Two actors are separated by zero "distance" if they have identical relations with every actor in their system. They are separated by high distance to the extent that they have very different relations with each actor. Actors separated by zero or negligible distance are "structurally equivalent" within their system and can be discussed as jointly occupying a single position as a system status/role-set. For our purposes, let distance be reduced to a nominal level of measurement such

versity of New York at Albany. The excellent facilities made available there by R. Farrell, R. Hall, and N. Lin are greatly appreciated. J. F. Burt and A. Ong helped in processing data for the analysis at the four-digit level. Although in no way implicated by my statements here, M. P. Allen, K. Azumi, J. S. Coleman, C. S. Fischer, J. Galaskiewicz, H. Turk, and an anonymous reader for this *Journal* provided comments on earlier drafts that have improved the presentation. Portions of this discussion were presented at the 1978 annual meeting of the American Sociological Association and a 1978 colloquium at Cornell University.

² The phrase "without constraint from other actors in the system" is to be emphasized here. It explicitly excludes from the domain of autonomy those interests that involve deliberate opposition from other actors. In order to realize interests despite "constraint from other actors in the system," an actor needs to have high power within the system. A discussion of power in terms of an actor's position in a system of actors is given elsewhere (Burt 1977*d*). While a hermit can have high autonomy, few would consider him powerful. Also, autonomy as it is discussed here does not consider behaviors that are performed after the original impetus for performance has disappeared. Such a view of autonomy is elaborated, e.g., by Simmel ([1917] 1950, pp. 41-43) as "the autonomization of contents," by Allport (1937; 1961, chap. 10) as "functional autonomy," and by Kelman (1961) as "internalization." Piaget's ([1932] 1965, chap. 3) discussion of "moral autonomy" in terms of the internalization of rules and the subsequent demand for justice in the establishment of rules mixes the treatment given here with the above-cited discussions of behavior without impetus.

that the distance between any two actors is zero if they are structurally equivalent and one otherwise. A multiple network system composed of N actors can be reduced to $M + 1$ groups of actors— M groups of actors corresponding to M unique statuses each jointly occupied by multiple, structurally equivalent actors and a residual set composed of actors non-equivalent to the M statuses in the system and no more than two of whom are equivalent to one another. The social structure of this system can be described in terms of aggregate relations between actors in each of the $M + 1$ sets, as presented in figure 1. If there are no actors falling into a residual group, figure 1 could define a “blockmodel” of the system’s social structure (cf. White, Boorman, and Breiger 1976). Aggregating relations is plausible here since relations between structurally equivalent actors are being aggregated and these relations are merely variations on a single average relation between two sets of structurally equivalent actors. The position J is defined by a pattern of relations in row and column J of figure 1; an average relation to the occupants of position 1 (z_{j1}), an average relation to the occupants of position 2 (z_{j2}), an average relation from the occupants of position 1 (z_{1j}), and so on.

Let me repose the original question in the light of figure 1: What is it about the pattern of relations defining position J in figure 1 that could yield its occupants high autonomy relative to occupants of other positions in the

z_{11}	z_{12}	...	z_{1j}	...	z_{1M}	$z_{1,M+1}$
z_{21}	z_{22}	...	z_{2j}	...	z_{2M}	$z_{2,M+1}$
.
.
.
z_{j1}	z_{j2}	...	z_{jj}	...	z_{jM}	$z_{j,M+1}$
.
.
.
z_{M1}	z_{M2}	...	z_{Mj}	...	z_{MM}	$z_{M,M+1}$
$z_{M+1,1}$	$z_{M+1,2}$...	$z_{M+1,j}$...	$z_{M+1,M}$	$z_{M+1,M+1}$

FIG. 1.—A system of actors cast as a social typology of relations among $M + 1$ structurally nonequivalent groups of actors (relations in boxes define position J).

system? Note that the question is concerned with the autonomy of occupying a position, not with the autonomy of particular actors per se, and is concerned with the relative autonomy of occupying structurally nonequivalent statuses, not with an absolute level of autonomy per se.

Aspects of Autonomy

There seem to be two basic aspects to the idea of being autonomous within a system of actors, either of which can be treated as embodying the overall concept of autonomy.

Developing Adam Smith's discussion in *The Wealth of Nations* ([1776] 1937), political economy treats the concept of autonomy in terms of collusion. As a consequence of competition among actors in a market system, "market prices" for any type of commodity (the prices for which the commodity is "sold") gravitate toward the "natural price" for the commodity (the price for which the commodity can be brought to market). Actors are equally constrained by the balancing of supply and demand through competition. The division of labor ensures that types of positions develop where each position is jointly occupied by actors who produce similar commodities, drawing supplies from the same types of other actors and making their sales to the same types of other actors. This means that interactor competition is sharpest between actors jointly occupying a status; each actor occupying the status is the structural equivalent of, and therefore substitutable for, other actors occupying the status.³ To the extent that decision making is centralized among structurally equivalent actors, the actors define an oligopoly to eliminate competition within their position and, accordingly, to escape the constraints of supply and demand. The autonomy of actors in an oligopoly, with regard to the constraint of supply and demand, is illustrated by their ability to raise the market price for their "commodity" far above the natural price (cf. Stigler 1964; Shepherd 1970, pp. 11-47).⁴

Thus, one aspect of autonomy concerns the relations among actors jointly occupying a status in a system. This is element (*J, J*) in figure 1. The actors jointly occupying position *J* will be able to escape the constraints of supply and demand imposed by actors in other positions and, accordingly, will be "autonomous" within their system, to the extent that among

³ The concept of structurally equivalent actors being substitutable goods and having substitutable perceptions is elaborated in detail elsewhere (Burt 1977d, pp. 25-36; 1979b; 1980).

⁴ Weber ([1925] 1947, p. 192) mentions a similar perspective but does not develop it systematically as "market freedom": "... the degree of autonomy enjoyed by the parties to market relationships in price determination and in competition."

persons,⁵ or corporate actors,⁶ occupying the position there exists an oligopoly (few competitive decision makers) or, in the extreme of centralization, a monopoly (a single decision maker). Let y_{ji} be a measure of the centralization of decision making within position J such that $0 < y_{ji} < 1$. Measures of Y_1 will vary by research problem. In sectors of an economy, for example, centralization is usually measured as the ratio of total sales by some number of the largest firms in a sector over the total sales by all firms in the sector. To the extent that there are few competitive firms in a sector, this ratio will approach one, as discussed below. In a traditional sociometric study, Y_1 could be measured by any of several centralization measures. For example, Freeman (1977) suggests measures that capture the extent to which communication among a set of persons must pass through a single "central" person.

What if collusion develops between actors in separate sectors of the market so that the entire market becomes what sociologists term an undifferentiated, cohesive system? Then, actors in each sector are constrained by their lack of differentiated relations to other actors in the system. Durkheim's *The Division of Labor in Society* ([1893] 1933) at a macro level and Simmel's "Web of Group-Affiliations" ([1922] 1955) at a more micro level contain discussions emphasizing the constraining effects of an absence of differentiation within a system of actors. For both Durkheim and Simmel, differential freedom from constraint by society occurs as a result of differential complexity in an actor's relations to other actors.⁷ Durkheim

⁵ In his discussion of the determinants of wages and the advantages of employers over laborers given by the greater ease with which the former are capable of organizing collectively to oppose the interests of the latter, Smith ([1776] 1937, p. 66) states: "It is not, however, difficult to foresee which of the two parties must, upon all ordinary occasions, have the advantage in the dispute, and force the other into a compliance with their terms. The masters, being fewer in number, can combine much more easily; and the law, besides, authorises, or at least does not prohibit their combinations, while it prohibits those of the workmen." Locke ([1689] 1955, chap. 5) develops a similar theme in which individuals forced to sell their labor in order to survive are less able to compete in society than are individuals whose accumulated capital goods enable them to purchase the labor of others (cf. Macpherson's [1962, pp. 221-38] discussion of how Locke generalizes this argument from an exchange of property to a loss of natural rights).

⁶ After making general remarks concerning the monopolistic purpose of corporations (Smith [1776] 1937, pp. 123-29), Smith considers some corporate actors in detail (e.g., the wool industry [pp. 612-19] and the trading companies with exclusive franchises in the colonies [pp. 557-606]) as supporting evidence. Examples more meaningful in current industrial society are discussed by Bain (1959) and Kaysen and Turner (1959). Shepherd (1970, pp. 39-42) reviews characteristics of the presence of few independent firms within a sector of the economy as "internal market structure."

⁷ I have deliberately replaced the term "autonomy" with "freedom" in this sentence because Durkheim and Simmel use the term "autonomy" differently, even though they both emphasize what has been discussed here as a group-affiliation hypothesis. Simmel uses autonomy to refer to the content of relations that continue to be performed after the original impetus for them is gone ("autonomization of contents")

focuses on the balancing of forces between occupational groups as statuses created by a division of labor⁸ and by moral authority of government.⁹ Simmel focuses on the competition among groups linked to an actor for his attention and conformity.¹⁰ He ([1908] 1950, p. 121) emphasizes the po-

[1917] 1950, pp. 41–43). Durkheim uses the term “moral individualism” to refer to what is discussed here as autonomy. His ([1925] 1961, pp. 95–126) discussion of autonomy is a mixture of our use of autonomy and Piaget’s ([1932] 1965) discussion of autonomy as morality based on an understanding of the rules by which action is guided as being “fair” or “just” rules.

⁸To say that the division of labor creates a stratification of statuses at some point in time does not in itself add to the oligopoly hypothesis. Indeed, the assumption of fixed requirements in input-output analysis corresponds to just such a condition. Instead of freely choosing transactions for the exchange of property, actors freely choose to occupy positions (i.e., sectors) within the system, and the capacity of actors occupying a position to restrict free entry to their position can be treated under the oligopoly hypothesis (cf. Bain 1956). It is by a consideration of the form and content of the pattern of relations defining a position that the group-affiliation hypothesis as represented in Durkheim’s discussion differs from the oligopoly hypothesis.

⁹Actors are occupants of professions, and these professions are constrained by the authority of the government. Durkheim ([1893] 1933, p. 131) views this liberation of the actor from the direct authority of either profession or government favorably: “Even in the exercise of our occupation, we conform to usages, to practices which are common to our whole professional brotherhood. But, even in this instance, the yoke that we submit to is much less heavy than when society completely controls us, and it leaves much more place open for the free play of our initiative. Here, then, the individuality of all grows at the same time as that of its parts. Society becomes more capable of collective movement, at the same time that each of its elements has more freedom of movement.” He ([1906] 1974, p. 76) is more general at a later date in his response to a critic who claimed that “civilization” is the continuing liberation of man from the material structure of society: “These rights and liberties are not things inherent in man as such. If you analyze man’s constitution you will find no trace of this sacredness with which he is invested and which confers upon him these rights. This character has been added to him by society. Society has consecrated the individual and made him pre-eminently worthy of respect. His progressive emancipation does not imply a weakening but a transformation of the social bonds. The individual does not tear himself from society but is joined to it in a new manner, this is because society sees him in a new manner and wishes this change to take place. The individual submits to society and this submission is the condition of his liberation.”

¹⁰In attending to the pattern of multiple ties between an individual and multiple disparate groups in society, Simmel ([1922] 1955, pp. 140–41) points out a cycle of causation between the individual’s position as a set of ties to groups and actions undertaken by the individual: “The groups with which the individual is affiliated constitute a system of coordinates, as it were, such that each new group with which he becomes affiliated circumscribes him more exactly and more unambiguously. . . . As the person becomes affiliated with a social group, he surrenders himself to it. A synthesis of such subjective affiliations creates a group in an objective sense. But the person also regains his individuality, because his pattern of participation is unique; hence the fact of multiple group-participation creates in turn a new subjective element. *Causal determination of, and purposive actions by, the individual appear as two sides of the same coin*” (emphasis added). He ([1922] 1955, p. 163) concludes after reviewing issues in multiple group affiliation: “Thus one can say that society arises from the individual and that the individual arises out of association.”

tential oppression of relations with groups left unchecked by competition from other relations:

Almost all relations—of the state, the party, the family, of friendship or love—quite naturally, as it were, seem to be on an inclined plane: if they were left to themselves, they would extend their claims over the whole of man. . . . But it is not only through the extensivity of claims that the egoism of every sociation threatens the freedom of the individuals engaged in it. It does so also through the relentlessness of the claim itself, which is one-tracked and monopolistic. Usually, each claim presses its rights in complete and pitiless indifference to other interests and duties, no matter whether they be in harmony or in utter incompatibility with it.

In other words, competitive claims by groups of actors can be balanced against one another to limit constraint from others. This principle works for those occupying positions of authority as well as for those occupying positions of subordination.¹¹ Autonomy is high for actors occupying a position with many conflicting group-affiliations and low for those occupying a position affiliated with only one other position.

It is important to recall that the concern here is with describing the autonomy of a jointly occupied position rather than of an actor *per se*. Under the idea of group-affiliation, actors jointly occupying a position that forms an oligopoly are subject to the constraints of the oligopoly. These constraints, in contrast to autonomy via oligopoly relative to other positions, serve to limit the autonomy of the individual wishing to deviate from other actors occupying his position. Substantively, the constraint on individual actors of being too strongly integrated into a group of similar others is documented in a range of studies, such as Festinger, Schachter, and Back's (1950) description of the formation of social norms within cohesive groups of students at M.I.T.; Riesman's (1950, chap. 14) description of "enforced privatization" as the constraints one's peers enforce concerning appropriate behaviors for someone occupying their position in society; Bott's (1957) description of the formation of conjugal roles as a function of husband and wife being absorbed into separate cohesive groups; and Gans's (1962) description of the maintenance of social norms among Italian-Americans in Boston's West End through cohesive peer groups. In

¹¹ Simmel (1896) emphasizes the symbiotic constraints imposed on actors occupying positions of authority by actors occupying the positions over which authority is exercised and vice versa. Riesman (1950, chaps. 13, 14) provides illustrations relevant to our day-to-day experience in his elaboration of two impediments to an individual having high autonomy: "false personalization" and "enforced privatization." The former refers to autonomy that is lowered because of an individual's absorption in artificial social relations arising from occupancy of a position rather than from relations defining the position (e.g., the need of a secretary, whose life outside the office is dull, for personalistic rather than universalistic relations with the employers [Riesman 1950, pp. 264-66]), and the latter refers to autonomy that is lowered as a result of other occupants of the position placing constraints on what is proper behavior for someone occupying their position.

contrast to these studies, I am concerned with the relative autonomy of separate positions. My use of the term "group-affiliations" accordingly refers to affiliations to actors in other positions rather than to structurally equivalent actors.

Thus, a second aspect of autonomy concerns the manner in which actors jointly occupying a status are related to actors occupying other statuses in their system. These are the elements of row and column J in figure 1, excluding element (J, J) . Actors jointly occupying position J will be able to balance demands from other actors and, accordingly, will be "autonomous" within their system, to the extent that the pattern of relations defining position J ensures high competition among those actors who interact with the occupants of position J . Autonomy via group-affiliation emphasizes two characteristics of the pattern of relations defining a position. First, actors occupying position J will have high autonomy to the extent that they have relations to many other statuses rather than with only one other. Second, actors occupying position J will have high autonomy to the extent that the statuses with whose occupants they do have relations are not oligopolies. In other words, a measure of autonomy via group-affiliation must consider two things: the extent to which actors occupying a status have diversified relations with other statuses, and the extent to which they have relations only with statuses that are too poorly organized to make collective demands.

Simply stated, the absence of these two characteristics in the pattern of relations defining position J is captured by the following group-affiliation index:

$$y_{j2} = \sum_i^{M+1} x_{ji} = \sum_i^{M+1} y_{i1} [(z_{ij}/\sum_i^{M+1} z_{ij})^2 + (z_{ji}/\sum_i^{M+1} z_{ji})^2], \quad j \neq i,$$

where z_{ij} is the average relation from actors occupying status I to actors occupying status J , y_{i1} is the above-mentioned measure of oligopoly among actors occupying status I , and $M + 1$ is the number of separate sets of actors being considered as groups in the topological representation of social structure. For each position I , other than position J , the component x_{ji} captures the extent to which position I is an oligopoly and all of the relations to and from occupants of position J are with occupants of position I . The index, then, is a sum of the x_{ji} across the M other sets of actors in the system. The index will equal its maximum of two when actors occupying position J initiate interaction only with actors occupying a single other position and are themselves the object of interaction from actors occupying a single other position and these position(s) are perfectly centralized ($V_1 = 1$). The index will approach zero as the occupants of position J have relations only with actors jointly occupying very decentralized positions

($Y_1 = 0$) and have no relations with actors whose positions are perfectly centralized ($Y_1 = 1$).

Structural Autonomy

Autonomy via oligopoly and autonomy via group-affiliation seem to be complementary aspects of autonomy rather than alternative concepts. The separation of these two aspects in the literature can be attributed, it seems to me, to disciplinary history rather than to substantive necessity. It seems reasonable, therefore, to propose a network concept of autonomy that is a simple combination of these well-known aspects: oligopoly focusing on the relations among structurally equivalent actors occupying a status, and group-affiliation focusing on relations linking those actors to other statuses.

As a simple first approximation, actors jointly occupying position J can be said to have high structural autonomy to the extent that their pattern of relations has three characteristics: (1) There is high centralization among occupants of the position such that they form an oligopoly; (2) their relations to other statuses are diversified and exist only with statuses that do not themselves form oligopolies; and (3) the first two conditions occur simultaneously as an interaction effect. These three conditions determine the structural autonomy of position J 's occupants, a_j , in the following equation, where β_o , β_g , and β_x , respectively, weight the above three features:¹²

$$a_j = \beta_o y_{j1} + \beta_g y_{j2} + \beta_x (y_{j1} - \bar{y}_1)(\bar{y}_2 - y_{j2}). \quad (1)$$

The weights in equation (1) have expected signs. Oligopoly should lead to autonomy, so a first hypothesis is that Y_1 has a positive effect on the autonomy of position J 's occupants:

$$H_1: \beta_o > 0.$$

As captured in Y_2 , the lack of conflicting group-affiliations should constrain autonomy, so a second hypothesis is that β_g is negative:

$$H_2: \beta_g < 0.$$

Finally, a third hypothesis is that β_x is positive to the extent that simultaneously forming an oligopoly and having conflicting group-affiliations leads to autonomy above and beyond the direct additive effects of either aspect of autonomy:

$$H_3: \beta_x > 0.$$

¹² The interaction term is expressed in terms of deviations from mean scores so as to eliminate spurious correlations between it and the two measures of aspects of autonomy, Y_1 and Y_2 (cf. Althauser 1971).

In words, hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 say that actors jointly occupying position J will have high structural autonomy to the extent that their relations ensure low competition among occupants of position J and high competition among the nonoccupant actors who interact with the occupants of position J .

Beyond measuring the relative autonomy of occupants of separate positions in a system, equation (1) contains information on where cooptive relations should occur. As described by Selznick (1949, p. 13) in his analysis of the Tennessee Valley Authority, "... cooptation is the process of absorbing new elements into the leadership or policy-determining structure of an organization as a means of averting threats to its stability or existence." Without doing violence to Selznick's analysis of corporate actors, let me extend this idea to actors in general and refer to a "cooptive" relation, w_{ji} , as an informal relation giving the actor(s) occupying position J some effect on the decisions made by actor(s) occupying position I . By an informal relation, I refer to a relation that is relatively dependent on, or at the discretion of, the individuals performing it. This is in contrast to a formal relation such as a role or technical requirement that is imposed on the individuals performing the relation.¹³ Within a corporate bureaucracy, for example, lines of authority would be formal relations between actors as employees, while friendships would be informal relations between actors as individuals. Authority relations are formal in the sense that the people to whom one gives direction and from whom one takes direction are defined by one's "job." Friendship relations in this context are informal in the sense that they can be created and destroyed at the discretion of the individuals engaged in them. If a friendship in this context is used to affect another person's decisions, the friendship is a "cooptive" relation in the sense used here. Persons with a "friend" in the purchasing department, for example, seem to get their requests filled more quickly than do persons without such a "friend."

Assuming that cooptive relations are used to eliminate constraints on autonomy, a cooptive relation, w_{ji} , should appear whenever such a relation will increase the autonomy of occupants of position J .

The partial derivative of the autonomy of position J 's occupants with respect to the level of oligopoly within the position is given as $\partial a_j / \partial y_{j1} = \beta_o + \beta_x(\bar{y}_2 - y_{j2})$, assuming that infinitesimal change in y_{j1} leaves the mean of Y_1 unchanged. Since β_o is positive under hypothesis 1 and β_x is positive

¹³ This formal-informal contrast is not to be confused with Granovetter's (1973) strong-weak contrast. Strong relations differ from weak relations in terms of the form of a relation, strong relations being far more intense than weak relations. In the formal-informal contrast, I wish merely to highlight two extremes in the content of relations, formal relations being far more subject to social sanctions or technical requirements beyond the control of the individuals performing them than is the case with informal relations.

under hypothesis 3, an increase in oligopoly, y_{j1} , will lead to an increase in autonomy, a_j , as long as the occupants of position J are not strongly constrained by actors in other positions.¹⁴ To specifically state a fourth hypothesis, there should be a significant level of cooptation among the occupants of a network position as long as they are not more constrained by actors in the system than are the average occupants of positions in the system:

$$H_4: w_{jj} > 0, \quad \text{given } \partial a_j / \partial y_{j1} > 0.$$

In other words, structurally equivalent actors will always have cooptive relations with one another as long as they are not subject to high constraint from actors outside their position.

In order to predict cooptive relations with actors in other positions, equation (1) must be disaggregated. Stating the group-affiliation index in terms of its component x_{ji} , an approximation to equation (1) can be stated in terms of the contribution each status makes to the structural autonomy of position J 's occupants:¹⁵

$$\begin{aligned} a_j &\simeq \beta_o y_{j1} + \sum_i^{M+1} \beta_o x_{ji} + \sum_i^{M+1} \beta_x (y_{j1} - \bar{y}_1) [y_{j2} / (M + 1) - x_{ji}], \quad j \neq i \\ &\simeq \beta_o y_{j1} + \sum_i^{M+1} \{ \beta_o x_{ji} + \beta_x (y_{j1} - \bar{y}_1) [y_{j2} / (M + 1) - x_{ji}] \}, \quad j \neq i \\ &\simeq \sum_i^{M+1} x_{ji}^*, \end{aligned}$$

where x_{ji}^* is $\beta_o y_{j1}$ so that the extent to which the occupants of position I contribute to the autonomy of position J 's occupants is given as the ratio:

$$a_{ji} = x_{ji}^* / |a_j|. \quad (2)$$

Equation (2) has x_{ji}^* divided by the absolute value of a_j merely for the convenience of comparing structural constraints across separate positions. If a_{ji} is significantly positive, the autonomy of position J 's occupants is

¹⁴ When occupants of position J suffer above-average constraint from actors occupying other positions, the term $\beta_x (\bar{y}_2 - y_{j2})$ will be negative. If the constraint is so high that this term exceeds β_o , then $\partial a_j / \partial y_{j1}$ will be negative so that occupants of position J would not perceive an increase in their autonomy as a result of a small increase in their centralization. In order to increase their autonomy, either a large increase in centralization is needed so that y_{j1} increases considerably, or, more important, a change is needed in their relations with other statuses so that y_{j2} decreases.

¹⁵ This is an approximation because of the manner in which the interaction term in eq. (1) is disaggregated. The strict disaggregation of the interaction term in (1) is: $\beta_x (y_{j1} - \bar{y}_1) [\sum_i^{M+1} (\sum_i^{M+1} x_{ji}) / (M + 1) - (\sum_i^{M+1} x_{ji})]$. The term I have used to disaggregate a_j replaces the mean group-affiliation index across all positions (\bar{y}_2), with the mean contribution each position makes to the group-affiliation index for position J , $\bar{x}_{ji} = \sum_i^{M+1} x_{ji} / (M + 1) = y_{j2} / (M + 1)$. My concern in disaggregating autonomy is to capture the relative contribution of each status to the autonomy of occupants of position J rather than to capture the relative contribution of each status to autonomy in general. For position J , the term $[y_{j2} / (M + 1) - x_{ji}]$ is negative to the extent that relations between positions I and J constrain the occupants of position J more than the average constraint they suffer from any one other position.

increased by their relations with the occupants of position I . On the other hand, if a_{ji} is significantly negative, relations with the occupants of position I decrease the autonomy of actors occupying position J .

The extent to which change in the relations with position I would affect the autonomy of position J 's occupants is given by the partial derivative of autonomy with respect to x_{ji} (the component of the group-affiliation index for position J which measures the extent to which position I is an oligopoly and is the only other position with which position J 's occupants have relations), which is $\partial a_j / \partial x_{ji} = \beta_\theta + \beta_x(\bar{y}_1 - y_{j1})$, assuming that infinitesimal change in x_{ji} leaves the mean of Y_2 unchanged. Since β_θ is negative under hypothesis 2 and β_x is positive under hypothesis 3, this derivative will be negative as long as the level of oligopoly among occupants of position J is no more than a fraction below the mean level for all $M + 1$ groups of actors.¹⁶

Given the above negative derivative, actors occupying position J can lower the extent to which they are constrained by the occupants of position I by establishing a cooptive relation to position I . Assuming that the cooptive relation w_{ji} does decrease x_{ji} as the constraint on position J from position I , and assuming that actors are interested in eliminating significant constraints on their autonomy, then a fifth hypothesis can be stated. Unless the actors occupying position J are poorly organized such that the above partial derivative is positive, there should be a significant level of cooptation by position J 's occupants of the occupants of each other position I which places a significant constraint on the autonomy of position J (i.e., each position I for which eq. [2] is significantly negative):

$$H_5: w_{ji} > 0, \quad \text{given } a_{ji} < 0 \text{ and } \partial a_j / \partial x_{ji} < 0.$$

If the occupants of position I do not constrain the autonomy of actors occupying position J , there is no need for actors occupying position J to establish cooptive relations with position I 's occupants. For negligible and positive a_{ji} , therefore, w_{ji} should be negligible:

$$H_6: w_{ji} = 0, \quad \text{given } a_{ji} = 0$$

and

$$H_7: w_{ji} = 0, \quad \text{given } a_{ji} > 0 \text{ and } j \neq i.$$

Suppose that in observing the social topology of a system, only formal relations were considered. The autonomy of employees in a corporate bu-

¹⁶ When the occupants of position J are particularly disorganized in comparison with the other M groups in their system, the term $\beta_x(\bar{y}_1 - y_{j1})$ will be positive. If y_{j1} falls below the mean (\bar{y}_1) by more than the fraction β_θ/β_x , $\partial a_j / \partial x_{ji}$ will be positive, so that occupants of position J would not perceive an increase in their autonomy as a result of a small decrease in the constraints they suffer at the hands of occupants of other positions. In order to increase their autonomy, the occupants of position J must radically alter their relations with other statuses or organize themselves to increase the centralization of decision making for their position.

reaucracy, for example, could be computed using equation (1) from the network(s) of formal authority relations in the bureaucracy without considering the network of informal friendship relations. This is illustrated below. Hypotheses 4–7 concern the likelihood of actors establishing informal, potentially cooptive relations with groups of actors threatening their autonomy. Not all actors, however, need to be equally successful in coopting such threats. Some will be able to eliminate all threats to their autonomy while others might not be able to eliminate any. This variability in successful cooptation means that autonomy estimated from formal relations alone will be erroneous in a predictable manner. Those actors who have successfully coopted the occupants of positions detracting from their autonomy (i.e., those positions I for which eq. [2] is negative) should have higher than expected autonomy. Those actors who have failed to coopt threats to their autonomy should have lower than expected autonomy. The extent to which the autonomy of position J 's occupants is increased through their strategies for coopting occupants of other positions is given as the product of the partial derivative of their autonomy with respect to constraints from other actors $(\partial a_j / \partial x_{ji})$ and the level of constraint they have managed to coopt. The latter quantity can be measured as the sum of the negative x_{ji} that have been successfully coopted. This yields an index of the expected increase in the autonomy of position J 's occupants:

$$d(a_j) = (\partial a_j / \partial x_{ji}) (\sum_i^{M+1} w_{ji} x_{ji}), \quad \text{for all } x_{ji} < 0. \quad (3)$$

This index will be high when the occupants of position J are constrained by many other positions and have successfully coopted all of the constraints. As an eighth hypothesis, the extent to which true autonomy (a_j) exceeds the level of autonomy erroneously estimated when cooptive relations were ignored (call it \hat{a}_j) should have a positive slope (β_e) when regressed over the extent to which occupants of position J have successfully coopted threats to their autonomy ($d[a_j]$):

$$H_8: \beta_e > 0, \quad \text{in the equation } (a_j - \hat{a}_j) = \beta_e d(a_j).$$

In answer to the question of how the pattern of relations defining an actor's position determines his autonomy, then, equation (1) proposes the concept of structural autonomy. Hypotheses 1–8 make explicit some of the concept's implications. Before assessing the adequacy of these implications in a strategic research site, I wish to provide a more traditional numerical illustration of the concept itself.

Numerical Illustration

Figure 2 presents a sociogram of choices among 12 persons in an organization obtained from their responses to the sociometric question, "To




FIG. 2.—A sociogram of a hypothetical system of actors responding to the question, "To whom do you go for information on your work?"

whom do you go for information on your work?" Table 1 presents the adjacency matrix described by figure 2 and blockmodel densities for the one-network system. Four jointly occupied positions were located, each composed of three structurally unique persons. There are no residual persons; each person occupies a jointly occupied position. Since the system is composed of only one network, the four jointly occupied positions define the system's statuses. The system-network model in table 1 presents average relations between occupants of the four statuses as densities computed from the sociometric choices. Computational details are given in the note to table 1. Persons 1, 2, and 3 jointly occupy status S_1 . They interact only with one another. Persons 4, 5, and 6 jointly occupy status S_2 . They have no interaction with one another, but they do seek information from the occupants of status S_1 and are the object of information seeking from the occupants of status S_3 . Persons 7, 8, and 9 jointly occupy status S_3 , while persons 10, 11, and 12 jointly occupy S_4 . Occupants of these statuses seek information on their work from persons with whom they are structurally equivalent, and the occupants of S_4 go to the occupants of S_3 for job-related information. Given the patterns of relations defining each of the four statuses in table 1, how is structural autonomy distributed across the statuses, and where are the structural constraints upon which cooptive relations should be patterned?

Table 2 presents the relative structural autonomy of the four statuses. Statuses S_1 and S_3 have high centralization, S_4 has lower centralization, and S_2 is completely decentralized. Note in figure 2 that the occupants of

TABLE 1
 SOCIOMETRIC CHOICES AND DENSITIES AMONG OCCUPANTS OF
 FOUR STATUSES IN THE HYPOTHETICAL SYSTEM IN FIGURE 2

	STATUSES			
	S ₁	S ₂	S ₃	S ₄
Binary choices:				
1.....	0 1 1	0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0
2.....	1 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0
3.....	1 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0
4.....	1 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0
5.....	0 1 0	0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0
6.....	0 0 1	0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0
7.....	0 0 0	1 1 1	0 1 1	0 0 0
8.....	0 0 0	1 1 1	1 0 0	0 0 0
9.....	0 0 0	1 1 1	1 0 0	0 0 0
10.....	0 0 0	0 0 0	1 1 1	0 1 1
11.....	0 0 0	0 0 0	1 1 1	1 0 1
12.....	0 0 0	0 0 0	1 1 1	1 1 0
Densities:				
S ₁7	.0	.0	.0
S ₂3	.0	.0	.0
S ₃0	1.0	.7	.0
S ₄0	.0	1.0	1.0

NOTE.—Densities have been computed from the binary choices as the ratio of observed choices over possible choices. The four statuses were located by inputting the binary choices into the computer package STRUCTURE (Project in Structural Analysis 1977) which separated four clusters of persons. As a check on the cluster analysis, there is a single dimension of distance to each status (see Burt 1977b, p. 113; 1977c, p. 557). The ratio of predicted to observed variance in distance to actors using a single principal component for each status is .87, .57, .85, and .97, respectively.

TABLE 2
 CENTRALIZATION, GROUP-AFFILIATION, AND STRUCTURAL
 AUTONOMY OF THE FOUR STATUSES IN FIGURE 2

	STATUSES			
	S ₁	S ₂	S ₃	S ₄
Centralization (Y ₁)*.....	1.00	.00	1.00	.50
Group-affiliation (Y ₂)†.....	.00	2.00	.17	.25
(y _{j1} - \bar{y}_1)(\bar{y}_2 - y _{j2}).....	.23	-.88	.16	-.04
Structural autonomy (a _j)‡.....	1.09	-2.44	.89	.24

* Centralization is measured as the maximum centrality of any one occupant of a status. Modified from Freeman (1977, p. 37), person *K* is central to the extent that $b_{ij}(p_k) = g_{ij}(p_k)/g_{ij}$ is close to one, where $g_{ij}(p_k)$ is the number of connections linking persons *I* and *J* through person *K* and g_{ij} is the total number of connections linking persons *I* and *J*.

† Computed from the densities in table 1 and the centralization scores according to the equation for group-affiliation index given in the text.

‡ Arbitrary values have been used for β_0 , β_0 , and β_2 in eq. (1). In keeping with hypotheses 1 and 3, β_0 and β_2 are positive; in keeping with hypothesis 2, β_0 is negative. The *t*-tests for the four-digit manufacturing industries (see table 4) suggest that β_0 and β_0 are equal and larger than β_2 by about five to two so the following values have been used as weights in this example: $\beta_0 = 1.0$, $\beta_0 = -1.0$, and $\beta_2 = .4$.

S_2 have no relations with one another. The occupants of S_4 have relations with one another, but there is no centralization of communication. In contrast, the occupants of S_1 and S_3 are centralized since a single person coordinates communication among all three persons occupying either status: persons 2 and 3 communicate through person 1, persons 8 and 9 communicate through person 7. Based on the densities in table 1, the group-affiliation index shows that the occupants of S_1 suffer no constraint from the other statuses (Y_2 is 0), the occupants of status S_2 suffer a maximum constraint from the other statuses (Y_2 is 2), and statuses S_3 and S_4 are subject to low constraint. The patterns of relations in table 1 explain these scores. The occupants of S_1 are free from constraint because their only relations with persons outside their own status are relations with status S_2 , a status that is completely decentralized so that its occupants cannot collectively impose demands on the occupants of S_1 . The unfortunate occupants of S_2 , in contrast, have all their relations with statuses S_1 and S_3 , both of which are completely centralized statuses. Finally, the computed values of Y_1 and Y_2 have been used to generate relative levels of structural autonomy for each status, a_j , using weights in keeping with hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 and suggested by the analysis given below.

Owing to their high centralization and the low constraint they confront from other statuses, the occupants of status S_1 have the highest autonomy in the system ($a_1 = 1.09$). The occupants of status S_3 are equally centralized; however, the constraint imposed on them by status S_4 means that they have lower autonomy ($a_3 = .89$) than the occupants of S_1 do. Completely decentralized and facing maximum constraint from outside their status, the occupants of status S_2 have the lowest autonomy of all ($a_2 = -2.44$). Even though the occupants of status S_2 serve as brokers between the prestigious status S_1 and the less "influential" statuses S_3 and S_4 , and even though the role of broker is traditionally thought of as an autonomous role optimum for the profit-seeking entrepreneur, the fact that the occupants of S_2 must deal with two oligopolistic statuses (S_1 and S_3) reduces their autonomy to a minimum in the system.

Table 3 presents information on constraint and cooptation in the hypothetical system. The only positive contributions to autonomy come from collusion among occupants of each status (a_{11} , a_{33} , and $a_{44} > 0$). The exception here is status S_2 , in which there is no centralization ($a_{22} = 0$). Since the relevant partial derivatives are all positive, there should be cooptive relations among occupants of each status. In addition, there should be cooptive relations wherever there is a significant constraint relation since the relevant partial derivatives here are all negative. The four highly negative contributions to autonomy in the system are not surprising in light of the above discussion of the group-affiliation index. The occupants of status S_2 confront high constraint from statuses S_1 and S_3 , so cooptive

TABLE 3
STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINTS, PARTIAL DERIVATIVES, AND
PREDICTED COOPTIVE RELATIONS FOR THE
HYPOTHETICAL SYSTEM IN FIGURE 2

	STATUSES			
	S ₁	S ₂	S ₃	S ₄
Structural con- straints (a_{ji}):				
S ₁92	.00	.00	.00
S ₂	-.36	.00	-.36	-.05
S ₃00	.00	1.12	-.22
S ₄00	.00	-1.00	2.08
$\partial a_j / \partial y_{j1}$	1.24	.44	1.18	1.14
$\partial a_j / \partial x_{ji}$	-1.15	-.75	-1.15	-.95
Cooptive rela- tions (w_{ji}):				
S ₁	Yes	No	No	No
S ₂	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
S ₃	No	No	Yes	Yes
S ₄	No	No	Yes	Yes

NOTE.—Structural constraints have been computed from eq. (2), the partial derivatives have been computed from equations in the text, and a cooptive relation w_{ji} appears where predicted by hypothesis 4, 5, or 6.

relations linking occupants of S₂ with those of S₁ and S₃ are expected ($a_{21} = a_{23} = -.36$). Similarly, occupants of statuses S₃ and S₄ constrain one another ($a_{34} = -.22$; $a_{43} = -1.0$), so cooptive relations would be expected between the occupants of these statuses. As a result of the lack of constraint imposed on their status, persons occupying status S₁ would be expected to establish no cooptive relations with persons occupying other statuses.

A STRATEGIC OPERATIONALIZATION

Having sketched what appears to be a plausible concept of autonomy and having illustrated how such a concept might be used in a routine network analysis, I turn now to the substantive adequacy of the concept's implications. In order to test the constraint and cooptation hypotheses, I propose to analyze manufacturing industries in the American economy as structurally equivalent firms whose pattern of transactions with other firms acting as suppliers and consumers has inherent in it some level of structural autonomy reflected as the relative level of profits obtained by firms in the industry. Manufacturing industries in the American economy provide a research site optimally suited to hypothesis testing for three reasons: (1) Perhaps most important, data are readily available on industry profits as a reflection of autonomy. (2) Data are readily available on the

economic transactions defining each manufacturing industry as a network position in the economy. (3) Economic transactions as formal relations are clearly distinct from a variety of informal—and potentially cooptive—relations involving industries in other sectors of the economy.

Industry Profits as a Reflection of Industry Autonomy

Values of Y_1 and Y_2 can be computed for any system of actors cast as a social topology, and, as illustrated for figure 2, possession of these values together with the original network relations is sufficient to compute the structural autonomy of positions in the system and the constraint on each position from every other. The constraint hypotheses, however, cannot be tested without some criterion variable that can be regressed over Y_1 and Y_2 . Thus, not all systems are equally suited to hypothesis testing.

There is no clear empirical criterion variable reflecting actor autonomy for all systems. Adopting an innovative idea or mode of dress, for example, would be a reflection of autonomy in some circumstances. The adoption demonstrates freedom from constraint by the traditional ideas or modes of dress endorsed by social norms. Where most actors are a priori favorably disposed toward the innovation, however, adoption could instead reflect constraint by social norms rather than freedom from such norms. In general, autonomy is not a prediction of behavior; it is a prediction of freedom of choice of behavior.¹⁷

It is only when an actor's interests and behaviors are known to an observer that the two can be compared to determine whether observed behaviors are a result of the actor's own interests rather than the interests of others. As a practical research problem, unfortunately, determining all the interests of all actors in a system is a formidable task, certainly a task beyond the capabilities of easily available research methodologies.

Another strategy is to look for a system composed of actors pursuing one nonzero-sum interest. In such a system, each actor's manifest behavior is oriented toward realizing a single interest for himself. Given the actors' common interest, manifest behavior can be analyzed for discrepancy in realizing that interest; discrepancy indicates the extent to which each actor is subject to constraint from other actors in the system. Those actors subject to the least constraint would evidence behaviors most directly realizing for themselves the common interest.

Of the general class of corporate actors, consider business firms engaged

¹⁷ This point is emphasized by Riesman (1961, pp. xv ff.) in his complaint that readers have tended to equate the concept of autonomy with his idea of "inner-directed" man, an equivalence that reduces autonomy to a type of behavior instead of keeping it as an ability to choose behaviors freely.

in manufacturing goods for sale to the highest bidder. These firms can be assumed to have a common motivating interest. Over time, they can be expected to seek maximum profits (in addition, of course, to a range of goals specific to more narrowly defined classes of firms). In seeking profits, a business firm does not commit the whole economy to some course of action (a type of interest the realization of which would require corporate power).¹⁸ The level of profits obtained by a firm within an economy thus provides a clue to the lack of market constraint confronting that firm. Those firms obtaining the highest profits should be the firms with the highest structural autonomy in the market.

Fortunately, data on profits need not be obtained for individual firms or obtained on an absolute scale. Since the hypotheses are concerned with relative levels of autonomy of structurally nonequivalent positions, profits need to be measured so as to capture the relative ability of groups of firms to make profits. Inferential measures of profits are available for whole manufacturing industries as groups of firms producing the same type of good.

As introduced by Collins and Preston (1968, pp. 13–17, 54–57; 1969), the relative level of profit obtained by firms in separate manufacturing industries can be compared in terms of the “price-cost margins” for the industries: $PCM_j = (VA_j - L_j)/VS_j$, where PCM_j is the price-cost margin for industry J computed as the ratio of dollars of sales in excess of direct costs over the total dollars of sales by firms in the industry; VS_j is the total dollars of sales by firms in industry J (value of shipments); L_j is the gross annual earnings of employees on the payroll of firms in industry J ; and VA_j is the value added by industry J as the difference between VS_j and direct costs (including materials, supplies, fuel, electric energy, cost of resales, and contract work done by others). Since the difference between VA and L does not consider the cost to different industries of

¹⁸ Again, the close linkage between power and autonomy should be emphasized. Powerful corporate actors will be able to derive high profits for their investors. There can be corporate actors that are autonomous yet not powerful, however, and these corporate actors will also be able to derive high profits according to hypotheses 1–3. It can be said that a powerful corporate actor would be a firm that controls highly valuable resources and has exchange relations with other corporate actors controlling resources (e.g., labor unions, government agencies, other business firms, etc.). This concept of structural power is elaborated elsewhere (Burt 1977d, pp. 25–36). According to the concept of structural autonomy, however, all a corporate actor needs in order to derive high profits is to have low competition with other firms in its industry and extensive transactions with firms in sectors of the economy within which there is high competition. Of course, this is not to say that power in combination with autonomy would not result in increased profits over time. As pointed out by an anonymous reviewer for this *Journal*, autonomy could be a sufficient condition for obtaining profits in the short run, but power is required in order to ensure the continued ability to obtain high profits in the long run. Unfortunately, the issues arising from a consideration of time series on profits and structural autonomy are beyond the scope of this discussion.

purchasing capital for production, price-cost margins have been corrected for interindustry differences in capital requirements (CR) in order to estimate relative industry profit margins as

$$y_{j0} = PCM_j - b(CR_j - \overline{CR}). \quad (4)$$

Relative industry profits as of 1967 have been computed for 335 four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) categories as well as for the 20 highly aggregated two-digit SIC categories.¹⁹ If y_{j0} is high relative to other industries, firms in industry J are able to obtain profits further in excess of direct costs than would be expected as a result of the industry's capital requirements.

Manufacturing Industries as Jointly Occupied Network Positions

The economy within a system of actors can be discussed as a network of exchange relations among corporate actors and persons. Division of labor ensures considerable redundancy in such a network. Those actors engaged in the production of similar goods will have similar relations from other actors (i.e., will require similar proportions of goods as inputs from suppliers) and to other actors (i.e., will offer similar types of goods as outputs to consumers). Those firms producing similar types of goods would be expected to occupy positions defined by similar patterns of relations with other actors as suppliers and consumers. Such firms are structurally equivalent, as given in the social topology in figure 1. The M jointly occupied positions in figure 1 correspond to "sectors" of the economy in an input-output table representation (cf. Leontief 1966). Such a representation of the network of economic relations among firms in the American economy is readily available at different levels of aggregation from the Department of Commerce such that z_{ji} in figure 1 would be the total dollars of sales by firms in sector J to firms in sector I .

Dollar flow transactions have been taken from the 1967 Input-Output Study of 83 sectors. Manufacturing sectors have been aggregated to corre-

¹⁹ Data used to compute price cost margins are taken from table 8 of the 1967 *Census of Manufactures* (U.S. Department of Commerce 1971a). Industry capital requirements (CR_j) are computed as the gross book value of depreciable assets for industry J divided by the value of shipments for the industry (both taken from the 1970 *Annual Survey of Manufactures*, chap. 7, table 1 [U.S. Department of Commerce 1973]). For the 335 input-output sectors corresponding to unique four-digit SIC categories, the regression coefficient in eq. (4) was .077. For the 20 two-digit SIC categories, the coefficient was .064. The regression results in table 4 were also computed for raw price-cost margins. While the coefficients were modified somewhat, the same inferences resulted. The results reported here are conservative in supporting the hypotheses since I have completely removed the effect on price-cost margins of interindustry differences in capital requirements.

spond to two-digit SIC categories.²⁰ The resulting table has 51 sectors. The pattern of relations defining the position occupied by firms in the food industry, for example, is given in row and column 14 of the aggregated input-output table. Firms in this industry sell \$3,694 million worth of goods to the "Livestock" sector ($z_{14, 1}$), nothing to the "Other Agriculture" sector ($z_{14, 2}$), and \$24 million worth to the "Forestry/Fishery" sector ($z_{14, 3}$). Firms in the food industry purchase \$19,777 million worth of goods from the "Livestock" sector ($z_{1, 14}$), \$6,882 million worth from the "Other Agriculture" sector ($z_{2, 14}$), and \$423 million worth from the "Forestry/Fishery" sector ($z_{3, 14}$). Each manufacturing industry is defined, therefore, by a pattern of relations consisting of 51 relations as sales to consumers and 51 relations as purchases from suppliers.

Following the lead of economic research on oligopoly within manufacturing industries (Weiss 1963; Collins and Preston 1968, 1969; Lustgarten 1975), the level of oligopoly within a manufacturing industry has been measured in terms of four-firm concentration ratios: the ratio of the combined sales of the four largest firms in the industry over the combined sales of all firms in the industry. To the extent that there are only four competitors, the four-firm concentration ratio will equal one. Concentration ratios for four-digit SIC categories are given in the *1967 Census of Manufactures* (U.S. Department of Commerce 1971a). Average concentration ratios based on the four-digit data have been computed for the two-digit categories.²¹ These concentration ratios provide a measure of Y_1 that varies between zero and one.

Given the relations defining each industry as a network position and concentration ratios as a measure of Y_1 , values of the group-affiliation index (Y_2) and constraint coefficients (a_{ji}) have been computed.²² Computing the variance in the 51 a_{ji} for industry J , I have used a t -statistic for placing a confidence interval around the mean in order to place an interval around zero. While not statistically accurate since the mean a_{ji} is not zero for each

²⁰ The original 83 industries are given in the 1967 Input-Output Study (U.S. Department of Commerce 1974). The SIC category 23, "Apparel," includes some portions of SIC category 22, "Textiles." In the Input-Output Study, four-digit industries 2251, 2252, 2253, 2254, 2256, and 2259 are classified as apparel rather than as textile sectors. I have therefore corrected the price-cost margins and concentration ratios to take into account the changes in these two industries.

²¹ These concentration ratios have been computed as the weighted sum of four-digit concentration ratios subsumed by each two-digit industry: $y_{j1} = \sum_k K(VS_k y_{k1}) / VS_j$, where k is a four-digit SIC category within two-digit category j . The value of shipments and concentration for four-digit industries are taken from the *1967 Census of Manufactures*, table 8 (U.S. Department of Commerce 1971a) of the special report series. Concentration ratios for nonmanufacturing sectors are approximations based on a variety of census data as presented for the 484 sector input-output table in Burt (1977a, table C.1).

²² The unstandardized estimates of β_o , β_s , and β_x for the two-digit level of aggregation in table 4 have been used to compute the a_{ji} .

industry, the following classification of the a_{ji} into three categories is adequate for the purposes here:

$$a_{ji} = \begin{cases} \text{significantly positive if } a_{ji} - CI > 0 \\ \text{negligible if } a_{ji} + CI \geq 0 \text{ or } a_{ji} - CI \leq 0 \\ \text{significantly negative if } a_{ji} + CI < 0 \end{cases} \quad (5)$$

where CI is the .95 confidence interval around the mean ($CI = .28s_j$, where s_j is the standard deviation of the 51 a_{ji} in industry J). This is a fairly conservative criterion for locating constraints. If the same rule is applied to the hypothetical data in table 3, the only significantly negative constraints in the system are those on status S_2 (a_{21} and a_{23}). This rule yields 20 positive contributions to autonomy (all intra-industry),²³ 106 constraints on autonomy (of which 70 are between manufacturing industries), and 894 negligible contributions (of which 330 are between manufacturing industries).²⁴

Cooptive Relations Involving Firms in Manufacturing Industries

Relations in the input-output table constitute "formal" relations in the sense that a firm choosing to manufacture a type of good must adopt the pattern of relations with other sectors as suppliers and consumers that characterizes the good. A firm in the food industry, for example, can expect to purchase the bulk of its supplies from firms in the "Livestock" and "Other Agriculture" sectors as well as from other firms in the food industry itself.

A second network of relations among firms is superimposed upon this

²³ Since y_{j1} and β_s will always be positive, the a_{ji} will always be nonnegative. For J not equal to I , however, the only condition under which the a_{ji} in eq. (5) will be positive when computed from (1) is when the term $(y_{j1} - \bar{y}_1)[y_{j2}/(M+1)]\beta_s$ is greater in absolute value than $x_{ji}(\beta_p - \beta_s)$. Thus, when industry J is highly concentrated and/or highly constrained by other sectors, other industries can make a positive contribution to the autonomy of firms in the industry. For example, firms in the "transportation equipment" industry have the most frequently positive a_{ji} . This industry is highly concentrated ($y_{j1} - \bar{y}_1 = .350$) and has an about-average level of constraint from other sectors ($y_{j2} - \bar{y}_2 = -.008$). Since positive a_{ji} occur as a result of the interaction term in eq. (1), the more components into which Y_2 is disaggregated, and accordingly the more interaction terms in eq. (1), the more likely are positive a_{ji} . A disaggregation of eq. (1) is required for an analysis of the four-digit industries and is given elsewhere (Burt 1979a, 1979c). Since the absolute value of a_{ji} is noticeably affected by the specification of structural autonomy, the most important feature of constraints on a specific industry are the relative values of a_{ji} for the industry. Coopitive relations are expected with those sectors I for which a_{ji} is significantly more negative than the other a_{ji} in industry J . For this reason, eq. (5) identifies significant constraints for each industry separately rather than for all industries simultaneously.

²⁴ The specific sectors constraining each of the 20 two-digit manufacturing industries, the estimated a_{ji} , price-cost margins, concentration ratios, group-affiliation indices, and the aggregated (51, 51) input-output table are given in Burt, Christman, and Bittner (1979).

network of formal economic relations. Firms have the option of creating and destroying informal social relations with one another. Perhaps the best known of these relations is the interlocking directorate: two firms are interlocked to the extent that the same individuals sit on their respective boards of directors (e.g., Allen 1974). For this analysis, I have operationalized informal, potentially cooptive relations between firms in terms of diversification through mergers. When constrained by firms in sector *I*, a firm in industry *J* can coopt that constraint by purchasing a representative firm in sector *I*. In one sense, purchasing a firm constraining an industry is a very formal method for strengthening oligopoly. However, it is important to distinguish the relative formality of an industry's economic transactions as the z_{ji} from its potentially cooptive merger relations as the w_{ji} . To what extent is a relation at the discretion of the actor initiating it? Under current technology, a firm in the food industry must purchase the bulk of its supplies from the "Livestock," "Other Agriculture," and "Food" sectors. There is no discretion here. General Foods can select between alternative suppliers, but in order to output food product it must purchase inputs from these three sectors. In contrast, there are no sectors into which a firm in the food industry must diversify. To be sure, when a firm in one industry purchases a firm in another, the resulting interindustry connection is less fragile than a friendship tie between two erstwhile colleagues. Nevertheless, the interindustry connection has been created at the discretion of the two parties to the merger; it is perhaps related to, but definitely not a technical requirement of, each firm's production of output. As such, the merger is an informal relation in comparison with economic transactions that are formal relations.

Given the frequency with which firms in industry *J* have purchased firms in sector *I*, f_{ji} , a significant merger relation from the industry to the sector is coded if the number of mergers is not less than a standard error below the mean tendency for firms in the industry to merge with other firms in manufacturing:

$$w_{ji} = \begin{cases} \text{negligible if } f_{ji} \leq (\bar{f}_j - .22s_j) \\ \text{significant otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (6)$$

where \bar{f}_j is the mean frequency with which firms in industry *J* merge with firms in other manufacturing industries and s_j is the standard deviation of the 21 f_{ji} for industry *J*. Two types of merger data have been used to locate significant merger relations according to equation (6): (1) data from the Federal Trade Commission (1970) on mergers between 1948 and 1969 of corporations with assets over \$10 million²⁵ (I refer to these w_{ji} as cor-

²⁵ These data were kindly provided by J. Pfeffer. For manufacturing industries, Pfeffer (1972) correlates the number of mergers in industry *J* that were with industry *I* (f_{ji} , in eq. [6]) and the percentage of total merger assets acquired in *I* by *J* with various

porate mergers), and (2) data from the U.S. Department of Commerce (1971b) on the purchase of establishments with 250 or more employees between 1963 and 1967²⁶ (I refer to these w_{ji} as establishment mergers).

The operationalization of potentially cooptive interindustry relations here is clearly less than perfect. Merger relations are reduced to a dichotomy: present versus absent. I have not selected this operationalization because network data are often based on binary sociometric citations. I could find no guidance from the available literature on how cooptation might vary by the number of mergers between two sectors. Does the occurrence of three mergers between two sectors reflect three times as intense a cooptive effort as the occurrence of one merger between the sectors? This seems to be a naive interpretation, but I could find no systematic research on alternatives. Equation (6) has been adopted for two reasons. First, it corresponds to the operationalization of constraint. In the same manner that constraints are assessed separately for each industry, equation (6) locates as "significant" a merger relation where firms in industry J have at least a no less than average tendency to merge with firms in industry I . Second, a large number of mergers are considered. The corporate merger relations are aggregated from a total of 854 transactions, and the establishment merger relations are aggregated from a total of 1,098 transactions. Since most of the interindustry merger relations are null, a large number of observed mergers are being used to locate a small number of significant merger relations. Therefore, it seems reasonable here to use statistical inference to identify significant merger relations. This would not be the case where a small number of interorganizational relations were used to estimate a large number of interindustry relations (e.g., Burt, Christman, and Kilburn 1979).

measures of the extent to which firms in industry J have transactions with those in industry I . Since Pfeffer finds nearly identical results using the two measures of merger relations, I have used the simple count data in eq. (6).

²⁶ Purchases by firms in the manufacturing industries of firms in nonmanufacturing are not given for these data (U.S. Department of Commerce 1971b, table 3). Mergers are traced by identification numbers assigned to each establishment in the 1963 census. Mergers are recorded when an establishment changes owners between the 1963 and the 1967 census. Of the 496 nonzero entries relevant to this analysis from the report, only 51 referred to mergers of more than one firm across sectors. Of these, 44 were intra-industry mergers, and all 51 fall within a significant merger relation, w_{ji} . The problem with these multiple mergers is that there is no method for determining exactly how many mergers occurred. As a simple assumption, multiple mergers were coded as two mergers. Most certainly, some of these multiple mergers involved more than two establishments changing hands since the total sales for the transferred establishments varied considerably across multiple mergers. Fortunately, all of the multiple mergers occurred in what were identified as significant merger relations. For the dichotomous level of measurement used here, the exact number of mergers represented by a multiple merger is unimportant.

ANALYSIS

Presented in table 4 are least-squares estimates of the coefficients in equation (1) at both the 20- and 335-industry levels of aggregation. The effects are weaker for the 20-industry level than they are for the 335-industry level; however, all coefficients are in the expected directions, and the results for the 335-industry level strongly support hypotheses 1, 2, and 3. As expected under hypothesis 1, oligopoly has a positive effect on profits. The unstandardized value of β_0 is .1, which is identical with the estimated regression of price-cost margins over concentration found by economists for earlier time periods (e.g., Collins and Preston 1969; Lustgarten 1975).²⁷ At both levels of aggregation, the strongest effect on profits is from the group-affiliation index. High values of Y_2 are associated with low profits, as expected under hypothesis 2 (the unstandardized estimate of β_0 is $-.224$ for the 335 industries and $-.582$ for the 20 industries). Hypothesis 3 receives the weakest—albeit statistically significant—support. At the 335-industry level of aggregation, concentration and group-affiliation are nearly independent ($r = .073$). Even so, there is a significant interaction effect from the two variables at less than the .05 level of confidence (unstandardized β_x is .792). At the 20-industry level, in contrast, concentration and group-affiliation are highly correlated ($r = -.333$), and their interaction effect on profits is negligible.

Figure 3 presents data on the patterning of potentially cooptive merger relations by structural market constraints. For the 420 relations among

TABLE 4
CORRELATION AND REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR EQUATION (1)

VARIABLES					β 's ($R = .40$)		
	Y_0	Y_1	Y_2	X	s_i		
Y_0243***	-.291***	.130**	.081		
Y_1324*		.073	-.088	.217	β_0	.272 (5.38)***
Y_2	-.390**	-.333		-.288	.105	β_g	-.291 (5.62)***
X029	.203	.496		.027	β_x	.264 (1.70)**
s_i066	.156	.053	.009			
β 's ($R = .47$)		β_0	β_g	β_x			
		.369	-.467	.230			
		(.46)	(1.59)*	(.83)			

NOTE.—Coefficients above the diagonal are based on the 335 industries corresponding to unique four-digit SIC categories and those below the diagonal are based on the 20 two-digit industries. Variables are defined in the text; Y_0 is the industry price-cost margin corrected for capital requirements; Y_1 is an industry concentration ratio; Y_2 is the industry group-affiliation index; X is the interaction term in eq. (1); and t -tests are given in parentheses.

- * Significant at less than the .10 level of confidence.
- ** Significant at less than the .05 level of confidence.
- *** Significant at less than the .001 level of confidence.

²⁷ A more detailed discussion of the findings in table 1 connecting the analysis by economists with a network approach to industry profits is given elsewhere (Burt 1979a).

Autonomy in a Social Topology




FIG. 3.—Cooptive relations are patterned by market constraints (*CM* refers to corporate mergers, *EM* refers to establishment mergers). For example, the 100% for hypothesis 4 means that all of the 16 w_{ji} under the hypothesis were significant establishment merger relations.

manufacturing industries, the top of figure 3 shows that there are 116 significant corporate merger relations (28%) and 90 significant establishment merger relations (21%). If the merger relations are randomly distributed across sectors under each hypothesis, approximately 25% of the merger relations falling under each hypothesis should be significant. Statistical inference can be used to assess the extent to which mergers occur under each hypothesis more or less than would be expected by random chance since the merger relations have been computed from data on a large number of interorganizational transactions. The frequency with which merger relations are significant under hypothesis K , call this frequency f_k , can be expressed in terms of four parameters (cf. Goodman 1970, p. 228; 1972, p. 1042): $f_k = \gamma \gamma^c \gamma_k^h \gamma_k^{ch}$, where γ is a constant similar to the overall mean in an analysis of variance; γ^c and γ_k^h describe the marginal tendencies, respectively, for mergers to be significant and for relations to fall under hypothesis K ; and γ_k^{ch} describes the tendency for mergers to be significant under hypothesis K . The interaction terms (the γ_k^{ch}) are the central concern here. A parameter is greater than one when

it describes a condition that occurs more often than would be expected on the average. Table 5 presents estimates of the above parameters based on the data in figure 3.²⁸

Hypothesis 4 says that firms in an industry will establish cooptive relations with one another as long as they are not too constrained by firms in other sectors. This hypothesis receives strong support. As given in figure 3, firms in each of the 16 industries have significant merger relations with other firms in the industry.²⁹ The higher than average occurrence of intra-industry merger relations is reflected in the greater than one estimates of γ_1^{ch} in table 5 (for corporate and establishment mergers, re-

TABLE 5
PREDICTING COOPTIVE RELATIONS IN FIGURE 3

PARAMETERS	COOPTIVE RELATIONS	
	Corporate Mergers	Establishment Mergers
Marginal terms:		
γ	27.36	21.43
γ^c	1.22	.25
γ_1^h18	.13
γ_2^h	1.26	1.65
γ_3^h	4.49	4.53
Interaction terms:		
γ_1^{ch}	2.65 (3.37)*	4.50 (3.12)*
γ_2^{ch}	1.04 (.21)	.88 (.52)
γ_3^{ch}37 (6.45)*	.25 (5.48)*
$\chi^2(\gamma_1^{ch} = \gamma_2^{ch} = \gamma_3^{ch} = 1) \dots$	88.45*	119.27*

NOTE.—Unit normal tests of significance for the interaction terms are in parentheses and the χ^2 statistic has two degrees of freedom.

* Significant at less than the .001 level of confidence.

²⁸ Frequencies for each type of merger relation can be computed directly from fig. 3. Let n_k refer to the number of relations falling under each hypothesis ($n_1 = 16$, $n_2 = 70$, and $n_3 = 330$). The f_k can then be computed from the percentages in fig. 3. For example, 61% of the relations falling under hypothesis 2 are significant corporate mergers, so f_2 for corporate mergers is .61(70), or 43. The relations under hypothesis 2 that are not significant, then, are $n_2 - f_2$, or 27. As described by Goodman (1972, p. 1046), the effects in table 6 are computed as geometric means:

$$\gamma = [\Pi_k^3(n_k - f_k)f_k]^{1/6}, \quad \gamma^c = \{[\Pi_k^3(n_k - f_k)f_k]^{1/3}\} / \gamma,$$

$$\gamma_k^{ch} = f_k / (\gamma \gamma^c \gamma_k^h), \quad \text{and} \quad \gamma_k^h = \{[f_k(n_k - f_k)]^{1/2}\} / \gamma.$$

²⁹ Although not present in the analysis, firms in all four industries severely constrained by other sectors, i.e., industries for which the partial derivative $\partial a_j / \partial y_{j1}$ is negative, also have significant intra-industry establishment, as well as corporate merger, relations. These industries are the "Textiles," "Apparel," "Rubber," and "Fabricated Metals" industries.

spectively, $\hat{\gamma}_1^{ch}$ is 2.65 and 4.50). The tendency for intra-industry mergers to occur is significant at well beyond the .001 level of confidence.

Hypothesis 5 says that firms in a sector having a negative effect on the structural autonomy of firms in an industry will be the object of cooptive relations, as long as firms in the industry are not too disorganized. All the industries are organized sufficiently well to engage in cooptive relations since the partial derivative $\partial a_j / \partial x_{ji}$ is negative for all industries. Figure 3 shows that the firms in industry J have an increased tendency to merge with firms in industry I when I constrains the structural autonomy of J . On the average, the odds are one out of four that firms in an industry will have a significant merger relation with other firms in an industry. If firms in industry J suffer a constraint to their structural autonomy from firms in industry I , however, the odds of a significant merger relation from J to I more than double (from .28 to .61 for corporate mergers and from .21 to .56 for establishment mergers). Table 5 shows, however, that this increased tendency for merger is not statistically significant even at the .10 level of confidence.³⁰ In accordance with hypothesis 5, the odds of firms merging into those other industries constraining their structural autonomy are double the odds of their merging on average, but this increase is not statistically significant.³¹

Hypotheses 6 and 7 say that firms in a sector which does not constrain the structural autonomy of firms in an industry will be ignored in the industry's cooptive strategies. There are no significant positive contributions to the structural autonomy of industries aside from intra-industry

³⁰ Is it the case, then, that firms are capitalizing on their ability to constrain other industries in order to purchase, at below market price, firms in those industries constrained? Instead of firms in industry J merging into industry I when I constrains J , perhaps the reverse is happening. Since the merger relations are asymmetric, this possibility was assessed by transposing the matrix of merger relations, so that w_{ji} became w_{ij} , and recomputing the parameters in table 5. This transposition greatly lowers the interaction between constraint (the a_{ji}) and cooptation (the w_{ji}). The χ^2 statistic drops to about two-thirds its value in table 5: from 88 to 65 for corporate mergers and from 119 to 73 for establishment mergers. The pattern of effects for the three hypotheses, however, is consistent with table 5. As would be expected, since the w_{ji} are not affected by transposing W , the intra-industry mergers are still high and significant. Mergers into constraint industries are still insignificant, and the absence of mergers into nonconstraint industries is still significant, although less so than is the case in table 5. For corporate and establishment mergers, respectively, the unit-normal test statistics for γ_3^{ch} drop from 6.5 to 5.6 and from 5.5 to 4.6. In short, the merger data demonstrate a slight, but hardly overwhelming, asymmetry corroborating the cooptation hypotheses as stated in the text.

³¹ Subsequent research on the cooptive uses of corporate boards of directors has extended the domain of potential cooptees to include nonmanufacturing sectors (Burt, Christman, and Kilburn 1979). The results are encouraging. Ownership ties, direct interlock ties, indirect interlock ties through financial institutions, and multiplex cooptive ties between corporations all have a statistically significant tendency to occur in the presence of market constraint, as predicted by hypothesis 5.

collusion (see n. 23). There is a very strong tendency, however, for firms not to merge with firms in industries having no effect on their structural autonomy. If firms in industry J suffer negligible constraint from firms in industry I , the odds are nine to one that there will be no significant merger relation from J to I (.84 for corporate mergers and .91 for establishment mergers). This tendency for mergers not to occur is reflected in the relevant parameter estimates being less than one in table 5 at well beyond the .001 level of confidence (for corporate and establishment mergers, respectively, $\hat{\gamma}_3^{ch}$ is .37 and .25).

In computing the structural autonomy of firms in separate industries based on the economic, or formal, relations defining each industry as a network position, no consideration was given to the merger relations as potentially cooptive "informal" relations. Since most market constraint confronting the manufacturing industries comes from firms in other manufacturing industries, the interindustry merger relations could be eliminating the bulk of market constraints in manufacturing. Hypothesis 8 says that the errors made in predicting profits in table 4 have a specific meaning. Industries with coopted constraints should have higher profits than expected from the regression results in table 4. Assuming that the presence of a significant merger relation from industry J to industry I is sufficient to eliminate any structural constraint by I on J , values of the differential in equation (3) have been computed for each two-digit manufacturing industry.³² When the differential $d(a_j)$ is high, it means that firms in industry J have coopted a high level of the structural constraint they confront. The values of $d(a_j)$, multiplied by 1,000 are presented in figure 4, where industry J is located in the graph according to its observed profit margin (y_{j0}) versus the profit margin it is predicted to have (\hat{y}_{j0}) as a result of the industry's structural autonomy defined by its pattern of economic transactions with suppliers and consumers.

The results on hypothesis 8 are not encouraging. The mean expected increase in structural autonomy for the industries as a consequence of their merger activities is .099, with a standard error of .024. In contrast to hypothesis 8, the correlation between expected increase ($d[a_j]$) and the difference between observed and predicted profit margin ($y_{j0} - \hat{y}_{j0}$) is negligible ($r = -.01$). Note in figure 4 that the chemical industry has a much higher profit margin than would be expected from the industry's structural autonomy based on economic transactions. At the bottom of the graph, the petroleum industry has a much lower profit margin than would be expected. Yet the two industries have similarly low expected increases in autonomy as a result of their merger activities ($d[a_j]$ is .050 and .021,

³² A significantly negative a_{ji} is considered eliminated whenever w_{ji} is either a significant corporate or establishment merger. In 91% of the cases where w_{ji} is a significant merger, it represents both a significant corporate as well as establishment merger.




FIG. 4.—Observed versus predicted profit margin, with success of cooptive mergers as $d(a_1)$.

respectively). Across all manufacturing industries, firms in the transportation equipment industry have eliminated the greatest level of constraint on their structural autonomy ($d[a_j]$ is .333). Instead of the profit margin in this industry being grossly underestimated by the industry's structural autonomy based on its economic transactions, the observed profit margin is nearly the most overestimated of all.

The lack of support for hypothesis 8 is, to some extent, a result of support for the other hypotheses. While significant merger relations do not occur whenever there is a significant market constraint (as evidenced by the statistically negligible support of hypothesis 5), virtually all the largest market constraints confronting each industry are covered by a significant merger relation.³³ This observation is strengthened and extended to non-manufacturing sectors when other types of cooptive ties are considered (Burt, Christman, and Kilburn 1979). There is little variation across industries in terms of cooptive success, as success is measured here. Those industries subject to massive structural constraint from other sectors do indeed make lower profits, as expected under hypothesis 2; however, firms in each industry have cooptive ties with firms in those sectors most severely constraining their structural autonomy, as expected under hypothesis 5. Thus, and in opposition to hypothesis 8, successfully coopting market constraints appears to be an attribute of all industries rather than a variable distinguishing industries in terms of their ability to obtain profits in excess of the profits to be expected from their relative levels of structural autonomy.

CONCLUSION

In an effort to capture the manner in which the pattern of relations defining a network position "frees" occupants of the position from constraint by others, a concept of structural autonomy has been proposed. The concept is based on two well-known ideas: oligopoly in economics and group-affiliation in sociology. While the many nuances of these two ideas are by no means captured in the proposed concept, the central features of oligopoly and group-affiliation are captured for the context of a system stratified across structurally nonequivalent statuses/role-sets. Beginning with the

³³ A measure of the extent to which firms in an industry have failed to coopt market constraints imposed on the industry by other manufacturing industries can be generated by computing the differential in eq. (3), where $x_{j,i}$ refers to uncoopted constraints. This computed differential, an expected increase in structural autonomy that would result from more successful cooptive efforts than were observed in the merger data, is close to zero for most of the industries. It has a mean across industries of .042 with a .086 standard deviation. Three industries have one $a_{j,i}$ each that is high, relative to the other $a_{j,i}$ in the industry, and is not coopted by a significant merger relation: textiles, apparel, and printing.

simple statement of structural autonomy in equation (1), eight hypotheses have been derived that provide a constellation of expectations concerning the location of cooptive relations in a system of actors and the relative freedom of actors in each system status from constraint by others in the system.

The most promising application of the concept, I believe, is in systems where there is a clear separation of formal from informal, potentially cooptive relations. In such systems, the hypotheses make the least ambiguous predictions. In a corporate bureaucracy, structural autonomy predicts the relative discretion allowed to executives occupying positions in the corporation and predicts informal friendships to develop where constraint on each position is high. Between corporate bureaucracies, as in the substantive application here, structural autonomy predicts the relative freedom of corporations in sectors of the economy to set prices independent of other sectors and predicts diversification, joint ventures, interlocking directorates, etc., to develop where constraint on each sector is high. Beyond describing observed groups of interconnected corporations, the proposed concept of structural autonomy predicts how groups should be interconnected and why, in terms of the constraints corporations place on one another as a result of their network of transactions.

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Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods. II. Provision Points, Stakes, Experience, and the Free-Rider Problem¹

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Our recent experimental research called into question the predictive utility of the free-rider hypothesis regarding the provision of public goods by groups. However, several critical questions regarding the generality of the findings may be raised. This paper reports three systematic replications of the previous research which deal with the most pressing of these questions. Study I shows that the presence of a "provision point" in the payoff structure does not substantially affect the results. Study II indicates that a fivefold increase in the amount of money at stake in the relevant decision does affect behavior but not sufficiently to salvage a strong version of the free-rider hypothesis. Study III shows that experienced subjects do not behave very differently from inexperienced ones in this situation.

The free-rider hypothesis (Hardin 1968; Olson 1968) has long been one of the most widely accepted and important theoretical propositions in the literature on collective action. However, our recently published experimental research (Marwell and Ames 1979), specifically designed to maximize the impact of the free-rider problem on the provision of public goods by groups, failed to support a "strong" version (Brubaker 1975) of the hypothesis. Although free riding appeared to prevent *optimal* investment in a public good, subjects did invest at a remarkably high level. On the average, they invested almost half of their resources in the public good, despite a situation which allowed absolutely no side payments, guaranteed anonymity, and stressed the importance of earning money as the objective for participating in the research.

These negative results for a firmly established theoretical proposition seem to us sufficiently important to be treated with more than the usual degree of caution. As in most scientific research, a number of problems may cast doubt on both the validity and the generalizability of the results. We noted some of these in the paper itself. At the same time, we noted

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that answers to the questions raised can be provided only through thorough and systematic replication. Taking our own advice, we now report three of our systematic attempts to replicate our findings. In general, the present results substantially support our previous findings and reinforce the necessity to reevaluate the assumptions underlying the free-rider hypothesis.

BACKGROUND AND SELECTION OF REPLICATIONS

The Free-Rider Hypothesis: A Brief Summary

The theory on which this series of experiments is based has been developed by a number of scholars, primarily economists, and has been well articulated by Olson (1968). Our previous paper contains a succinct presentation of our interpretation of the free-rider hypothesis, and the reader is referred to that paper for elaboration. Here we shall restrict ourselves to a brief summary.

The free-rider hypothesis concerns the provision of *public goods* by groups. A "public good" may be defined as "any good such that, if any person X_i in a group $X_1, \dots, X_i, \dots, X_n$ consumes it, it cannot feasibly be withheld from others in that group" (Olson 1968, p. 14). For example, in an industry containing several firms making a homogeneous product, a "public good" could be a higher price for that product. A higher price may be gained by the restriction of output by some of the firms. However, regardless of which firms restrict output, the higher price accrues to *all* firms making the product. The higher price is a public good because it is non-excludable.

The free-rider problem may be understood by considering the economic "logic" facing each of the firms in the example above. If a given firm restricts its output, prices may go up—but since other firms maintain their output, the effect on prices will be small. So small, in fact, that profits for the first company will decline because of reduced sales. How much smarter to let the other companies reduce output and to "free ride" on the price increase they cause, without reducing one's own production. That maximizes profits. Unfortunately, all the other firms in the industry think the same way, so no reduction in supply is likely. Therefore, no public good in the form of a higher price will accrue to any of the companies. Even though all would have been better off with some restriction of output, the free-rider problem will obviate any such restriction.

The free-rider hypothesis, then, states that except under certain specifiable conditions the provision of public goods either will not occur at all (what Brubaker [1975] calls the "strong" version) or will be "suboptimal" (the "weak" version). The group will provide either no public good at all or less than it would provide if it were a single individual making an economic decision on how to act under the same conditions.

The Previous Experiment

Our previous research tested the free-rider hypothesis in a controlled, highly abstract, experimental situation. High school subjects were provided with resources which they had to invest in either a public good or a private good with similar operational characteristics. The private good was called the "individual exchange" and returned a fixed amount of money for each unit of resources invested. The public good was called the "group exchange," and its monetary returns to the subject depended on the investment decisions of *all* group members, instead of on the investment of the individual alone. All members of the group received a preset share of the earnings from the group exchange, regardless of who invested in the exchange. The subject thus received a share of the return on his own investment in the group exchange (if any) and also the same share of the return on the investments of each of the other group members. The group exchange thus was characterized by nonexcludability and met our definition of a *public* good.

What made the group exchange a public *good*, when compared with the individual exchange, was that it was possible to have the group exchange return substantially more than the fixed amount set for the individual exchange. Our experiment set returns to the group exchange near zero for the first X units of resources invested, but at $X + 1$ units of investment—the "provision point"—the return on all invested resources increased dramatically. At this point the group exchange returned approximately 3.8 times as much as the individual exchange per resource unit invested. Thus all members of the group would have been better off if all their resources had been invested in the group exchange than if all had been invested in the individual exchange. On the other hand, each individual would have been best off if he or she had invested in the individual exchange while everyone else had invested in the group exchange—that is, if one person "free rode" on all others' investments in the public good.

Besides testing the free-rider hypothesis, the previous research examined the effects on investment of three independent variables: group size, the distribution of interest, and the distribution of resources in the group. None of these variables will be of interest here.

The relevant results of our previous research may be easily summarized: subjects invested *much* more in the public good than would be predicted by the strong free-rider hypothesis, but less than optimality. A typical group invested approximately 57% of its resources in the public good, 28% more than needed to reach the provision point. As we state in our paper, "There can be little doubt that subjects in our experiment do not fit Olson's description of rational free riders" (p. 1350).

Three Replications

Given the nature of experiments, our previous research had to control a number of potentially important variables by setting them at somewhat arbitrary points. These settings might specify a unique set of conditions which are responsible for our surprising results. For example, our use of a provision point might be the source of high contributions. The research reported in this paper speaks to what we see as three of the most telling of these possible threats to the generality and validity of our previous results.

Provision point.—It may be argued that a provision point makes the investment decision faced by an individual much more complex than would a payoff system without a provision point. For the group exchange, the subjects' expected returns to investment are dependent on the investment decisions of others. If many subjects expect others to invest close to the amount required to reach the provision point, they may see their own investment as having a particularly high return, because it would move the group investment over the provision point. If no such provision point exists no subject can expect high returns from his contribution. Therefore, a payoff system without a provision point may lead to substantially lower levels of investment in the public good.

Stakes.—The high levels of investment in the public good that we found may reflect the fact that subjects were deciding about relatively small amounts of money. With such low stakes they may have been willing to take risks, or gamble on the behavior of other members of the groups, or make an inexpensive gesture toward some learned norm, such as altruism, competitive with self-interest. With higher stakes subjects may well be more under the control of the economic "logic" of collective action posited by the free-rider hypothesis.

Experience.—Subjects confronted the decision at issue only once. Since they were in a highly abstract, unrealistic situation, their initial decision might have reflected a lack of understanding—or lack of full information. Experienced subjects, necessarily acting with fuller information, may be more likely to respond "logically" and not invest in the public good.

The three studies reported below are designed to deal in turn with these arguments against the importance of our previous findings and are, therefore, designed to diminish or completely forestall the provision of public goods by groups.

STUDY I: NO PROVISION POINT

To find out whether the presence of a provision point was important in determining the level of investment, an experiment was designed with

exactly the same operational characteristics as our previous research, except for the structure of payoffs for investment in the public good. Instead of the returns to investments in the group exchange increasing precipitously at a given point, returns were kept in simple proportion, regardless of the total amount invested.

Subjects

The 128 subjects for this study were randomly selected from Madison high school juniors and seniors. As in the previous study, subjects were between 15 and 17 years old and were equally divided between males and females. Eight additional subjects who began the experiment had to be replaced, either because they did not complete the required work or because they talked to another subject in the experiment. Of the students invited to be subjects, 100 decided they did not wish to participate. These students did not appear very different in background characteristics from those who did participate.

Procedures

The general procedures are described and discussed in detail in our previous paper. All contact with the subjects was through the mail and by telephone. Subjects first received a packet of instructions giving them complete information about their groups and the investment decision they were to make. All subjects in the current study, like those in the previous research with whom they will be compared, were told that they belonged to groups of 80 students "like themselves." Since subjects in the previous study had been assigned to groups accorded different treatments of the distribution of resources and interest in the public good, a similar distribution of treatments was used in this research. The effects of these differences (which were not significant) will not be discussed further here, and the reader may consult our earlier paper for a complete description.

A few days after the mailing an experimenter called the subject and went over each point in the instructions, testing and reviewing until the subject fully understood the situation and the decision to be made. The subject was then given one or two days to decide on her investment, and was again called by the experimenter. At this point the subject reported her investment decision, answered several questions checking her understanding of the situation, and gave a verbal explanation of her own behavior. Finally, subjects responded to a mailed questionnaire regarding certain background and personality characteristics and their reactions to the experiment.

Dependent Variable: Investment in the Public Good

The dependent variable of interest was how much the subject invested in each of the two exchanges. As noted in our description of the previous experiment, the more certain way to invest was in the individual exchange, in which every token earned a set amount—1¢. The individual exchange was thus like a bank in assuring a specific return on investment. The return did not depend on the behavior of other group members and was excludable. We therefore consider it a private good. The group exchange, on the other hand, paid its cash earnings to all the members of the group by a preset formula, regardless of who had done the investing. It was thus a nonexcludable public good. The amount of money in the group exchange available for distribution depended on the total amount contributed by all of the members of the group. The more invested, the more there was to divide. How the subjects allocated their investments between these two exchanges constitutes the dependent variable for this analysis.

Provision Point

It is the relationship between the amount invested in the group exchange by the group and the amount of money to be divided among the group members which results from that investment that differs between the previous and the current experiment. Table 1 contains a sample payoff structure from the group exchange for both the previous and current research.²

TABLE 1
PAYOFFS FROM GROUP EXCHANGE
(\$)

IF THE TOTAL TOKENS INVESTED IN THE GROUP EXCHANGE BY ALL GROUP MEMBERS IS BETWEEN	PREVIOUS STUDY: PROVISION POINT		PRESENT STUDY: NO PROVISION POINT	
	Total Money Earned by the Group Is	How Much Money You Get ($1\frac{1}{4}$ ¢ of Each Group Dollar)	Total Money Earned by the Group Is	How Much Money You Get ($1\frac{1}{4}$ ¢ of Each Group Dollar)
0 and 1,999.....	0	0	0	0
2,000 and 3,999.....	14.00	.18	44.00	.55
4,000 and 5,999.....	32.00	.40	88.00	1.10
6,000 and 7,999.....	54.00	.68	132.00	1.65
8,000 and 9,999.....	320.00	4.00	176.00	2.20
10,000 and 11,999.....	350.00	4.38	220.00	2.75
12,000 and 13,999.....	390.00	4.88	264.00	3.30
14,000 and 15,999.....	420.00	5.25	308.00	3.85
16,000 and 17,999.....	440.00	5.50	352.00	4.40
18,000.....	450.00	5.63	396.00	4.95

² The example is for an equal-resources, equal-interest treatment, because it is the simplest. The contrasts between experiments involved in the other treatments are similar. Exact specifications may be obtained from the authors.

Subjects received one or the other of these exact payoff matrices in their information packets.

In both payoff matrices subjects received payoffs according to *intervals* of group investment, rather than from some continuous function. Our pretests argued strongly that subjects had difficulty understanding the formulas which would represent continuous payoff functions and could deal more knowledgeably with their investment decision when they could consult a specific table. In addition, pretests indicated that subjects did not make the fine predictions of others' investments that would be required for them to calculate whether an additional investment on their part would "put the group over" the border of specific intervals.

As indicated in table 1, however, one interval border that attracted unusual attention from subjects in our original research occurs at 8,000 tokens. This is the "provision point," at which returns from investment in the public good increase by a factor of almost six. Whereas up to this point the group receives much less per token than it could from investments in the individual exchange (i.e., less than 1¢ per token), returns to investments above this point average more than half again those from the individual exchange.

In contrast, no such major discontinuity appears in the new payoff matrix ("present study"). Returns to investment in the group exchange remain stable, averaging 2.2¢ per token over the entire range of investments.

Results and Discussion

The general level of investment in the public good in the current experiment replicates that of our previous work to a remarkable degree. In both studies the subjects averaged 113 tokens invested in the group exchange, or approximately 51% of the tokens they had available. The standard deviations, 79 tokens in the previous research and 82 in the present study, were also strikingly similar.

These results appear to fully support our previous conclusions. The provision point does not, in itself, explain the high level of investment in public goods in the previous study. It appears that subjects did *not* invest in the group exchange because they thought their investment would receive the particularly high return available at the provision point. Other, less economically clear, factors appear to be the sources of our subjects' high investments in the public goods, despite an obvious free-rider situation.

In our previous study, analysis of subjects' self-reports suggested that they generally agreed that there was a "fair" investment, of about half their available resources, that should be made in the public good. Subjects who indicated that they were "concerned with being fair" tended to make

contributions at about this level. Only subjects willing to state they were not concerned with fairness tended to contribute little or nothing to the group. This effect was quite strong. Analysis of the responses of subjects in the present study conform remarkably well to this pattern, fully replicating the previous finding.

In summary, it would be difficult to argue that the present subjects and those in the previous experiment were in any way different in their behavior and, thus, that they were treated in any meaningfully different way. The effects of the presence of a provision point appear to be nil.

STUDY II: HIGH STAKES

As in study I, testing for the effects of the level of stakes involved in the subject's decision required only a single change in the experimental design. In this case, however, we decided to use for comparison the results from study I rather than those from the original research. Since study I involved no provision point it was operationally less complex than the original study and easier to present to the subjects. Results in study I were almost identical to those in the original research, so that comparison with either seemed to yield basically the same information.

The operations used for study II were therefore identical to those of study I, with one major exception: all returns to investment specified in study I were multiplied by five. Thus, investments in the individual exchange returned 5¢ per token instead of 1¢. Similarly, an investment of between 4,000 and 5,999 tokens in the group exchange returned \$440.00 to the group instead of \$88.00, and \$5.50 to each individual instead of \$1.10 (see the right-hand panel of table 1). This meant that the maximum amount an individual could earn was now \$33.25 (if he free rode while everyone else invested in the public good), certainly a significant amount for the typical high school student.

In part because of the substantial costs now involved in running each subject we did not fully replicate the design of study I. To reduce the number of subjects, we used only the "equal-resources, equal-interest" conditions which characterized one of the four treatments used in study I. Thus, all subjects had 225 tokens to invest and comparisons are made only with the 32 subjects run under the same conditions in study I.

Experimenters

One additional change was made between study I and study II, and it turned out to be unfortunate. For a variety of reasons—including the number of studies being run at once, the time of year, and the imminent departure of some of our experimenters—study II used four experimenters.

Two of these were very experienced and had, in fact, run all of the subjects in study I. The two new experimenters were trained the same way as the experienced workers but had not participated in study I.

Unfortunately, analysis of the data from the first 32 subjects run in study II revealed a significant experimenter effect. This is the only time we have found such an effect in the 13 experiments run in this program. More specifically, the major differences were between the more and the less experienced experimenters.

Considering these differences, we decided to run additional subjects; therefore a total of 32 subjects were run in study II by the experienced experimenters. This allows our primary comparison to be between subjects run under high- and low-stakes conditions, all of whom have been run by the same experimenters. However, we shall also report as secondary information comparisons that use all of the subjects run by all experimenters under high-stakes conditions.

Results and Discussion

There are no significant differences between those subjects run by our experienced experimenters in high- and low-stakes conditions. Table 2 shows that in study I (low stakes) subjects in the equal-resources, equal-interest condition invested an average of 94 tokens, 42% of their resources, in the group exchange, with a standard deviation of 67 tokens. In study II (high stakes), the final sample of 32 subjects invested an average of 78 tokens, 35% of their resources, in the public good. The standard deviation for this group of subjects was 72. An *F*-ratio of .84 for the difference between means was not significant.

On the other hand, if data from all experimenters are used for study II, the difference in mean investment in the public good between high- and low-stakes treatments *does* become significant. All subjects combined in

TABLE 2
MEAN INVESTMENTS IN GROUP EXCHANGE AND
STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR STUDIES II AND
III AND THE CORRESPONDING CONDITION IN
STUDY I

Study	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
I (<i>N</i> =32)	93.8	66.5
II:		
(<i>N</i> =32)*	77.8	71.7
(<i>N</i> =56)	62.7	67.1
III (<i>N</i> =32)	106.3	85.2

* The 32 subjects run by the same two experimenters who conducted study I.

the high-stakes study averaged 63 tokens, only 28% of their resources, invested in the group exchange. The resultant F -ratio of 4.4 is significant at the .05 level. The standard deviation of 67 resource units did not differ significantly from that in study I.

In either case, however, it should be realized that the subjects under high-stakes conditions continued to invest in the group exchange at a level much higher than that which we would predict from a strong free-rider hypothesis. A subject who invests even 70 tokens in the group exchange under high-stakes conditions is giving up a sure \$3.50 to help the other members of his or her group, without knowing whether any of them will do anything to reciprocate. Any subject willing to put all his tokens in the group exchange is giving up more than \$11.00. Surely these are both meaningful amounts of money to typical high school students.

We should also realize that there is undoubtedly some level of stakes at which it should become highly improbable that *anyone* would invest in the public good. If we gave each person 2 million tokens it would be understandable if every one of them took the \$100,000 and ran, not trying at all to turn it into \$220,000. Risking that much sure money would not seem likely in a population of high school students or, for that matter, almost any population. But the theory, as stated, is not meant to explain behavior only when the stakes involved are so high as to make people completely risk averse. It is meant to predict behavior whenever persons are making "rational" choices about amounts of money they find meaningful. Here, the evidence remains that people will contribute substantially to the provision of public goods despite the free-rider problem.

STUDY III: EXPERIENCED SUBJECTS

To examine the effects of previous experience on investment behavior no operational changes from study I were required. Instead, the key difference was in the process of sampling. All 32 subjects used in this study had also participated in study I and were therefore experienced in the specific procedures and payoffs of the study and the decision that they were to make. Because study III was done long after study I we also decided to increase the payoffs so as to meet the impact of inflation. Thus, investments in the individual exchange returned 2¢ per token, and the payoffs for the group exchange shown on the right-hand side of table I were also each doubled.

In addition to the effects of experience per se, we wished to consider how specific *kinds* of experience affected investment behavior. For example, we wanted to see whether persons who had previously invested a considerable amount in the group and received a substantial return from the group exchange behaved differently from those who had invested similarly but received little in return. Rudimentary psychological theory suggests

that the former subject will continue to invest at a high level, while the latter may change to a different strategy. More generally, we need to be able to distinguish the effects of experience with the setting and problem—which may lead to a more considered process of decision making—from the effects of certain kinds of rewarding or punishing experiences—which may reinforce or extinguish previous behavior.

In order to bring more clarity to the description of the individual's previous behavior, and to be able to specify whether individuals were rewarded or punished, we did not select subjects randomly from the available pool of 128 participants in study I. Instead, subjects were stratified by the proportion of their available resources that they had invested in the group exchange and by the rate of return they had experienced on that investment.

Subjects were first selected from among those who had invested two-thirds or more of their available resources (high investors) or one-third or less of those resources (low investors). Although subjects did not realize it, the behavior of the individual in study I substantially affected the amount of money he was told the group had invested in the group exchange. Four individuals actually determined the returns of the individual's "group." Thus, criteria for high and low return were set differently for the two types of investors. Among high-investment subjects those who had been rewarded on the basis of 10,000 or more tokens invested in the group exchange by their group were classified as "high return"; subjects whose groups invested less were classified as "low return." The cutting point for low-investment subjects was 8,000 tokens. Both figures were approximate medians for investment by those groups.

Eight subjects were selected to be in each of the four categories defined by prior investments and returns. Unfortunately, it was later discovered that one subject was incorrectly classified, so that there are nine high-investment, high-return subjects, and only seven low-investment, low-return subjects. The results, however, suggest that this error could have little effect on our ultimate interpretation of the data.

Results and Discussion

The results of this experiment with experienced subjects again strongly support previous findings. There are no significant differences between our experienced subjects and subjects in the similar condition in study I. Referring to table 2, we find that while the mean investment of all subjects run under "equal resources, equal interest" conditions in study I was 94 tokens, the mean investment of experienced subjects in study III was 106, with standard deviations of 67 and 85 tokens, respectively. Neither the means nor variances differed significantly by *F*-test. Comparing the invest-

ments of experienced subjects with their own previous behavior in study I, we also see no appreciable or significant difference. These subjects invested an average of 56% of their resources in study I and 47.2% in study III.

An analysis of variance indicates that return on previous investment does not affect subsequent investment to a significant degree. However, investment in study III is related to the individual's previous behavior. The correlation between proportion of resources invested in study I and in study III is .42. This suggests that in similar circumstances individuals tend to behave in somewhat the same way they behaved before.

CONCLUSIONS

We can only conclude from these three studies that the behavior of subjects in this particular setting is robust to a variety of changes in parameters. Three seeming threats to our previous finding appear to be generally baseless. Even when they are duly considered, and appropriate adjustments made in the setting, the power of the "free-rider" hypothesis accurately to predict behavior remains severely limited. Subjects persist in investing substantial proportions of their resources in public goods despite conditions specifically designed to maximize the advantage of free riding and thus minimize investment. The data thus continue to call into question the power of the theory.

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White Ethnics, Racial Prejudice, and Labor Market Segmentation¹

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Data are presented describing the presence of white ethnic groups within secondary labor markets. High scores of racial intolerance among certain ethnic groups appear to be strongly associated with that group's employment situation. Generally, the data confirm the idea that ethnic groups which directly compete with blacks for employment opportunities in secondary labor markets are more racially intolerant than ethnic groups employed in primary labor markets. Racial tolerance and intolerance among white groups are explained as social psychological products of labor market conditions.

Radical economists have described the existence of a dual labor market within the American economy (Edwards, Reich, and Gordon 1975; Gordon 1972). Central to the dual labor market concept is the idea of segmentation: "The segmented markets are distinguished by separate systems of rules, different channels of information, and different skill and job requirements. Little mobility between the primary and secondary markets is thought to exist. Segmented and internal markets are often seen to be related, since the dichotomization of the industrial structure, of which the rise of large corporations with their internal markets forms one part, is seen as one cause of segmented (external) markets" (Edwards 1975, p. 16).

The idea of segmented labor markets provides a useful way to elaborate the themes appearing in existing structural explanations of ethnic and racial conflict (e.g., Boggs 1970; Bonacich 1972, 1975, 1976; Cox 1948; Cummings 1977). As explained by Edwards (1975, p. 16), "The idea of segmentation grew out of studies of poverty, unemployment, and oppressive job conditions of those persons working outside the normal white male career channels of middle-class America." What is unique about the use of segmentation in this study is its application to white ethnic groups. While some scholars have discussed European capitalism in terms of immigrant placement in segmented labor markets, comparable applications have not been developed for the American industrial experience (Baron 1975, pp.

¹ This article is a revised version of a paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, San Francisco, 1978. Several comments by anonymous reviewers were most helpful and I appreciate their assistance.

209–10). Segmentation is typically described in racial rather than ethnic terms (Edwards et al. 1975).

Considerable evidence exists documenting the extent to which blacks disproportionately cluster within segmented labor markets, especially within secondary employment sectors. We know that certain industries are racially segregated (Baron 1975; Baron and Hymer 1968; Edwards 1975). Additionally, within some industries there apparently exists a dual system of recruitment into various occupational categories (Piore 1970; Gordon 1972). In many northern cities, transportation and utilities; business, insurance, and finance; and certain manufacturing industries are highly segregated (Baron and Hymer 1968). And within both segregated and integrated industrial sectors, blacks are typically concentrated in the lowest-paying blue-collar or clerical jobs (Baron and Hymer 1968; Taylor 1968; Gwartney 1970; Flanagan 1973). Within this secondary labor market, “control is based on more open and arbitrary power, and the sanction of surplus labor tends to prevail” (Edwards 1975, p. 21).

What is not usually emphasized in discussions of segmented labor market conditions, however, is the extent to which certain white groups may also be found within particular industrial and occupational categories. The purpose of the research presented here is to report the results of an attempt to test the idea that racial prejudice and conflict between selected white ethnic groups and black Americans is brought about by segmented labor market conditions. Generally, it was hypothesized that white ethnics who work in industries where blacks compete for jobs are more racially intolerant and antagonistic than white ethnics who work in other industries. Specifically, it was hypothesized that the most intolerant ethnic groups are those employed within secondary or comparable labor markets populated by blacks in search of employment opportunities.

The actual data used to examine the racial orientations and employment situations of white ethnic groups were drawn from the 15-city survey conducted by Campbell and Schuman (1968). The data were made available through the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research. Although collected during the late 1960s, they represent a good source of information with which to examine the issues at hand. First, the data were collected at precisely that time when racial tensions in northern cities were greatest. Second, the cities surveyed were those with large ethnic populations.² Most national survey data sets do not include enough Jews or Catholic ethnic groups to allow for meaningful analysis. Since Catholics and Jews are largely a northern and eastern urban population, the Campbell and Schuman study is an ideal source of data for the present study. Additionally, blacks

² The cities surveyed were: Baltimore, Boston, Brooklyn, Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Detroit, Gary, Milwaukee, Newark, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, St. Louis, San Francisco, and Washington, D.C.

residing in the same cities were surveyed. Consequently, relevant comparisons between blacks and whites are possible.

In order to operationalize the idea of segmented labor market conditions, an analytical scheme based on four variables was constructed: (1) annual family income, (2) industrial sector, (3) occupation, and (4) the relative presence of blacks within different industrial sectors and occupational categories (table 1). Discussions of primary and secondary labor markets have typically made reference to all of these variables. While segmented conditions are usually viewed as logical manifestations of advanced capitalism (Baron 1975), the characteristics of secondary labor markets include not only low pay, but also low skill requirements, specific industrial sectors, and racial segregation. In this sense, the scheme developed is based more on the characteristics of particular labor markets than on more global notions of structural sectors within the economy (Beck, Horan, and Tolbert 1978).

Table 1 shows the analytical scheme used to operationalize labor market segmentation. Working-class occupations include all blue-collar as well as clerical workers (Anderson 1974; Wright and Perrone 1977). These occupations were subdivided into integrated and segregated industrial sectors. Based on an examination of the distribution of blacks within various sectors, integrated industries were identified as construction, metal and steel, motor vehicle manufacturing, all sectors of the personal and professional services industry, and municipal and public service employment. Nearly 60% of blacks sampled were employed in these five industrial and employment sectors. Segregated industries include agriculture, mining, all sectors of manufacturing except metal and automotive, transportation, wholesale and retail trade, finance, insurance, and real estate. While blacks were obviously present in these categories, they were scattered throughout. Middle and professional classes include managers, owners, and professional and sales workers in all sectors of the economy. This general category is highly segregated, irrespective of industry. Last, both the working-class and the

TABLE 1
ANALYTICAL CLASSIFICATION OF PRIMARY AND SECONDARY LABOR MARKETS

OCCUPATIONS	INCOME LEVELS		
	Low (<\$7,999)	Medium (\$8,000-\$11,999)	High (>\$12,000)
Working class:			
Integrated industries.	Secondary labor markets	Secondary labor markets	Mixed labor markets
Segregated industries.	Secondary labor markets	Secondary labor markets	Mixed labor markets
Middle and professional class	Mixed labor markets	Primary labor markets	Primary labor markets

middle- and professional-class categories were stratified according to annual family income: low (less than \$7,999), medium (\$8,000 to \$11,999), and high (over \$12,000). Cutting points were based on natural breaks in the data and a consideration of cell frequency.

With the possible exception of the lowest income strata, the middle- and professional-class category corresponds roughly to what the radical economists would call the primary labor market. The middle- and lower-paying jobs within both working-class categories correspond roughly to the secondary labor market, but it is within the integrated industrial sectors of the working class that one would expect to find the highest degrees of intergroup conflict and competition, especially within the middle- and lower-income categories. The higher-paying working-class sectors and the lowest-paying middle- and professional-class categories undoubtedly contain both primary and secondary labor markets.

While this analytical scheme lacks the precision which more accurate and complete data might be capable of providing, it should nonetheless supply an adequate conceptual base for testing the specific hypotheses which shaped the present research: (1) racial intolerance should be highest among those ethnic groups concentrated in the same industrial, occupational, and income strata in which blacks disproportionately appear; (2) the most racially tolerant groups should be those employed in high-paying jobs, within highly segregated industrial and occupational categories.

In order to operationalize the racial orientations of ethnic groups, three specific measures were derived from the 15-city survey. General orientations toward interracial contact were measured by a five-point scale indicating varying preferences for selected types of interpersonal relations with blacks.³ A four-point scale measured the respondents' endorsement of civil rights legislation dealing with employment and housing discrimination.⁴

³ The following items were used to measure general orientations toward contact. The response or responses weighted are indicated in parentheses.

a) Suppose you had a job where your supervisor was a qualified Negro. Would you mind that a lot, a little, or not at all? (Respondent says "not at all," or "would like it.")

b) If a Negro family with about the same income and education as you moved next door to you, would you mind it a lot, a little, or not at all? (Respondent says "not at all," or "would like it.")

c) Who do you feel you could more easily become friends with—a Negro with the same education and income as you, or a white person with a different education and income from you? (Respondent says "Negro with same," or "makes no difference.")

d) If you had small children, would you rather they had only white friends, or would you like to see them have Negro friends too, or wouldn't you care one way or the other? (Respondent says "Negro friends too.")

⁴ Support of civil rights legislation was measured by three items.

a) Which of these statements would you agree with—first, white people have a right to keep Negroes out of their neighborhoods if they want to, or second, Negroes have a right to live wherever they can afford to just like white people. Responses: (1)

Another scale, a six-point cumulative index, measured varying degrees of sympathy with black protest.⁵ All three scales deal with important facets of the civil rights movement during the late 1960s and early 1970s and index sociopolitical concerns conceptually related to intergroup competition and conflict. Additionally, two of the scales are conceptually linked to the idea that the government should intervene on behalf of black Americans for purposes of insuring economic opportunity and social mobility. The scales were weighted so that higher scores indicate higher levels of tolerance.

Table 2 shows the distribution of respondents according to the analytical scheme used to conceptualize labor market segmentation. The data appearing in table 2 are revealing.⁶ First, nearly 88% of black respondents fell within the working-class categories. Nearly 80% of blacks were employed in the lowest-paying jobs in both the segregated and integrated industrial sectors of the working class—in secondary labor markets. Among Catholic

Whites have right to keep Negroes out; (2) Negroes have right to live anywhere; (3) other; (4) all right to have Negroes if "right kind" (income, class, etc.); (5) Respondent agrees with statements; both are right.

b) Do you favor or oppose laws to prevent discrimination against Negroes in job hiring and promotion?

c) How about laws to prevent discrimination against Negroes in buying or renting houses and apartments? Do you favor or oppose such laws?

If respondents feel whites can keep Negroes out of neighborhoods and are opposed to undecided about the legislation options presented, they received a score of 1 on the scale. If they supported only one type of legislation and opposed the other, they received a score of 2. If they supported one type of legislation and were undecided about the other, they received a score of 3. And if they favored both types of legislation, they received a score of 4.

⁵ Sympathy with black protest was determined by responses to five questions. The response or responses weighted are indicated in parentheses.

a) Some people say the disturbances which occurred in Newark and Detroit in the summer of 1967 are mainly a protest by Negroes against unfair conditions. Others say they are mainly a way of looting and things like that. Which of these seems more correct to you? (Respondent says "mainly protest.")

b) Do you think the large disturbances like those in Detroit and Newark were planned in advance, or that there was some planning but not much, or that they weren't planned at all? (Respondent says "some planned," or "not planned at all.")

c) Are Negroes justified in protesting through sit-ins? (Respondent feels protests are justified.)

d) Some Negro leaders are talking about having nonviolent marches and demonstrations in several cities in 1968 to protest lack of opportunity for Negroes. Do you think such demonstrations are different from riots, or that there is no real difference? (Respondent says "are different from riots.")

e) Some say that Negroes have been pushing too fast for what they want. Others feel they haven't pushed fast enough. How about you—do you think Negroes are trying to push too fast, are going too slowly, or moving at about the right speed? (Respondent says "about the right speed," or "too slowly.")

⁶ Religio-ethnic identification was measured by an item asking, "Which country did most of your ancestors come from?" Eastern European includes Poland, Hungary, Russia, Armenia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. British includes Great Britain, Scotland, and Wales.

TABLE 2
EMPLOYMENT SITUATION BY RELIGIO-ETHNIC IDENTIFICATION

	PROTESTANT						CATHOLIC							
	BLACK	British	Irish	German	Scandi- navian	Other	French	German	Irish	Eastern Euro- pean	Italian	Other	JEWISH	OTHER
Working class:														
Integrated industries:														
Low (secondary).....	32.6	14.9	29.5	15.0	22.9	20.1	9.1	12.7	14.9	16.7	15.6	22.0	6.9	15.2
Medium (secondary).....	12.7	8.6	11.5	14.1	2.9	13.4	4.5	18.2	12.9	18.7	17.0	14.6	3.7	11.2
High (mixed).....	5.2	6.3	2.6	5.6	2.9	3.9	.0	4.8	6.7	6.6	3.8	4.7	3.2	3.2
Segregated industries:														
Low (secondary).....	24.0	20.1	23.1	15.5	8.6	20.7	31.8	18.2	18.6	19.7	24.0	14.6	7.8	12.8
Medium (secondary).....	9.8	9.8	9.0	14.6	.0	10.1	4.5	13.3	9.3	11.6	12.8	11.8	4.6	9.6
High (mixed).....	3.6	6.3	5.1	6.6	5.7	6.7	9.1	4.2	8.2	5.1	6.3	4.3	6.4	4.0
Middle and professional classes:														
Low (mixed).....	5.2	10.3	9.0	8.5	11.4	8.9	.0	9.1	6.7	4.5	5.9	10.6	12.4	12.0
Medium (primary).....	2.9	9.2	6.4	10.8	17.1	6.7	22.7	12.7	12.4	8.6	8.3	6.3	18.8	16.0
High (primary).....	3.9	14.4	3.8	9.4	28.6	9.5	18.2	6.7	10.3	8.6	6.2	11.0	36.2	16.0
Total.....	2,276	174	78	213	35	179	22	165	194	198	288	254	218	125

groups, Eastern Europeans and Italians had the highest proportion of respondents in the working-class categories, nearly 80%. Among Protestants, the Irish had the highest proportion appearing in the working-class categories, over 80%. Jews had the highest proportion of respondents appearing in the middle- and professional-class categories, 67.4%. French and Irish Catholics, British, Scandinavians, and the residual "others" also had a comparatively higher number of respondents in the middle- and professional-class categories, 40.9%, 29.4%, 33.9%, 57.1%, and 44%, respectively.

On the basis of the data appearing in table 2, one would expect to find significant differences in the racial orientations of ethnic groups. More specifically, one would expect to find high levels of tolerance among Jews, French and Irish Catholics, British Protestants, Scandinavians, and the residual others. The lowest levels of racial tolerance should be found among Eastern Europeans, Italians, and Irish Protestants. Simply, racial intolerance is viewed as a response to potential economic competition. Groups not in direct competition with blacks should experience fewer incentives to adopt a racially intolerant posture.

Table 3 shows the analysis of racial orientations, according to religio-ethnic identification. Using the .01 level, the *F*-ratio indicates that differences between groups are probably not a result of sampling error. More important, differences between groups are generally in the direction predicted. Jews, Irish and French Catholics, British Protestants, Scandinavians, and the residual others consistently revealed the highest scores of racial

TABLE 3
ORIENTATION TOWARD INTERRACIAL CONTACT, CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION,
AND BLACK PROTEST BY RELIGIO-ETHNIC IDENTIFICATION

	Interracial Contact	Civil Rights Legislation	Black Protest
Protestant:			
British.....	(200) 1.98	(194) 2.47	(208) 2.24
Irish.....	(88) 1.56	(85) 2.51	(90) 1.72
German.....	(239) 1.82	(241) 2.48	(247) 1.95
Scandinavian.....	(38) 1.97	(35) 2.46	(38) 2.58
Other.....	(207) 1.84	(205) 2.39	(213) 1.88
Catholic:			
French.....	(23) 1.91	(25) 2.76	(26) 2.58
German.....	(184) 1.76	(184) 2.5	(189) 1.86
Irish.....	(242) 1.98	(237) 2.79	(248) 2.24
Eastern European.....	(225) 1.59	(231) 2.37	(236) 1.58
Italian.....	(329) 1.85	(232) 2.42	(342) 1.74
Other.....	(297) 1.85	(296) 2.53	(312) 1.99
Jewish.....	(168) 2.18	(246) 3.16	(257) 2.68
Other.....	(168) 2.14	(163) 2.51	(177) 2.31
	(\bar{X} = 1.87; F = 6.17; P < .01)	(\bar{X} = 2.58; F = 10.07; P < .01)	(\bar{X} = 2.06; F = 10.86; P < .01)

tolerance. Irish Protestants, Eastern Europeans, and Italians generally revealed the lowest scores.

The argument up to this point can be summarized briefly. According to the segmented labor market interpretation, Irish Protestants, Eastern Europeans, and Italians are more racially intolerant because they are partly concentrated in secondary labor markets within integrated industries, and in direct competition with blacks and other groups for jobs, pay, and advancement. On the other hand, groups exhibiting racial tolerance are farther removed from blacks financially, occupationally, and industrially. They may be employed within secondary labor markets but in segregated industries, or employed within primary labor markets.

Within the context of immigration history, the argument being developed appears reasonable. Italians and Eastern Europeans were generally part of the "second wave" of immigration from Europe (Dinnerstein and Reimers 1975; Handlin 1959) and are the more recent arrivals to northern cities. Additionally, while most Protestant groups in the sample were raised in northern cities, nearly 50% of Irish Protestants tended to be first-generation, southern migrants. And even though many Jews were part of the second wave of immigration, their business, commercial, and union activities largely developed in a specialized fashion, insulating many from widespread involvement in working-class jobs in manufacturing or heavy industry (Howe 1976; Rischin 1962). Consequently, Jewish immigrants have partially escaped direct competition with blacks for jobs in the secondary labor market, especially in the manufacturing sector.

If the segmented labor market interpretation of intergroup conflict is correct, however, racial prejudice and competition between groups should dissipate when the conditions which produce a segmented labor market are controlled or eliminated. Generally, the theory implies there should be nothing psychologically or historically peculiar about Eastern European, Italian, or Irish Protestant culture which compels members of these groups to exhibit racially intolerant attitudes. Likewise, there is nothing culturally relevant about the Jewish, Irish Catholic, or British Protestant experience that leads members of these groups to adopt a racially tolerant posture. Specifically, Jews, Irish Catholics, and British Protestants, at the levels of the working class, especially those employed in secondary labor markets within integrated industrial sectors, should be as racially intolerant as their Italian, Irish Protestant, and Eastern European counterparts. Likewise, highly paid Italian and Eastern European professional and sales workers should be as racially tolerant as their Irish Catholic, Jewish, and British Protestant counterparts who are employed in primary labor markets.

Analytically, then, one should expect to find that differences between ethnic groups within industrial and occupational categories are statistically insignificant. Table 4 shows the analysis of ethnic differences within the

TABLE 4

ORIENTATION TOWARD INTERRACIAL CONTACT, CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION, AND BLACK PROTEST BY RELIGIO-ETHNIC
IDENTIFICATION CONTROLLING FOR SOCIAL EMPLOYMENT SITUATION

	WORKING CLASS									
	Integrated Industries					Segregated Industries				
	Low (Secondary)	Medium (Secondary)	High (Mixed)	Low (Secondary)	Medium (Secondary)	High (Mixed)	Low (Mixed)	Medium (Primary)	High (Primary)	
Inter-racial Contact										
Protestant:										
British.....	(24) 1.9	(15) 1.9	(11) 1.7	(34) 1.9	(17) 1.2	(11) 1.8	(10) 1.7	(16) 1.8	(23) 2.0	
Irish.....	(22) 1.4	(9) 1.6	(2) 2.1	(18) 1.4	(7) 2.0	(4) 1.8	(7) 1.1	(5) 1.6	(3) 2.0	
German.....	(32) 1.5	(30) 1.9	(12) 1.9	(31) 1.7	(31) 2.0	(14) 1.5	(18) 1.9	(22) 2.0	(18) 1.8	
Other.....	(35) 1.4	(22) 2.0	(7) 1.4	(37) 1.6	(18) 1.9	(11) 2.1	(16) 2.3	(12) 2.3	(17) 2.2	
Catholic:										
German.....	(20) 1.75	(30) 1.7	(8) 1.9	(29) 1.5	(22) 1.4	(7) 2.1	(14) 1.6	(21) 1.9	(10) 2.4	
Irish.....	(28) 2.2	(25) 1.8	(12) 1.7	(36) 1.7	(18) 1.9	(16) 2.0	(12) 2.7	(24) 2.0	(20) 2.1	
Eastern European.....	(31) 1.7	(36) 1.6	(12) 1.5	(37) 1.5	(22) 1.2	(10) 1.6	(9) 1.9	(17) 1.7	(17) 1.4	
Italian.....	(43) 1.9	(48) 1.5	(9) 1.7	(18) 1.5	(36) 1.9	(17) 1.3	(16) 1.8	(23) 1.8	(18) 2.3	
Other.....	(20) 1.56	(36) 1.9	(12) 2.2	(34) 2.0	(28) 1.5	(10) 2.1	(26) 2.0	(16) 1.9	(28) 1.9	
Jewish.....	(14) 1.8	(8) 1.5	(7) 1.6	(17) 2.0	(10) 2.0	(14) 2.4	(25) 2.2	(39) 2.4	(78) 2.3	
Other.....	(18) 1.9	(14) 1.9	(4) 1.5	(15) 1.9	(12) 1.75	(5) 2.2	(15) 2.5	(17) 2.2	(20) 2.4	
	($\bar{X}=1.7$; $F=1.8$; $P>.01$)	($\bar{X}=1.7$; $F=.78$; $P>.01$)	($\bar{X}=1.7$; $F=.52$; $P>.01$)	($\bar{X}=1.7$; $F=1.4$; $P>.01$)	($\bar{X}=1.7$; $F=2.2$; $P>.01$)	($\bar{X}=1.9$; $F=1.3$; $P>.01$)	($\bar{X}=2.0$; $F=1.6$; $P>.01$)	($\bar{X}=2.0$; $F=1.1$; $P>.01$)	($\bar{X}=2.2$; $F=2.7$; $P<.01$)	
Civil Rights Legislation										
Protestant:										
British.....	(25) 2.3	(14) 2.0	(10) 2.2	(33) 2.4	(17) 2.2	(11) 2.4	(14) 2.8	(14) 2.8	(23) 2.7	
Irish.....	(22) 2.2	(9) 1.5	(2) 1.5	(17) 2.4	(7) 2.9	(4) 2.8	(6) 3.5	(5) 2.2	(3) 2.7	
German.....	(32) 2.5	(30) 2.3	(12) 2.3	(32) 2.6	(31) 2.5	(13) 2.5	(17) 2.4	(22) 2.7	(20) 2.6	
Other.....	(34) 2.0	(24) 2.3	(7) 2.0	(36) 2.3	(18) 2.3	(12) 2.7	(15) 3.1	(12) 2.7	(16) 3.1	

TABLE 4 (Continued)

	WORKING CLASS				MIDDLE AND PROFESSIONAL CLASSES				
	Integrated Industries		Segregated Industries		Integrated Industries		Segregated Industries		
	Low (Secondary)	Medium (Secondary)	High (Mixed)	Low (Secondary)	Medium (Secondary)	High (Mixed)	Low (Mixed)	Medium (Primary)	High (Primary)
Civil Rights Legislation (<i>Continued</i>)									
Catholic:									
German.....	(21) 2.5	(27) 2.8	(8) 2.1	(29) 2.3	(22) 2.3	(7) 3.3	(15) 2.5	(21) 2.2	(11) 2.6
Irish.....	(26) 2.9	(25) 2.8	(13) 2.5	(34) 2.6	(17) 2.9	(15) 2.5	(12) 2.8	(23) 3.0	(18) 3.2
Eastern European.....	(32) 2.3	(37) 2.2	(13) 2.4	(38) 2.2	(21) 2.7	(10) 2.2	(9) 2.2	(17) 2.6	(17) 2.4
Italian.....	(44) 2.5	(47) 2.3	(11) 2.4	(67) 2.4	(36) 2.5	(18) 2.3	(16) 2.0	(23) 2.5	(18) 3.0
Other.....	(55) 2.2	(36) 2.8	(11) 2.6	(34) 2.8	(28) 2.0	(11) 2.9	(25) 2.6	(13) 2.9	(27) 2.8
Jewish.....	(15) 3.0	(8) 2.5	(7) 3.6	(17) 2.9	(10) 3.0	(13) 3.4	(28) 3.0	(39) 3.3	(75) 3.2
Other.....	(14) 2.2	(12) 1.9	(4) 2.0	(16) 2.1	(11) 2.4	(4) 2.8	(15) 3.0	(20) 2.5	(19) 2.6
	(\bar{X} = 2.4; F = 1.4; P > .01)	(\bar{X} = 2.4; F = 1.5; P > .01)	(\bar{X} = 2.5; F = 1.2; P > .01)	(\bar{X} = 2.5; F = .96; P > .01)	(\bar{X} = 2.4; F = 1.2; P > .01)	(\bar{X} = 2.6; F = 1.3; P > .01)	(\bar{X} = 2.7; F = 1.4; P > .01)	(\bar{X} = 2.8; F = 1.6; P > .01)	(\bar{X} = 2.9; F = 1.3; P > .01)
Black Protest									
Protestant:									
British.....	(26) 2.0	(15) 1.6	(11) 1.6	(35) 1.8	(17) 1.8	(11) 2.3	(18) 2.3	(16) 2.5	(25) 2.9
Irish.....	(23) 1.0	(9) 1.9	(2) 1.0	(18) 1.7	(7) 1.9	(4) 1.5	(7) 2.3	(5) 2.8	(3) 2.3
German.....	(32) 1.7	(20) 2.2	(12) 2.9	(33) 1.5	(31) 1.5	(14) 2.1	(18) 2.3	(23) 2.4	(20) 2.2
Other.....	(36) 1.7	(24) 2.0	(7) 1.9	(37) 1.2	(18) 2.0	(12) 1.8	(16) 2.3	(12) 2.4	(17) 3.0
Catholic:									
German.....	(21) 1.8	(30) 2.1	(8) .8	(30) 1.3	(22) 1.6	(7) 1.7	(15) 1.7	(21) 2.0	(11) 3.1
Irish.....	(29) 2.4	(25) 2.1	(13) 2.5	(36) 1.8	(18) 1.9	(16) 2.6	(13) 2.4	(24) 2.5	(20) 2.5
Eastern European.....	(33) 1.2	(37) 1.3	(13) 1.7	(38) 1.2	(23) 2.2	(10) 1.6	(9) 1.8	(17) 1.9	(17) 2.1
Italian.....	(45) 1.6	(49) 1.8	(11) 2.4	(69) 1.7	(37) 1.5	(18) 1.7	(17) 1.5	(24) 1.9	(18) 2.3
Other.....	(55) 1.8	(37) 1.9	(12) 1.8	(37) 2.3	(30) 2.0	(11) 1.7	(27) 1.9	(16) 2.4	(28) 2.6
Jewish.....	(15) 2.1	(8) 2.1	(7) 3.0	(17) 2.2	(10) 2.2	(14) 2.1	(27) 2.6	(41) 2.8	(79) 3.0
Other.....	(19) 1.8	(14) 1.6	(4) 1.75	(16) 2.6	(12) 1.8	(5) 3.0	(15) 2.7	(20) 2.7	(20) 2.3
	(\bar{X} = 1.76; F = 1.1; P > .01)	(\bar{X} = 1.9; F = 1.1; P > .01)	(\bar{X} = 2.0; F = 2.0; P > .01)	(\bar{X} = 1.7; F = 3.2; P < .01)	(\bar{X} = 1.8; F = .7; P > .01)	(\bar{X} = 2.0; F = .96; P > .01)	(\bar{X} = 2.2; F = 1.0; P > .01)	(\bar{X} = 2.4; F = 1.8; P > .01)	(\bar{X} = 2.7; F = 1.5; P > .01)

appropriate analytical categories. The .01 level was used to reject the null hypothesis, which in this case must be confirmed in order to substantiate the segmented labor market interpretation. Although French and Scandinavian respondents had to be eliminated from the analysis because of an insufficient number of cases, the data generally confirm the interpretation being developed. Of the 27 specific analyses, the null hypothesis was accepted 25 times. This means that ethnic differences within industrial and occupational categories are probably due to sampling error.

Because of case losses, firm generalizations are difficult, and some degree of prudence should be exercised when interpreting the data. Nonetheless, the patterns revealed are generally in the directions predicted. In the analysis of the three dependent variables, the scores of the more tolerant groups generally decrease as the analysis moves from the highest levels of the middle and professional classes to the lowest levels of integrated industries within the working class, or more generally from the primary to the secondary labor market. Likewise, the scores of the least tolerant groups generally rise as labor market conditions are analytically controlled.

Despite the problems of case loss and the absence of more precise measures of employment situations which promote intergroup competition and conflict, the findings can be used to develop a logical case in support of the segmented labor market interpretation. Generally, occupational and industrial affiliation erases nearly all differences in racial orientations between ethnic groups. Consequently, it seems reasonable to suggest that differences between occupational and industrial categories are of greater theoretical significance than are differences between ethnic groups (table 5).

TABLE 5
ORIENTATION TOWARD INTERRACIAL CONTACT, CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION,
AND BLACK PROTEST BY SOCIAL CLASS POSITION

	Interracial Contact	Civil Rights Legislation	Black Protest
Working class:			
Integrated industries:			
Low (secondary) . .	(331) 1.7	(329) 2.36	(344) 1.74
Medium (secondary) . .	(275) 1.73	(271) 2.43	(280) 1.86
High (mixed)	(97) 1.74	(99) 2.41	(101) 2.06
Segregated industries:			
Low (secondary) . .	(365) 1.7	(362) 2.45	(377) 1.71
Medium (secondary) . .	(222) 1.7	(219) 2.44	(226) 1.80
High (mixed)	(122) 1.9	(122) 2.65	(126) 2.04
Middle and professional classes:			
Low (mixed)	(178) 2.0	(175) 2.67	(186) 2.16
Medium (primary)	(222) 2.05	(220) 2.75	(230) 2.44
High (primary)	(266) 2.2	(259) 2.88	(272) 2.67
	(\bar{X} = 1.8; F = 6.9; P < .01)	(\bar{X} = 2.6; F = 4.9 P < .01)	(\bar{X} = 2.0; F = 15.1; P < .01)

The data suggest that high scores of racial intolerance are strongly associated with a group's relationship to the economy, as well as with the larger sociohistorical factors connected with industrialization and time of immigration. *Ethnicity*, per se, does not appear to be an influential force shaping the racial orientations of white Americans. Scores between ethnic groups, within the working- and the middle- and professional-class categories, are neither large nor systematic. In this respect, the findings in this study partially corroborate recent observations by Yancey, Ericksen, and Juliani (1975, p. 399): ". . . much of the behavior commonly associated with ethnicity is largely a function of the structural situations in which groups have found themselves."

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Commentary and Debate

The comments printed in this section are limited to brief critiques of articles and reviews published in the *AJS*. These comments are expected to address specific errors or flaws. Comments on articles are not to exceed 1,500 words, those on reviews 750 words. Authors of articles and reviews are invited to reply to comments, subject to the same length limits. The *AJS* does not publish commenters' rebuttals to authors' replies. Longer or less narrowly focused comments on articles published in the *AJS* should be submitted themselves as articles.

THE VAGARIES OF THE VIGNETTE WORLD: A COMMENT ON ALVES AND ROSSI

As a means of assessing the normative regulation of social stratification, the technique of using "fairness judgments" of computer-contrived vignettes has much to recommend it; Alves and Rossi ("Who Should Get What? Fairness Judgments of the Distribution of Earnings," *AJS* 84 [November 1978]: 541-64) are to be commended. Possessed of a clever and provocative method, Rossi and his associates show signs of running hard; they will not get far, however, for they are running on feet of clay.

In view of difficulties encountered by social scientists in trying to account for variance in income—we typically account for 15%–20%—it is of the utmost importance that we try to determine whether normative regulation of income exists in this (or any) society generally, or whether it tends to be confined to special circumstances, for example, specific bureaucratic settings. The Alves and Rossi concept of normative judgment, however, is misinformed and cannot properly be used to test for the existence of normative regulation as conventionally understood. Respondents were asked to judge the fairness of incomes associated with clusters of background characteristics—education, occupation, and so forth—and presented to respondents by means of computer-generated vignettes. The vignette program, however, was deliberately designed to generate unrealistic results: dis-

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tributions of background characteristics were generally "rectangular" rather than bell shaped, and the correlations among the characteristics were generally close to zero. Inevitably, then, a substantial proportion of vignettes involved combinations of socioeconomic characteristics that do not appear in the real world, and respondents may have been sophisticated enough to recognize functional untenabilities and to classify such vignettes as "overpaid" or "underpaid" largely on the basis of size of income alone. Not surprisingly, gross earnings overshadowed all other variables as a factor influencing fairness judgments.

Conventional definitions of normative regulation recognize the important role of social deviance in providing conforming members of society with a point of reference. When Durkheim argued that crime is "normal," he had essentially two points in mind: first, that any society that attempted to eliminate crime would have to establish such a repressive system of social control that it would probably disintegrate; second, that conformity is maintained largely through the repeated ritual of sanctioning deviants. What Alves and Rossi must demonstrate is that there are existing, and therefore realistic, combinations of socioeconomic characteristics regarded as violating the alleged norms of "merit" and "need," that sanctions are indeed called forth by such instances, and so forth. Given the unreality of many Alves-Rossi vignettes, it is entirely possible that respondents did not vary their fairness judgments at all among those vignettes that correspond roughly with American reality. If this were the case it would tend to confirm my suspicion that, as far as income is concerned, America is Reno writ large. (I call it Reno, Durkheim calls it anomie—that is, *normlessness*—and Marx would probably call it a result of the immense surplus product of the final stages of capitalism.) Alves and Rossi would do well to abandon their vignette program and to have their computer select vignettes from, say, the NORC General Social Survey.

As an analogy, we could probably get Americans to come out for premarital chastity by having them make selections among vignettes in which the alternatives to chastity were buggery and bestiality.

Alves and Rossi argue that R^2 for the regression of fairness judgments on income and background characteristics is an indicator of degree of "consensus" around their alleged normative structure. Obtained values of R^2 hover around .50, ranging as high as .62 and as low as .40. Aside from the fact that these coefficients may reflect primarily the ability of respondents to distinguish between realistic and unrealistic vignettes, they tend to be spuriously high for several reasons: first, the arbitrarily low correlations among background traits artificially enhance the ability of each variable to account for variance; second, the vignettes were extraordinarily parsimonious despite the authors' finding that small increments in complexity—such as changing from single persons to married couples—would substantial-

ly reduce explained variance; third, each respondent judged 50 vignettes, and consistency among these judgments, while raising R^2 , may reflect merely a mental set toward consistency and not an application of subjectively held "norms"; fourth, the sample itself is suspect: a "national probability sample" cannot set "sex quotas within households" and remain a probability sample. (Because of this sampling limitation, the sex variable among "respondent characteristics" in tables 6 and 7 should probably not have been used at all.)

Another fundamental weakness of this article is its erroneous conception of merit and need theories. These theories are inherently relativistic and comparative, and in a multiple regression format they necessitate the use of interaction terms. Yet Alves and Rossi employ only a single interactive term—earnings-occupation interaction—which, though not clearly defined (p. 548), has little impact on the fairness judgments. I gather that, mathematically, this term is a product of its components, and in contriving such a term the authors make it clear that they have not thought adequately about the conceptualization of merit and need. Interaction terms involving products are appropriate for "complementarity" theories. For instance, if academicians are rewarded in part for their research productivity, in part for their teaching skill, and in part for maintaining a balance between these two roles (as a means of taking advantage of whatever complementarity may exist between them), a multiplicative interaction term might well account for much of the variance in, say, salaries. Some hypotheses—for example, those drawing a nexus between status crystallization and suicidal behavior or other forms of personal disorganization—seem to require an unsigned or absolute difference between pairs of status components. Finally, the status-discrepancy literature, which has dealt in part with distributive justice (with generally negative results), tends to operationalize "investment-reward" aspects of distributive justice by taking the signed difference between an investment (e.g., education) and a reward (e.g., occupational prestige) (see Geschwender 1967). Alves and Rossi need to invoke such terms if their research is to have anything to do with distributive-justice issues such as merit and need, being ever mindful of the fact that, since signed differences are linear transformations of their components, there are identification problems; these are not, however, insuperable (Hodge 1970; Hope 1975).

Given these limitations, it is not surprising that gross earnings per se turn out to be the major explanatory factor for variations in fairness judgments. The coefficients associated with education and occupational prestige, with income held constant, are not an adequate indicator of the impact of merit and need on fairness judgments. They merely tell us that fairness judgments tend to change ever so slightly across educational or occupational categories with income held constant, and we cannot tell

whether these changes are associated with education or occupational prestige per se or with the *discrepancy* between these two measures and income.

Finally, the authors have made no serious effort to operationalize need. Since "full-family households" consisted of married couples, and since 90% of all vignettes involved full-family households, only 10% of all vignettes—those for "one-person households"—treated marital status as a variable. Among the latter vignettes, a certain proportion were designated "previously married." For obvious reasons, this designation cannot be taken as a measure of need, or even as a rough indicator. Similarly for number of children: the needs of children vary tremendously by age, and in the case of one-person households headed by previously married persons, the vignettes apparently do not clarify the matter of custody. "Need" is a complex, multidimensional concept involving established expectations, family composition and structure, accumulated responsibilities, health, and so forth; it cannot be treated cavalierly.

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REJOINDER TO FAIA

Michael Faia's comments are difficult to understand completely; they stem mainly from either misreading our article or misunderstanding the rationale behind the approach used. Perhaps the most serious misunderstanding arises over the zero correlations built into the vignettes by design. Of course the "vignette world" does not mirror the "real world": it was designed that way in order to clarify the judgment principles employed. In the real world, the correlation, say, between occupation and income is certainly nonzero and perhaps as high as $+.5$, a fact that makes it difficult to separate the effects of income from those of occupation in any analysis of the joint distribution of income, occupation, and any third variable. Not so in the vignette world, where the estimates of income and educational effects are truly net, unaffected by the covariance between education and income.

It should also be pointed out that all of the vignette "anomalies" do

exist in the real world, as a glance at the occupation-income tabs of the U.S. census will reveal. There are businessmen whose earnings are below the poverty line just as there are garbage men who earn more than \$25,000 per year. In short, there is considerable variance in the earnings of persons in every occupational group: indeed that is what accounts for the fact that the correlation between income and education is not higher than $+.5$.

The issue in income fairness is whether characteristics can balance each other out, with a higher educational attainment, say, justifying more income than a higher occupational position. Hence, it is precisely the anomalies that reveal the principles of judgment. If everyone were completely constant in every respect, there would be no problem of fairness, each person or household receiving precisely one and only one income.

Faia is upset because the fairness ratings are heavily affected by the incomes attributed to the vignette families. We would certainly have been upset were it otherwise. The only way a person can be overpaid is to have more money than someone else of comparable characteristics, and the only way to be judged underpaid is to have less money. The finding that Faia considers so puzzling is simply a reflection of the fact that the respondents were perceptive enough to understand that simple idea.

Parenthetically, it would be easy, as Faia says, to have Americans come out for premarital chastity by offering as alternatives only bestiality or buggery. That is neither a faithful nor an accurate analogy to what the vignette technique did in the case of income-fairness ratings. A much more accurate analogy would have put the alternatives as the full range of sexual practices, just as our vignettes offered very full ranges of occupations, incomes, and educational levels.

There are other points in Faia's rejoinder that are simply puzzling. We cannot understand his reference to interaction terms, especially in the light of our footnote indicating that the terms used are only those that survived from a much larger list of potential candidates. His suggestion for adding absolute differences among characteristics as a variable does not make sense: because such differences are simply alternative statements of existing variables, that move would merely add redundancy and confound calculations. Nor does his suspicion of our sampling procedures reflect much credit on his understanding of survey sampling methods.

In short, there is less than meets the eye in Faia's comment. There is a lot more in our article which any perceptive and knowledgeable reader can find. We urge such persons to read it.

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MORE ON THE MYTH OF RURAL TRANQUILLITY

In the field of planning for the provision of community mental health services, one is continually faced with the seemingly endless demand for services and a finite amount of resources. Given this dilemma, the usual choice has been to serve the larger population areas first. The article appearing in the November issue of this *Journal* ("Rural-Urban Differences in the Use of Stress-Alleviative Drugs," by Stephen D. Webb and John Collette [83:700-707]) concerning the inverse relationship between community size and stress reduction behavior brought sharply into focus the rural-urban debate among planners of mental health services. We therefore decided to replicate Webb and Collette's study as part of a larger community-needs survey being conducted at that time.

Community Selection

Ten communities are being considered as possible sites for an out-patient community mental health center. The population of the communities ranges from 1,200 to 12,000 with catchment area populations of 4,000-23,000 persons.

Each community is a distinct self-contained unit and is not part of a larger urban sprawl. All of them are over 100 miles from any city of 100,000 or more and are at least 30 miles from any other community. These communities are the main commercial centers for the catchment areas.

Because of the isolation of the communities and their small population size, all of them could be considered rural. Our concern was the relationship between prescription rates for psychotherapeutic drugs and community size.

Data Acquisition and Treatment

The methodology of the Webb-Collette study was duplicated in that data were solicited from all pharmacies in the communities surveyed. The information requested was for the actual number of prescriptions for psychotropic drugs filled on a certain day. The design of the study required that pharmacists all use the same day in June 1978. The psychotropic medications were specified as antidepressants, such as trimipramine and amitriptyline, and antipsychotics, such as haloperidol and Chlorpromazine.

Webb and Collette mention the possible bias that is introduced because of the artificial boundaries of the administrative districts which were used

in their study. This problem was subsequently taken up by Charles Crothers ("On the Myth of Rural Tranquillity: Comment on Webb and Collette" [*AJS* 84 (May): 1441-45]); and Webb and Collette ("Rural-Urban Stress: New Data and New Conclusions" [*AJS* 84 (May): 1446-52]) agreed with him that community and hinterland combined is the proper level of analysis. We also agree, but for comparison purposes we used all three possible levels of analysis: rates for community population only, rates for hinterland population only, and rates for community and hinterland combined.

In determining the population grouping for the hinterlands, we used the school district boundaries and subtracted the community population from this population base. For this survey, the school district boundaries worked quite well since each district contains only one community, the sample community. This held for all but one district, which contained three small communities having a combined population of 4,000.

Results

Because of the small population size in the areas surveyed, the drug classifications were combined. All results refer to total drug prescriptions of antipsychotics and antidepressants.

Table 1 presents the findings by community only, by hinterland only, and by community and hinterland combined. The communities were grouped into the two categories of large and small on the basis of falling above or below the means for the total population.

Using the community-only population, as in the original Webb-Collette study, we found the inverse relationship between population and drug use to hold true ($r = -.33$).

The next data set, that of the hinterland population only, shows a dra-

TABLE 1
POINT PREVALENCE RATES OF PRESCRIPTIONS FILLED FOR ANTIDEPRESSANT
AND ANTIPSYCHOTIC DRUGS BY POPULATION SIZE OF LOCALITY

	Community	Hinterland	Community and Hinterland
Prevalence (\bar{X}):			
Larger.....	1.22	.89	.57
Smaller.....	1.80	.73	.42
ρ	-.33	.60	.52
f16	.06	.09
Population:			
\bar{X}	3,754	7,329	12,033
Range.....	1,420-10,530	2,670-11,810	4,090-22,340

matic and opposite effect with a direct relationship between population size and drug use ($r = .60$). If one were to use these data sets only, one could interpret the data as showing that the smaller the community, the more the stress, and that living outside a community is even more stressful. However, as mentioned earlier, the proper level of measurement is community and hinterland combined. This analysis reveals that the larger the total population, the higher the per capita rates of stress-relieving behavior ($r = .52$).

Discussion

The data from this survey show that the inverse relationship first discovered by Webb and Collette holds true for the community-only population ($r = -.33$) but that there is a direct relationship ($r = .52$) when total catchment-area population is used, as Crother's simulation predicted.

While our data agree with Crother's prediction, our conclusions are quite the opposite. As Crothers pointed out in his comment, the hinterland to community population ratios are reduced for the larger communities. This would have the effect of diluting the hinterland effect on the larger communities' prescription rates. In looking at our three correlations, we conclude that the smaller communities' higher rates of psychotherapeutic drug use are influenced by the much larger (up to five times as large in this sample) hinterland populations utilizing these pharmacies. Our conclusion is that the direct population to prescription-rate relationship found when utilizing total catchment populations is due to the influence of the hinterland population. In terms of the rural tranquillity argument, our finding that the larger the rural population in the area, the higher the prescription rates, causes us to conclude that the rural environment is more stress producing than a community environment is.

Neither this study nor the Webb and Collette study can be taken as a strict test of the stress-community-size proposition when utilizing pharmacy data. What is needed, we feel, is what Crothers suggests—an investigation of this relationship on an individual basis. That would enable the users to be identified by area of residence, thus solving the present problem with interpreting survey results.

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REVOLUTION AND INEQUALITY: REPLY TO ECKSTEIN

Susan Eckstein's comment (*AJS* 84 [November 1978]: 724–27) raises a number of interesting points in criticism of our article “Revolution and the Rebirth of Inequality: A Theory of Stratification in Postrevolutionary Society” (*AJS* 83 [July 1977]: 78–99). In it we argued that radical revolutions in predominantly peasant societies lead at first to a decline in inequality and status inheritance. But at the same time, revolution destroys traditional restrictions that have prevented peasants from fully utilizing their skills, education, land, and capital. Thereby, we argued, it looses forces which in the long run lead to the rebirth of inequality and the reemergence of status inheritance. Eckstein's three main criticisms involve, first, whether skilled and educated workers will in fact earn more than other workers, second, the role of government and international forces in shaping the consequences of revolution, and, third, the consequences of socialist as opposed to capitalist revolutions. We take up these points in turn.

Skills, Education, and Income

The fact that skilled and educated workers earn more is central to our theory, but Eckstein mistakenly argues that they earn more only in a neo-classical capitalist labor market. To be sure, we use the evocative term “human capital” and our theory does apply to neoclassical capitalist societies, but the argument is much more general, applying to *any* society, including socialist societies, in which people with education and skills are paid more than other workers, regardless of why the pay differential exists. Conventional human-capital theory gives one analysis of differentials in one type of economy, but differentials have existed in virtually every known society regardless of economic system—in, among others, Pharaonic Egypt, classical Greece, the Roman Empire, tribal Africa, medieval Europe, 13th-century Nepal, colonial Latin America, the Ottoman Empire, the USSR and other eastern European communist societies, communist China, Cuba, and throughout the contemporary third world. We, following many others, argue that differentials exist because skills are necessary for economic and administrative efficiency in any even moderately complex economy, socialist as well as capitalist, ancient as well as modern. Neither ancient kings nor modern nation-states can keep track of taxes without literate clerks; skilled technicians are needed to make iron cauldrons and airplanes, chain mail and atomic bombs; it takes skilled managers to provision a modern army, run a large farm, or direct a steel industry. Those with skills and technical training will have to be rewarded—whether in money or in housing, vacations, automobiles, or other perquisites—in order to motivate them

to acquire the training to apply their skills diligently. Their skills also give them a stronger bargaining position than unskilled workers and, even if all power is concentrated in the hands of a socialist state, the carrot is a more efficient form of control than the stick.

Revolution will, if anything, make education and skills more important. Increases in government control imply more clerks and administrators; improvements in education and health require more teachers and doctors; and economic development requires more engineers, technicians, and administrators. Virtually all revolutions want those, so they will not only have to tolerate an educated elite but will need a growing, increasingly skilled and educated one. And they will have to pay for it, thus increasing inequality and in the long run increasing status inheritance as the new elite passes on its human capital to its children.

Government Intervention

Revolutions have generally been studied from the top down with the focus on government policies and the national and international forces that shape them. Eckstein argues strongly for this traditional approach, suggesting that governments can effectively restrain the forces that produce inequality. While the focus on government has merit for many purposes, it is far from clear whether, and how, government policies affect the issues at hand, issues which turn on the education and work of ordinary people far removed from the pinnacles of power. Since these are issues that cannot fruitfully be discussed in the abstract, we will follow Epstein's focus on national policies that seem to restrict the play of market forces in the countryside following a capitalist revolution, particularly her discussion of the well-documented Bolivian revolution. Her analysis assumes that international forces can easily mold national governments, which is problematic. More fundamentally and more problematically, she assumes that revolutionary leaders can impose their policies on their societies, while in fact there is a wide gap between what leaders want and what actually happens.

Even in the best of times bureaucracies are often inefficient and self-serving; disrupted by revolution, with conflicting loyalties, new personnel, and an uncertain future, the years following a revolution are hardly the best of times. It is difficult for even the most efficient bureaucracies to deal with the small farms and businesses that dominate economies like Bolivia's because transactions are carried out largely in cash, by private parties, and at varied times and places; even the relatively efficient bureaucracies of western Europe and the United States are less than wholly successful at that. In Bolivia the revolutionary MNR government did not have the administrative ability to do many things its leaders might have liked to do, for example, collect income taxes. Nor were the MNR leaders strong

enough to overcome all political opposition. In geographically remote areas the prerevolutionary elite was often able to keep much of its power and, more crucially, the MNR could not even control the central areas of the country in the face of the armed militancy of miners, workers, and peasant syndicates. For years these groups were militarily stronger than the central government and conducted their affairs in blissful disregard of its wishes. The MNR's writ long ended at the city limits of La Paz and did not always run freely even within those narrow boundaries. Despite the government's occasional attempts to restrict market forces in the countryside, empirical research has consistently found that the revolution led to a dramatic increase in the penetration of market forces, with peasants acting like stereotypical neoclassical small capitalists maximizing their own returns, accumulating wealth, responding swiftly to economic forces, and eschewing particularistic ties in favor of universalistic market relations (Wennergren and Whitaker 1975; Slater et al. 1969). Had the MNR seriously attempted to limit peasants' private accumulation and inheritance of capital, they would have had no success and, had their efforts shown any signs of success, they would have been overthrown within days. Nor are these difficulties unique to Bolivia; for reasons set out in the original paper (pp. 86-87) it is extraordinarily difficult for a government to undermine the role of capital in a peasant society with a multitude of small property owners and impossible for it to undermine the even more crucial role of human capital.

Some Evidence

The ultimate test of a theory is not to be found in argument but in empirical evidence, and we have tested our theory with data on the Bolivian revolution and, in much less detail, with data on Poland's Communist revolution (Kelley and Klein 1977). With these data we are able to test our predictions that in the short run a radical revolution leads to less status inheritance for those coming of age just afterward but that in the long run revolution creates forces which cause status inheritance to increase once more (hypotheses 1 and 7). With status inheritance measured conventionally by the correlation between father's and son's occupational status, the results are as shown in figure 1. The predicted patterns are clear in both Bolivia and Poland, and further analysis strongly supports these first impressions.

Socialist Revolutions

Eckstein claims that our theory cannot deal systematically with socialist revolutions, although we argued that it does (pp. 86-87, 97). In this she is




FIG. 1.—Correlation between father's occupational status and the status of son's first job in Bolivia and in Poland at different time periods.

wrong, but the matter is of sufficient importance to warrant consideration in some detail. Let us begin with inequality in wealth. If a socialist government is able entirely to eliminate inherited wealth, inequality in wealth will depend entirely on the wealth accumulated over a single lifetime and will be a simple function of the third term in our equation (6) (p. 94) since the first term drops out and the second is the same for everyone:

$$\frac{(1 + \text{save} \cdot \text{int})^n - 1}{\text{int}} \text{hours} \cdot \text{pay}_s \cdot (\text{HUMANCAP} + \text{OTHER}).$$

So in our model there will be variance in wealth, that is, inequality, so long as workers with skills and education are paid more than other workers, and inequality will be greater when savings are larger, interest rates higher, people work longer hours, or skills are more highly rewarded. These things being equal, inequality will be less in socialist societies than in capitalist ones only because the contribution of inherited wealth (the first term of eq. [6]) is less. How much of a difference this makes is an empirical question, but the fragmentary evidence available from capitalist societies suggests that inherited wealth is of little consequence in practice, so the difference may not be very large.

Inequality of income depends in the same way on wealth accumulated over the course of a single lifetime and on the returns to human capital, hours • pay_s (HUMANCAP + OTHER) (see eq. [7]). These will not be zero even in a socialist society, so income inequality will still exist and will be greater if skill differentials are larger. Otherwise, inequality in a socialist society will be smaller than in a capitalist society only because of the absence of interest from inherited wealth, and that is probably only a small part of the total income inequality.

As for status inheritance, even if wealth cannot be handed on directly from one generation to the next, fathers with higher income or greater wealth in socialist societies are likely to be able to help their children acquire human capital, if only because they can more easily afford to forgo the income the children would contribute to the household by quitting school and going to work. And in a society where children generally live at home until they marry or even longer (as in the USSR and many socialist societies), this may be an important consideration. But even if a socialist society is able to undermine these and other indirect advantages of wealth, governments cannot effectively prevent human capital from being passed from one generation to the next except at ruinous cost, as is clear from the now extensive evidence from eastern Europe (e.g., Anderson 1975). Even in the total absence of direct and indirect effects of wealth and income, status inheritance in our model will be (from eq. [3]) $r_{fs,ss} = r_{fs,h}/(\sigma_f h/\sigma_{ss}) h_{fh}h$, and all these terms are positive. Other things being equal, our model predicts less status inheritance following a socialist revolution than following a capitalist revolution, how much less depending on the size of the other terms in equation 3, all of which have to do with income and wealth. But the difference between socialist and capitalist societies may not be large, since cross-cultural studies of status inheritance suggest consistently that human capital, not physical capital, is the crucial factor.

A socialist revolution will thus be somewhat different from a capitalist one. Wealth will play a smaller role, but human capital remains and has the same consequences as in capitalist societies. In our model, some terms drop out of the crucial equations but others remain and are quite sufficient to establish our conclusions. Inequality will be somewhat less than after a capitalist revolution, but inequality there will be, and status inheritance; even socialist revolutions lead to the rebirth of inequality.

Conclusion

In all, we think Eckstein's arguments are mistaken. We do not postulate capitalism as a necessary condition for our theory; rather, our basic argument applies to any efficient economy. With a powerful and effective social-

ist government, by no means the norm after revolutions in peasant societies, the rebirth of inequality will be slower in ways we have described. But it is equally inevitable, unless a society is willing to completely eliminate pay differentials based on education and skill and also willing to destroy the intimate contacts within the family that lead to the transmission of human capital from one generation to the next. With the possible exception of China during the Cultural Revolution, no society has been willing to bear the great costs involved, and even militant socialist revolutions have led to the rebirth of inequality.

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Book Reviews

The Declining Significance of Race: Blacks and Changing American Institutions. By William Julius Wilson. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978. Pp xii+204. \$12.50.

Wilson Record

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This review appears after a plethora of other appraisals of William Wilson's original and provocative examination of the changing social stratification of contemporary black Americans. Drawing on data from history, economics, and sociology, in *The Declining Significance of Race* Wilson boldly challenges much of the received wisdom concerning the origins, growth, character, and implications of class distinctions within a group that numbers at least 25,000,000 and constitutes more than 10% of the total population.

As the title suggests and as Wilson persuasively argues, race is no longer the major determinant of the status and fate of blacks in a society that has undergone very rapid changes: economic, social and political. Race has been superseded by class, although the former remains important for both blacks and whites and for those institutions based on differences between the two. Intraracial class distinctions, which have become sharper during the past few decades, tend to polarize blacks, with a rapidly growing and increasingly secure middle class at one pole and an expanding and progressively alienated underclass at the other.

Such a division has significant implications which many concerned people, scholars and laymen, black and white, are reluctant to face. It undermines the promises of racial solidarity; it militates against the development by racial movements of a high degree of consensus on specific goals and the means for their attainment; it casts doubt on the warrant and ability of black leaders to speak to or for blacks as a group. Finally, it prompts blacks to develop perceptions of themselves as members of different socioeconomic classes, with noncomplementary, if not conflicting, interests rather than as members of an oppressed minority with a shared past and a common future. No doubt it is these and related implications of Wilson's well-documented and closely reasoned inquiry that have precipitated controversies unparalleled by those concerning any other recent studies of blacks and black-white relations.

By no means is the debate, frequently heated and rarely calm, limited to sociologists and other professional social scientists. Journalists, ministers, racial activists, administrators, novelists, poets, and social critics—all of whom are likely to live at middle-class levels—have frequently hur-

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ried to condemn or to applaud a work that deserves to be considered seriously on its own merits. Ironically, one is struck by the fact that while the author was receiving the prestigious Spivak Award from the American Sociological Association, he was also being officially denounced at a poorly attended meeting of the Association of Black Sociologists.

Several symposia on *The Declining Significance of Race* have been conducted at professional social science meetings, and essay-reviews have been scheduled by a major sociological journal. Wilson's defense has been firm, and he has refused to respond in kind to the frequently shrill, and just as frequently irrelevant, charges of his critics. His more thoughtful peers have come to realize that the work is both theoretically and empirically sophisticated and that persuasive challenges to it must rest on research of commensurate scope and quality. At this point it can be said that no subsequent inquiry into social stratification among blacks in this country can dismiss or regard lightly this seminal volume. Those who trumpet the hollowness of "the myth of black progress," as indeed does the head of a major black betterment organization, would do well actually to read and ponder Wilson's bold thesis and his supporting evidence. The continuing failure to do so, as William Raspberry has pointed out, can lead to actions as harmful to blacks as they are to accurate perceptions of greatly changed patterns of both interracial and intraracial relations in American society.

This is not the place to attempt to gauge the motives of those scholars and activists who continue to insist that three decades of major changes in American race relations have left blacks only slightly better off or even worse off than before. However, the first step in such an assessment should be an exploration of the gap between their own middle-class status and that of the black underclass with which they want to feel some meaningful identity and with whose welfare they think they ought to be concerned. Just possibly, "making it" in spite of—now perhaps because of—race is for them a source of both elation and guilt, producing ambiguities that are not readily resolved, especially not by denial.

What is Wilson saying that provokes responses of such wide range and great intensity? Specifically, what is his central theme and with what theory, facts, and reasoning is it supported? Contrary to his critics, he holds that race relations in this country have undergone profound changes during the past quarter century, "so much so that now the life chances of individual blacks have more to do with their economic class position than with their day-to-day encounters with whites" (p. 1). Prior changes were not inconsequential but recent ones have had a nearly revolutionary impact. Neither superficial nor temporary, they have far-reaching implications, not only for blacks but also for whites; the two groups are inextricably linked.

The present "modern industrial" era of black-white relations, Wilson holds, contrasts sharply and in major respects with its predecessor, the "industrial" one, which began in the postreconstruction period and came to a close with the ending of the New Deal and the beginning of World

War II. In turn, the industrial era was significantly different from the long period of slavery in which most blacks were bondsmen and few, North or South, had even minimal rights as citizens.

During any one era, the author continues, the dominant forms of race relations were shaped largely by the character of the economy. Also, the internal differences among blacks—the social, psychological, and material distinctions—hinged on the type of economy and their places within it. The plantation economy, controlled by a very small elite of white owners, provided few opportunities for one slave to rise very far above fellow blacks. Some slaves, of course, fared better than others, given the divisions of labor and the paternalistic attitudes of the masters. Free blacks, in and outside the South, generally lacked the numbers, rights, and resources for developing a well-stratified subsociety.

With the industrial system of production, Wilson contends, came the base for changes in relations of blacks and whites and for the development of a black middle class. This class tended to be small and the positions of its members constrained and tenuous. It was composed of small businessmen, doctors, dentists, lawyers, skilled workers, ministers, teachers, and those holding steady jobs, particularly in federal government units. However, this middle class lacked power, even within the black communities. Furthermore, Wilson emphasizes, its members were regarded with contempt by most members of white society.

With the emergence of the modern industrial economy, however, significant changes, political as well as economic, generated rapid upward social mobility for some segments of the black minority, greatly expanding the black middle class. The latter benefited most from the large increase in job opportunities in the government and corporate structures. The black middle class continues to grow and its members become more secure, widening their participation in the economic, political, social, and cultural arenas.

In contrast, the black underclass sinks lower and lower on any gauge that one chooses to apply. Resolution of its basic problems cannot be achieved through conventional means. In the absence of major structural changes, particularly in the economy, the black underclass will become increasingly dependent and despondent, unconsolated by the presence of many whites who are similarly situated. Its members will survive through minimal welfare grants or by illegal hustles carried on largely within the black community.

Wilson, let it be emphasized, is not an economic determinist. He clearly recognizes the crucial role of politics, perceiving the economic gains of blacks as a result in large measure of the mass protest and more conventional political movements of the past three decades. Nor is he insensitive to the social and psychological levies imposed by this society on blacks, regardless of their socioeconomic status. Even those who have "made it" in a society in which racism is deeply embedded are bound to be wounded. However, he emphasizes that prejudice is less harmful to and more readily

dealt with by those blacks whose political and economic power has grown substantially. And he reminds his black critics that their middle-class lifestyles are qualitatively different from and better than those of their fellow blacks on the lower rungs of the status ladder, that their blackness is not an unbreakable bond that invariably binds them closely to all other blacks.

The foregoing interpretation of Wilson's study does not convey fully its richness, complexity, and scholarly craftsmanship. Nor does it give sufficient weight to the qualifications and refinements which attend his generalizations and underscore his awareness that few aspects of the subject are simple. In addition, it falls short in reporting his analysis of previous works on racial stratification. He draws on them, of course, but he is clearly aware of their limitations and datedness. For example, he rejects Frazier's portrayal of the social life of the black middle class as empty ritualism and an aping of the white middle class.

Wilson's study has a number of significant consequences. It suggests, for example, that at last patterns of black mobility are coming to resemble those of other groups who have started on the lower rungs of the status ladder and moved upward in response to economic and political opportunities. It highlights social and occupational gains of a large number of blacks whose progress frequently has been obscured by the overconspicuous failure of the underclass. It reminds us that black educational gains do, in fact, pay off, not only in the economic sphere but also in the political, social, and cultural ones. It underscores the emergence of a large black group that can sustain itself and socialize its young to participate fully in a modern economy, society, and polity. Middle-class blacks have arrived.

On the other hand, Wilson's work underscores the increasingly problematic status of the black underclass. The failure of many public programs to draw members of this group toward the mainstream is testimony, not only to the questionable content of the programs, but also to the extreme complexity and enormity of the problem itself. Wilson perceives clearly that, in the absence of significant structural changes, particularly in the economy, the black underclass can make at best only marginal gains. It tends to be self-perpetuating, and there are no major points at which the vicious circle in which its members are caught up can be broken. The public policy implications of this distressing fact are enormous.

In sum, Wilson has written a profound and provocative book that is destined to become a classic in the field. He has articulated the issues with which future researchers will have to deal. Truly, he has made a contribution to social science.

The controversy which *The Declining Significance of Race* has precipitated will produce in the end, one hopes, more light than heat. If it does, our debt to the author will be all the greater.

Class and Conformity: A Study in Values. 2d ed., with a reassessment, 1977. By Melvin L. Kohn. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977. Pp. lx+316. \$6.45 (paper).

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As first published in 1969, *Class and Conformity* quickly became a classic. Carefully assimilating a mountain of prior research on the relationship of social class position to values and socialization practices, Kohn and his associates designed and executed three major empirical investigations. The thoughtful translation of these findings and related evidence from other research into an integrating theoretical formulation made the volume a landmark rather than merely another report of research on a popular set of questions. The thesis is that the extent of self-direction on the job determines the value placed on self-direction for the worker's children, which in turn is the most critical and pervasive dimension distinguishing children raised in different socioeconomic classes.

The investigation began with the question, What is it about social class that makes it so important for so much of human behavior? Social class was chosen for study over other aspects of social structure because of its comprehensiveness. "Members of different social classes, by virtue of enjoying (or suffering) different conditions of life, come to see the world differently—to develop different concepts of the desirable" (p. 7). In both the United States and Italy, parental values expressed as desirable and undesirable behavior in children are related to socioeconomic status in linear fashion. Men in higher status occupations value self-direction not only in their children but also in themselves. The conditions under which parents resort to punishing their children are consistent with this value difference. Belief in self-direction is integrally related to a sort of self-confidence quite reminiscent of Selig Perlman's early analysis of laboring-class psychology (strangely missing from the bibliography).

In reissuing the monograph Kohn has added a valuable 36-page reassessment, drawing on subsequent research and thought of his own and others bearing on the earlier issues and conclusions. Although the author is even more confident of his central theses than before, the reassessment examines with admirable candor several possible revisions and extensions in the theory. I shall mention just a few of these.

Kohn is less certain now that education and occupation have independent and additive effects on values and orientation. Evidence on whether parental values have changed in recent years is judged indecisive, though the magnitude of the correlation between social class and parental valuation of self-direction is as strong as ever. An improved index of adult values for self, correlating more highly with class than the earlier index, increases support for the argument that derivations from the work situation are generalized to a comprehensive set of personal values. Subsequent

research has helped to reinterpret authoritarianism as part of the complex of intellectual flexibility, breadth of perspective, and self-directed values and orientation. Although there is still insufficient evidence on the linkage between values and behavior, Kohn is persuaded that parental emphasis on self-direction or conformity to external authority is a more satisfactory explanation for such relationships than is the need for achievement. Minor reconceptualizations of the components of occupational self-direction have been made, and some new comparative research raises the question whether occupational self-direction is as important for explaining relationships between social class and values in partially industrialized as in fully industrialized societies. Further research has made small gains in demonstrating direction of causality and in clarifying the role of education in the class socialization process. New evidence shows that bureaucratic employment may incorporate more opportunity for self-direction than alternative arrangements at the same class levels, and that variables of ownership-employeeeship and employment in profit-making versus non-profitmaking establishments have less significance for worker alienation than does self-direction in the work role.

The original work was a masterpiece, and the reassessment is a worthy extension. Although I find it difficult to refute any of the carefully documented conclusions and interpretations, I should like to mention just a few of the unresolved issues that leave me with lingering reservations about the integrating theory.

The first concern has to do with the conception of stratification that dominates most American work and is used by Kohn. There often seems to be an academic bias that weighs education too heavily as the critical component differentiating levels in occupational stratification, consistently placing professionals above the more wealthy and powerful leaders of industry, and many lowly clerks above the better-paid and more respected representatives of skilled manual labor. Of course, North-Hatt types of popular evaluation agree with the academics, but both are evaluating symbolic hierarchies rather than effective power and independence hierarchies. The symbolic hierarchy that always ranks the public official above the machine boss who gives him his orders also provides the language with which we talk about occupations. This would not matter, since the symbolic hierarchy rather than the power-wealth hierarchy correlates best with values, except for Kohn's thesis that the values ultimately reflect differences in life conditions. Degree of self-determination, job complexity, and so forth, are difficult to determine objectively, and evaluation can be affected by the fact that education enhances ability to describe a job in these terms. That the more objective dimension of income has no independent effect while job-related discretion is critical leaves me worried that Kohn may have discovered the inner logic of the symbolic hierarchy rather than conditions of life, except for his emphasis on complex symbolization skills.

Another concern comes from my conviction that some kinds of theorization require very high coefficients of determination. Although Kohn's

coefficients are good by the usual sociological standards, the idea of comprehensive life conditions leading to fundamentally different frames of reference is difficult to sustain in the absence of very large coefficients. Kohn's evidence indicates great heterogeneity at each class level, so the normal adult and child must be exposed to a wide range of orientations among his peers.

I am disappointed that Kohn has chosen to ignore the predominantly middle-class youth protest of the late sixties, when the young cried out against the "plastic" lives of their parents and the lack of independence they saw in the way of life laid out for them. Was this whole revolt merely a figment of misperception? Or was it indeed the revolt of those perceptive enough to see the tragic discrepancies between verbal symbolism and reality?

And I remain puzzled over how the adult male's occupational role can decisively shape the child's socialization when we all know that most of our children are socialized chiefly by their mothers, whose worlds are quite different. Even an assumption of selectiveness for value compatibility in marriage won't do, since most marriages occur before the husband has been long in his occupation. Is it a vestige from an earlier era that makes it possible to construct a theory crucially dependent on such an unexplained and unexplored leap?

Man in Marxist Theory and the Psychology of Personality. By Lucien Sève. Translated by John McGreal. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1978. Pp. 508. \$31.00.

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Hope for a plausible "Marx-Freud synthesis" was engendered in social science long ago through Reich's work, then transformed and enlarged somewhat later by Marcuse. During the past decade a profusion of works claiming to make the requisite leap—from structural analysis of Marxian political economy to the processual, interactional plane of Freudian depth psychology—have surfaced in France, Germany, and Italy, but original work in English remains scarce. Bruce Brown and Phil Brown each published brief prolegomena to the entire problem early in this decade, and a translation of Michael Schneider's *Neurose und Klassenkampf* significantly enriched the discussion when it appeared several years ago, though it is cast in terms quite compatible with the Marcusean stream. A truly innovative departure from the Frankfurt perspective, showing how "radical" psychological theory might enhance equally radical political economics and political sociology, has not appeared in the United States. Yet this is not for lack of would-be synthesists. A major theoretical and practical complaint heard frequently among the New Left, of course (Bruce Brown

could be taken as an exemplar), was the dire need for a Marxian social psychology, an antitraditional analytical link between "character and social structure." Although Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse, and even Habermas, have doctrinally sidestepped or transformed the problem, the demand that Marxism address itself less perfunctorily to interpersonal dynamics, to the "self"—thereby refuting pedestrian "bourgeois psychology," as it is known to the Left—has persisted. Thus it is most timely that Lucien Sève's lifework, a proposed Marxist theory of personality, should be translated into English, the sixteenth language in which the book has found an audience.

A check of handbooks and surveys of European Marxism and social theory commonly used nowadays in this country reveals that Sève is all but unknown, especially among those most readily identifiable as potential theoretical allies. In 1960 and 1962 he published two works in English, but neither hints at the scope of his magnum opus, *Marxisme et théorie de la personnalité* (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1969). Over the years he has engaged in polemical exchange with Althusser (as yet untranslated) but, except for incidental mention in the latter's translated essays, has hardly dented Anglo-American Marxology. That he would appear ideologically suspect to some Americans seems possible, since for many years he has served on the Central Committee of the French Communist Party, and he currently directs the party's publishing house. He is identified in a recent book by Althusser as "in some ways the Party's senior philosopher." All of this notwithstanding, this translation will probably guarantee him a new readership, for his book is important by any standard, leftist or otherwise.

Man in Marxist Theory and the Psychology of Personality was translated from the third edition (1974), nearly 100 pages longer than the first, with most of the additional length devoted to polemics. The work opens with a stunning critique of the "embryonic [incomplete] science: the psychology of personality." Although most of the thinkers discussed (except Piaget) are more a part of Sève's intellectual sphere than ours, he manages to write of theorists (e.g., Georges Politzer) in a way that at once signals their theoretical importance and roughly meshes with problematics in social psychological theory here. In place, then, of Mead, Skinner, et al., one learns of Janet, Granger, Cvekl, Sartre, Foucault, Canguilhem, and others as major voices in delineating a theory of personality. Sève does nod toward the United States, for instance, in accusing Kurt Lewin of having employed a nondialectical (Galilean) epistemology. Here he sports the handiness of his own dialectical method; by contrasting the static understanding of personality prevalent, so he believes, wherever Marxism is ignored by social psychologists, he adroitly smashes "bourgeois" pretensions of understanding the subject and advances claims for his own position.

One would hope that in the second chapter his version of truth would rapidly materialize. But true to European discourse, Sève feels compelled to comment at length on the classical texts, those from which he believes a fruitful theory of personality must arise. The reader then encounters

a masterful, difficult, and scarcely flawed "orthodox" interpretation of protopsychological theory within Marx's early works, the *Grundrisse*, and in *Capital*. Sève's commentary on the unabridged edition of the *German Ideology* is especially welcome because, unlike *Capital*, it was somehow overlooked during the recent burst of Marxist hermeneutics, especially as regards its submerged Marxist psychology. Nevertheless, 176 pages into the book, and in spite of his excellent commentary, Sève's own analytical prescription remains veiled. The unveiling occupies the third chapter (pp. 175-294), and "hypotheses for a scientific theory of personality" receive their due in the next (pp. 295-388). The "death and transfiguration of anthropology [sic]" concludes the main body of the book (pp. 389-418).

It is quite hopeless within this space to assess the "validity" or applicability of Sève's theory, for its scope and complexity—not to speak of its epistemology—defeat such a task. If one bears with the rhetoric of "scientific historical materialism," and the attendant apotheosis of Marx, one can learn from Sève's book an enormous amount: about French intellectualism at the highest level, about the strengths and possibilities of the elusive Marx-Freud conjuncture, about theoretical and empirical weakness in our own social psychology as perceived by an astute ideological *and* scientific adversary, and about the confidence intelligent Europeans still enjoy when using the Marxist mode. This issue itself—why excellent minds turn to Marx, and not to William James, Cooley, Mead, or Allport in these matters—cannot be dispensed with via blunt rhetoric about "true believers." Something else is happening here, and we probably don't know what it is. What we must acknowledge, however, is the existence of this important work. American social psychology will be stronger for having wrestled with it.

The Privatised World. By Arthur Brittan. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977. Pp. 184. \$12.00 (cloth); \$5.95 (paper).

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To think of "mass" is to think of substance without structure; to think of "mass society" is to think of structure without substance. In the popular conception of mass society, "civic spirit is poor, local loyalties are few, primordial solidarity is virtually non-existent. There is no individuality, only a restless and frustrated egoism" (Edward Shils, *Center and Periphery* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975], p. 92). This conception, which Shils tries to refute, roughly conforms to the one to which Arthur Brittan commits himself in *The Privatised World*. This melancholy vision of the world supplies the context for Brittan's three objectives: (1) to refine our conception of the structure of mass society, (2) to describe the peculiarities of social psychological theories which develop in this setting,

and (3) to suggest a way of eliminating the bondage of theory to setting, with a view to ultimately emancipating man himself. These aims are foreshadowed in the conclusion of Brittan's earlier work, *Situations and Meanings*. The interactional theories discussed in that book are now fully transformed into instruments of social criticism.

The present argument goes like this. Capitalist society, with its refined division of labor, inevitably leads to routines of everyday life which are fragmented into multiple realities or "pluralized life worlds." (Why this should be characteristic of capitalist and not socialist industrialism Brittan fails to say.) The consequence of this social fragmentation is a partitioning of consciousness into public and private domains. What is involved here is not a new relationship between public and private life but their dissociation. *Homo duplex*, whose inner being reciprocates an external institutional order, is replaced by *homo multiplex*, whose inwardness relates to no coherent communal purpose. In *homo multiplex* we find diffuse and superficial interests instead of the concentrated and profound attachments of his forebears.

The breakdown of the medieval synthesis of polity, economy, and society has led not to a process of social disintegration but to the ordered fragmentation of capitalism. Correspondingly, the psychological transformation is not toward a state of "meaninglessness"; instead, the repository of meaning has shifted and its sources have narrowed. Meaning and identity are cultivated in the private rather than the public sphere. The individual replaces the community as the source and custodian of meaning.

Embodied in this process is a new role for the family. In preindustrial societies, the family was an essentially public institution; it was the agency by which the community colonized the mind. With capitalism, the family becomes an underground commune. However, there is no longer a corporate will with which to contend; there is only a locked door. "The family in itself" says Brittan, "cannot do what the old traditional community did, that is, it cannot act as a complete repository of identity—all it can do is to provide a refuge from the nastiness of everyday life" (p. 58). Providing a bounded zone for the private, then, the family incarnates a structural guarantee of the individual's detachment from the community. It becomes the precinct wherein a quest for meaning is tied into an unharnessed celebration of inwardness. As Brittan puts it, the family is the breeding ground for subjectivity, not identity.

The gears shift as Brittan makes note of two intellectual trends which flourish in this context. The first is a "flight from consciousness," embodied in macrotheories of postindustrial society and structuralist theories of the preindustrial order. The second trend is a "flight to consciousness," instanced in phenomenology, dramaturgy, and the sociology of everyday life. At issue is whether this second trend, this renewed concern for the situational context of meaning and selfhood, is anything more than a second thought: a way of checking the house one last time before abandoning it. Brittan does not believe this to be so. "The rumor of a presence behind the mask" (p. 117), he says, is true. That presence must be recog-

nized as a crucial part of social theory. The self has become an object of urgent inquiry precisely because of its apparent irrelevance in the face of burgeoning and increasingly overwhelming institutional structures.

The same conditions which bring about the fragmentation of public and private life and produce a subjectivity alienated from society also give rise to theories of consciousness which make less and less contact with structural and historical forces. Fragmentation of the world is reflected in the shortsightedness of the theories which describe it. For example, in contemporary images of the self, "the trivia of existence are given portentous significance. . . . Every encounter turns into an opportunity for weaving meaning out of confusion" (p. 37). At the same time, this meaning is always in flux, for there can be no definite core to a personality anchored only in an unstable sequence of fleeting situations. Thus the dominant approaches to social psychology supply us with a view of "meaning without structure." This is to be contrasted with macroscopic theories, which provide us with an equally moribund "structure without meaning."

On the other hand, these partial theories cannot be dismissed, for they are accurate "reflections" of a partial social reality. In other words, the segregation of society and consciousness at the *theoretical* level is no more than an expression of *social* incompleteness. Such a parallel is maintained by the institutional framework in which theorists do their work. From the academy, says Brittan, the world is rarely seen firsthand; most of the time it is refracted through the lens of textual discourse. The interpretation of society develops from a dialogue with books rather than a confrontation with the reality itself. The book becomes an ideal medium for the privatization of the intellect. Cutting off social thought from the world of men, the text comes into view as a permanent substitute for experience. Brittan maintains that we can break through this impasse only by the cultivation of "concrete humanism," a method which seeks to capture the meaning of everyday life by unpacking it from its historical as well as its situational casing.

As noted, Brittan's argument rests on certain assumptions about mass society. I am convinced that these assumptions are wrong. I would argue that the source of current interest in social structure is not the alienating fragmentation of our society but its unprecedented capacity to attract the individual to its central values and institutions. I would also suggest that the intensified concern with the individual is not a response to his degrading privatization but a celebration of his newfound dignity and privacy. On the other hand, if Brittan's convictions are too pessimistic and cranky, my own may be too optimistic, too naive in their appreciation of the benefits of the post-Enlightenment. A book review is not a place to argue the point; it is a place to recognize it. For this purpose, *The Privatized World* makes convenient reading, for Arthur Brittan is an articulate representative of his own side. He has not only refined the "classic" approach to mass society (particularly through his analysis of the role of the family); he has also applied his understandings to the enduring question of the social production of knowledge. For these reasons alone, Brittan's book can

be read profitably by a very wide audience. However, his book will appeal most to social psychologists, for whom it was explicitly intended.

Of the many sectors of sociology, none is as privatized as the one in which social psychologists work. The problem is not the often-cited differentiation of social psychology into self-contained schools and cults. That is justified as long as the interactional bridge between individual and society is complicated enough to keep everyone busy. For Brittan, the trouble begins when the bridge itself is abandoned, when the schools and cults regress from the broader vision by ignoring the social context which superintends the inner and outer workings of the self. In this respect, *The Privatized World* may be understood as an elegant protest against intellectual secession. That may be its greatest merit.

The Iron Barons: A Social Analysis of an American Urban Elite, 1874-1965. By John N. Ingham. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978. Pp. xix+242. \$19.95.

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What are the class and status-group origins of post-Civil War U.S. iron-steel (I.S.) magnates? Were their families of origin largely of one class, ethnic, and religious stripe? Or did they derive from a variegated background enriched by a mix of class and nationality? Did the class and status-group backgrounds of these 19th-century barons approximate the overall occupational and nationality-religious groupings found within steel communities such as Cleveland? *The Iron Barons* sets out to answer these and related questions.

Acting contrary to the potboiler methods of much left-oriented social science, a meticulous and indefatigable historian has obtained a sample of 19th-century I.S. manufacturers by perusing all volumes of the *Directory of Iron and Steel Manufacturing Plants in the United States and Canada*, from 1874 to 1901. From these pages John Ingham extracted every listed officer of every I.S. plant, regardless of size, in the six steel communities of Philadelphia, Bethlehem, Pittsburgh, Wheeling, Youngstown, and Cleveland. Where necessary, other sources were also gleaned to produce a total of 907 I.S. manufacturers found in 164 companies. These men were then traced through county and city histories, biographical compendia, and individual family histories, with the result that a total of 76% ($N = 696$) were analyzed.

To carry the study into the early and mid-20th century, Ingham, his family, and other allies proceeded to identify the descendants of *all* the 19th-century I.S. manufacturers down to the present day. The intent was to trace the degree, nature, and importance of intermarriage patterns in bringing together the various I.S. manufacturers into a unified, upper-class

group. In this monumental effort, the number of individuals involved in the study totaled 12,600. Since the sample proved too large and unwieldy to be studied effectively, the main effort was restricted to the 696 late 19th-century I.S. magnates. Only when Ingham investigated the marriage patterns and club memberships of the I.S. group did he turn bravely to the total sample.

The numerous tables link objective class and religious ethnicity (RE) of family of origin to (a) *who* became steel corporate officers (and owners), and (b) *how* these arrivals were buttressed through membership of person and family in common clubs, private schools, strategic marriages, and homogeneous block residencies, in other words, class cementing associations (CCA). Class, RE, and CCA interpenetrated to give the families in question back-to-back intergenerational dominance within the steel industry.

Persons from manufacturing, merchant, and banking families (top class backgrounds) and of British descent (top nationality status) were a large majority of the I.S. barons in the six communities: 83% of the lesser sample. In contrast, professionals, public officials, and the various levels of the working class proved statistically marginal, the Andrew Carnegie myth about the rise of the Scottish working class notwithstanding. This pattern of class and status prevailed at a time when the less skilled working-class populations of these steel centers were overwhelmingly German and Irish-Catholic, with a growing proportion of recent immigrants of Italian and Slavic background. By the time of the Great 1919 Steel Strike, the "new" immigrant steel workers had joined the German and Irish as groups nearly excluded from top managerial and ownership positions.

The "duo-dominants" (upper-class background and British Isles descent) not only found it easier to secure good positions in family-oriented I.S. firms of the 19th century—many of them had in fact descended from the old iron industry—but also used their prestigious backgrounds to secure good personal and family fortune in the early 20th century: not a single steel family heir from a duo-dominant family slipped into permanent insolvency. The Irish and Germans should have been so lucky.

On many occasions the nouveau duo-dominants had merged their own personal fortunes with those of old I.S. family members. These amalgamations helped create nest eggs which would guarantee upper-class standing for heirs, persons most careful—with few exceptions—to obtain positive sanction and much honor from Episcopalian or Presbyterian attachment. Some I.S. barons came from German Protestant, Catholic, or Jewish background; some were of Irish-Catholic extraction. But these marginals simply could not pick up the needed CCA to transform momentary family success into intergenerational barony.

As the author demonstrates, in every I.S. community, if only for a century, the barons did in fact form community-based, organically connected, homogeneous groups—upper-class islands, each acting for itself, each with little contact with others. Or so it seems. The data appear convincing. Unfortunately, the author neglects the way the Republican party helped to

knit together these regionally diverse baronies. Nor does he take up the importance of the National Association of Manufacturers, created at the turn of the century with the express purpose of realizing regional and interregional bourgeois integration.

Of lesser importance, perhaps, is Ingham's hesitance to analyze the connection between officership in, and ownership of, I.S. firms, although we have ample reason and data to believe that prior to the turn of the century these two phenomena were closely intercorrelated. Perhaps more pertinent, he leaves aside the connection between the big I.S. dominants and the upper-class elements derived from railroads and the coal and oil industries. What did that interpenetrating phalanx look like, especially in cities like Cleveland, where by 1920 all four industrial elements had come together to govern simultaneously? How did they cooperate yet rival one another, and on occasion fall victim to yet another force, the banking interests centered in New York? For not just the I.S. barons but also the "others" helped to determine a great deal for cities such as Cleveland, regions like northeastern Ohio, and the political party of Harding.

What the author does extremely well, however, is dig both historically and vertically into I.S. turf. And for that we are indebted. Ingham presents many hard data on a significant portion of the U.S. bourgeoisie at a time when it used its class and status-group powers to accumulate, however primitively, the huge amounts of capital necessary for the transformation of a U.S. bourgeoisie committed to overtaking its English counterpart yet imitating and extending the Edwardian life-style. Some day someone will link these materials to the way in which I.S. wealth legitimated, through flaunty anglophilism, the coercive power used to struggle against the largely anglophobic Great Unwashed of I.S., itself portrayed recently and magnificently by Richard Krickus in *Pursuing the American Dream* (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1976).

For as yet no one has analyzed properly the relational contradiction between those at the top of I.S. and those at the bottom. Lest the Inghams forget, I.S. workers generated the surplus value, got but a fraction of it, fought to build the union, increased wages, ended the 12-hour I.S. work-day, and partially eliminated through the CIO the murderous working conditions that paid for the Cleveland and Shaker Heights life-style.

Elite Structure and Ideology: A Theory with Applications to Norway. By John Higley, G. Lowell Field, and Knut Grøholt. New York: Columbia University Press, 1976. Pp. xiii+367. \$17.50.

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As sociologists develop a better understanding of social stratification and the dynamics of political interest groups, a pall of pessimism and cynicism settles over scholars who hoped for egalitarian trends. They will find no

solace in this book. As the motivations and behavior of the elite become more transparent, and as the reluctance of the upper-middle-class insiders to give up a tittle of their relative share of the national income crystallizes, the stability of the social reward system becomes more understandable, if lamentable. But the dynamics of this equation may be shifting.

From this introduction, one might think *Elite Structure and Ideology* is basically polemic. It is not. Only in the final pages does one find evidence of polemic argument. The major contribution of John Higley, G. Lowell Field, and Knut Grøholt lies in pulling related conceptual strands together into a coherent and comprehensive theory of elite behavior. For those interested in the sociology of the elite, the book is a must.

The empirical aspects of the study are less impressive, in part because of the lack of definitiveness in presenting and analyzing data and in part because of the descriptive nature of the study and the application of a very complex theory to one case. In addition, one is constantly troubled by the question of representativeness of response from the Norwegian elite. Nevertheless the empirical sections are instructive and set the stage for comparative studies.

The theoretical aspects of the book are more provocative, however. One of the critical strands of the theory of the elites distinguishes between manual workers oriented to the material environment and those oriented to the social environment of supervision. These in turn are distinguished from the nonmanual workers oriented to the social environment of interdependent decision making and management. These three labor force segments vary in attitudes toward and understanding of the use of power, the necessity of management roles, and the nature of organizations and bureaucracies. The size of the three segments varies with the level of economic development, with the nonmanual, managerially oriented segment becoming a salient political force which, initially at least, makes the task of elite managers somewhat easier.

Regarding serious consensus in a large collectivity as rare, the authors argue that the development of strategic decision makers is inevitable, giving rise to an elite made up of business leaders, political leaders, top public servants, and trade union leaders. These managers of society are held together by tacit (not necessarily conspiratorial) agreement about what is desirable and permissible. It is their unity that makes stability possible and even probable. The argument is not unfamiliar. The prescription for maintaining the status quo is suppressing, distorting, and otherwise manipulating issues to avoid divisiveness and disastrous conflict that would undermine the organizational supports of the elite.

The development of a large nonmanual, management-oriented segment in the work force tends to weaken the traditional partisan alignments, blurring class lines and making it possible for the elite to drop an ideological stance and to adopt a more blatantly managerial posture. Each new nonelite generation, preoccupied with newfound affluence generated by higher standards of living, becomes as little interested in egalitarian measures as the elite.

The flaw in this compatible alliance is that the insiders have become distrustful and demanding. Insiders were previously set apart by their education and social skills. With advanced education available to many more, qualifications are no longer unique and competition is greater. Insiders now want to impose safeguards against arbitrary and uninformed decisions about their careers and make greater demands that tenure and advancement be protected. Higley, Field, and Grøholt argue that these demands weaken organizations. They see the pressure to formalize and restrict decision-making latitude as increasing indefinitely and leading to organizational paralysis, an argument that seems a bit overdrawn. The essential demands are the right to stay in an organization once employed, the right to substantial preference, and rights of possession of the job at the expense of meritocratic and egalitarian principles.

The insecurity of the insiders is exaggerated by inflation, increasing redundancy due to automation and technological advances, and the growing realization that they cannot defend themselves against better-organized segments of society. From this insecure position, the high cost of government is seen by the insider nonelites as a major problem. The argument adds some flesh to the bones of Wilensky's argument on the revolt of the middle mass.

The authors ultimately present as two major tensions the erosion of decision making and the animosity between insiders and outsiders. They argue that fragile and tenuous social control mechanisms are in jeopardy. Nonnegotiable demands and disruptive tactics raise the specter of retaliation by massive deterrent force. While the latter may be seen as implausible by many of the elite, the increasing organizational collapse brought on by insiders and disruption perpetrated by outsiders may lead increasing use of force to be viewed as a necessary alternative. Holding the enforcement agencies of government in check has been a continuing problem; unleashing this force with its inevitable violence is a great impetus to insurrection. The escalation of this cycle could lead to military dictatorship.

Higley, Field and Grøholt do not predict this outcome. They predict only that present strategies and conceptualizations of the elite in highly developed Western democracies will be inadequate to the task of dealing with the conditions they see unfolding.

Social Structure and Change: Finland and Poland Comparative Perspective. Edited by Erik Allardt and Włodzimierz Wesołowski. Warsaw: Polish Scientific Publishers, 1978. Pp. 391. \$6.00.

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Social Structure and Change is the most recent and most ambitious example of a notable genre, the analytic study of the social structure of an en-

tire industrial society. The pioneering work in this genre was Robin Williams's *American Society*, an institution-by-institution analysis of the social structure and values of the United States. Another pertinent example, modeled on Williams's study, was *Norwegian Society*, edited (in the English-language version) by Natalie Rogoff Ramsøy, with each chapter presenting an analysis of a major social institution by the leading Norwegian specialist in that particular field. This most recent volume, edited by Erik Allardt of Finland and Włodzimierz Wesołowski of Poland, follows the Norwegian example of having each institution analyzed by leading specialists in that field. It differs from both earlier works in its explicitly cross-national comparative perspective. The book compares systematically the main social institutions of Finland and Poland—in particular, their political systems, socioeconomic and class structures, stratification and mobility, the social position of women, educational systems, income and consumption, and marriage and the family. It also analyzes regional development, social networks, and cultural participation in the two countries. Each chapter is written by a "team" of at least one Polish and one Finnish scholar, with a largely successful effort to have the chapter represent their joint perspective on the two countries. Although the chapters bear the mark of the special interests, analytic and writing styles, and sociological perspectives of the 15 Finnish and 14 Polish authors, there is an impressive coherence to the book—testimony, I suspect, to a great deal of discussion, intensive editorial work, and maybe some hard bargaining as well.

The analyses focus on formal social structure, paying relatively less attention to values, religion, and the social psychological ramifications of social structure. They are particularly effective in their treatment of historical development and changes in social and economic structures. In the main, the authors rely on secondary analyses and previously published research, but where they can, they analyze primary data, which they make as comparable as possible. A broad range of materials is employed: the analyses of social stratification and social mobility, for example, are based on large-scale surveys; the data on class structure come mainly from official statistics; the discussion of "cultural participation" (e.g., reading, watching TV) interweaves governmental statistics and special surveys; and many of the chapters make use of historical documents and trend data based on official statistical reports. Moreover, these materials are nearly always used comparatively. Except in the chapter on political systems, where the formal systems are so different that it is necessary to describe each of them separately before any real comparisons can be made, Finnish data are systematically juxtaposed to Polish throughout the entire analysis of each institution. In many analyses, the two countries are compared also with the rest of the world or appropriate other countries.

It is evident that a principal interest of the editors and authors is to compare the functioning of a capitalist society with that of a socialist society. One indication of the editors' and authors' theoretical acumen is their consistent awareness of all the other factors that enter into such a comparison.

As they show in detail, neither country is a pure example of its type: Finland, though capitalist, has government ownership of some major industries and considerable governmental regulation of industry and labor-management relations; Poland, though socialist, has 80%–85% of its agriculture in private production and a sizable segment of its nonagricultural economy in the hands of small entrepreneurs. Moreover, and much more important, nonpolitical factors must constantly be taken into account—as the authors scrupulously do. There are, for example, considerable differences between the two countries in their supplies of raw materials, geography, climate, and terrain; the Polish population is seven times as large as the Finnish but lives in an area of approximately the same size; and the two countries have very different patterns of international trade. Then, too, there are important historical differences that bear on present social reality: Poland suffered vastly greater losses during World War II, in industry, transport, and number of people killed; Poland suffered especially from the systematic Nazi effort to destroy the entire academic and professional segment of the population. Going back further in history, the authors see considerable current pertinence in the religious and cultural heritages of the two countries. They point out, for example, that Finnish Lutheranism contributed to that country's prewar economic vitality, giving Finland an important advantage in postwar economic development. Moreover, although both countries attained independence after World War I, Finland had enjoyed semiautonomy for the previous century, while Poland had been divided among three conquerors and treated by all three as a hinterland to be exploited—thus different conditions existed for postindependence economic development.

Despite these and many other differences, the authors repeatedly underscore the similarities between capitalist Finland and socialist Poland by comparison with the rest of the world, particularly other small- and medium-sized countries. Some of the most important similarities are: both are staunchly nationalist and independent, but both have friendship with the USSR as a cardinal (one might add, necessary) principle of their foreign policy; both have experienced dramatic increases in recent years in urbanization and industrialization; and their stratification and mobility systems are, despite all differences in political ideology, markedly similar, reflecting the common requirements of industrialized society. Even at the level of politics, there are more similarities than one might expect, for as the authors show in concrete detail, the political structures may be quite dissimilar, but they serve many of the same political functions. And even where current social conditions may be different, ongoing processes of social change are often parallel; this is apparently the case, for example, with respect to changes occurring in educational systems, mass culture, and the family.

It is also true that dissimilar social processes may result in similar social outcomes. To my mind, the analytic sensitivity of the book is best illustrated by its repeated demonstration, not only that there are more similarities between capitalist Finland and socialist Poland than one might

expect, but also that these very similarities may have quite different historical roots. In the chapter on the social position of women, for example, Elina Haavio-Mannila and Magdalena Sokołowska show that in both countries an unusually large proportion of women are employed outside the home and that in both countries women have attained relatively high occupational statuses. The authors then go on to demonstrate that the historical processes that led to these similar social conditions were markedly different. Occupational equality for women in Finland was facilitated by processes that extended over several hundred years: Lutheranism fostered women's education; a peasant society without much of a landed aristocracy never developed the degree of male dominance characteristic of many other societies of that era; and from early in the process of industrialization, there was a considerable need for female labor. Thus the position of women in Finland today is the result of a long and gradual development. In Poland, in contrast, the religious and cultural background—a traditional Catholicism emphasizing the patriarchal family, a feudal society with a culture greatly influenced by a landed aristocracy—was antithetical to equality for females. The transformation of Polish social structure was sudden (post-World War II), dramatic, and the result of deliberate Marxist policy, but here too facilitated by an acute manpower shortage in the aftermath of the war.

One process about which the authors show that current social or economic differences between Finland and Poland do result from political differences is the much greater development since World War II in Finland than in Poland of the tertiary sector of the economy—the service industries. But even here, where Finnish economic development resulted primarily from market forces and Polish economic development resulted from the political decision of a socialist government to invest in heavy industry rather than in consumer goods and services, one wonders whether the different outcomes resulted entirely from the one country being capitalist and the other socialist. Granted, a nonsocialist Polish government probably would not have decided to devote its efforts so singlemindedly to investment in industry; market forces would have pushed for the development of service industries. But the political decision was, after all, taken by a government faced with the consequences of terrible wartime destruction. In other circumstances, a Polish socialist government might have opted for more balanced economic development.

For several years it has been evident that Finland and Poland play leading roles in world sociology. It would be interesting to see an analysis of why sociology is so well developed in these two relatively small countries. Such an analysis would start, I am sure, with the rich sociological heritages of these countries, beginning at least as far back as the work of Westermarck in Finland and Krzywicki, Znaniecki, and Ossowski in Poland. Finnish and Polish sociologies have benefited also from their openness to new ideas and new methodologies wherever developed, their acute awareness of cleavages in their own social structure, and their considerable interest, however differently manifested, in social planning. This book, of

course, does not address itself to why Polish and Finnish sociologies are so impressive. It does add considerable further evidence that they are.

The Inequality of Pay. By Henry Phelps Brown. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977. Pp. xi+360. \$16.50.

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Phelps Brown leads the reader through a multidimensional maze of economic, sociological, anthropological, and genetic data to the inductive conclusion that the chief cause of inequality in pay is inequality in the ability to work. The scope of *The Inequality of Pay* is macrosociological. There is something here for everyone, yet this vastness of purpose, this attempt at grand theory, at times excites and at others alarms.

The author begins with a review of the reasons for renewed interest in income inequality and includes a brief exposition on basic principles of economic forces determining rates of pay, such as supply and demand and labor intensive costs. But the basic issue presented—one that lies at the heart of the book and represents a challenge to economics and sociology—is the validity of the disparate approaches of those disciplines for explaining social reality in general and inequality of income in particular.

Cross-cultural comparisons are presented to demonstrate similarity of income distribution by occupation. Tabular evidence is used to illustrate the fact that the more complex an occupation is, the better it will pay, regardless of the prevailing political and economic ideology. Thus, with the exception of some white-collar workers, the USSR continues to use material incentives to encourage people to enter socially desirable (i.e., economically and scientifically important) occupations. Contrary to expectations, there has not been a decrease in the labor supply for white-collar occupations in the USSR and other Eastern European communist countries despite their low pay—probably because of the large numbers of women entering them.

The data often make the author's position compelling but they are not always comparable, and in view of periodic ideological shifts over the past decade which have precipitated changes in incentive schemes and intensified production in different sectors of the economy, they are sometimes dated, fragmentary as in the cases of China and Cuba, or suspect because of ideological intrusion in their collection and dissemination. Yet the finding that there is agreement among countries in the rank order of pay in broad grades of occupations, with the exception of manual occupations, is persuasively conveyed. With the partial exception of the Israeli kibbutzim and lower white-collar occupations, in every society and period analyzed, grades of work requiring more education, skill, experience, and responsibility offered higher pay.

A historical economic analysis of market forces which influence changes in the pay structure, supply of, and demand for labor also delineates key determinants of the rate of pay and the persistence of pay differentials through time; custom, government policies, and unions are assigned important determining roles. This is followed by a historical, sociological, and anthropological analysis of the role of status in the pay structure. Although there is some reciprocity between status and pay, here again one finds custom and status playing important roles in the determination of pay assigned to an occupation. While Weber, Parsons, and other structural-functionalists are used to establish a theoretical and empirical framework for understanding the nature of status and its relationship to pay and occupational stratification, the conflict approach is largely overlooked, as are references to Lenski.

An attempt to link discrimination with the inequality of pay delineates two primary causes for pay differentials between men and women: a lower economic value is placed on women's work because of their lower productivity and shorter tenure in the labor market. Although useful ideas are presented, much current literature on the subject in the United States is missing, and the data on the productive ability of women seem dated. Realizing the difficulty in gathering and bringing to bear such a voluminous amount of information from diverse areas, and the obsolescent character of official demographic statistics, I sympathize with the author, but his case could have been strengthened in some instances by more current data. However, a more serious problem emerges that might be described as a sophisticated scientific sociological attempt to justify, legitimize, and explain inequalities in pay on the basis of individual personality attributes and IQ. In moving from demographic, economic, and sociological analyses to the realm of IQ and personality, the author embarks on a perilous journey from tentative hypotheses based on incomplete aggregate data to dubious extrapolations about genetics and inheritance.

The lengthiest chapter in the book is devoted to establishing the relationship of social class and mental ability to the educational and occupational level attained. Evidence for racial differences in mental ability is derived from standardized IQ tests, U.S. and British Armed Forces tests administered decades ago, and studies of twins. Despite the well-documented problems in extrapolating and generalizing from such data bases, Phelps Brown believes there is "a consistent and positive association between the level of an occupation in the socio-economic structure and the average I.Q. of those who work in it" (p. 208). At times the author is quite selective in the presentation of evidence, as when he cites Arthur Jensen's statement ("How Much Can We Boost I.Q. and Scholastic Achievement?" *Harvard Educational Review* 39 [Winter 1969]: 1-213) to support his contention that IQ differences between blacks and whites are partly hereditary and may therefore account for some of the pay differential between them. But he ignores the subsequent rejoinders and contradictory evidence in that journal and elsewhere. The pitfalls of espousing such biological determinist perspectives can lead to some pretty naive

if not ludicrous assumptions, as when he brashly contends, "Anyone with an IQ below 115 is unlikely to be able to qualify as a doctor, however strong his personality" (p. 213). As if all successful medical school applicants in the United States were accepted on the basis of merit alone and the 30,000 who are annually rejected were unqualified! In his zeal to establish a relationship between tests, IQ, and social position he has overlooked the screening and exclusionary motivation for such tests. Here the balanced treatment of the subject fades in favor of the reification of an abstract concept, IQ. Although the environmental elements which impinge on an individual—family, peers, and the opportunity structure—are discussed, they are subordinated to genetics. So many intervening variables affect the relationship among heredity, IQ, and social class that it becomes a chicken-and-egg argument. Certainly the role of nutrition must not be overlooked, for diet plays a crucial role in fetal and neonatal brain development. One wonders if our time might not be more fruitfully devoted to exploring and rectifying structural inadequacies in the social system, such as the opportunity structure in education and occupation, which foster inequality. Indeed, the International Labor Organization estimates that there are currently 50 million unemployed and 300 million underemployed people in the world.

The subsequent discussion of the absurdity of the human-capital position is excellent but ignores the work of Ivar Berg. The attempt to explain individual differences in earnings draws on the development of the concept of ability to work (ATW) and a consideration of socioeconomic status and other pertinent background variables. Many of the data come from the United States and the United Kingdom and again rely heavily on twin studies conducted by Taubman. Phelps Brown concludes that genetic endowment plays a key role in individual earnings differentials within an occupation, as does what Lydall calls the D-factor: dynamism, doggedness, or determination. Other factors he finds important include "enterprise, willingness to take risks, and ability to work with other people. In addition, the earnings of any one person are likely to be affected . . . by a variety of circumstances that are beyond the ability of any person to foresee or control, and whose impacts are usually comprehended under the title of luck" (p. 312). And so, after the presentation of voluminous data, charts, figures, models, and statistics, we are left with the conclusion that the chief cause of inequality of pay is inequalities in the ability to work, and that IQ, heredity, and luck play vital roles in determining an individual's ability to work.

Despite the author's rather timid acknowledgment of the relationship among social inequality, opportunities, and achievement, *The Inequality of Pay* seems mired in a conservative functionalist rut which accentuates individual responsibility for inequality and largely ignores the analysis of power, prejudice, and conflict. Nevertheless, Phelps Brown has brought together interesting and diverse materials, and while the data may be deficient or slanted in places, this book should not be taken lightly, given the immensity of his task and accomplishment.

The Images of Occupational Prestige: A Study in Social Cognition. By Anthony P. M. Coxon and Charles L. Jones. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978. Pp. xii+226. \$19.95.

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"When you cannot measure your knowledge is meagre and unsatisfactory." When W. F. Ogburn had a shortened version of Lord Kelvin's dictum carved on the face of the Social Science Building of the University of Chicago, he enshrined in stone a view which has held powerful sway in 20th-century sociology. Anthony P. M. Coxon and Charles L. Jones share Ogburn's view, which underlies their approach to the ways in which people think about occupations. At the same time they are fully aware of the distortions which "measurement by fiat" can impose. *The Images of Occupational Prestige* is the first of three volumes which will report research carried out at the University of Edinburgh. Since Coxon is the leading British exponent of multidimensional scaling, the appearance of the book is something of an event and one very much to be welcomed.

This first monograph, concerned with subjective aspects of stratification, comprises four chapters. Two of them contain a general critique of previous research on occupational imagery and prestige hierarchies; the other two report original research into occupational cognition and evaluation, using the metaphor of a continuous space into which occupational images may be mapped. The second volume in the series, *Class and Hierarchy*, will analyze the social meanings of occupation, while the third will treat the methodology of the study. *The Images of Occupational Prestige* will be of greatest interest to specialists in social stratification, social mobility, occupational sociology, and methodology, and the series as a whole is likely to be a major contribution to sociological thinking about the world of work.

The literature review in the first two chapters will be of general interest. Coxon and Jones's examination of the literature in sociology and psychology leads them to conclude that occupational images are best studied for themselves, and that data about images cannot be used to make inferences about "objective" social structure. They are critical of attempts, as in occupational prestige scales, to rank occupations on a single dimension of general desirability. This approach the authors view as a dangerous oversimplification. Their own approach to claiming the "subjective" for legitimate scientific concern (p. ix) is to use the metaphor of a continuous space with n dimensions and to employ multidimensional scaling techniques to examine occupational imagery. These techniques are deployed in chapters three and four to analyze survey data providing respondents' judgments of the similarity or dissimilarity of pairs of occupations. Throughout, a sharp distinction is drawn between cognitive and evaluative aspects of imagery, which previous research has tended to conflate.

The second half of the book is much heavier going than the first, despite a profusion of graphs and diagrams. In a sense the reader suffers from Coxon and Jones's command of the techniques that they are using. In particular, Coxon's key description of his methodology in chapter 3 is overly compressed, which is most unfortunate given the relative novelty of the techniques he is using and the extent to which the manipulation of data plotted in multidimensional space may be unfamiliar to some readers. The nonspecialist would do well to read in conjunction with this book D. D. McFarland and D. J. Brown's "Social Distance as a Metric: A Systematic Introduction to Smallest Space Analysis" (pp. 213-53 in *The Bonds of Pluralism*, by Edward O. Laumann [New York: Wiley, 1973]). There can be no doubt that the idea of publishing three separate books over a period of time was entirely mistaken. Proper assessment of the methodology is impossible until the third volume appears, yet an understanding of the methodology is integral to the approach (*pace* the authors' wish to separate the substantive from the technical).

Editorially the book leaves much to be desired. Unjustified right-hand margins are an increasingly common economy, but here the saving is not reflected in the price. Misprints are avoidable, as is faulty printing; at least 16 pages of the review copy had a double image. The bibliography is incomplete, failing to include references to works by Parsons (p. 18), Treiman (p. 35), Duncan (p. 46), Goldthorpe (p. 55), Cicourel (p. 61), and the authors themselves (p. 67). Most inexplicable is the absence of an entry for the major British study by J. H. Goldthorpe and K. Hope, *The Social Grading of Occupations: A New Approach and a Scale* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974) which is referred to on page 24.

These cavils aside, Coxon and Jones's stimulating alternative approach to the study of occupational imagery is likely to prove fruitful. Those who pioneer new methodological developments need to have the courage of their convictions, as these authors do. Occupational prestige rankings suffer most severe criticism. Other British work on occupational grading and imagery is treated rather lightly. The work of the Oxford social mobility group is bypassed, while work on the relationship between images of the stratification system held by members of different occupations, and their social situation, first stimulated by Elizabeth Bott, is dismissed as methodologically unsound (see E. Bott, *Family and Social Network*, 2d ed. [London: Tavistock, 1971]; see also M. Bulmer, ed., *Working-Class Images of Society* [Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975]). Since Bott would probably not share Ogburn's admiration for Lord Kelvin, such criticism is partially misdirected. Nevertheless, *The Images of Occupational Prestige* is an imaginative and thoughtful attempt to advance the frontiers of sociological measurement. Although a considered judgment must await the publication of the second and third volumes, the first is a significant contribution to quantitative social science.

Bad News. Vol. 1. By the Glasgow University Media Group. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976. Pp. xv+310. £5.95.

Peter V. Miller

University of Michigan

This book is both novel and unsurprising, detailed and uninformative, serious and silly. The Glasgow University Media Group has set out to attack a well-propped straw man—the myth of television news objectivity—by documenting the fact that the news does not present the manifest world but only a particular view of it. Readers familiar with the work of Edward J. Epstein, Gaye Tuchman, Harvey Molotch, Barbara Philips, and Paul Hirsch may wonder why the Glasgow team felt the need to reveal the bias in TV news. As Richard Hoggart points out in his foreword to this volume (in my view, the best part of the book), *of course* the news is “artificially shaped.” It is uncontestedly the product of selection procedures which systematically eliminate certain events and interpretations and emphasize others. Even so, the Glasgow researchers demonstrate this perfectly obvious point in what seem like 900 tedious ways. What they do not do is to offer a compelling explanation of the “news-making” process. For this, we must rely on Hoggart’s speculations and the work of researchers noted above.

In fact, *Bad News*, volume 1, is really a compendium of field notes with practically no theoretical “glue” to bind them together. The authors spend almost as much time detailing such weighty matters as their problems with video cassette recorders and their selection of computer software as they do in interpreting the significance of the content distributions they find and supporting those interpretations. One gets the feeling that the Glasgow team was more concerned with presenting an objective, “scientific” image of its procedures than with structuring an argument on the process of news making.

I suspect that the reason for this emphasis is the politically charged atmosphere surrounding this type of inquiry in Great Britain, particularly since the major focus of the study was news coverage of labor and industry. The authors recount several acrimonious contacts with media personnel, both during the course of the study and afterward. They had minimal or no cooperation from the networks. Further, since much media criticism in Great Britain finds its intellectual roots in Marxist interpretations of culture, the focus of this study on news coverage of such matters as labor disputes is bound to suggest to observers the possibility of another such critique. The Glasgow group seems to have been trying to “beat the rap” in the rapid presentation of its raw data, although they certainly come at the question from the Left.

Some obligatory qualifying remarks. The study design—including a content analysis of broadcasts, observations in the newsroom, interviews with participants, and examination of official records on labor disputes—was inventive and, if pursued adequately on all fronts, would have provided

the opportunity for a rich data set on news making. It is certainly better than a simple content analysis. Further, this is the first of two volumes reporting the results of the study; the second volume may go beyond the field notes to a more sophisticated analysis. Finally, *Bad News* was published four years ago. If its findings seem obvious and dated, it may be partly for this reason.

Although they try to avoid the problem, the authors inevitably fall into the trap of inferring from content analysis of newscasts the likely impact of the presentations on audience members. For example, they argue that the choice of interviewees in a set of newscasts "*create[s] an impression* of familiar figures who reappear and provide continuity in an endless sequence of similar but unconnected names and faces" (p. 139; my italics). There is no evidence, of course, that audience members actively view the newscasts in a manner conducive to the creation of such an impression. Nor is there support for the claim that they unconsciously sum certain features of newscasts to form a pattern like that emerging from the content analysis. The Glasgow team pays lip service to the argument that content is not effect, but the whole project is premised on the notion that TV's inaccuracy or artificiality has social consequences. The study design, then, should have included audience measurements to check for this possibility. Moreover, comparing the content record with official statistics, though better than dealing with the content analysis alone, does not permit an unquestioned conclusion of TV inaccuracy. The official statistics are merely one other way to look at events, and to discover that the TV productions do not match the statistics is not to say that the newscasts lack "validity." Any measure of the "real world" is suspect. Even if more working days are lost in a coal strike than in an auto dispute, the latter may be seen as more important by the general public, and television may reflect this set of priorities.

All in all, the intellectual level of this book is on a par with the discussions of media bias during the days of Spiro Agnew. Much of the content belongs in an appendix; it has limited utility for scholars interested in media organizations in this country.

Psychopolitical Analysis: Selected Writings of Nathan Leites. Edited by Elizabeth Wirth Marvick. New York: Sage Publications, Halsted Press, 1977. Pp. 384. \$20.00.

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In the world of scholarship there are persons of great reputation who are rarely read. Some are teachers who pass on their legacy orally. Others write, but in a style that discourages readers; the cognoscenti cite them and transmit their ideas to others. Nathan Leites is one of the latter. He has made major contributions to political psychology, personality and cul-

ture, Soviet studies, and content analysis. Experts in any of those fields could identify his impact on later work; yet most students have never read anything by him. Elizabeth Marvick is to be congratulated on bringing out a collection which will make that less excusable. *Psychopolitical Analysis* assembles in one volume many of Leites's insightful and usually hard-to-find articles, organizes them in coherent groupings, drops some of the more difficult and repetitious material, and gives us a useful introduction and explanatory notes along the way.

It is hard to review briefly 18 selections covering a wide range of subject matter. Perhaps I can best serve the reader by commenting on a few of my favorite pieces, trying to convey their flavor and importance.

In 1947, Leites (with Ernst Kris) wrote a piece called "Trends in Twentieth Century Propaganda," comparing the rhetoric used in the two world wars. Today, commentators on the political scene tell us, as a discovery, that people have become disenchanted with politics, distrustful of what their political leaders tell them, alienated, and done with ideology. It is startling to read so much of what people say of the 1960s and 1970s in Leites's discussion of the 1940s. In World War I people could be stirred by atrocity stories. They were ready to believe in a crusade of good against evil. By World War II when the atrocities were mammoth, the public was unwilling to believe such propaganda, and intelligent democratic propagandists played down moral preachment and even the truth of what was happening in Nazi Germany. Privatization and a sense of personal impotence about politics made it hard for political leaders to react and mobilize their followers. Yet in Winston Churchill Leites recognizes a style of leadership appropriate to an era of disenchantment. Instead of making promises to his followers that they would not believe, Churchill promised nothing but "blood, sweat, and tears." It was not just accentuating the negative that accounted for Churchill's success in a moment of danger. It was presenting himself as a behavioral model. It was not what he preached that made the difference, but the fact that he acted as a symbol of courage and resolution. Whether or not people believed him, they learned from him how to behave. That is the style of leadership for an age of disenchantment.

Leites's best known work, *The Operational Code of the Politburo* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951), concerns the Stalin years. No selection from that book is included, but there is a most interesting article analyzing the speeches made by members of the top Soviet leadership for Stalin's seventieth birthday. To the outside world, the Soviet Union was then an enigma, and the assumption was that in the rigidly controlled verbal output of the totalitarian Stalinist state no secrets were to be deciphered and no differences in attitude were to be found. But Leites took these speeches and with meticulous detail tabulated differences in the imagery of different speakers. Some described Stalin as their mentor and others as their colleague; some described him as a perfect Bolshevik and others as the nation's father. The pattern correlated with what Leites at the time took to be the power ranking in the Politburo—a hypothesis that for that date

was well confirmed when Stalin died. Detailed attention to symbolism and psychological insight into the rules of that particular political game paid off.

Similar psychocultural analyses have also been applied by Leites to the politics of France, Germany, Vietnam, and China. He draws evidence from literature, history, the political statements of leaders, and (as one might expect from an astute student of Freud) child training. His analysis of French politics is contained in an unpublished manuscript on de Gaulle, of which Marvick gives us a small sample, and in extensive writings on the Fourth Republic. In one selection Leites documents a preoccupation in French perceptions of childhood with the theme of abandonment and a persistent preoccupation with the same theme in French politics. In another selection he describes the French child as "always in danger of finding itself fenced in by grown-ups—literally shut up in a room" (p. 320). He links this concern with being circumscribed to political manifestations of avoidance of commitment and retention of freedom of action.

Such psychocultural generalizations offend many people, particularly those described. Yet there are differences in patterns of cultural behavior; how can one document them? Leites does so by massive compilation of examples. Their very massiveness stops some readers, but for those who proceed the rich and erudite documentation is the reward.

Sex, Violence and the Media. By H. J. Eysenck and D. K. B. Nias. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978. Pp. 306. \$10.95.

Thelma McCormack
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Public concern about media violence and pornography has produced a substantial research literature, yet no one is satisfied, least of all the two British psychologists who have written *Sex, Violence and the Media*. Critical of the research methods, various interpretations of data, and the absence of sound theory, H. J. Eysenck and D. K. B. Nias blame sociologists who, they say, are "unaware of the psychological complexities of the topic and ignorant of the psychological literature" (p. 265). They also blame improperly designed studies.

Reviewing the literature which they have organized into four groups (single case studies, field studies, experimental field studies, experimental laboratory studies), they bluntly dismiss studies with negative findings—usually the pornography studies—and mildly approve others which support their view that exposure to media violence and pornography have harmful results. The preferred method, they say, is the laboratory experimental one; and the preferred theory is "conditioning," which, as they define it, hardly lends itself to the rigorous proof they demand from others.

Conditioning, they assert, reaches the paleocortex of the brain, the level below the thinking part, the neocortex. Sex and aggression reside in the

paleocortex. It is, therefore, inevitable that viewers regularly exposed to media violence are being conditioned. However, even a single exposure may imprint fantasies which are subsequently recalled through memory and act as the conditioning agent. That being the case, it would be almost impossible to find any population over the age of eight to serve as a control group. As for negative evidence, such as rates of sex offenses in Denmark: (a) negative evidence does not prove anything, (b) not enough time has elapsed for the conditioning effect to show up, and (c) the effects of conditioning are to make people more tolerant of sexual offenses so that such offenses are decreasingly reported. That is the kettle calling the sociological pot black.

Yet there is a sense in which Eysenck and Nias do alter the research agenda. Whereas in the past the focus of attention has been on the catharsis hypothesis or some variant of it, these authors shift to the victimization theory of George Gerbner and Larry Gross in "Living with Television: The Violence Profile" (*Journal of Communication* 26 [1976]: 173-99), according to which continuous exposure to media violence alters our perceptions of reality so that we become more fearful and, ultimately, dependent on police or other authorities. Eysenck and Nias claim that, on the contrary, the conditioning effect of such exposure decreases anxiety and desensitizes us to violence, thereby disinhibiting antisocial behavior. In the former view, we become law-and-order supporters; in the latter, amoral accomplices, if not participants, in an immoral world.

A second shift is to give more attention to individual differences which Eysenck and Nias believe have been neglected. But it is questionable whether they advance the cause with their premise that biology is destiny. For example, the basic differences are sex differences, fundamentally genetic. When such differences have been impaired in mothers, the female offspring are masculinized. Such women "showed more interest in careers and less interest in marriage, as well as toy preferences of boys" (p. 230).

Superimposed on these differences are personality differences: extraversion, emotionality or neuroticism, and psychoticism. Men score higher on psychoticism which, in turn, is related to (a) earlier sexual activity; (b) greater attraction to pornography; and, more important, (c) civil libertarian attitudes toward such materials. The Freudian tradition which casts doubt on the motivation of the censors is thus reversed.

The final step connects all of this to antisocial behavior—"violence, vandalism, cruelty and undesirable sex practices" (p. 15), "massive increase in divorce" (p. 18), "sheer destructiveness" (p. 274), "the changing moral climate" (p. 36). While Eysenck and Nias do not regard censorship as a panacea, they are not intimidated by notions of artistic freedom of expression, having decided that genuine art does not require explicit depictions of violence or sex. One of their concerns is that pornography (hardcore?) be available for therapeutic purposes which would allow psychologists to recondition the pedophiles and rapists and help the impotent to achieve acceptable levels of orgasm competence.

Some of the important points Eysenck and Nias make are lost in their

ranting tone, political bias, and sexism. For example, they suggest that the aggressive responses experimenters found in various studies may be responses to an intervening variable, the fantasies created by the stimuli. This seems to me a useful line to pursue without necessarily accepting their conditioning paradigm. But nowhere do they raise the question of whether the experimental method is the most desirable one for providing answers to problems of public policy. For more than half a century now the courts have held that passages of a book cannot serve as the basis for judgments of obscenity; the entire book must be considered. Yet, in experimental research which attempts to isolate and disaggregate variables, seven minutes of a 90-minute film are used to test the effects of media violence. This may improve our knowledge about violence, but it tells us little about how average moviegoers respond to one of Sam Peckinpah's gory *oeuvres*. Perhaps, then, the strength of Eysenck and Nias's exposition is that it unintentionally establishes clearly that the choices we make with regard to social control are, in the last analysis, political. Without recognizing this we may, considering the way contemporary research is going, be left with *The Sound of Music*.

The Show and Tell Machine: How Television Works and Works You Over. By Rose K. Goldsen. New York: Dial Press, 1977. Pp. xvi+427. \$10.00.

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American University

Rose Goldsen has written a scathing criticism of American commercial television. Her major point is that although it is possible to turn off the television set, one cannot turn off the "television environment." Goldsen's book is a political statement in two ways: She alerts the reader to the politics of broadcasting by showing how the system works, that is, how economic, industrial, and government controls relate to the content seen. She also reminds us that "there is nothing more political than opportunities a social system holds out to its members, permitting them to live in the imagination of others" (p. 280). Contrary to conventional wisdom, to her all art is both social and political. She believes that this reality must be pointed out to those who control the airways, who may think that they merely entertain the public, and especially to the audience, which may think that television's effects are not of major consequence.

The Show and Tell Machine is a collection of Goldsen's syndicated radio programs and some material published elsewhere. Although she has a common theme which is thought provoking and the style is breezy and readable, the book is limited because of its presentation. Radio addresses are not easily translated to the printed page. It is possible that two shorter books might have been in order: the first on the television environment and how television permeates other modes of communication and thought,

and the second about the industry, focusing on how government and business interests intermesh to control the work milieu for creators.

To reach an independent judgment, I have not read other reviews of this book. However, I imagine that it has not been received favorably by other social scientists. But even with the faults I perceive, I contend that the thesis of Goldsen's book should be taken seriously by educators and social scientists. We all know that almost everyone owns at least one television set and that almost every commercial station in an area competes with all the others by presenting virtually identical programs and commercial advertisements throughout the program day. Thus most of the viewing public is provided with only one mode of thought and little cultural diversity. This can be defended because television, by providing similar news and entertainment shows, may function to integrate the diverse groups in the population. However, it is also possible, as Goldsen contends, that television creates a new thought environment. Television both organizes our time and presents material which may affect our total thought processes in ways not measurable by usual social science investigations. Television may or may not make us more aggressive people, better consumers, more or less informed voters, or more or less likely to support the arts. However, according to Goldsen, these and other effects usually studied by social scientists are not significant. Rather, Goldsen insists that television desensitizes people and modifies behavior in ways that may not be measurable. For her, the real effect of television is that it systematically whittles away at feelings and emotions by destroying old emotional ties. Moreover, the television experience, she contends, has become one of the (if not *the*) primal experiences that mold character.

There is no way that Goldsen's claims can be tested. Thus her propositions and assertions are not always convincing, especially to those trained to use the empirical method. She makes her arguments by reporting on the content of both prime-time series and soap operas and on the use of the laugh track and other devices to keep the attention of the audience. The 10 pages on the content of the soap opera are insightful and possibly the best part of the book. She also shows how the forms developed by the commercial system, such as short segments and the commercial, have been adapted by those making programs for public television, especially the Children's Television Workshop. She does not do rigorous, systematic content analysis, nor does she discuss the legitimate issues of how audiences use television and what people perceive and select. Of course, if Goldsen is right and television is all pervasive, it is not necessary to count violent acts or sexual encounters, nor is it important whether the set is on or off. The issues she raises may not be testable but nonetheless they are important. It is puzzling that she did not draw on Marcuse to develop her arguments. Like Marcuse, she postulates a one-dimensional society. She is not insisting that mass persuasion can generate a fascist dictatorship, as was the fear among critics in an earlier time, but that the total efforts of television result in drastic changes in the ways the human psyche is formed and thus change social existence.

Although I recognize the importance of considering Goldsen's arguments, I personally disagree with the premise that television is "mass behavior modification" (p. 15). Television is not everything. It is one element in a complex web that makes up the total system in which children and adults are continuously being socialized. Certainly class position, sex, and opportunity are more important in the socialization process than is the television environment. I realize that there is easy access to television, and I agree that television content is neither great art nor morally uplifting. However, television does not exist in a social vacuum. It is produced and created by people who live in the same social, political, and economic world as the viewers. Again, Goldsen, along with several other authors in the past few years, may be blaming the messenger.

Goldsen's claims about the power of television to indoctrinate people may be questionable, but this does not negate the strength of her presentation on how television works. Commercial television is produced by industrial processes supported by the Constitution, Congress, the regulatory agencies, and the private companies, both networks and production houses, which are responsible for the programs and the way time is used. Although the analysis is limited, her attempt to tie content to structure is to be admired. For me, this portion of the book is the most important, and I hope she expands and enlarges on this in the future to show how the work environment influences the creators as well as the audience. It is through such analysis that television will be seen in the total context of the larger society.

The Suburban Environment: Sweden and the United States. By David Popenoe. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977. Pp. xii+275. \$19.00.

Scott Greer

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The Suburban Environment is a gracefully written and honest book comparing the life of suburbanites in two rich societies. It is also much more than this. In the process of analyzing his selected households, David Popenoe compares the relevant aspects of the total society, its urban settlements, and the effects of urban policy (or the lack of it) on the two settlements.

The two "suburbs" studied are Levittown, Pennsylvania, and Vallingby, a part of Stockholm. Levittown is a large, packaged, suburban settlement aimed at the middle-mass market of upper blue-collar and lower white-collar workers. Vallingby is a packaged extension of Stockholm into what would be called suburbia here. It is also for the middle masses. Vallingby was the first and probably the most successful of the fully planned housing developments started in Sweden after World War II. Profiting from the enormous demand for housing at the time, from the power and pres-

tige of planners in Sweden, and, not least, from the city's ownership of almost all of the land in Stockholm county, the planners exercised enormous power and committed Swedish suburbanites to multiple-family dwelling units on rapid transit lines. These apartment blocks surround large shopping centers replete with shops, restaurants, theaters, and public halls—in short, substitutes for “downtown.” Scattered among the apartment blocks are green spaces traversed by footpaths (one can live comfortably in Vallingby without an automobile), nurseries, preschools, and schools. While most households own a car, only 15% go to work in it. Levittown is a typical American suburb, its main distinction being that it was built all at once by a single entrepreneur who planned it, insofar as it was planned. The street pattern is designed to create relatively small neighborhoods sheltered from through traffic, and there is an indigenous shopping center with a (sparsely used) public assembly hall. Households average more than one car each (indeed, one is necessary to get to work) and automobiles are ubiquitous. There is little foot traffic and what there is may be dangerous, for often there are no sidewalks. The car is the umbilical cord to the urban world. Nearby residents are the local community.

Popenoe selected 25 households in each suburb, stratifying by known characteristics of the populations. He interviewed all the residents over the age of “about ten or twelve” and interviewed teenagers separately from the rest. He also interviewed 20 key informants in each suburb and spent a great deal of time “walking around” in Vallingby, driving around in Levittown, and “hanging out.” While the size of the samples makes generalization risky, the coherence of the account and the care in reporting the evidential base and negative findings contribute to its credibility.

What did he find? While there are some striking differences in the way the two samples manage their lives, the overwhelming impression is of sameness. Besides work and the home there is little social life (and that not organized) in either population. The arts consist largely of television and an occasional movie. Exercise in Vallingby is walking or bicycling; in Levittown it consists of yard care and puttering around the house and in the car. In short, social class tends to level all differences: the lives of the middle mass are not very interesting in either country.

As a planner, Popenoe prefers the Swedish way, and there are some strong arguments for it. Economically, Vallingby is much more efficient in the use of land and energy. Residential land use in Vallingby ranges from two to four times the density of Levittown, and the apartment blocks conserve heat while mass transit conserves fuel. Aesthetically, one is impressed with the order of the building layout, the accessibility of structures to pedestrians, the amount of street life and pathway traffic, and, most of all, the invisibility of the automobile. Vallingby also provides conveniences and amenities for less fortunate people: life is better for the old, the single person, and teenagers. (The latter, in Levittown, complained vociferously of boredom and “nothing to do.”) Easy local access to the necessities of life and easy access to downtown Stockholm generate an array of values. Socially, however, Levittown gets a few good marks:

Levittowners enjoy privacy and use their yards as they like instead of going to a park or playground. They also entertain in their homes and fraternize with their neighbors—activities conspicuously missing in Vallingby.

As a sociologist, Popenoe unsays much of the above. He finds that, except for teenagers and single persons (those most in need of public transportation), there is little difference in the overall "environmental fit" between the two samples. The great majority are happy where they are in Levittown, although they might like a larger house "further out." In Vallingby, a substantial minority prefer a single-family dwelling unit. Most Swedes would like another room or so, for the apartments are tiny—the majority consisting of two rooms plus a kitchen. Indeed, one sees why there is little entertaining and, perhaps, why neighbor avoidance is a norm.

One curious finding is the enormous value placed on the summer home by those who own one. The automobile is used mostly for drives to the summer home on weekends (for maintenance) and during the two-month vacation when the household lives there. One suspects that, given the choice, a majority of the Swedish population would prefer the single-family detached dwellings of Levittowners and that they would prefer private space to public space for recreation and puttering around. The economies of land and energy effected by the work of the planners are mixed blessings to the residents of Vallingby.

There are strong indications that private housing is making a comeback. Historically Sweden has not been a place where apartment blocks were the model dwelling; indeed, rural Swedish families eschewed villages and lived, like American farmers, in dispersed single-family units until the recent urbanization of the country. This forced them into cities and the arms of the planners, who decided what choices they could have, if any. It is possible that the housing market in the United States does its work as well as the city planners of Sweden if we are concerned with environmental fit. If we are concerned with the long-range husbanding and growth of resources it is another matter.

The Rise of the Egalitarian Family: Aristocratic Kinship and Domestic Relations in Eighteenth-Century England. By Randolph Trumbach. New York: Academic Press, 1978. Pp. xviii+324. \$17.50.

Historical Studies of Changing Fertility. Edited by Charles Tilly. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978. Pp. ix+390. \$27.50 (cloth); \$10.95 (paper).

Myron P. Gutmann
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Randolph Trumbach, in *The Rise of the Egalitarian Family*, provides us with a rich description of aristocratic family life, servants, parents and

children, and marriage and the transmission of property from generation to generation. Teachers of social and family history will treasure its detail. Sadly, Trumbach's enterprise took longer than normal to reach completion, and Lawrence Stone (*The Family, Sex and Marriage in England, 1500-1800* [New York: Harper & Row, 1977]) preempted many of what must have been his most original conclusions. Like Stone, Trumbach argues that family life became more domestic and the family more egalitarian during the 18th century. But by focusing only on the aristocracy, and only on the 18th century, Trumbach has painted a much more detailed, and therefore more satisfying, picture of the growth of domesticity in all its forms.

Trumbach sees three 30-year generations between 1690 and 1780, each more domestic than the last. The first saw the growth of property settlements which protected wives and children at the expense of brothers, and the outlawing of professional matchmakers. During the second, inoculation was invented and romantic marriage "became truly prestigious" (p. 291). In the last, the Marriage Act of 1753 guaranteed romantic marriage, mothers consistently nursed their own children by 1780, and mourning customs demonstrated a new focus on the nuclear family as opposed to the lineage. While one might disagree with some of the elements of Trumbach's argument, he is on solid ground: the aristocratic family was more domestic in the 18th century than earlier. Moreover, Trumbach attempts to go beyond the mere description of change to put the growth of domesticity in context. He shows that it evolved from a compromise in the long-standing conflict in England between allegiance to kindred (all one's relatives) and patrilineage (only relations through the father's line). Having been preempted by others in the discovery of domesticity, he sees the articulation of the conflict and the discovery of the compromise as one of his main achievements. This point is a refinement in our understanding, but I question whether it is a major refinement. Stone at least implies this general point, and it sometimes seems that Trumbach sees his own contribution as terminological: only the knowledge of the proper anthropological terms is important. What we now need, if this is important, is a study of the origins and early development of the conflict.

Causes and effects are the real weakness in Trumbach's book. He does little to identify the causes of the rise of domesticity, a failing he admits (p. 123). As for the effects, domesticity did not cause industrialization, but it may have contributed to the political climate of the 18th century. Trumbach also suggests that domesticity led to lower infant mortality. Surprisingly, he attributes this change neither to maternal breastfeeding nor to smallpox inoculation. Instead, he suggests that by 1750 aristocratic women became better mothers, and their children were "... not only happier but healthier as well, and more likely to live" (p. 188). Trumbach has little clinical evidence to support this thesis but refers to the psychological theory of attachment developed by John Bowlby (*Attachment and Loss*, 2 vols. [London: Hogarth Press, 1969-73]). Trumbach wants to present a psychohistorical alternative to Freud and Erikson, and one must

applaud his efforts to open our eyes to a new theory. But he has not yet proved that better mothering led in this way to lower infant mortality.

Unlike Trumbach, who uses the traditional historical method of supporting his argument by reference to anecdotal examples, the authors of *Historical Studies of Changing Fertility* employ numerical models of the adoption of new fertility behavior in 18th- and 19th-century Europe and America. The basic point implied by all the contributors to this book (there are seven substantive contributions, plus an excellent introduction and conclusion by Charles Tilly) is that there are exogenous conditions which affect fertility, and the relationship between the exogenous conditions and fertility can almost always be stated numerically, either by empirical measurement or by theoretical formulation. Four of the chapters, those by Richard A. Easterlin ("The Economics and Sociology of Fertility: A Synthesis"), E. A. Wrigley ("Fertility Strategy for the Individual and the Group"), Ronald Lee ("Models of Preindustrial Dynamics with Applications to England"), and Lutz K. Berkner and Franklin F. Mendels ("Inheritance Systems, Family Structure, and Demographic Patterns in Western Europe, 1700-1900") do this in general terms and define the boundaries of present theoretical approaches to historical fertility behavior. Berkner and Mendels identify the basic relationships between inheritance and demographic behavior and show how and when they interacted. They show that peasants were sometimes able to outwit inheritance law and custom. Wrigley builds on our growing appreciation of the importance of heirship and inheritance by asking whether preindustrial fertility was rational, if only unconsciously so. He shows that individuals in need of an heir and groups in need of replacing themselves had different fertility goals in an environment of high mortality. For Easterlin rationality is assumed, and he asks why couples would choose to limit their fertility and how the costs of fertility regulation might keep them from doing so. Lee, on the other hand, avoids questions of individual behavior and evaluates the aggregate relationship between fertility, mortality, wages, and demand for labor in England. He finds that before 1700 only exogenous mortality affected wages and fertility, while after that date a new variable, demand for labor, came into the picture. It is not possible to do justice here to these theoretical contributions, which as a group add significantly to our understanding of the possible mechanisms of fertility change. While all four are excellent, Easterlin's chapter, with pride of place as the first, is certainly the most important, for both historians and those interested in contemporary fertility change.

The three remaining authors, Etienne van de Walle ("Alone in Europe: The French Fertility Decline until 1850"), Maris A. Vinovskis ("A Multivariate Regression Analysis of Fertility Differentials among Massachusetts Townships and Regions in 1860"), and Rudolf Braun ("Early Industrialization and Demographic Change in the Canton of Zurich"), attempt to test various formulations by examining individual regions. They are not as successful as the theoretical authors, mostly because it is difficult to test the propositions with their data. This is not all their fault. Easterlin's

model, depending as it does on tastes and individual behavior, may be impossible to apply to historical data and is certainly difficult to use without large quantities of data about individual families, something none of the authors in this volume employ. Even cruder efforts prove difficult to manage. Lee's data are, as he acknowledges, suspect and render his discussion illustrative but not definitive. With better data van de Walle gets less satisfactory results. He attempts to test some elements of Easterlin's model for France in the 19th century. Higher incomes, he concludes, produced less rather than more fertility, contrary to the Easterlin model. This might imply new attitudes toward children, something Easterlin associates with modernization, but in France, at least, it is not associated with urbanization, literacy, or loss of religious zeal—several aspects of modernization. Van de Walle seems at a loss about what to do, except to say that his departmental level data may be too gross to show the changes really at work.

Does the method used by Tilly et al. work better than that employed by Trumbach? Only partially. Van de Walle, Braun, and Berkner and Mendels all employ essentially qualitative data to help prove their points in the absence of quantitative data. Trumbach does the same. The advantage of his book (though intentions are different) is that he shows a whole spectrum of aspects of the family; the advantage of the other book is its coherent theories and attempts to test them empirically, something Trumbach might have more fully tried.

The Community of the Vill: A Study in the History of the Family and Village Life in Fourteenth-Century England. By Edward Britton. Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1977. Pp. xvii+291. \$22.50.

Franklin Mendels

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Edward Britton presents here a study of medieval peasant society "from below." Following on the pioneering work of his teacher J. A. Raftis, he extracts a great deal of social, economic, and demographic information from a series of court rolls for the village of Broughton (Huntingdonshire) between 1288 and 1340. These rolls are the minutes of village court sessions, where litigations among the villagers were recorded, administrative work conducted, fines levied, and license fees assessed. The essential piece of information around which the analysis revolves is the identity, that is, the name, of the individual mentioned in the record. In studying a continuous series of these records and merging them with a variety of other sources, Britton is able to construct nominative dossiers encompassing many facets of the material and social life of the 999 individuals and 128 families that he has identified.

The analysis begins with the constitution of social groups. They are the elite (A), the intermediate group (B), the have-nots (C), and the out-

siders (D). The criterion is the court rolls: families providing jurors and other officials are grouped into A, families rarely called upon to become officials are called B, and families holding no offices during this period are placed in C. The author is aware of the difficulties of this narrow definition of status, yet succeeds in the rest of the book in justifying his assumptions by showing that taxes and real property holdings seem correlated with status as defined above.

The rest of this essentially quantitative study is rich in noteworthy findings and provocative interpretations. The emancipation of married women was much greater in the local custom of the manor than in the common law, which made them little more than wards of their husbands. Women entered into contracts and debts, they were partners of their husbands and cotenants with them in the holding of land. Some kept land independently of their husbands. Court records show that men and women were equally likely to be prosecuted and fined in cases of adultery. On the other hand, a double standard existed for unmarried women. They alone took responsibility and punishment for premarital sex ("fornication") and out-of-wedlock children.

Although there was some social mobility up and down, elite status (jurorships) tended to become hereditary. The eldest son usually inherited the office of his father and often entered into the position even before the latter's death, a process of "mergence" which helped to preserve family continuity. Failure to inherit and thus downward mobility is shown to result from the death of sons at an early age, the lack of sons of heritable age, or the failure to produce male heirs at all. Despite the importance of inheritance, however, Britton shows that family composition was not as strictly determined by it as G. C. Homans has argued in *English Villagers of the Thirteenth Century* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1941). Noninheriting sons did not always have to leave the village, as some were found holding land they had purchased. This was more likely to occur among the haves than among the have-nots.

Britton examines conflict and cooperation among the families of different classes. Pledges, assaults, hue and cry, and false claims are used to measure intraclass cooperation as well as interclass dependence and aggression. Aggression was most frequent between A and C members, but there were as many cases when A members aggressed against C members as vice versa. Among the young, however, elite members were clearly the most aggressive.

Although his data contain no information on ages, exclude children, servants, and hired workers, and underrepresent women, Britton extracts demographic information from them. An 18% population decline is inferred in the half century preceding the great plague of 1348. Yet the evidence also shows that the elite population dropped faster than the number of elite families, whereas the poor population fell more slowly than the number of poor families, which implies that among the elite, family size fell, whereas it rose among the poor. This is difficult to reconcile with the view of a Malthusian subsistence crisis preceding the great plague and

facilitating its onslaught. Britton adduces additional economic evidence to show some serious inconsistencies in the Malthusian approach, which has been associated for years with the name of M. M. Postan. Britton argues instead that the demographic decline could have been caused by changes in migration patterns, about which he offers some evidence but no explanation. Britton is aware of the one major defect of his method, a problem he shares with other practitioners of the new "history from below." The records used here overrepresent the stable members of the community, those who had a claim on the land. We know much less about the unstable, more mobile, propertyless peasants whose sojourn in the village was too transitory to leave any tracks or whose dependent status made them less likely to participate in ordinary court transactions. Leaving this aside, however, *The Community of the Vill* is a remarkable book. Britton must be admired for the great ingeniousness and imagination with which he has processed his information, asked questions from it, and offered interpretations that go far beyond a mere report of findings. The clear and lucid style in which the book is written also contributes to make it a success.

Beyond the Nuclear Family Model: Cross-cultural Perspectives. Edited by Luis Lenero-Otero. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1977. Pp. 226. \$12.00 (cloth); \$6.00 (paper).

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For students of the family in sociology, the choice of books emphasizing cross-cultural perspectives is limited. There is an overabundance of books on the American family to the extent that North American students have very little opportunity to learn about family systems outside the United States. Among the few publications are *Comparative Family Systems* by M. F. Nimkoff (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965) and *Family in Cross-cultural Perspective* by William N. Stephens (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1963). Still one of the best available books on the subject, the former has an excellent introduction to comparative family studies and a number of case studies of different family systems. The book by Stephens is a review of the literature on family customs from an anthropological view. Another study is *Cross-national Family Research* by Marvin Sussman and Betty E. Cogswell (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1972), which is a collection of articles from the papers presented at the Seventh World Congress of Sociology in Varna, Bulgaria, in 1970.

In this rather specialized field, how does *Beyond the Nuclear Family Model*, edited by Luis Lenero-Otero, fare? At the outset, I feel that this is a far more successful attempt to present a coordinated theme than the book by Sussman and Cogswell. By limiting the book to only eight papers,

the editor has tried to confine himself to the question of the validity of the idea of the universality of the nuclear family as expounded by Murdock and of William J. Goode's assertion of the inevitability of the worldwide movement toward the conjugal family. One must examine this publication to see how far Lenero-Otero's attempt is successful. He has tried to tie the different papers together with a well-argued introduction.

In my view, two papers are most suited to the theme of the book: "Inadequacy of Theory of the Nuclear Family: The Polish Experience" by Jan Turowski and "The Nuclear Family within the Three-Generational Household in Modern Japan" by Tsuneo Yamane. In Poland there are significant differences in family composition in rural as well as urban areas. It seems that the number of children influences the economic status of the family. This is not taken into consideration by the authors of the concept of the nuclear family. The proposition of the disintegration of kinship (including the three-generation family), which is part of the nuclear family theory, does not find support in the case of Poland. Of old people who have children, 67% live with them (p. 23), indicating that the modified extended family is acceptable to most people.

According to Tsuneo Yamane, "Despite the progressive 'nucleation' of the family, about fourteen percent of the households in Japan still contain three generations of members" (p. 93). "The most favored pattern is to live near a married child but not in the same household" (p. 88). Although parents are looked after by their children, they are no longer central figures. The author may be right in feeling that there may be an emergence of a new three-generation family.

The third paper dealing with the concept of the nuclear family is by William T. Liu and is based on his study in the Philippines. Although well argued, it is not convincing enough.

Of the other papers, "The Political Economy of the Mother-Child Family: A Cross-societal View" by Beumberg and Garcia is one of the most interesting. I agree with the editor's assessment: "The extension of its contribution—larger than the others—is justified by the importance and originality of the research" (p. 8). The authors argue successfully against the notion that mother-headed families are linked to mother-child dwelling units by race (p. 100). They highlight the importance of the relationship of the woman to her society's mode of production.

Khatri's paper, "Understanding Changes in the Family in Contemporary India," provides valuable information from fiction, although it is not directly related to the theme of the book. According to Khatri, "To foster a further understanding of the changes in the family and to gain insight into the internal dynamic processes and relationships within the family and other related social institutions, a case study technique was adopted by the author in his analysis of the fiction" (pp. 73-74).

The paper, "Culture, Crisis and Creativity of Families in Bombay, San Juan and Minneapolis," by Foss and Straus is an interesting exercise in cross-cultural studies. However, the small samples used in the study may not have general validity. Jan Trost's paper on married and unmarried

cohabitation in Sweden (with some comparisons) provides valuable insight into the increasing incidence of unmarried cohabitation outstripping marriages.

The final paper, by Harold Christenson, "Relationship between Differentiation and Equality in the Sex Structure," is interesting for those who are concerned about women's attitudes. He argues successfully against the neofeminist view "that only elementary biological differences need to be recognized, and that even these should be de-emphasized by erasing the sex role structure imposed by the culture and by establishing a more or less uniform socialization process for the early years whereby males and females would be reared in essentially the same manner" (pp. 206-7). This paper, while interesting, does not really fit into the theme of the book.

In conclusion, I feel that Luis Lenero-Otero's book has partly succeeded in justifying its title. Some of the papers do not quite fit in the present book. However, in view of the paucity of cross-cultural studies of the family, it will be a useful source for scholars.

Contemporary Urban Ecology. By Brian J. L. Berry and John D. Kasarda. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1977. Pp. xiii+497. \$12.95.

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I continue to be amazed at how little is known generally by sociologists about contemporary human ecology. Unfortunately, the collective sociological understanding of one of the major sociological specializations is meager. Many of our colleagues with something to say about ecology in their introductory sociology textbook chapters, and in verbal and written communications, possess even today an antiquated conceptualization of the perspective. To some, human ecology involves the techniques for the study of spatial distributions through maps and related kinds of descriptions; to others, ecological studies are analyses of any phenomena in which the units of analysis are spatial rather than individual entities; to still others, ecological studies are detailed descriptions of the inhabitants and geographical and physical features of urban subareas, for example, Harvey Zorbaugh's *The Gold Coast and the Slum* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977). Few sociologists possess an accurate, let alone an adequate, understanding of contemporary human ecology. Indeed, the above examples tend to buttress Duncan's broader observation that "the term 'ecology' is sometimes applied rather casually—even irresponsibly. [Frequently] studies adopting the label bear only a tenuous relationship to any systematic scientific conception of the field" (O. D. Duncan, "Human Ecology and Population Studies," in *The Study of Population*, ed. P. H. Hauser and O. D. Duncan [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959], p. 680).

This misunderstanding of the scope and approach of contemporary human ecology is all the more unfortunate given the wealth and abundance of empirical and theoretical papers, especially the former, which have appeared in the past 10 years in the major sociological journals. I have often thought that if sociologists would only read or even skim the human ecology articles in the recent journals they would have little justification for retaining their inaccurate ideas and perceptions about the perspective.

With the publication in 1977 of *Contemporary Urban Ecology* by Brian J. L. Berry and John D. Kasarda, a continuation of this misunderstanding will be difficult to maintain. For here is a book about contemporary human ecology that is both contemporary and ecological in the best and most accurate sense of the two terms. To eliminate any misunderstanding of their point of view, the authors are quick to discard the antiquated notions about human ecology and to assert a mere 12 pages into their book that "the central problem of contemporary ecological inquiry is understanding how a population organizes itself in adapting to a constantly changing yet restricting environment. . . . The basic premise of the ecological approach is that, as a population develops an effective organization, it improves its chances of survival in its environment" (p. 12). This line of thinking is conceptually consistent with contemporary sociological human ecology and sets the stage for the ecological contributions which follow.

Berry and Kasarda note that the book is a product of a series of informal exchanges between them while they were colleagues at the University of Chicago (a most appropriate place for a book on human ecology to emerge). Their "idea was to present an interdisciplinary approach to urban ecological issues" (p. vii), and in my opinion the objective has been met. The book is a real attempt to study ecological organization in the city from the perspectives of geography and sociology. The authors are well-known and competent urban specialists in their respective fields, yet their names (and writings) are familiar to those outside their fields. Most urban sociologists, for example, know the work of Berry and urban geographers the work of Kasarda. There is probably no better interdisciplinary team available to carry off such an objective so well.

Since the book draws heavily on earlier research and publications of the two authors, in one respect there is little new empirical urban ecology contained in it that readers of Berry and Kasarda have not already seen. Although there are a couple of exceptions, the chapters are taken from earlier analyses published principally in sociology and geography books and journals.

In another respect, however, there is a wealth of new empirical urban ecology in this book in the form of synthesis, integration, and application. Most of the chapters have been extensively rewritten, thus taking into consideration materials preceding and following. The reader is treated to an integration of ecological research in many of the chapters that would not be obtained were the original articles and chapters read one after the

other. The authors frequently attempt to bring the results of earlier chapters to bear on those of later ones, and this works cumulatively through the successively larger spatial and social hierarchies. In many of their extensions they have brought forth new data sets, and, as best as I can tell, four or five chapters were prepared specifically for the book. (More specific citations to their previously published work should have been provided in the preface rather than merely noting by name the journals and publishers.)

The book is not a comprehensive text in urban ecology, but then the authors did not intend it to be. It is meant to be an exposure to an ordered selection of urban ecological issues, each of which draws upon earlier work by Berry and by Kasarda. After introducing the reader to the nature of contemporary urban ecological inquiry, the next five sections of the book reflect "successive levels of a sociospatial hierarchy" (p. vii) from the neighborhood or local community (part 2) to the total society (part 6). Parts 3 and 4 deal with issues of intraurban and metropolitan structure, part 5 with regional and metropolitan systems. Part 7 is more programmatic and deals with ecology of the future.

These sections, by the way, reflect a most fitting division of labor. Some of Kasarda's best work has dealt with metropolitan structure and change; appropriately, part 4 is based almost entirely on his analyses. Some of Berry's most ingenious work has dealt with comparative urban structures, and part 6 belongs to him. However, both authors have contributed to the study of neighborhoods and communities, and part 2 contains papers by both. The book presents the best of the two authors and should be a useful addition to graduate-level seminars in urban geography, sociology, and ecology.

Captive Cities: Studies in the Political Economy of Cities and Regions. Edited by Michael Harloe. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1977. Pp. 218. \$17.50.

Dennis McGrath

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Urban sociology in America has long been dominated by the early work of Park, Burgess, and the other members of the Chicago school. Their concern with migration and adaptation to urban areas, as well as the culture of cities, provided both a theoretical framework and a research program that has guided much empirical inquiry.

In recent years, however, urban sociologists have become more concerned and reflective about the status of their subdiscipline. Some argue that the extensive focus on urban problems found in the literature obscures the very field of inquiry, and they question whether the investigation of poverty, crime, and other topics in the urban context represents

a theoretically valid perspective. The issue they raise is whether there is anything distinctively urban to be studied or if urban areas are merely a convenient setting for the analysis of social phenomena defined by other criteria. The problem, in one urbanist's terms, is that it has become difficult to justify the analysis of the city as a "focus" rather than merely a "locus."

A related critique asserts that urban sociology has been too isolated from more general theoretical perspectives. The subdiscipline must, according to some critics, come to address broader issues of societal structure and social change. To achieve this end, it is further argued that urban sociology must become more historical, comparative, and theoretically sophisticated.

Captive Cities echoes many of these contemporary concerns. It is based on papers presented in the past several years at sessions of the Research Committee on the Sociology of Urban and Regional Development that was first established following the Seventh World Congress of Sociology at Varna in 1970. The contributors are united in their dissatisfaction with what they term "traditional" urban sociology and in the desire to place their work in a broader theoretical perspective. More specifically, the authors utilize Weberian and (primarily) Marxist approaches to understand the city as a "focus" of inquiry, as a historical, social form which is both shaped by and influences economic and political processes. This desire to link urban structure and dynamics with larger societal structure is expressed in what the editor loosely terms the political economy approach.

Michael Harloe, in an introductory essay, provides a very lucid and thoughtful overview of the issues discussed in the volume and distinguishes the areas of convergence and disagreement among the contributors. He also performs the useful function of translating the somewhat obscure vocabularies of the European Marxists into terms more accessible to Anglo-American social scientists.

R. E. Pahl represents the only Weberian approach and argues for a comparative analysis of urban and regional development as an essential foundation for the political economy of space. He also reassesses his earlier work based on the analysis of competition for scarce urban resources within a sociospatial system and attempts to integrate various criticisms that have been advanced. He concludes by emphasizing the compatibility between his work and that of Marxist investigators and, noting the growing interest in the allocation processes of advanced industrial societies, calls for comparative research, especially of the Eastern European state socialist societies with their very different mix of market and political mechanisms.

The French Marxist Manuel Castells follows with a recapitulation of his critique of traditional urban sociology originally developed in *La Question urbaine* (Paris: Maspero, 1972). Since many of the other contributors rely heavily on Castells and Poulantzas, or at least use their

work as a point of reference, this is really the central theoretical piece in the book. Castells, drawing on the philosophy of Louis Althusser, argues that urban sociology requires new theoretical perspectives because it lacks an "object" that is theoretical rather than concrete and specifically urban rather than societal. Urban sociology, therefore, "is not a scientific domain, nor a field for observation, but rather an ideological artifact" (p. 61). It is ideological rather than scientific in that it produces "displaced knowledge," a distorted picture of reality for want of incorporation into a fully adequate theory. He then articulates his own theoretical approach and discusses its application in the study of urbanization in the Dunkerque region.

The rest of the articles are of somewhat uneven quality but are collectively interesting in their attempt to apply the emerging political economy framework to a broad range of empirical questions. David Harvey's paper entitled "Government Policies, Financial Institutions and Neighborhood Change in the United States Cities" and C. G. Pickvance's study of urban protest movements are particularly stimulating.

This volume is an important contribution to urban literature. Although at times the theoretical reflections become too abstract and formalistic, the selections go far in helping to define a new problematic for the discipline. The very incomplete and tentative nature of the articles is appropriate in symbolizing the need to rethink our research agendas as well as our conceptual frameworks.

An Introduction to the Sociology of Rural Development. By Norman Long. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1977. Pp. ix+221. \$15.00.

Robert H. Bates

California Institute of Technology

Norman Long's book furnishes a useful synthesis of the sociology of rural development and provides a tantalizing adumbration of what a new sociology of development should be like.

Long provides a competent and economical overview of the field. In his first chapter, he reviews the "traditional" approach: the theory of modernization and the work of its most illustrious proponents, for example, N. J. Smelser and W. E. Moore. He also reviews close variants of this approach: R. Redfield's theory of the urban-rural continuum and the theory of structural dualism. In his second chapter, Long concludes his review of the classical contribution by summarizing those studies which emphasize the role of structural prerequisites and cultural obstacles to change. The work of G. M. Foster and his notion of the limited good; studies of the fiesta system in Latin America, with its emphasis on egalitarian and redistributive social mechanisms; and a variety of studies,



including his own, of the role of religious and cultural values in social change—all receive attention and comment.

In the second part of *An Introduction to the Sociology of Rural Development*, Long moves on to the work of the neo-Marxist theorists: those who emphasize the role of structural dependency and opposition between modes of production as fundamental to the problem of agrarian stagnation in the developing areas. Among the dependency theorists, he reviews in particular the contributions of P. Baran, A. G. Frank, F. H. Cardoso, and R. Stavehagen; among those who study the clash between primary modes of production, he emphasizes the work of C. Meillasoux.

In the next part of his book, Long covers the work on entrepreneurial behavior, particularly the work of Frederik Barth. Long's judgment in giving such weight to this mode of analysis can be questioned, but he appears to feel that the study of entrepreneurship corrects serious deficiencies in the modernization literature and provides as well a corrective to the exclusive preoccupation with conflict that dominates its principal alternatives. Long's enthusiasm for studies of entrepreneurial behavior wanes toward the conclusion of the book, however; I reserve further comment on this until the end of the review.

In his last substantive chapter, Long reviews sociological studies of major attempts at applied social change. S. C. Dube's studies of the Indian development effort provide much of the material of this chapter.

In each of these sections, Long's method is largely the same. In a forthright and competent manner, he outlines the major points of each approach. He then summarizes significant attempts to employ the approach in question in an empirical investigation—S. Epstein's use of the notion of structural differentiation in her studies in South India, for example. Long's appraisal of the utility of the various theories in actual field investigations provides a basis for his evaluation of them as theoretical constructs. These critiques are also competently and concisely conveyed.

Obviously, this book has much to recommend it. It will be the envy of anyone who has tried to provide an overview of the development field. It will be invaluable to any instructor contemplating lectures or for any graduate student preparing for qualifying exams. Moreover, I respect the utilitarian focus in the book: the perceived payoff of the theories in actual field investigations lies at the basis of Long's evaluation of them. The depth and diversity of his own field work in Central Africa and Latin America give substance to these evaluations.

What problems there are in this book lie not in its empirical foundations—and this is rare for works in the sociology of development—but, rather, in a lack of keenness and passion in critiquing the theories on theoretical grounds. What is an adequate theory of development? What should a theory of development be called upon to explain? How rigorous are the various approaches? Are they internally consistent? Answers to questions such as these should figure in any appraisal of the development literature, and Long's book can be faulted for giving them insufficient attention. A

second major deficiency is Long's lack of concern with the normative basis of the different approaches. Is the encounter between the modernization theorists and the neo-Marxists as dispassionate and bloodless as it is made herein to appear? Of course not. *Cui bono?* This crude but crucial question lies at the bottom of the conflict between the two schools and between the various parties who seek to mount, block, or manipulate the development process itself.

Long's growing awareness of the centrality of distributional issues in the course of this book helps to make it interesting reading. In the end, he places the competitive struggle for the benefits of development at the center of a new conception of development sociology. It is a conception that sees the development process as political at its core. The politicization of sociology which so prominently figures in development studies has led Long to the verge of a sociology of the politics of the development process.

Obedience and Revolt: French Behavior toward Authority. By William R. Schonfeld. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1976. Pp. 256. \$14.00 (cloth); \$6.95 (paper).

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The relationship between political regimes and their subjects has been fundamental in all political sociologies from classical to modern times. When citizens behave in certain ways toward state authority, we say the regime is stable; if they behave in certain other ways, the regime is unstable and the subjects insurrectionary or revolutionary. What, then, determines how citizens behave? Increasingly, political science and sociology have turned to early socialization for an answer: subjects behave in certain ways because that is how they were taught to behave. In this fashion, a direct causal link is sometimes traced between the early political experiences of children and the very stability of modern, especially democratic, societies.

William Schonfeld's *Obedience and Revolt* is very much within the political socialization tradition. The ultimate object of his interest is how citizens (in France) behave toward the state; the specific focus of inquiry is how French students relate to their teachers. From a case study of secondary school students (roughly, ages 11–18), a model of authority relationships is developed; the model is tested and refined in a companion study (involving more advanced students) and then extended to a reinterpretation of (nothing less than) "the overall sequence of events in French politics from the beginning of the Fourth Republic to the death of President Pompidou" (p. 143). Anyone who is willing to believe that

how adolescents relate to their teachers provides an analytic key to the entire postwar political history of France will probably find something useful and informative here; others, I think, will tend to be put off by the presumptuousness of the enterprise.

The initial case study is based on classroom observations, unstructured interviewing, and some questionnaire data obtained in a sample of 13 French secondary schools. (The complexities of the French educational system are explained in the first of two appendices.) Three general and interrelated patterns of behavior toward school authorities were observed. The first is called the "authority-laden mode." In this mode, students are given precise instructions about what to do and how to do it, and they follow the instructions. Sometimes, of course, they do *not* follow the instructions but engage in a form of ritualized and organized insubordination called a *chahut*; *chahuting* is thus a second behavioral mode. Among younger students, behavior toward authority typically alternates between these two modes, with teachers who are perceived as incompetent or lacking in forcefulness the ones most likely to be *chahuted*.

Among older students, this alternating pattern gives way to what is called a "pattern of assumed coverage." Here, "the behavior of students is as regimented as [in the authority-laden mode], but, in contradistinction, only a minimal number of specific or special directives are issued . . ." (p. 41). Assumed coverage thus is based on what Schonfeld calls "remembered socialization." In this mode, teachers no longer give many precise instructions because they expect older students to be more independent; students no longer *chahut* because they have come to value the completion of their education. Older students sometimes fall back into the alternating pattern with incompetent teachers or with those who teach unimportant subjects. Thus, Schonfeld's "model" of authority relationships is approximately this: if the individual values what the unit (school, union, party, state, whatever) has to offer and perceives that membership in the unit maximizes that value (if the unit is seen as effective), assumed coverage will predominate; otherwise, behavior toward unit authority will alternate between conformity with authority-laden directives and organized insurrection (the *chahut*).

This school-based model is applied in the second case study, that of the *Ecole Nationale d'Administration* (ENA), which is, in essence, a high-powered graduate school specializing in training upper-echelon civil servants for the French government. (The structure and functioning of the ENA is discussed in the second appendix.) The ENA is very much an elite institution; half the ministers in Pompidou's last cabinet were ENA graduates. Most of the fieldwork for the ENA study was done from May through July 1968 or, in short, during the famous May Revolt, the most serious instability in French politics since the Algerian crisis 10 years earlier.

During the May Revolt, the ENA went through a minicrisis of its own, precipitated by the posting of grades and revolving around the general

issue of ENA reforms. The analysis of the ENA crisis need not concern us in detail. In general, precrisis authority relationships were governed by assumed coverage; some questioning of the relevance of the school to occupational goals, coupled with a certain lack of forcefulness in the ENA administration, led to a breakdown of assumed coverage and a prolonged *chahut*; this *chahut* ended (and assumed coverage resurfaced) as the result of authority-laden behavior by school officials. Thus, the ENA study tends to confirm the school-based model of authority relationships in most particulars. Since that was the purpose of doing the second case study, perhaps one should not insist on anything more. Still, given research access to the nascent political elite of France in a time of serious national crisis, one might have hoped for something a bit more interesting to surface from these materials.

The secondary school and ENA case studies occupy the first half of the book; in the second half, the model of authority relationships is formalized (chap. 4) and then extended to a more general analysis of French political history (chap. 5), and social structure (chap. 6). The Fourth Republic, for example, was "basically an assumed coverage regime" (p. 145); the Algerian crisis of May 1958 was "a full-blown *chahut*" (p. 147); the new constitution of September 1958, which launched the Fifth Republic, is interpreted as a *chahut*-ending instance of authority-laden behavior (pp. 146-47); the May Revolt of 1968 was another *chahut*; and so on through all the significant political events in France up to the death of Pompidou. One wishes (desperately, at times) that it were possible to take all this as seriously as the author does, but in the end it is not. Of the entire volume, it may be fairly said, there is less here than meets the eye.

Class and Status in France: Economic Change and Social Immobility, 1945-1975. By Jane Marceau. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977. Pp. xii+217. \$13.95.

Jacques F. Brissy

University of Illinois at Urbana

This book is about the French stratification system after World War II. Jane Marceau's primary objective is to disprove the "frequently encountered opinion" that economic growth necessarily entails a decline in inequality. The French economy grew, in terms of its own history, exceptionally fast after 1945. The French miracle, however, failed to solve the basic problems of social inequality: "... bourgeois control of the major institutions of French society after 1945 in many ways made the persistence of inequality inevitable" (p. 183). The secondary purpose of the book is to present the work of modern French sociologists in the area of stratification. Much of this work remains untranslated and therefore is not

easily accessible for sociologists outside French-speaking countries. This second objective is fairly well attained and will not be discussed here.

As far as the first objective is concerned, I would characterize *Class and Status in France* as both informative and frustrating. It is informative in the sense that the reader unfamiliar with the French case is provided with a relatively complete digest of selected official statistics concerning various aspects of social mobility and stratification: distribution of capital and patrimony, income, taxation, housing, holidays, consumer goods, education, occupations, recruitment of business and political elites, etc. Many of these statistics are probably available at your library, but the book may save you some time if you are mainly looking for the overall picture.

When one turns from the statistical tables to the text itself, this ambitious work is often frustrating and sometimes irritating. The central argument developed in eight chapters can be summarized as follows. Although the living standards of the mass of French people were greatly improved as a result of prolonged and rapid economic growth in France between 1945 and 1975, there is no ground for optimism. In spite of increased prosperity, the shape of the social structure was not fundamentally modified. One can still identify the traditional class barriers that persist between the bourgeoisie, the middle class, and the working class. Access to rewards, status, and power is still primarily determined by the individual's position in the production process. The major institutions of production and distribution, education, information, and decision making remain under capitalist control.

According to Marceau, two features remained particularly salient in French society between 1945 and 1975: patterned inequality and clustering of rewards. The first is unequal access of individuals to nearly all the socially available rewards generated by the socioeconomic system, an inequality patterned by the place of the recipient in the productive process. Second, there is a clear clustering of rewards: those groups relatively worst placed in terms of any one aspect of well-being are to be found equally badly off in terms of virtually all the others. Such discoveries could provide illustrations for an introductory sociology textbook; they look somewhat naive in the work of an expert in class and stratification.

Marceau tried hard to reconcile the Marxian rhetoric with the statistical evidence used, without being completely successful. The book is presented to us as "primarily an empirical work, though not an empiricist one" (p. 3). This probably means that statistics can be used at face value when they tend to support the theory and only with "important provisos" otherwise (see, for instance, the reinterpretations in pp. 51-54). The Marxist makeup does not add to the analysis. A Marxist audience will have difficulties in coping with Marceau's three-class model, for instance. And non-Marxists may become bored with the unnecessary jargon. Nonetheless, the book contains plenty of valuable factual information, and this case study will be welcomed by all of us who share some interest in comparative analysis.

Protest and Political Consciousness. By Alan Marsh. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1977. Pp. 272. \$14.00 (cloth); \$6.95 (paper).

Richard Apostle
Dalhousie University

In *Protest and Political Consciousness*, Alan Marsh sets out to demonstrate that widespread citizen deference to political authority is not an adequate explanation of British political stability. Marsh conducted a major social survey—the first of an eight-nation series of national surveys on the sources of protest in advanced industrial systems—during 1973 and 1974 with a representative sample of the British electorate. The study, in focusing on the social-psychological aspects of protest behavior, investigates the major sets of psychological variables, including measures of deference, which may interpret the connection between social structure and behavior.

The basic dependent variable is a measure of protest potential which is constructed from respondent attitudes toward various examples of unconventional political behavior. In chapter 2, Marsh is able to demonstrate broad approval for, and verbal willingness to engage in, unorthodox activities ranging from petitioning to unlawful demonstrations. This finding does indeed challenge G. Almond and S. Verba's emphasis on deference as a key to British political life. In terms of the data the author presents in chapters 5 and 9, the fact that there are relatively few respondents who combine political trust with political sophistication and efficacy justifies the conclusion (pp. 221–24) that only a small portion of the British population may be characterized as passive, deferential participants in orthodox political processes.

There are some clear limits to this type of analysis. The final measure of protest potential excludes the extreme items on damage and violence because so few respondents endorse them (p. 50), indicating important reservations about unorthodox political behavior. The emergence of a first "proestablishment" factor in a factor analysis of major political attitudes (pp. 97–100), which Marsh does not gloss over, suggests the existence of further constraints on protest activities. There are also some perennial questions and criticisms regarding the connection between dispositional measures and actual behavior. On this last problem, Marsh argues persuasively that the real issue concerns the "parameters of behavioral license" (p. 18) within which protest may occur, not the direct prediction of behavior.


Marsh subsequently develops a solid accounting model which assesses the relative significance of various psychological measures for an explanation of protest potential. In chapters 4, 6, and 7, he shows that ideological position, relative deprivation, and personal values, respectively, have only a modest capacity to account for protest potential. In the crucial fifth chapter, Marsh argues that the relatively nonpartisan measures of political

sophistication, efficacy, and trust are the major determinants of protest potential. In particular, the combination of political sophistication and efficacy with a distrust of political authority leads to increased protest potential (pp. 121–31). The eighth chapter examines the somewhat different dynamics of protest among students.

The quantitative analysis is well done. Marsh employs a wide variety of techniques, ranging from cross-tabulations to factor and regression analysis, to explore the data. He demonstrates a good deal of sensitivity to the significance of the nonlinear relationships, particularly in the central chapter on political conceptualization, efficacy, and trust. However, the schematic final model presented in the concluding chapter would probably have benefited from more complex regression procedures that handle indirect and interaction effects. Marsh also provides readable explanations of the various techniques in the body of the text and includes an informative appendix on index construction.

Despite the considerable accomplishments of this volume, there are some problems. The theoretical structure of the study is not sufficiently integrated. Several chapters are organized around relatively weak social psychological notions, such as the “dissatisfaction → protest model” (p. 134), which have only indirect links to major positions in the collective behavior literature. There are also some limitations inherent in the study design which create theoretical difficulties. First, the survey is a cross-sectional one, and it is difficult to make strong statements concerning trends in deference levels. Contrary to the author’s assurances (p. 9), he is indeed pushed in the direction of making claims of this order. For example, he states at one point that “the general theme of this study” is “that deference is *no longer* a force in British political culture but has *given way* to a concern for influence in the decisions of the political community” (p. 117; my italics). Second, and most important, the study cannot, by itself, address the basic comparative questions which Almond and Verba have raised regarding deference with the same range of data they had. Perhaps with the completion of other studies in the series, Marsh will be able to match, or even surpass, the comparative basis of previous work.

The book is poorly produced. In addition to numerous typographical errors and instances of awkward constructions, there are references, particularly to some important questionnaire wordings (p. 44), which are missing. Some of the analysis in the text is difficult to assess because the complex tabulations have not been included; some descriptive tables, or schematic diagrams of simple correlations, might have easily been replaced by tables concerning more important relationships (pp. 86, 120–21). There is no index, and the binding of the paperback version disintegrated under the gentle impact of two careful readings.



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
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
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
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IN THIS ISSUE

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The Weakness of Organization: A New Look at Gamson's *The Strategy of Social Protest*¹

Jack A. Goldstone
Harvard University

In *The Strategy of Social Protest* William Gamson asserted that the organization and tactics of a social protest group strongly influence the group's chances for success. This assertion was based on an analysis of the rates of success of 53 social protest groups arising in America between 1800 and 1945. This article shows first that Gamson's results are based on a series of very weak assumptions and on frequently spurious zero-order correlations. When data on the rates of protest group success are reanalyzed, no effect of organizational or tactical parameters is evident. Additional data on the timing of social protest group success are then introduced, and a stochastic model is presented which closely fits the data ($r > .95$). With the help of this model, the timing of success is also shown to be substantially independent of the organization and tactics of the protest group. Finally, a new interpretation of the probability of protest group success, based on the incidence of broad national crises, is suggested.

William Gamson's *The Strategy of Social Protest* (1975) attempted to find explanations for the success or failure of social protest groups in achieving their expressed goals. Gamson examined detailed data on 53 groups, ranging from labor unions to Christian peace movements, to see whether there were any consistent relationships between rates of success and the organization, tactics, or goals of the challenging groups. He reported that goals, tactics, and organization factors *did* make a difference in a protest group's chances for success; groups which could not marshal the necessary organizational or tactical strengths were considered likely to fail, in their own terms, to wrest any favors from the economic or political system. Thus Gamson concluded that (p. 143) "entry . . . into the pluralist heaven . . . is not prohibited for those with the gumption, the persistence, and the skill to pursue it long enough. But this is, at best, cold comfort. . . . If it costs so much to succeed, how can we be confident that there are not countless

¹ Thanks are due to Geoff Fougere, whose trenchant criticisms of Gamson's work prompted this reexamination of Gamson's analysis; to Ron Breiger, Kevin Fong, Theda Skocpol, and Harrison White, who provided many helpful comments; and especially to John Padgett, whose patience and penetrating observations in many discussions greatly improved the paper. Research support under National Science Foundation grants no. SOC76-24394 and JER76-17502 and an NSF graduate fellowship is gratefully acknowledged.

would-be challengers who are deterred by the mere prospect?" However, a closer examination of the data shows that they do not support this conclusion.

CRITIQUE OF GAMSON'S ANALYSIS

The Analysis Summarized

Gamson's data base is a random sample of 53 groups drawn from a list of 4,500 groups that participated in acts of social protest in America between 1800 and 1945. The final 53 groups were arrived at by a process including random selection, correction for duplication, and examination to see whether the group fitted Gamson's definition of a social protest group as a group seeking to mobilize an unmobilized constituency against an antagonist lying outside that constituency. In Gamson's words, the final groups represent a "random sample of all valid entries in the gross file [of 4,500 groups]" (p. 155).

The success or failure of each group was then determined from a combination of historical studies and, where possible, interviews. Groups that attained their desired ends in regard to most of their goals were considered to have gained *new advantages*. Groups that attained only some of their desired goals, or only partial satisfaction in regard to their chief goals, were considered to have gained *partial advantages*. Groups that failed to attain their goals to any appreciable degree were considered to have gained *no advantages*. In Gamson's analysis, 26 groups (49%) received new advantages; seven (13%) received partial advantages; 20 (38%) received no advantages. Gamson combined groups receiving partial advantages with those receiving none, giving overall success rates of 49% success (i.e., new advantages) and 51% failure (i.e., partial or no advantages).²

He then coded 39 organizational, tactical, and goal-oriented parameters for each group. The distribution of these parameters was checked for zero-

² Gamson also assessed success in terms of the acceptance of the group by its antagonist as a valid spokesman for its constituency. However, I shall discuss only the attainment of new advantages, since, except for a very few cases, the two indicators give the same results. In fact, of Gamson's 53 groups, only two that did not gain at least partial advantages gained acceptance, while only six groups that did attain new advantages did not also gain acceptance. Even these differences, however, may be misleading, in the light of Gamson's observation (pp. 51-53) that "in a few cases, there seemed to be no particular desire for acceptance, once gains had been achieved." Examples include the Night Riders, "a clandestine group that never anticipated or sought acceptance for themselves," and the Society for the Promotion of Manual Labor in Literary Institutions, whose key activists turned to other issues once success had been achieved. Moreover, insofar as differences in the indicators occur, acceptance seems less affected than new advantages by the organizational and tactical parameters I shall be discussing (see figs. 6-1, 6-2, 7-2, 7-4, and 7-5 in Gamson [1975], pp. 79, 80, 94, 95, 102, respectively). Thus acceptance seems a slightly less sensitive, and, given Gamson's remark on groups

order correlations with rates of success. Seven parameters were stated to have significant correlations with success rates: bureaucratization, centralization, use of selective incentives,³ and the use of violence were positively correlated; recipience of violence, displacement-type goals, and factionalism were negatively correlated.

Problems in Gamson's Analysis

Several errors and inconsistencies in Gamson's data analysis lead to questions regarding his results. These involve matters of data counting and coding, the definition of success, the follow-up of the groups studied, and reliance on zero-order correlations without testing for the possible spuriousness of the observed correlations.

Spurious correlations.—Gamson's analysis of his 39 tactical, organizational, and goal-related parameters is based on examination of the zero-order correlations between individual parameters, or occasionally a pair of parameters, and the rate of group success. Unfortunately, with 39 parameters at work, if any one parameter is a particularly strong determinant of success or failure, it will generate spurious results in the zero-order correlations between other parameters unless controlled for.

One particularly strong determinant emerges at the outset—the espousal of displacement or nondisplacement goals. Among the 53 groups, 16 were designated as having displacement-type goals, that is, “goals including the destruction or replacement of antagonists” (p. 48). Nondisplacement groups, on the other hand, were those that sought only “to change the policies or organization of antagonists” (p. 43). Among the 16 displacement groups, the rate of success, as defined by Gamson, was 1 out of 16, or 6%. Among the 37 nondisplacement groups, the rate of success was 11 times greater: 25 out of 37, or 68% (see table 1). The strength of this factor is sufficient to invalidate almost all the zero-order correlations in which the impact of displacement goals was not factored out.

For example, Gamson reports that bureaucracy is a significant factor promoting protest group success. In his analysis, the 24 groups classified as bureaucratic had a success rate of 62%, compared with a 38% success rate for the 29 groups classified as nonbureaucratic (see table 2). However, as table 2 demonstrates, if the 16 displacement groups are removed from

that did not seek acceptance, a more problematic indicator of success than new advantages. Nonetheless, given the close association between the two, my comments on Gamson's analysis of new advantages generally apply to his analysis of acceptance as well.

³ “Selective incentives,” a term coined by Olson (1965), denotes special benefits or incentives offered exclusively to members of an organization, usually to maintain their allegiance.

the analysis, the success rate for the bureaucratic groups becomes 65%, while that of the nonbureaucratic groups becomes 71%. Thus the difference between the success rates of bureaucratic and nonbureaucratic groups is small and in the opposite direction when the impact of the displacement groups is removed.

Other spurious correlations, as will be demonstrated below, can be attributed to questionable assumptions in defining success, errors in counting and coding, and inadequate follow-up.

The definition of success.—For reasons that he fails to make explicit, Gamson lumps groups that have attained partial advantages with those that received no advantages to yield a success rate of 49%. However, one could just as well argue that partial advantages are evidence of success, and lump groups receiving partial advantages with those receiving new advantages.

TABLE 1
DISPLACEMENT GOALS AND OUTCOME—GAMSON'S ANALYSIS

OUTCOME	NONDISPLACEMENT GOALS		DISPLACEMENT GOALS	
	%	<i>n</i>	%	<i>n</i>
Success.....	68	25	6	1
Failure.....	32	12	94	15
Total.....	100	37	100	16

NOTE.— $N = 53$; $\tau_c = .52$; $\lambda_{rc} = .50$.

TABLE 2
BUREAUCRACY AND OUTCOME

OUTCOME	BUREAUCRATIC GROUPS		NONBUREAUCRATIC GROUPS	
	%	<i>n</i>	%	<i>n</i>
Gamson's analysis:*				
Success.....	62	15	38	11
Failure.....	38	9	62	18
Total.....	100	24	100	29
Gamson's analysis with displacement groups removed:†				
Success.....	65	15	71	10
Failure.....	35	8	29	4
Total.....	100	23	100	14

* $N = 53$; $\tau_c = .24$; $\lambda_{rc} = .23$.

† $N = 37$ (16 displacement groups excluded, total sample = 53); $\tau_c = -.06$; $\lambda_{rc} = 0.0$.

This would yield a success rate of 62% (33 successes out of 53). The difference this makes in assessing correlations of organizational and other parameters with success rates is evident. Thus the decision of how to count the partially successful cases must be made with care.

The nature of the hypothesis that Gamson claims to be testing—the permeability of the American social system by the demands of protest groups—would seem to militate against classifying the attainment of partial advantages as evidence of failure. If the question being probed is when does a group succeed in gaining advantages from the standing social system, surely groups that have attained some advantages must be differentiated from those that have received none. The latter have simply failed—they apparently lack the organizational or other parameters requisite to securing any gains. The partially successful groups, though not gaining complete satisfaction, are nonetheless gaining both attention and some benefits. Thus they should be considered successful in an important sense. Yet as we shall see, Gamson's results rest heavily on his classification of partial successes as failures.

Counting and coding.—Gamson's definition of success or failure of a challenge depends only on whether a group's goals were achieved. Since in two instances pairs of groups were pursuing the same goal at the same time, the success or failure of these groups was not independent. If one group succeeded, the paired group also succeeded, by definition. Yet such pairs are counted as independent groups.

The two pairs that fit this description are (1) the American Anti-Slavery Society and the National Female Anti-Slavery Society, both seeking support for emancipation from the northern white middle class in the 1830s; and (2) the National Student League and the American Student Union, both seeking support for left-wing political activity on campus in the 1930s. Both members of each pair were pursuing the same goals, with the same or related constituencies and similar tactics, during the same time period. If one corrects this double counting, the number of independent groups is reduced to 51 instead of 53.

There is also an apparent error in coding. As noted previously, one of the most important classifications is whether or not a group adopts displacement goals. Gamson defines a displacement group as one whose goals include "the destruction or replacement of antagonists." Yet he codes as a nondisplacement group the First International, which he describes as "the first real Marxist effort in America . . . looking ultimately toward the building of a socialist state" (p. 153). As the professed goal of the International was the destruction of the power of capitalist employers as a class, or their replacement by worker-based management, it seems that the International fits Gamson's criterion for a group with displacement goals and should be coded accordingly.

The effects of these counting and coding corrections will be discussed after a look at problems in Gamson's follow-up of the groups in his sample.

Follow-up.—In following the progress of a group in its course of protest, Gamson ceased to follow the history of the group if its protest activities ceased for five consecutive years. If such a period of inaction occurred before the group had attained any of its goals, the group's efforts were simply counted as a failure. This treatment of periods of inaction as evidence of failure leads to serious inconsistency in the analysis of similar cases.

As examples, let us take the American Federation of Labor and the National Brotherhood of Baseball Players, two of Gamson's protest groups. The AFL began its challenge in 1881. However, success was only fully achieved 54 years later, with passage of the National Labor Relations Act in 1935. During that time, many of the parameters describing the AFL changed—size, levels of organization, tactics, even specific goals. The level of protest activities varied as well, ranging from periods of large-scale strike activity to periods of relative quiescence. Nonetheless, Gamson considers the entire 54 years of activity to constitute one challenge. His coding is organized to provide consistent values for the test parameters in spite of changes over time—for example, size is scored as the group's peak size; use of violence is scored by whether the group ever used violence; factionalism is scored when factionalism occurred either at the genesis or during any reorganizations of the group; if a group's name changes over time, consistency is achieved by simply coding the longest-used name as the unique name of the group. Gamson—quite correctly—considers that insofar as the AFL, during its entire history of activity, sought to mobilize the same constituency, in support of roughly the same set of goals, against the same antagonist, its activities should constitute one challenge.

Consider now the National Brotherhood of Baseball Players. Major league baseball players were first organized by the Brotherhood in 1885 to seek greater freedom and higher base pay and pension benefits from the major league clubowners. No successes were gained by the players in the 1880s, and the Brotherhood's formal activities temporarily ceased. However, various acts of protest, including threats of strikes, were conducted periodically throughout the early and mid-1900s. In the 1960s, the players' union, then called the Major League Baseball Players' Association, won several major concessions. Success was indisputably achieved in 1972, when the players' union conducted the first successful general strike in major league history, delaying the start of the baseball season for three weeks. The owners came to terms, offering major concessions on all issues—contract freedoms, base pay, and pension benefits—that had been fought over intermittently since 1885. Again we find success after a long drawn-out series of protest activities, in which the same constituency was being mobilized throughout against the same antagonist, seeking the same goals.

Thus we would expect the activities of the baseball players' union to constitute one challenge in Gamson's analysis.

Yet this is not the case. Since bursts of protest activity by the players' union were separated by intervals of over five years, Gamson considers each burst a separate challenge by a different challenging group. Thus the failure of the union in the 1880s functions in his analysis as an instance of failure by a protest group; the later bursts of activity, and the successful conclusion of the challenge in 1972, are ignored. Though the overall pattern appears similar, the fact that the activity of the AFL was continuous leads to its inclusion as a success in Gamson's data. The discontinuity of the players' union activities leads to classification as a failure.

To see whether discontinuity of protest activities had affected Gamson's analysis and to assure consistent treatment of all cases, I followed up all the groups that Gamson classified as unsuccessful. I considered a group's activities to form part of a longer, discontinuous, challenge, only if *all* the following criteria were met: (1) The original group's protest activities were resumed by a group having the same constituency, espousing the same goals, and challenging the same antagonist. (2) When the challenge was resumed, both the general ideology and the specific goals were the same as those of the original challengers. (3) The basic organizational, tactical, and goal-related parameters (e.g., bureaucratic/nonbureaucratic, used violence/never used violence) of the renewed challenge were the same as those of the original challengers.⁴

Several challenges were found to meet these criteria.

In one case—the challenge by the Young People's Socialist League—two unsuccessful bursts of activity by the same group, only 10 years apart, are counted in Gamson's analysis as two independent instances of failure by two independent groups. Yet since the same goals, antagonist, constituency, organization, and tactics were retained throughout the YPSL's activities, it would be preferable to treat the YPSL's activities as a single, albeit discontinuous, challenge.⁵

⁴ The precise criterion was that when the challenge was resumed, at least five of the six major tactical and organizational parameters—use of selective incentives, bureaucratization, centralization, factionalism, use of violence, and recipience of violence—must be the same. In fact, only two of the challenges discussed exhibited any changes in organization or tactics. These were Planned Parenthood and the Journeyman Tailors' Union, both becoming more bureaucratic in their later stages. In this paper, Gamson's original coding of these challenges as nonbureaucratic has been maintained, because it is valid for much of their duration. However, recoding these challenges as bureaucratic would have no effect on any of the results discussed in this paper. The critique of Gamson's results on bureaucracy in table 2 is independent of the discussion of follow-up, while the results on the effects of bureaucracy presented below would only be strengthened by recoding these challenges as bureaucratic.

⁵ With the two instances of double counting noted earlier, this reduces the number of independent challenges in Gamson's sample to 50.

Moreover, in several cases, challenges which Gamson classified as failures were successfully resumed. In addition to the major league baseball players, these include:

1. *The American Anti-Slavery Society and the National Female Anti-Slavery Society*, established in 1832 and 1833, respectively. Goals as stated by Gamson: "mobiliz[ation of] a middle-class . . . reform constituency for the abolition of slavery" (p. 153). Goals achieved, under the leadership of the founder of the AAS, William L. Garrison, with passage of the Thirteenth Amendment in 1865.

2. *The American Birth Control League*, established 1921. Goals as stated by Gamson: to "mobilize a middle-class reform constituency of women for the greater acceptance of birth control, and more specifically to influence legislation affecting this goal" (p. 147). Goals achieved in the late 1960s, with the success of Planned Parenthood in gaining support for birth control among middle-class women, and with legislative successes in liberalizing abortion laws in California, New York, and other states. (The ABCL had changed its name to Planned Parenthood in 1942.)

3. *The Union Trade Society of Journeyman Tailors*, established 1833. Goals as stated by Gamson: "mobiliz[ation of] journeymen tailors for the achievement of benefits to this group" (p. 152). Goals achieved in 1915. The Journeyman Tailors' National Union had taken up UTSJT's cause. In 1914, JTNU merged with a breakaway faction of the United Garment Workers to become the Amalgamated Clothing Workers. The ACW mobilized journeymen and shop tailors for a successful strike in 1915, winning significant benefits.⁶

4. *The National Student League and the American Student Union*, established in 1931 and 1935, respectively. Goals as stated by Gamson: NSL—"A group, formed by former members of the Student League for Industrial Democracy, that attempted to mobilize university students for the achievement of an anti-war, anti-racist, and anti-fascist political program. It also concerned itself with campus issues such as the achievement of a free student press and the elimination of compulsory ROTC." ASU—"A group, formed by former members of NSL and SLID, that attempted to mobilize university students behind a broad . . . set of leftist political goals" (pp. 148-49). In 1962, the parent organization of NSL and ASU—the Student League for Industrial Democracy (SLID)—changed its name to Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). Goals achieved in the late 1960s with successful mobilization of university students for antiwar, antiracist ac-

⁶ The Journeyman Tailors Union left ACW later in 1915, over jurisdictional disputes, and maintained a separate existence as an AFL affiliate until 1938. However, major wage, hours, and closed-shop agreements—the goals of the UTSJT—had been achieved. (From 1915 on, the JTNU simply sought to maintain jurisdictional separation from the shop tailors of ACW; strike activity by JTNU after 1915 was insignificant.)

tivities. Specific goals achieved included abolition of ROTC on many campuses, liberalization of restrictions on free speech and free press at major universities, and various civil rights successes.⁷

Thus five challenges that Gamson considered to have failed did eventually succeed in mobilizing their target constituencies, and attaining full or partial achievement of their original goals. Since the goals, constituency, antagonists, and basic organizational and tactical parameters remained the same throughout each challenge, it appears that Gamson's attribution of failure in these cases is due to inadequate follow-up. Inasmuch as proper follow-up, when corrected for double counting, changes Gamson's success rate from 49% (26 out of 53 groups) to 62% (31 out of 50 groups), inadequate follow-up is a significant factor in Gamson's analysis.

Conclusion.—The critical nature of Gamson's errors and assumptions in the areas of definition of success, counting and coding, and follow-up can be seen in an analysis of the impact of factionalism on group success. Gamson reports that factionalism is nearly fatal to a group's challenge—groups free of factionalism are reported to have a success rate of 70%, while groups touched by it at some time in their history are reported to have a success rate of only 22% (see table 3). Much of this difference is accounted for simply by cases of double counting, lack of proper follow-up, and Gamson's definition of success. As table 3 shows, if these flaws are remedied, the success rate of groups free of factionalism rises to 87% (26 successes out of 30 groups), while the rate for groups that had experienced factionalism becomes 60% (12 successes out of 20). Even this slight difference, however, is erased when the displacement groups are factored out. As table 3 shows, factionalism then makes no difference—both the 23 groups free of it and the 11 affected by it had success rates of 100%.

The final tally of outcomes, if one were to make all the corrections noted and to control for the impact of displacement groups, is presented in table 4. These results deserve close attention.

A Reexamination: Displacement Groups and Success

The importance of the displacement/nondisplacement factor to group success is immediately apparent from table 4.

All the nondisplacement groups attained their goals, either wholly or in part. Thus it appears that any group willing to accommodate itself to some degree to its antagonist has an excellent chance of attaining its ends. More-

⁷ The histories of the AAS, the baseball players' union, and the American birth control movement can be readily found in any good encyclopedia, such as *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (1974). The history of the tailors' union can be found in Commons et al.'s (1934–35) history of American labor, and in Zaretz's (1934) account of the ACW, while the history of SDS is taken from Sale (1973).

over, the chances of substantial success for protest groups in general look quite good: of the 38 successful groups, 82% (31 of 38) were considered to have achieved most of their goals, only 18% (7 of 38) having been originally classified by Gamson as achieving partial success.

Among the displacement groups, however, 75% met with total failure.

TABLE 3
FACTIONALISM AND OUTCOME

OUTCOME	GROUPS WITHOUT FACTIONALISM		GROUPS WITH FACTIONALISM	
	%	n	%	n
Gamson's analysis (uncorrected):*				
Success	70	21	22	5
Failure	30	9	78	18
Total	100	30	100	23
Gamson's analysis (corrected for double counting, follow-up, and counting partially successful challenges as successes):†				
Success	87	26	60	12
Failure	13	4	40	8
Total	100	30	100	20
Gamson's analysis (corrected for double counting, follow-up, and counting partially successful challenges as successes) with displacement groups removed:‡				
Success	100	23	100	11
Failure	0	0	0	0
Total	100	23	100	11

* $N = 53$; $\tau_c = .47$; $\lambda_{rc} = .46$.
† $N = 50$; $\tau_c = .26$; $\lambda_{rc} = 0.0$.
‡ The First International is classified as a displacement group; 16 displacement groups are excluded; $N = 34$ (total sample = 50); $\tau_c = 0.0$; $\lambda_{rc} = 0.0$.

TABLE 4
OUTCOMES IN GAMSON'S DATA AFTER CORRECTIONS,
CONTROLLING FOR DISPLACEMENT GROUPS

OUTCOME	NONDISPLACEMENT GROUPS		DISPLACEMENT GROUPS		TOTAL
	%	n	%	n	
Success	100	34	25	4	38
Failure	0	0	75	12	12
Total	100	34	100	16	50

NOTE.—Includes corrections for double counting and follow-up, counting partially successful challenges as successes, and classifying the First International as a displacement group; $N = 50$; $\tau_c = .65$; $\lambda_{rc} = .67$.

We may thus examine with some interest the four displacement groups that did succeed.

One group, Father Coughlin's National Union for Social Justice, is an ambiguous case. Originally organized in 1934 to mobilize immigrants and the unemployed for the achievement of inflationary monetary policies, Gamson considered the NUSJ to have attained partial success when Roosevelt took up inflationary policies to combat the Depression. Success was only partial, however, because the NUSJ had also begun to espouse anticapitalist goals, seeking to replace free enterprise capitalism by nationalization of all banking and all natural resources. In these essentially displacement goals, the NUSJ was a failure. Thus, while the NUSJ is classified as a displacement group that attained success, on closer inspection it fits the general pattern—in its nondisplacement goals, it was able to attain partial success; in regard to its displacement goals, its challenge was a failure.

The three other displacement groups which succeeded, however, are indeed cases of the successful attainment of displacement-type goals. The National Student League and its successor organizations were eventually successful in eliminating ROTC from many campuses. The League of Deliverance, established in 1882 to oppose the employment of Chinese labor on the West Coast, and the Native American Party, an East Coast effort begun in 1843 to counter the rising political and economic power of Catholic immigrants, had some initial successes in obtaining economic and political sanctions against their targets.

All three of these displacement groups sought to displace an unpopular minority. The 12 displacement groups that failed were all minority groups—extremist political groups, third party movements, etc.—presenting a challenge to well-established interests. Thus we may refine our notions of displacement goals and success. For a protest group representing a minority interest, adoption of goals that include the destruction or replacement of the antagonist is almost certain to lead to failure. For a protest group representing a majority or established interest, however, some success in eliminating or displacing an unpopular minority may be quite possible.

These results have two consequences for Gamson's analysis. First, it appears that the permeability of American society to new interests, and the response of the society to new claims upon it, is far greater than Gamson indicates. Any interest group that is willing to accommodate itself to the rules of compromise, to seek advantages "within the system," has an excellent chance of eventually attaining, to some degree, its desired goals. The "flaw in the pluralist heaven," which Gamson seeks to demonstrate, seems to be not that the system is unresponsive to new interests, but that it is responsive even when those new interests seek to displace unpopular minorities.

The second point goes to the heart of Gamson's analysis. He is primarily concerned with seeking evidence for the effect of various organizational and tactical parameters on rates of success. Yet, as table 4 shows, his data are insufficient to support any such conclusions. The single parameter of displacement or nondisplacement goals is sufficiently strong that it must be factored out if the impact of other parameters on success is to be determined. However, if all the displacement groups are removed, unless one counts partial successes and discontinuous challenges, even if later successful, as "failures," the success rate of the nondisplacement groups is 100%. There is thus no apparent variability on which to base a conclusion on the effects of the remaining parameters, other than to note that, *prima facie* at least; based on the 100% success rate, they do not seem to make much difference.

Thus Gamson's analysis is seriously flawed. In addition to the spurious correlations produced by a failure to control, his results rest heavily on a scheme of data classification—specifying partial successes and discontinuous challenges, even if later successful, as "failures"—which is, at best, questionable.⁸

There is, however, another variable that can be used to test the effects of organizational and other parameters in Gamson's data—namely, the timing of success. Even among the groups that succeeded, there is a great deal of variability in the time from the initiation of their challenge to the attainment of their goals. Some groups were successful within a year; others worked for many decades before gaining success. Although the timing of success was ignored as a potential variable in Gamson's analysis, examining its distribution may tell us something more about the process of accommodation of the American system to social protest.

⁸ This conclusion also applies to a recent attempt to recast Gamson's analysis in multivariate form (Steedly and Foley 1979). The recasting uncritically accepts Gamson's definition of success, lack of follow-up, etc., and thus shares the problems of Gamson's study. However, it does eliminate some of the spurious correlations deriving from Gamson's reliance on zero-order correlations. In particular, the authors find that the most important predictor of success is displacement/nondisplacement goals, and that when this predictor is included in a multiple regression on group success, the parameters of bureaucracy (levels of hierarchy), centralization, and use of selective incentives contribute less than .015 to the coefficient of determination (p. 7 and table 5, p. 12). Curiously, the authors find the exclusion of bureaucracy, centralization, and the use of selective incentives from their predictive model unremarkable. They approach their work simply as a methodological strengthening of Gamson's study, that "confirmed the propositions of . . . Gamson" (p. 12). Yet insofar as the authors—accepting all of Gamson's counting, coding, and so forth—still find that several of his propositions regarding the effects of organizational parameters were spurious, their methodological strengthening, even though they seem unaware of it, displays the weakness of several of Gamson's substantive conclusions.

A STOCHASTIC MODEL FOR THE TIMING OF PROTEST GROUP SUCCESS

The Time Distribution of Success

The time distribution of success for those protest groups that attained their goals, both in Gamson's original analysis and when augmented by partially successful and discontinuous successful challenges, is shown in figure 1. As can be seen from the graph, the pattern is the same for both populations: a substantial number of groups attain success in 12 years or less; a substantial, but lesser, number attain success in more than 12 but less than 24 years; and as we go further out on the X axis, we find successively fewer groups taking a longer time to attain success.

One might suspect that differences in group organization or tactics were responsible for differences in the time required. However, the observed pattern can be generated by a simple stochastic model. As we shall show, the model both fits the data extremely well and is independent of any consideration of the effects of organizational or tactical parameters. Thus the timing of protest group success appears to have no causal relation to the organization or tactics of a protest group; instead, the timing of success seems to depend heavily on the incidence of broad political and/or economic crises in the society at large.

Generating the Model

The simplest way to generate the probability model is as follows. In any given year, a group may either attain its goals or not. Let us say that the probability of success in any given year is p . Then the probability that a group will succeed in its first year is simply p . The probability that it




FIG. 1.—The time distribution of success

will succeed in its second year is the probability it fails in year 1— $(1 - p)$ —times the probability that it will succeed in year 2, which is simply p . Thus the probability of success in exactly two years is $(1 - p)p$. Similarly, the probability of succeeding in the third year is the product of the probability of failing in years 1 and 2 times the probability of success in year 3, or $p(\text{success in exactly three years}) = (1 - p)(1 - p)p$. Thus in general, the probability of succeeding in exactly n years is given by equation (1):

$$p(\text{success in exactly } n \text{ years}) = (1 - p)^{n-1}p. \quad (1)$$

If p is small, the values of p for specific years will not vary greatly. Thus if $p = .05$, the probability of success in exactly 20 years is .02, while the probability of success in exactly 30 years is .01—not a large difference. However, significant differences emerge if instead of looking at the probabilities for specific years, we look at the probabilities of success for intervals of several years.

Say we look at the probability that a group will succeed in 20 years *or less*. This is simply one minus the probability that the group will fail in all 20 years, or $1 - (1 - p)^{20}$. In general, the probability of succeeding in n years or less is given by equation (2):

$$p(\text{success in } n \text{ years or less}) = p_n = 1 - (1 - p)^n. \quad (2)$$

Using equation (2), we can calculate the probability of success in 20 years or less, if $p = .05$, to be $p_{20} = .64$. Similarly, we can calculate the probability of success in 30 years or less, again with $p = .05$, to be $p_{30} = .785$.

We can think of p_n not only as the probability that a single group will succeed in a given number of years, but also as the proportion of groups in a sample that is likely to succeed in that number of years. Thus, for $p = .05$, the model would predict that 64% of the groups in a sample would have succeeded in 20 years or less, that an additional 14.5% of the sample would have succeeded in 20–30 years, and that the remaining 21.5% would succeed only after 30 years or more. Thus the model is simply tested—one need only compare the proportion of groups in our sample observed to succeed in a given number of years with the proportion predicted from the model.

Testing the Model

Two tests were made of the goodness of fit of the simple stochastic model described above to the time distribution of success data in Gamson's study: the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) one-sample test, and computation of the semilog linear regression correlation.

1. *Kolmogorov-Smirnov test*.—Figures 2 and 3 compare the time distribution of success for the stochastic model and the observed data sets. In each figure the smooth curve represents the model's specification of $p_n = 1 - (1 - p)^n$; the step curve represents the observed data (i.e., the proportion of the groups in Gamson's study that attained success in elapsed time x).⁹ The parameter p has been estimated from the inverse of the sample mean. Thus, for Gamson's original analysis (fig. 2), p is estimated within .98 confidence limits as $\hat{p} = 1/E(x) = .048 (+.023/-.018)$. If one uses the larger sample including partially successful and discontinuous successful challenges (fig. 3), p is estimated as just a bit smaller, but in the same range, at .041 (+.021/-.013).

The K-S one-sample test (Conover 1971) analyzes the probability that a given sample was drawn from a population with a specified cumulative distribution on a two-valued dependent variable, for example, success/failure. The test focuses on the maximum difference, labeled D , between the cumulative distribution of the sample data and the specified cumulative distribution. If D exceeds the critical value for the $1 - \alpha$ confidence level, then with probability α , the sample was not drawn from a population with the specified distribution.

As can be seen from the figures, the fit to the model in both cases is




FIG. 2.—The cumulative time distribution of success for successful groups in Gamson's original analysis ($N = 26$).

⁹ The model is actually a step function too, with a small step each year, but it has been smoothed out slightly to ease comparison with the data curve.




FIG. 3.—The cumulative time distribution of success for successful groups in Gamson's original analysis plus partially successful and discontinuous successful challenges ($N = 38$).

excellent. To reject the hypothesis that the samples were drawn from a population represented by the model at the .95 level, observed D 's would have to exceed the critical values of .259 and .215 for samples of size 26 and 38, respectively. The observed D 's, .13 and .085, are well within these limits. Thus the probability is quite good that both samples were drawn from a population with the distribution of success specified by the given model.¹⁰

2. *Semilog linear correlation.*—The semilog linear correlation coefficient was calculated in order to determine the power of the model in predicting the observed data sets.

The relation between cumulative success and elapsed time specified by the model, $y = p_n = 1 - (1 - p)^n$, can be rewritten as a linear relation between a substitute variable, $y^* = \ln(1 - y)$, and n , as follows:

$$y^* = n[\ln(1 - p)]. \quad (3)$$

Thus, if a linear regression is computed for y^* and n , the model predicts that the resulting linear equation will have slope $\ln(1 - p)$ and intercept

¹⁰ Even with these small samples, the K-S test is fairly powerful. For example, an alternative stochastic distribution, the Poisson distribution with mean $\mu = E(x)$, can be calculated and compared with both data curves. The maximum D 's in this case are .420 at nine years for Gamson's original data and .419 at 16 years for the larger sample. Thus the possibility that the time distribution of success is a Poisson distribution can be decisively rejected.

zero. The computed correlation will be a measure of how well the cumulative success rate y is predicted simply by the elapsed time n and the probability-of-success parameter p .

The results of the linear correlation are given in table 5. As can be seen, the correlations are very high, greater than .95, and the correspondence between the predicted slope and intercept and the observed data is quite good.

In sum, the model gives excellent predictions of the observed distribution of the timing of success; moreover, the accuracy of prediction is robust when partial successes and discontinuous successful challenges are included in the analysis.

Testing for Spurious Correlation

Another way to express the close agreement between the observed time distribution of success and the stochastic model is to note that the time distribution of success can be predicted from knowledge of only one parameter—the constant probability of success, p . However, if the entire distribution can be predicted from p , which is assumed to be constant, none of the organizational or tactical parameters of the groups need be known in order to predict the distribution of success. In other words, *the success of the model in predicting the overall time distribution of success implies that organizational and tactical parameters are irrelevant to the timing of protest group success.*

This hypothesis deserves further testing.

If, for example, bureaucratic groups *do* succeed more rapidly than non-bureaucratic ones, but there are more bureaucratic groups in the sample, the overall distribution of success may be skewed in a way resembling

TABLE 5
REGRESSION ANALYSIS RESULTS, TIME DISTRIBUTION OF SUCCESS

	ESTIMATED $\ln(1-p)^*$	DATA ANALYSIS RESULTS†		
		Slope	Intercept	r
Success in Gamson's original analysis ($N=26$)...	-.049 (+.019/-.024)	-.054 (±.0098)	.11 (±.26)	.97 (+.024/-.080)
Success in Gamson's original analysis plus partially successful and discontinuous successful challenges ($N=33$)....	-.042 (+.014/-.022)	-.047 (±.0049)	.11 (±.15)	.98 (+.012/-.032)

* Model: $y^* = n [\ln(1 - p)]$; estimates derived using estimates of p from $1/E(X)$, for $N = 26$ and $N = 38$, respectively; .98 confidence limits from Clemans (1959) in parentheses.
† .99 confidence limits on parameters in parentheses.

the stochastic probability function. Or the overall fit may conceal the effect of individual factors which, in combination, offset each other.

To make sure that the fit of the overall distribution to the model was not in part a result of such effects, the time distribution of success was again examined, focusing on a number of specific organizational and tactical parameters.

Gamson indicated that six tactical and organizational factors had a significant impact on the success of protest groups. The factors were: (1) bureaucratization, (2) centralization, (3) use of selective incentives, (4) use of violence, (5) recipience of violence, and (6) factionalism. The first four factors were held to improve the chances for success, the latter two to make success less likely.

The K-S two-sample test was used to determine whether these factors, examined individually, had any impact on the timing of success. Successful groups were divided first into bureaucratic and nonbureaucratic groups, and the cumulative time distribution of success for the former was checked against that of the latter. If the former had any tendency to succeed more rapidly than the latter, the cumulative success curves would diverge. The maximum divergence, D , could then be compared with the critical value of D that would signify a statistically significant difference in the time distribution of success. Since the test is somewhat weak with samples this small, a .1, rather than the more stringent .05, level of significance was sought.

This analysis was carried out for all six factors, as shown in table 6. Again, the results are essentially the same whether one examines only those groups considered successful by Gamson or includes the partially successful and discontinuous successful groups. Although the impact of most factors is not statistically significant, there are a few surprises.

The difference between Gamson's 15 bureaucratic and 11 nonbureaucratic groups was statistically significant, but in the negative direction (table 6). That is, the bureaucratic groups took significantly *longer* to attain success than the nonbureaucratic ones. The same result occurs for the larger sample. The only other significant factor was the use of selective incentives. Again we find, for both Gamson's and the augmented sample, a negative impact, with groups that used selective incentives taking significantly longer to attain their goals. How can we account for these unexpected results?

These results may in fact imply that bureaucratization and the use of selective incentives tend to cause delays or inefficiencies in a group's struggle for success. Or the results may simply suggest that groups that succeed quickly do not need to use bureaucratization or selective incentives to hold together. Conversely, groups that have not succeeded rapidly may

adopt these means in order to maintain cohesion and allegiance.¹¹ In this event, the correlation of bureaucratization and the use of selective incentives with longer challenges may not indicate a causal effect of the mode of organization on the time required for success, but rather the reverse. Without more detailed data on the organizational history of the specific groups in this sample, one cannot confidently point the causal arrow in a specific direction. Suffice it to say that there is definitely no evidence that *any* of the factors Gamson claimed to be significant have a statistically significant effect on the timing of success in the direction that Gamson suggested.

A search was also made for interaction effects by testing various combinations of factors, as shown in table 7. For example, Gamson claims that the combination of centralization and bureaucracy is particularly helpful—but its effect in the two-sample test was not significant. Given that the two strongest positive effects in table 6 were centralization and use of violence, this combination was tested, but again to no effect. Finally, the combination of both of Gamson's negative factors—factionalism and recipience

TABLE 6
KOLMOGOROV-SMIRNOV TWO-SAMPLE TEST RESULTS FOR IMPACT OF
TACTICAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL VARIABLES ON THE TIME
DISTRIBUTION OF SUCCESS

Variable	<i>N</i> Groups Having That Characteristic	<i>N</i> Groups Not Having That Characteristic	<i>D</i>	Significance
Success in Gamson's original analysis (<i>N</i> =26):				
Bureaucratization.....	15	11	— .618	*
Centralization.....	18	8	.486	N.S.
Use of selective incentives...	7	19	— .646	*
Use of violence.....	6	20	.350	N.S.
Recipience of violence.....	3	23	— .450	N.S.
Factionalism.....	5	21	— .419	N.S.
Success in Gamson's original analysis plus partially successful and discontinuous successful challenges (<i>N</i> =38):				
Bureaucratization.....	21	17	— .423	*
Centralization.....	23	15	.365	N.S.
Use of selective incentives...	9	29	— .483	*
Use of violence.....	8	30	.270	N.S.
Recipience of violence.....	6	32	— .417	N.S.
Factionalism.....	12	26	— .410	N.S.

NOTE.—Recipience of violence includes both physical abuse and arrest.

* Significant at .1 level.

¹¹ This point is also made by Gamson (1975, p. 122).

TABLE 7

KOLMOGOROV-SMIRNOV TWO-SAMPLE TEST RESULTS FOR INTERACTION EFFECTS
(Data Drawn from Larger [$N = 38$] Data Base)

Variables	<i>N</i> Having Both	<i>N</i> Having Neither	<i>D</i>	Significance
Centralization and bureaucratization.....	11	5	-.344	N.S.
Centralization and use of violence.....	6	13	.514	N.S.
Factionalism and recipience of violence.....	3	23	-.826	*

* Significant at .1 level.

of violence—was examined. Here alone a statistically significant result, in the direction expected from Gamson's study, was found.

Yet there is again a problem of determining the direction of causality. It may be that groups afflicted by both factionalism and the receipt of violence are particularly likely to take longer in attaining their goals than groups not so afflicted. However, it may also be that groups that both take a long time before attaining success, and are subjected to violence, are more likely to develop factional splits as a result of such stress. There is substantial evidence in Gamson's data for this latter contention.

The overall rate of factionalism in the augmented sample of 38 successful groups is 32% (12 out of 38). However, for the five groups that both were violence recipients and took more than 10 years to attain success, the rate of factionalism is 60% (three out of five). Moreover, Gamson does record whether factionalism was present at the genesis of a group or developed later. Of the three groups that were violence recipients and experienced factionalism, two had no factional disputes at the time of their origin but developed them later. The third experienced factional divisions both at the outset of, and throughout, its challenge. Thus, while it is certainly possible that the interaction of violence recipience and factionalism causes delays in the attainment of success, there is suggestive evidence that the correlation is due instead to delays in the attainment of success, combined with recipience of violence, contributing to factional divisions. Again the time requisite to attaining success may have a causal effect on a group's organization, as well as the reverse.

In sum, no significant advantages in the time distribution of success could be attributed to the presence of any of the "helpful" tactical or organizational parameters, either alone or in combination. Nor could any significant disadvantages be attributed to the "harmful" factors, excepting the combination of violence recipience and factionalism. Such significant effects as were found seem to suggest that the timing of success has more impact on the organization of the challenging group than vice versa. Thus

the apparent independence of the time distribution of success from organizational and tactical parameters, implied by the stochastic model, was substantially confirmed.¹²

AN INTERPRETATION: CRISES AND THE TIMING OF SUCCESS

To this point I have provided largely negative results. In regard to rates of success, the overwhelming factor in determining success is the single parameter of displacement/nondisplacement goals. Nondisplacement groups succeed, displacement groups—except those with unpopular minorities as targets—fail; the organization and tactics of the groups appear to have little or no additional impact. Moreover, the timing of protest group success appears to be a simple stochastic process, governed by a constant probability parameter, p . This process can be modeled by equation (2) with excellent predictive results. Thus, tactical and organizational factors appear to be very weak as explanations of either the rate or the timing of success of the protest groups in Gamson's sample.

These results pose several substantial problems of interpretation. First, why should the process of social protest group success be stochastic? What type of model of political processes or social change would generate such stochastic outcomes, and could such a model provide an empirical meaning for the value of p ? Second, how can the apparent irrelevance of the organizational and tactical parameters of protest groups to their chances and timing of success be explained? Finally, what does the difference in success rates between displacement and nondisplacement groups imply?

Answers to all of these questions are beyond the scope of the present data analysis. However, I wish to present a few tentative interpretations, based on an apparent connection between the timing of protest group success and the incidence of broad, national, economic and political crises.

A distinction is often made between revolutionary change, which is highly discontinuous, and the normal processes of accommodation and gradual change in ongoing political systems. However, it may be that even the process of accommodation and "routine" change occurs in a rather lumpy, discontinuous manner. For example, we may suggest, following Gamson's results (Gamson 1975, pp. 116–20), that social protest groups, even if seeking nondisplacement goals, will get serious attention only when some external shock occurs, such as a major war or economic or political crisis. Only at such times, when the need for integration and support of the

¹² A multiple regression for the timing of success was also run, using Gamson's organizational and tactical parameters as the independent variables. The results were the same as those given above. The tactical and organizational parameters had little explanatory power; such power as they did have was almost entirely due to the correlation of use of selective incentives with longer challenges.

established order is particularly strong, are established interests likely to feel the need to compromise and accommodate to new social protest groups. In this case, the success of protest groups would be tied to the essentially stochastic flow of major shocks to the society.

Empirically, we would then expect, if there were any truth to this hypothesis, that protest group success would tend to be clustered around times of stress or turmoil. In fact, there is substantial evidence in the data of just such a clustering pattern.

In figure 4, the pattern of success over dated time is given for the 38 groups in the sample (including partially successful and discontinuous successful challenges) that attained their ends. There is clearly substantial clustering; moreover, the clustering is significantly in excess of that which would be expected from merely random clumping. (This is true whether or not the partially and discontinuous successful groups are included; see the box in fig. 4.) Most of the dates of success fall into six groups or clusters: one in the early 1830s; another from 1865 to 1873; one from 1905 to 1922; then two close clusters, but with distinguishable peaks, the first running from 1929 to 1937, the second from 1942 to 1948; and finally one from 1968 to 1972. All of these periods are associated with major periods of stress—the Jacksonian Revolution in the 1830s; Civil War and Reconstruction in the late 1860s and early 1870s; the overlapping turmoil of the Progressive Era, World War I, and the postwar recession from 1901 to 1922; and the depression, World War II, and the peak of the Vietnam War corresponding precisely with the last three clusters.

Looked at closely, even the two dates of success that fall outside these periods of national crisis confirm the general rule. The group that succeeded between the first and second clusters was the Native American Party, established in 1843 to oppose the rising power of Catholic immigrants on the East Coast and attaining some success by 1847. If we look at immigration figures for the city of Boston, for example, we find that there was indeed a regional "crisis" by 1847, when the group attained its partial success. In the decade from 1837 to 1846, Irish immigration into Boston totaled roughly 20,000 individuals, as it did in the decade from 1857 to 1866. Yet in the decade from 1847 to 1856, Irish immigrants to Boston totaled 120,000 (Handlin 1959). Thus an immigration "crisis" was occurring at the time and place of the challenging group's success. Exactly the same is true of the group that succeeded between the second and third clusters; this was the League of Deliverance, which succeeded in 1882 in obtaining sanctions against Chinese immigrant labor on the West Coast, at a time when Chinese immigration to the coast was reaching "crisis" proportions.

Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test vs. Random Distribution

$D_n = .375, n = 38;$	Sig. at .01 level
$D_n = .462, n = 26;$	Sig. at .01 level



FIG. 4.—The dated time distribution of success

In short, there is a near-perfect match between periods of protest group success and periods of broad crises. This is not to say that groups may not be found that succeeded at other times; yet if Gamson's sample is truly a random sample of groups active in this period, the proportion of groups whose success does not coincide with national or acute regional crises must be small indeed.

We should also note that if one focuses on the date of origination of the challenges in the sample, one does not find the same correspondence with periods of crisis. Instead, only slightly more than half (55%) of the 38 groups began their challenges during one of the periods of crisis listed above. Moreover, as such crises included 42% of the years from 1800 to 1945 (only challenges begun between these dates were in the gross file from which the sample was drawn), the correlation between periods of crises and the start-up of challenges is no more than would be expected from chance (χ^2 test, N.S.). Thus there appears to be little connection between the initiation of challenges and the periods of crisis noted above.

If these periodic crises are indeed the factor that explains the time distribution of success, we should be able to compute the average probability of success parameter p from them as well. This is easily done.

Since there is no connection between the times of start-up and the periods of crisis listed above, the probability of success in any given year, from the perspective of a challenging group, is simply the probability that a year will be a crisis year, times the average probability of success during a crisis year. The probability of a crisis year, or the frequency of crisis years in the time period of Gamson's study, is 42%.¹³ The average probability of success during a crisis year can be estimated by observing, for each year of the crises listed above, the percentage of active challenging groups that attain success that year. The average success rate for the cited crisis years is .095. Multiplying, we find the estimate of p from the frequency of, and the chances of success during, crisis years to be .040, in close agreement with the range of .041 (+.021/-.013) estimated from the simple elapsed-time distribution shown in figure 1, and used in generating the stochastic model. Thus attributing the timing of protest group success to the incidence of crises in the society at large is fully consistent with the stochastic model described above.

¹³ The dates for the full span of the above-named crises, taken from Current, Williams, and Freidel (1975), are: Jacksonian Revolution (through the panic of 1837), 1829-37; Civil War and Reconstruction, 1860-77; Progressive Era and World War I (through the postwar recession), 1901-16 and 1917-22, respectively; the depression, 1929-37; World War II (through postwar economic sanctions), 1942-48; and Vietnam, 1964-72. Different historians differ on precise dates for the beginning and end of these periods, so a year or two may be added or subtracted in various texts. On the basis of the dates above, total years spanned by these crises were 74, or 42% of the years from 1800 to 1975.

CONCLUSION

The irrelevance of group attributes to the chances and timing of group success poses problems for the traditional pluralist model of social structure. Since change is supposed to occur through the resolution of conflicts between competing interest groups, those groups better prepared for the process of competition—that is, those with superior organization or tactics—*should* come out ahead. However, this does not seem to be the case; at least, no one set of organizational or tactical attributes seems to offer significant advantages over others in attaining or hastening success. If there are any conclusions regarding the effects of organization to be drawn from Gamson's data, they seem to be two: First, *any* group capable of expressing its aims in some fashion (enough to get into a gross file sample of protest groups), and adopting nondisplacement goals, has excellent chances of eventually attaining its aims, provided it maintains its challenge until a crisis arises that makes success likely. Second, correlations between longer challenges and the use of selective incentives and bureaucratization suggest that these organizational attributes may be useful to groups that have a long wait prior to attaining success, and find themselves in need of some kind of reinforcement to maintain cohesion.

In regard to the process of accommodation of the American system to social protest and change, we thus find a picture of peculiar flexibility combined with peculiar rigidity, a picture rather different from that drawn by Gamson. Gamson claimed that success was difficult to attain, and painted a picture in which only the best-organized groups, after a long struggle, were likely to attain their ends. Yet if one challenges his definition of partial success as "failure," and follows up discontinuous challenges, a very different picture emerges. As noted, *all* of the nondisplacement groups eventually attain their ends in some degree, regardless of their organization. Moreover, the struggle is as likely to be a short one as a long one—fully 37% of the 38 successful groups attained their ends in less than a dozen years, while only 31% took more than 30 years. And the better organized among those groups, as we have seen, succeed no more rapidly than the rest.

Yet while the American social system thus appears extremely flexible and permeable to new interests, it also exhibits peculiar rigidities. All of the groups with displacement goals, except those with unpopular minorities as targets, fail. Thus there is effective discrimination between groups that accommodate themselves to compromise, and those that do not. While "compromisers" may almost certainly attain success, well-established interests seem to be nearly impervious to attempts to destroy or replace them. In addition, even nondisplacement groups appear extremely limited in their chances for success except during times of broad crises. It thus appears that

well-established interests are highly resistant to even compromise or accommodation unless the external pressures of a substantial crisis arise.

To sum up, the American social system appears to be willing to accommodate itself to a tremendous range of social protest, provided that destruction or replacement of well-established interests is not sought. Yet this process of accommodation is a highly intermittent, discontinuous process, in which the incidence of large-scale crises, rather than the organizational or tactical efforts of particular protest groups, determines the timing of protest group success.

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Understanding the Careers of Challenging Groups: A Commentary on Goldstone

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The disagreements between Goldstone and myself go beyond the merits or demerits of *The Strategy of Social Protest*. We differ in our approaches to historical materials, in the way we relate argument or theory to data, and in our concern with how theoretical models may be relevant to policy. Furthermore, these differences in approach to understanding the careers of challenging groups lead us to different conclusions on what it takes to gain entry into the American polity. As I shall try to show, Goldstone's criticism is weak, even when taken in its own terms, but our differences must be understood in the context of these wider issues.

THE MEANING OF SUCCESS

There is no more ticklish issue in studying social protest than deciding what constitutes success. The approach in *Strategy* begins with the distinction between the challenge and the challenger. "The actor whose political career will concern us is the *carrier* of a challenge to the political system" (p. 28, emphasis added here). This distinction between a social movement and a social movement organization (here, the carrier) is central to the resource-mobilization approach to social movements (see Zald and Ash 1966; Oberschall 1973; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Tilly 1978).

Organizational entities that carry a challenge hope or claim that certain people (perhaps everybody) will be affected positively by the changes they seek from their antagonist. Those people for whom benefits are claimed are the challenging group's *beneficiary*. The degree to which the beneficiary gains new advantages must be assessed independently of the success of the challenger qua organization. One group may see its leaders honored or rewarded while their supposed beneficiaries linger in the same cheerless state as before. Another challenger may have leaders who are vilified and imprisoned even as their program is eagerly implemented by their oppressor.

Operationally, there are many specific indicators of success, and *Strategy* divides them into two clusters. One cluster concerns the acceptance of a challenging group by its antagonists as a valid spokesperson for a legitimate

set of interests.¹ The second cluster focuses on whether the group's beneficiary gains new advantages during the challenge and its aftermath.

By distinguishing these two meanings of success, *Strategy* describes four outcomes: *full response* (groups that are successful on both clusters); *collapse* (groups that are not successful on either); *cooptation* (groups that gain acceptance without new advantages); and *preemption* (groups that gain new advantages without acceptance).

Of course, the two kinds of success are correlated, and most of the 53 cases fall on the main diagonal, but some 20% do not: 11 groups have either preemption or cooptation as outcomes. Furthermore, virtually all of the theoretical arguments and data analyses in *Strategy* make use of the distinction. Different antecedent variables are related to the two outcomes. The most interesting thing that one can say about how success relates to such variables as factionalism, centralization, bureaucracy, selective incentives, violence, and the like frequently concerns the relative strength of their relationship to these alternative meanings of success.

Goldstone hacks through this artery with a footnote in which he says, "I shall discuss only the attainment of new advantages, since, except for a very few cases, the two indicators give the same results." For him it is a distinction without a difference, not worth making. The elusiveness of the concept of success holds no fascination. There are simply better or worse indicators of a label with unexamined meaning.

Let us accept, for the moment, the meaning of success that Goldstone uses: the spread of new advantages to the challenger's beneficiary. How does one assess it and what rules should one follow to deal with the many troubling problem cases that arise? Our divergences in approaching historical materials are highlighted by our disagreements on such an issue.

The summary measure of success used in *Strategy* was based on a complicated procedure.² We are dealing with groups 75% of which had multiple antagonists. Hence, one could gain advantages from some antagonists and not from others. Some groups gave programmatic attention to subgoals in distinct institutional settings, involving quite separate antagonists. The National Student League, for example, focused some of its activity on campus-oriented concerns such as ending compulsory ROTC and compulsory chapel while at the same time it involved itself in the bitter struggle of coal miners in Harlan County, Kentucky. Given separate goal areas, groups may gain new advantages in some but not in others.

¹ In the case of groups with displacement goals, it would be more accurate to label this cluster "inclusion" rather than "acceptance."

² The procedures summarized here are described in greater detail on pp. 35-36 of *Strategy*.

The basic measure of success was consensual, relying on perceived agreement by historians, the challenging group itself, and its antagonist. A group received fields of codes reflecting these various assessments, with a separate field for each of its different goal areas and antagonists. Some groups had a dozen or more such fields. Clearly, some summary measure is necessary to reduce this complexity. The one used in *Strategy* distinguished two kinds of borderline cases: those that received peripheral advantages (that is, the positive fields appeared in goal areas that were not central for the group); and those that received equivocal advantages (that is, there was no consensus on whether the particular new advantages actually occurred).

The question arises how one should treat these borderline cases. Goldstone reasons that, inasmuch as I am a critic of pluralist theory and a skeptic about the openness of American society, I ought to bend over backward and take the most liberal possible definition of success. This would be the only fair way of testing my hypothesis that American society is not easily permeable.

I did not approach the issue in this fashion. The intent in *Strategy* is "to make sense of the experience of challenging groups in America" (p. 12) and, in the process, to evaluate parts of the pluralist interpretation of American politics. I do not believe that questions of the magnitude and complexity of the permeability of the American political system can be resolved in some definitive test of a hypothesis—no matter how carefully the sample is selected or the data set prepared. But even if I believed that one could prove or disprove such a hypothesis as Goldstone posits, I certainly would not rely on where the line is drawn between calling a group a success or a failure. *Strategy* never suggests that American society is not open because only half of the groups met the standard of success used. The issue is a red herring.

A better starting point is to ask whether, in summarizing a complex, multidimensional concept like success, one is able to capture the intuitively meaningful differences that exist. If groups as different in their experience and fate as Father Coughlin's National Union for Social Justice and the Steel Workers' Organizing Committee are both considered to have the same "successful" outcome, one is entitled to ask whether this is a discriminating enough standard.

The issue, then, is not one of testing hypotheses but one of data quality. The question to ask is whether subtle enough distinctions are being made to do justice to the historical reality underlying the summary measure of success. By throwing groups with peripheral or equivocal advantages in a bin with more genuine successes, one simply blurs important distinctions and thereby dilutes the quality of the resulting data set. Indeed, this theme of blurring important distinctions is a recurrent one in the discussion below.

THE AFTERMATH ISSUE

The end point of a challenge is marked by any one of the following:³ (1) the challenging group ceases to exist as a formal entity; (2) the challenging group, while not formally dissolving, ceases mobilization and influence activity for a period of five years; (3) the challenging group's major antagonists accept the group as a valid spokesperson for its constituency and deal with it as such. Since this end point is defined in terms of the acceptance cluster, it is not immediately apparent what the time period should be in assessing new advantages for the beneficiary. Should one look for new advantages only up to the end point of the challenge, or should one continue to look after that? If afterward, for how long a period?

There are two good reasons not to stop at the end of the challenge. First there is the danger that one will miss preemption, mistaking it for failure. A challenger might be crushed or fall apart after setting in motion important changes that reach full fruition only after its demise. Second, there is the danger that one will mistake full response for cooptation. Sometimes groups gain acceptance before any new advantages have appeared. By not looking beyond the end of the challenge, one would ignore the new advantages that followed soon after acceptance.

Strategy elected to assess new advantages for a period of 15 years beyond the end of the challenge.⁴ There is obvious arbitrariness in the choice of 15 years, and one might well argue for a shorter period to provide more assurance that there is some causal connection between the activity of the challenger and the advantages to its beneficiary. But Goldstone advocates that an indefinite period be used.

In my view, this advice leads to absurdities, well illustrated by the National Brotherhood of Professional Baseball Players. The Brotherhood began its challenge in 1885 and made quite a bit of headway with professional baseball players in the National League during the next few years under the leadership of John Montgomery Ward. After initially negotiating with the Brotherhood and agreeing to review the standard player's contract, the owners reneged without warning. Taking advantage of Ward's absence from the country and the geographical dispersion of the players during the off season, the owners sent out contracts ignoring the Brotherhood and unilat-

³ See pp. 30-31 of *Strategy* for a fuller discussion of what is summarized here.

⁴ Goldstone apparently thinks that no follow-up period was used, although *Strategy* states (p. 36), "The codes covered changes both during the period of the challenge and in the following 15 years." One might wonder how Goldstone could have missed this since the discussion of how new advantages were measured occupies only about a page. It is understandable in view of his muddle on the distinction between challenger and challenge. It is easy to get confused about a five-year period of organizational inactivity and a 15-year period for assessing new advantages when one is not clear on the conceptual distinction.

erally instituting a new classification system unfavorable to the players. Ward, who was a lawyer as well as a star shortstop, responded by forming a Players' League with outside financial backing. The Players' League competed with the National League during the 1890 season but collapsed after one year, taking the Brotherhood along with it.

Goldstone would have us call this group a success because in the 1970s—80 years later—major league baseball players received significant new benefits! The Brotherhood had certain organizational characteristics such as centralization. But how could one expect to find any meaningful connection between this characteristic of the group and a measure of success that rests on events 80 years after its demise?

THE INDEPENDENCE ISSUE

The unit of analysis in *Strategy* is the challenging group. This might seem a relatively clear unit, but a number of sticky questions arise. Suppose, for example, that a group changes its name. Is this merely old wine in new bottles, or is it really a different entity? If it is nothing more than relabeling, surely it is a case of double counting to treat it as a different challenging group.

There is also a problem of new wine in old bottles. Sometimes a minority faction seizes control of an organization's apparatus and its name. The organization may then radically change its direction, organization, and strategy. Surely, at some point, one would want to consider it a new challenger that happens to bear the old name.

As I write, the Ku Klux Klan is marching again in the South. Are we to treat this as the same challenging group as the Klan of the Reconstruction era, the Klan of the 1890s, and the Klan of the 1920s? The members are, after all, different people who may adopt different organizational forms and strategies, may have different interactions with agents of social control, and may have different outcomes.

The choice of a name by a group was never a criterion for inclusion or exclusion.⁵ Two names were considered to represent the same challenging

⁵ Goldstone says that "if a group's name changes over time, consistency [was] achieved by simply coding the longest-used name as the unique name of the group." This is false. We recorded every name that a group had and, for purposes of identification, used whatever initials or nickname was most convenient. The issue of a unique name arises only as a *sampling* problem. If one group has 20 names and another has only one, then the first one has 20 times the probability of being selected. Hence, in drawing our sample, we linked every group to a unique name. Our conventions were to use the most common or popular name if this was unambiguous and to use the name with the most letters if there were two or more competitors for the most common. This is quite separate from the question of whether, when a group changes its name, it has become an independent challenging group.

group if and only if the major goals, programmatic efforts, and constituency remained the same, and the average challenging group member and potential member would agree that the new-name group was essentially the old group relabeled.⁶

Strategy focused on a sustained effort or campaign as the basis for putting boundaries around the challenging group. An organization that carries a new mobilization effort by a new generation is a new challenging group, even if it bears an old name and has ideology and general values similar to those of earlier campaigns many years ago.

There are good reasons why challengers may choose to make use of existing names and organizational identities to launch new campaigns. The Ku Klux Klan is a symbol of terror and successful racial oppression in the South. Today it reappears, defanged, its members no longer able to hide their identity behind a ghoulish mask. Today's Klan still means to intimidate. Indeed, the symbolism of the Klan is chosen as an aid in that purpose. But to consider today's Klan the same challenging group as the Klan of Reconstruction is to be mesmerized by a symbol.

Goldstone considers that these methodological decisions were "errors." (I envy him his certainty that there are right and wrong answers to such questions instead of merely more and less useful ones.) Our differences stand out most clearly on the cases of the National Student League and the American Student Union. Goldstone calls it "double counting." They should, he suggests, be considered a single case. They were, he claims, "pursuing the same goals, with the same or related constituencies, and similar tactics, during the same time period."

Why should one consider them two independent challenging groups? Start with the fact that they had different outcomes. The National Student League grew out of the fratricidal struggles of the campus left in the early 1930s. Dissatisfied with the socialist politics of the Student League for Industrial Democracy, radical members formed this new communist-oriented challenger. From 1931 to 1935, the group pursued a number of specific campaigns—for the elimination of compulsory ROTC and compulsory chapel on campuses, equal educational opportunity for women and blacks, employment security for college graduates, and better working conditions for coal miners. The National Student League was generally met with hostility by university administrations, although the administration at Columbia University did, briefly, negotiate with the group. They ended up gaining neither acceptance nor advantages.

The period of combat and separate paths among communist and socialist groups on campuses gave way to the era of the popular front. The American Student Union was a popular front challenger, combining socialist and

⁶ This discussion of how name changes are handled appears in *Strategy*, p. 30.

communist efforts in a single challenging group. Some of the new efforts were continuations of those begun by the National Student League—for example, the campaign to end ROTC. But the American Student Union took up new issues such as economic aid to students and reform of college administrations. It took up foreign policy issues, promoting the Oxford Pledge “not to support any war which the government may undertake.”

This challenger was much more successful than the National Student League in gaining acceptance. During its 1938 convention, for example, the delegates received a letter of greeting from President Roosevelt, as well as messages from the mayor of New York, the president of CCNY, and the women’s director of the Democratic National Committee. While neither the National Student League nor the American Student Union gained new advantages, they *could* have had different outcomes on this variable, given the differences in where they placed their efforts.

But even if these two groups really had operated at the same time and had had the same outcome,⁷ there would be ample reason for considering them independent. The National Student League was involved in violent interactions with the police; the American Student Union was not. Members of the National Student League were arrested; members of the American Student Union were not. The American Student Union was 10 times the size of the National Student League. The National Student League made use of constraints as a means of influence; the American Student Union did not. The National Student League was competing with other, rival challenging groups for the same constituency, while the American Student Union had the field pretty much to itself. If we treat the two groups as a single case, what value should we assign it on these variables? Goldstone’s claim of double counting here is unwarranted, and his advice to treat the two groups as one can only muddy the antecedents of success, making it more difficult to discover and interpret the relationships that may exist.⁸

⁷ By Goldstone’s rules, they necessarily *do* have the same outcome, since he would credit either or both with the successes won by the student movement a generation later in the 1960s.

⁸ While I concede nothing to Goldstone’s general arguments on independence, I am prepared to second guess the coding of individual cases in *Strategy*. The American Anti-Slavery Society provided a particularly difficult set of dilemmas. Our procedures excluded satellite groups of a parent organization. A satellite group—for example, a women’s auxiliary or a vigilante protection unit—has no programmatic goals separate from those of the parent group and merely provides a service or additional resources for the parent group. Perhaps the Female Anti-Slavery Society should have been excluded as merely a satellite of the American Anti-Slavery Society, and this does represent a genuine instance of double counting. The American Anti-Slavery Society also confronted us with a case of a faction seizing control of an organizational apparatus. In 1840 the original organization split, but the Garrison faction continued to mount a challenge under the original name. We chose to use this watershed as the end of the

THE ISSUE OF PSEUDOSUCCESS

Goldstone believes that *Strategy* employs too restrictive a definition of success. There is irony in this charge because the book is, in fact, much more vulnerable to the opposite critique. It fails to distinguish the genuine article from two possible kinds of pseudosuccess. Hence, it is insufficiently restrictive.

Consider the shadow success: a group that realizes the changes it is seeking only to have the changes turn out empty of real meaning or impact. There is no more poignant example of such a group than the American Committee for the Outlawry of War. The committee carried on a decade-long campaign in the 1920s to gain American support and participation in a treaty that would make war illegal under international law. Salmon O. Levinson, an energetic and well-connected lawyer, made the committee's effort his own personal crusade, paying more than 95% of the expenses of the campaign from his own pocket, even when it was costing more than \$15,000 a year. The committee got what it was seeking when the U.S. Senate ratified the Pact of Paris (the Kellogg-Briand Pact) in 1929. Within a few years, legalities notwithstanding, the Japanese invaded Manchuria, the Italians attacked Ethiopia, and the Germans dismembered Czechoslovakia. History played a cruel joke on Levinson and his supporters.

Consider the tag-along group: a group that realizes the changes it is seeking because of what another, more powerful and effective, challenging group is doing. It joins successful campaigns but, in reality, contributes little of importance to them. Hence, it appears successful, riding on the success of others. The Federal Suffrage Association, for example, was not the most important of the women's suffrage groups. It fell in the sample, while the National American Woman Suffrage Association did not. The Federal Suffrage Association was inactive during the crucial years from 1916 to the passage of the federal suffrage amendment in 1920. The measure of success in *Strategy* does not distinguish this situation from one in which a group is the sole organizational carrier of a challenge.

These problems of pseudosuccess are acknowledged in *Strategy*, but they are not solved. The route to improving the quality of this data set is through further discriminations of this sort, allowing us to sort pseudo-successes from genuine ones in some reliable fashion. Goldstone's efforts to redefine the measure of success used in *Strategy* would have been better directed in showing us how to disaggregate these cases rather than aggregating even more.

challenge. But by the logic of our procedures, we should have then considered the Garrison American Anti-Slavery Society from 1840 onward as a new, independent challenging group to be included in the sample. Hence, one might say that we failed to double count here when we should have.

BUREAUCRACY AND SUCCESS

If one had not read *Strategy*, but relied only on Goldstone's presentation of its argument, his table 2 might appear to be a major embarrassment.⁹ It shows that when one looks only at groups without displacement goals, there is no relationship between bureaucracy and the ability to gain new advantages. One might think, from Goldstone's account, that *Strategy* argues that bureaucracy is an important determinant of gaining new advantages, but the book does not make that argument.

What does it say about bureaucracy and success? For a challenging group to operate effectively in conflict situations, two separate functional problems must be solved. On the one hand, the group must be able to maintain a series of commitments from members that can be activated when necessary—essentially a problem of *pattern maintenance*. Pattern maintenance exists when members of a group carry around their membership in latent form, even while not actively participating in collective action. When they convene, the individuals are ready to begin functioning immediately as group members again. In this sense, the group continues to exist even while individual members are scattered about and not in direct interaction with each other. On the other hand, the group must be able to solve problems of internal conflict so that power struggles within the group do not paralyze its ability to act—essentially a problem of *integration*.

Centralization of power, *Strategy* argues, helps a group with the problem of managing internal conflict. It does so in particular because it helps a group to avoid debilitating factional splits. Bureaucratic organization helps a group with the problem of pattern maintenance. By creating a structure of roles with defined expectations in the place of diffuse commitments, a challenging group can better assure that certain necessary tasks will be routinely performed.

Strategy created two organizational variables intended to capture the theoretical distinction. One, labeled "power centralization," differentiated those groups with either a dominant leader or another form of centralized power structure (e.g., a central committee) from the rest. The second, labeled "bureaucracy," might more precisely have been labeled "formalization and role differentiation." It distinguished groups that had a written constitution or charter, maintained a formal list of members, and possessed at least three distinct levels of internal divisions from those that lacked one or more of these characteristics. These two summary measures are empirically independent in this sample of groups.

⁹ Goldstone states that *Strategy* rests "on frequently spurious zero-order correlations" but, in fact, table 2 is the only shred of evidence he offers for this assertion. All of his other tables rest on the recoding of individual cases, using his own definition of successful groups.

What *Strategy* argues is that centralization of power is more strongly related to gaining new advantages, while bureaucratization is more strongly related to gaining acceptance. Both characteristics are helpful, but coopted groups are particularly likely to be bureaucratic, and preempted groups are particularly likely to be power centralized.

In the chapter on these organizational issues, *Strategy* works with a cluster of variables including centralization of power, bureaucracy, factional splits, external attack by antagonists or hostile third parties, inclusive versus exclusive organization, and the two measures of successful outcome. It looks at the relationships among these variables sequentially, typically analyzing three or four variables at a time, to explore different parts of a complex argument. I was remiss in not including the variable of displacement goals in this analysis.¹⁰ Let me use this opportunity to rectify the omission.

We coded a number of specific questions about the concerns of the challenging group. Specifically, we asked whether in its influence attempts, the group was concerned with (1) altering the scope of authority of all or some of its antagonists, (2) altering the procedures used by these antagonists, (3) altering the personnel of its antagonists, and/or (4) destroying or replacing all or some of its antagonists. Some 16 groups were coded "yes" on the last of these items; these are groups with displacement goals. They have a very poor rate of either new advantages or acceptance.

How do groups with displacement goals organize themselves compared with nondisplacement groups? Figure 1 shows the relationships for bureaucracy and centralization. Displacement groups are strikingly less likely to be bureaucratic than the others but only a little less likely to be centralized. No displacement groups are both bureaucratic and centralized, and only one is bureaucratic.

In considering why displacement groups fail, there is no way to disentangle the extent to which organizational characteristics such as lack of bureaucracy may contribute in important ways. Perhaps it is their choice of an impossible goal that leads them to ultimate failure, regardless of their organization. But it is just as plausible to argue that it is the inability of such groups to solve the problem of pattern maintenance through becoming bureaucratic that really produces the failure. In any event, groups with displacement goals are especially likely to lack bureaucracy, suggesting a problem of pattern maintenance.

¹⁰Goldstone misleads the reader by suggesting that the role of displacement goals is omitted in other discussions in *Strategy* where it is relevant. The chapter dealing with the unruliness of a group's tactics and the extent to which it is attacked by others includes displacement goals as a variable throughout. Similarly, this variable plays an important role in the discussion of the relationship of war and other crises to acceptance and new advantages.




FIG. 1.—Bureaucracy, centralization, and displacement goals

How does the argument fare when we examine the 37 nondisplacement groups? Figure 2 presents the same analysis as figure 7.4 in *Strategy* (p. 95) but this time for nondisplacement groups only. It shows, perhaps more clearly than the earlier figure, how bureaucracy is associated with acceptance while centralization is associated with new advantages. If a group is centralized, bureaucracy does not add to its ability to gain new advantages. Indeed, the nonbureaucratic, centralized groups do as well as or better than groups that have both characteristics.

A complementary result holds for acceptance. Here, bureaucracy is the more important organizational variable, while centralization does not add to the group's ability to gain acceptance. Indeed, the bureaucratic, decentralized groups do even better than those that have both characteristics.

Many of the groups with neither bureaucracy nor centralization have displacement goals. Hence, we are reduced to only four cases in this category for this analysis. It is worth noting that the only one of these four that enjoyed both acceptance and new advantages was the Federal Suffrage Association—a group pointed to earlier as a possible pseudosuccess.

LENGTH OF TIME OF SUCCESS: A CRITIQUE OF GOLDSTONE

Goldstone goes beyond a critique of *Strategy* to offer a positive contribution to our understanding of how challenging groups gain entry into the American polity. How does this contribution stand up? Goldstone first makes a series of unwise methodological choices that result in an indiscriminate measure of success. The consequence is that virtually every group appears to succeed and, hence, there is no variance in outcome to explain. Thus, he turns to the length of the challenger's career as a variable.




FIG. 2.—Bureaucracy and centralization by outcome for nondisplacement groups only

In trying to use this measure, he immediately comes to grief on his inability to distinguish the challenger from the challenge. Recall that the end point of a challenge is defined by acceptance or disappearance of the organization. Goldstone accepts this definition for those cases in *Strategy* that are already defined as successes. For his recoding, however, he uses a different measure to mark the end point, based on new advantages. These two measures frequently yield different values. The challenge of the Steel Workers Organizing Committee, for example, ended in 1942 when the union won recognition from its remaining antagonists after a six-year struggle. But it was not until several years later, after World War II ended, that significant new advantages were won. Goldstone is apparently unaware that the end point of a challenge in his data set means different things: sometimes that a group gained new advantages for its beneficiary; sometimes that the challenging group was accepted by its antagonists; and sometimes, in the case of preemption, that the challenging group collapsed.

What kind of model might fit such a muddy set of observations? I would suggest a null model as follows: success is unrelated to whether agents of social control physically attack or arrest members of a group; it is unrelated to the techniques that a group uses to gain and sustain the commitment of its constituency; unrelated to the strategy and tactics that a group employs to influence its antagonist; unrelated to the internal organization of the challenger.

This weakness-of-everything model assumes that the process is essentially random. In any given year, every extant challenging group has an equal, constant probability of success. In some years it may be a little easier, in other years a little harder, but for everybody equally. Nothing that the group does or undergoes really affects its chances in this stochastic process.

The poorer the quality of the data set, the more likely this null model is to fit. Poor quality is what one gets when the success of a challenge and a challenging group are confused, an indefinite follow-up period is used, groups with very different organization and strategy are treated as identical, and different definitions of the end point of a challenge are used. Indeed, this is the major lesson to be learned from Goldstone's analysis.

He encounters three awkward moments in his efforts to make a positive contribution. The first occurs when he presents table 6, assessing the impact of six variables on the time distribution of success. To his credit, he presents the analysis two ways—once using the definition of success and length of challenge from *Strategy*, and once with his revised, enlarged, and supposedly improved data set.

It is of some interest to compare the strength of the relationships in the two data sets. If Goldstone has, indeed, improved the quality, the relationships should appear more clearly. It turns out that Goldstone loses six-love on this comparison. The relationships are consistently stronger on the original data set from *Strategy* than they are on the revisions, sometimes very substantially so. He deftly sidesteps this potential embarrassment by not noticing it.

His second awkward moment occurs when he attempts to explain why bureaucracy and selective incentives are associated with slower rather than more rapid success. To explain this result, he finds himself echoing arguments made in *Strategy* and acknowledges as much in his footnote 11. He does not, however, actually present the argument, so let us look at what *Strategy* has to say on this point (p. 122):

We noted in Chapter Seven . . . that bureaucracy had a stronger relationship to one measure of success—acceptance—while centralization was more strongly related to the other—new advantages. Now we note that long-term challengers tend to be more bureaucratic than short-timers, but not more centralized and, further, that groups with a challenge in progress when a crisis arrives have a clear advantage in winning acceptance but a more equivocal one in gaining new advantages. Putting these results together suggests that third-party pressure in a crisis may be a mechanism that connects bureaucracy and acceptance. Bureaucracy helps a group to survive for a longer period in the absence of tangible results; a system-wide crisis then occurs and outside pressures push the group's antagonist to make some accommodation with it. The result is a higher rate of acceptance for bureaucratic groups.

Goldstone's final awkward moment occurs in his discussion of crises and the timing of success. Again, he finds himself making an argument that has already appeared quite explicitly in *Strategy*. He suggests that "social protest groups, even if seeking nondisplacement goals, will get serious attention only when some external shock occurs, such as a major war or economic or political crisis. Only at such times, when the need for integration and support of the established order is particularly strong, are established interests likely to feel the need to compromise and accommodate to new social protest groups."

While I prefer my version of this argument, Goldstone's is similar, as he acknowledges. But he fails to describe the analysis in *Strategy* that bears on this issue. Groups during whose period of challenge a war occurs are compared with the other groups. It turns out that the wartime challengers are considerably more successful, but mainly on the acceptance criterion. The results for new advantages are considerably weaker.

Strategy also compares groups that launched a challenge prior to the Great Depression—a challenge that was still unresolved when the depression came—with those that began their challenge while the country was in the throes of that national crisis. The predepression groups were markedly more successful than their depression counterparts, especially on new advantages. When one removes groups with displacement goals, the results on wartime challengers continue to hold for nondisplacement groups, but the depression results do not. Here, the interpretation must be complicated by the fact that the depression stimulated the formation of challenging groups with goals of replacing their antagonist. Six of the 10 depression-spawned groups were of this type, while none of the predepression groups had such goals.

Goldstone offers a different analysis, and in my view it is much less helpful in evaluating the crisis argument. Crisis is a loose label, and if it is to be anything other than a sponge concept, it needs a tight definition. Not only does Goldstone neglect to offer us one; he also shows a remarkable flexibility in deciding what is or is not a crisis period. The period before the panic of 1837 is a crisis but the period after is not; the postwar years of 1946–48 are considered a crisis but the prewar years, 1939–41, are not; the Vietnam years, 1970–72, are considered a crisis but the Korean War years of 1950–53 are not. I do not disagree with the underlying argument, but it is hard to see how one can evaluate it when so much flexibility and arbitrariness are allowed in deciding what constitutes a crisis period.

To summarize my criticisms of Goldstone, he has diluted the quality of the data set in *Strategy* in four ways: (a) he fails to distinguish between social movements and their organizational carriers; (b) he employs a definition of success so loose that it fails to distinguish among very different challenging group careers; (c) he treats quite different cases as if

they were identical; and (d) he fails to use a consistent definition in determining the length of a challenge. Furthermore, his attempt at a positive contribution employs the concept of crisis in such a sloppy fashion that it is deprived of any possible explanatory power.

CONCLUSION

Strategy explores a number of arguments from the literature on protest groups, bringing evidence to bear on them whenever possible. Some of these arguments bear on the general issue of the permeability of the American polity but many of them have little direct bearing. An attempt is made to draw out empirical implications from these arguments whenever possible and to examine how well the set of 53 groups fits these implications. Typically, clusters of variables are presented that deal with particular arguments. To make the analysis easier to follow, relationships are presented sequentially, using very simple graphs, but this mode of presentation does not make it any less a multivariate analysis.

There are some advantages to this mode of analysis and presentation. It makes it quite easy to identify deviant cases, forcing one to question why they do not fit the main pattern. It helps one to remain close to the reality underlying the labels and numbers, to remember the concrete experiences they supposedly reflect. By going back and forth between argument and data at many different points, one can develop a theoretical argument that is grounded in a large number of different concrete relationships.

Although I may be a critic of pluralist theory as an interpretation of American politics, I am a dyed-in-the-wool pluralist on methodological approaches in sociology. I readily concede that there are other ways of handling these data that might yield additional insights. *Strategy* includes the summary codes for the 53 groups in an appendix as an invitation to other scholars to pursue such analyses, and Goldstone's is the fourth such analysis that I know of.¹¹

¹¹ The others are Steedly and Foley (1979), Weisburd (1979), and Mirowsky and Ross (1979). Steedly and Foley took 30 of the summary measures and used nonmetric multidimensional scaling to reduce them to a smaller number of clusters. Five clusters were derived, using a similarities matrix. These empirically derived clusters turn out to be quite similar to the theoretically derived clusters considered in *Strategy* and, in fact, the authors use the chapter headings of *Strategy* to label most of them. Steedly and Foley then explored this data set with both multiple regression and discriminant function analyses, using, in turn, the five composite variables which they identified and the underlying set of 30 discrete variables. Most of their analysis supports the general thrust of *Strategy* and, indeed, they conclude that "through multivariate analysis we confirmed the propositions of Ash, Turner and Killian, Garner, Gamson, and others" (p. 12). Their analysis provides some additional insight. In particular, the number of alliances that a group has (a variable that is not given much emphasis in *Strategy*) emerges as an important predictor of success. This theme of third-party help is an im-

Just as there are matters of taste or style in data analysis and presentation, there are issues of taste in the type of theoretical argument with which one chooses to work. In a world where phenomena are overdetermined, one can pick different levels of analysis. To focus on systemwide crises, for example, is to pick a nonmanipulable variable—unless one considers the possibility that challenging groups through their actions can create such crises.

My personal preference is to pursue arguments that rely on manipulable variables. *Strategy* emphasizes strategies of mobilization, strategies of influence, and internal organization because these are things that challenging groups can control. Hence, the argument has immediate relevance for practice. The impact of nonmanipulable events, such as wars and depressions, must be considered in the argument. Even crises, though, take on more implications for practice when they are viewed as opportunities or threats with implications for the mobilization and influence strategies of challenging groups.

Clearly, Goldstone has a different perspective on these issues. I respect the time he has spent with the historical materials analyzed in *Strategy*, and his willingness to take on the question how individual groups should be coded on the variables of interest. Unfortunately, he offers us poor methodological advice that shows insensitivity to important issues of data quality. Nor do I think he really understands what *Strategy* is saying theoretically about the careers of challenging groups. In the end, the book

portant one in a number of studies of more recent protest movements including the work of Jenkins and Perrow (1977) on farm worker movements and Lipsky (1970) on the tenant rights movement in New York City. Weisburd (1979) uses the data to explore a number of issues concerned with the integrative and disintegrative effects of conflict. While many have argued that external conflict causes internal unity, Weisburd attempts to show that causality runs in the reverse direction as well. He codes a number of additional variables concerned with group unity and external conflict for most of the groups in the sample. (For nine of them, he was unable to find all of the relevant information for his additional codes.) His analysis explores the relationships by estimating a linear regression model with reciprocal effects between social conflict and group unity. Finally, Mirowsky and Ross (1979) analyze the data using both measures of success in *Strategy*. The antecedent variables are divided into five categories on a priori grounds: movement context, beliefs and goals, organization, action and interaction, and length of challenge. The middle three categories involve clusters of from eight to 12 variables which were factor analyzed. Three orthogonal factors were extracted in each cluster. Since the dependent variables were dichotomous, multidimensional scaling with embedded hierarchical clustering was also used. The resulting indexes correlated between .85 and 1.0 with the corresponding factor analytically derived indexes. A path analytic model was estimated for both dependent variables with the causal flow following the order listed above. Again, the general thrust of the results is consistent with *Strategy* but there are refinements and different emphases. Mirowsky and Ross conclude, for example, that bureaucracy has a "decisive effect" on acceptance but, in contrast to Steedly and Foley's analysis, "protest group success does not generally depend on the intercession of third parties."

emerges from his critical examination unscathed. But I am a partisan, and this is a matter for others to judge.¹²

APPENDIX

A few clarifications and corrections not bearing on any important issues between Goldstone and myself need brief comment.

Interviewing.—Goldstone states that *Strategy* relied on interviews, where possible, for some of its data on the 53 groups. This is not so. It relied on historical documents and secondary sources only. Goldstone's memory was probably playing a trick on him here, since my description in the book used the metaphor of an interview. "Instead of employing our questionnaire to interview individuals as one would on a survey, we employed it to interview books and documents" (p. 24).

First International.—Goldstone thinks that the International Workingmen's Association should have been coded as a displacement group. Although the IWA had a long-range objective of gaining political power and establishing a socialist society, its immediate program focused on the economic emancipation of the working class. The IWA in America spent most of its energy in fratricidal combat, paralleling the split between Marx and Bakunin in Europe. But there were some programmatic efforts to achieve nondisplacement goals. During the financial panic and depression of 1873–74, the IWA presented demands for relief of the unemployed to the city governments of New York and Chicago—demands which would not have required the replacement of city officials.

International Association of Machinists.—Weisburd (1979) calls attention to an error in the violence code for this group. It was coded as not being involved in violent interactions, but it was so involved during the period from 1901 to 1911. The evidence appeared in one of our major sources on this group (Perlman 1961), but our compiler simply missed it. Since *Strategy* argues that unruliness is positively related to success, this correction tends to strengthen the argument at this point.

Industrial Workers of the World.—My apologies to Wobblie fans for inadvertently calling them the International Workers of the World—a slip I should have caught.

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¹² A further comment, by Foley and Steedly, and Goldstone's reply to both comments are scheduled to appear in the next issue of the *AJS*.—Ed.

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Regional Modes of Production and Patterns of State Formation in Western Europe¹

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The rise of the modern territorial state in early modern western Europe was a spatially skewed process. An endogenous model of the uneven pattern of 16th-century state formation is presented. It holds that the geographical distribution of the first modern state structures was largely determined by preexisting regional differences of social and economic organization, differences emanating from the 12th century if not earlier. The model specifies that three distinct regional modes of production existed in 12th-century western Europe. These postulated forms of social organization are designated as the sedentary pastoral, petty commodity, and feudal modes of production. The optimal preconditions for the initial formation of modern states were to be found only in those regions dominated by the feudal mode of production. The paper concludes with a discussion of some methodological and theoretical implications of these findings.

Despite its preeminent role in enforcing the rules of the game and thereby delimiting the economy, polity, and culture of any complex social form, sociologists have been reluctant to consider the modern state until quite recently. Now there are unmistakable signs that this neglect is being remedied (Moore 1966; Eisenstadt and Rokkan 1973; Anderson 1974*a*, 1974*b*; Wallerstein 1974; Tilly 1975*a*; Collins 1978; Poggi 1978).

One of the puzzles about the modern state has been to account for its genesis. Although states of one kind or another have existed for millennia (see Service 1975; Wright 1977) the first modern, or national, states arose in 16-century western Europe. Many different types of states have existed in history: leagues of independent cities, empires, federations held together by loose central control, and theocratic federations (Tilly 1975*b*). Modern states differed, at least quantitatively, from these other forms in four respects (Sabine 1953; Watkins 1968; Tilly 1975*b*). First, the mod-

¹ Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, Boston, 1979. A preliminary version was presented at a meeting of the Social Science History Association, Ann Arbor, and at colloquia of the Center for European Studies, Harvard University, and the Department of Sociology, University of California, San Diego. We are grateful to Margaret Levi, Douglass C. North, Joan Thirsk, Franklin Mendels, Jonathan Pool, Andreas Teuber, M. Estelle Smith, and two anonymous *AJS* referees for their comments on previous drafts.

ern state everywhere sought and was able to achieve some degree of territorial expansion and consolidation. Second, it managed to attain an unprecedented degree of control over social, economic, and cultural activities taking place within its borders. Third, it encompassed a set of ruling institutions that were formally separate from all other kinds of institutions in its territory. Last, its rulers had a quantitatively greater capacity to monopolize and concentrate the means of violence. Dramatic evidence of the growth of the modern state is provided by the fact that Europe in 1500 was composed of some 500 sovereign political units, whereas by 1900 this number had been reduced to about 25 (Tilly 1975*b*, p. 15).

The reasons for the success of this kind of political unit are far from understood. As an organizational form, the modern state must have been well suited to the historical circumstances existing since the Renaissance, else why did it succeed at the expense of rival state forms? Since the survival of a political unit in this environment ultimately meant its military survival, it is likely that states of this kind were somehow able to maximize tax revenues (net of collection costs), maintain standing armies, delimit national economies, provide economic growth, and be recognized as sources of legitimate authority. All of this may be taken to be axiomatic, but it does not offer much help in specifying the precise nature of its comparative advantages (for an interesting attempt in this direction, though it offers an explanation at variance with some of the evidence presented below, see Friedman [1977]).

In retrospect, it can be seen that the survival prospects for any given 16th-century political unit were extremely slim. Against these formidable odds, political units that became the nuclei—or what Whittlesey (1944, p. 596) has termed the cores—of today's states emerged in particular areas of western Europe, including the Paris basin, southeastern England, and Castile (see map 1). But other political units which had sprung up in vast reaches of territory on the continent and the British archipelago were destined to be superseded. What distinguished the small number of surviving political units, the cores, from the great majority of short-lived failures?

Previous discussions of this issue have offered long lists of possible differentiating factors, but not much in the way of explanation. For heuristic purposes these factors may be placed in two categories. First, there are attributes of the various sovereign territories themselves. Thus it has been claimed that the survival prospects of a political unit were maximized if it encompassed territory that was blessed with a high concentration of landholding (Rokkan 1973, 1975); cultural homogeneity (Tilly 1975*b*); geographical advantages, such as natural barriers promoting security or a high proportion of fertile lowlands (Ardant 1975; Collins 1978); the availability of extractable resources (Tilly 1975*b*); and a continuous supply of political entrepreneurs (Tilly 1975*b*).

However, because evidently the variation in the location of modern states cannot be fully explained by these factors, which are endogenous to the early political units, increasing attention has recently been focused on a second category, characteristics of the units' environment. Thus exogenous variables, such as a territory's geopolitical situation and its position in the international division of labor, have been held to be important determinants. It has been argued that modern states tended to arise in territories that had a protected position in time and space (Anderson 1974a; Tilly 1975b); that were removed from the city-studded dorsal spine of western Europe (Rokkan 1973, 1975); or that specialized in the production of manufactured commodities (such as textile goods), rather than in the supply of primary products or in subsistence agriculture (Wallenstein 1974).

Each of these variables may indeed be correlated with the appearance of core regions in western Europe. But the significance of the correlations remains murky in previous discussions. Are some of these variables causally prior to or more significant than others? And what is the relative importance of the endogenous as against exogenous causes of core formation?

Before leaping to conclusions about the salience of geopolitical or international economic factors as determinants of core formation in western Europe, it is necessary to appreciate, first, that there were extensive regional social organizational differences in early modern Europe, and second, that these regional differences themselves influenced the course of the formation of modern state apparatuses. Yet these considerations have generally been ignored in the literature. The failure to take regional differences in social organization into account has led to an unwarranted emphasis on the exogenous determinants of initial state formation in western European history.


We will argue that until the 17th century the spatial pattern of core formation was decisively influenced, but not wholly determined, by the distribution of three quite distinct types of social organization, or modes of production, existing in western Europe from the 12th century if not earlier. These are designated as the *sedentary pastoral*, *petty commodity*, and *feudal* modes of production.

For reasons not yet entirely clear, each of these types of social organization came to dominate specific territories; hence they will be referred to as regional modes of production. However, the optimal preconditions for the initial development of cores, and thus of modern states, were to be found in those regions predominantly characterized by the feudal mode of production alone. First the paper will outline the general features of each mode of production. Then it will discuss the preconditions generated by each mode of production for the development of the modern state. Altogether, an elementary endogenous model of core formation in western

Europe will be presented. This model attempts to account for the initial development of modern states in western Europe, but other factors need to be considered in order to explain state formation in later historical eras.

REGIONAL MODES OF PRODUCTION IN EARLY MODERN WESTERN EUROPE

A consideration of regional differences in medieval western Europe must begin with the 12th century, since the evidence for earlier periods is frag-



MAP 1.—Core areas of the major western European states

mentary. However, by this date regional differentiation was already considerable. This indicates that the origins of regional differences are older than the historical record permits us to see. By the 12th century, western European regions varied with respect to a host of social factors, including types of agricultural organization, patterns of settlement, inheritance customs, modal family types, class composition, systems of governance, legal systems and types of property rights, and, in some cases, religious practices.

Whereas each of these individual *differentia* warrants and has received separate study, what is striking to us is that there appears to be a pattern of correspondence among them. For example, one mode of agricultural organization (the open-field system) is usually found in conjunction with a particular settlement pattern (villages distributed according to the expectations of central-place theory), a particular set of inheritance customs (unigeniture), a particular modal family type (the stem family), a particular class structure (in which the bourgeoisie and artisanry are of intermediate strength), a particular political system (characterized by parceled sovereignty), a particular legal system (based upon customary codes), and so on. A similar correspondence can be observed between the two other major field systems and the same factors. While the intercorrelations are by no means perfect,² they occur with such regularity that some kind of ideal-typical analysis is justified.

These ideal-typical constellations of social factors can be considered to be modes of production.³ Following Marx, a mode of production contains two separate elements: the social and technical means by which production is organized and carried out (the forces of production); and the institutions and practices associated with the way goods are produced, exchanged, and distributed (the relations of production).⁴ Although a wide variety of these modes of production have been described in abstract terms, here we posit that three particular modes coexisted in 12th-century western Europe.

The sedentary pastoral mode of production was composed of self-sufficient households, loosely linked together by kinship ties. In this mode the productive forces were at a low level of development: hunting, pas-

² See the various regional studies in Baker and Butlin (1973), particularly that of Roden.

³ Other attempts to describe regional differentiation in medieval western Europe include Bloch's (1966) "*régimes agraires*" and Arensberg's (1963) "culture areas." The concept of the mode of production seems preferable in that it insists upon the essential holism of these systems of social organization—a holism sacrificed when field systems, inheritance patterns, and the other dimensions of these social formations are treated as if they were autonomous institutions unconnected by an underlying social structural logic. The best rationale for using the concept of the mode of production is that it indicates the presence of a single social structural logic at the base of these social forms.

⁴ On the concept of mode of production see Anderson (1974a); Terray (1975); Gurley (1976); Hindess and Hirst (1976); Godelier (1977); Foster-Carter (1978).

toralism, and intermittent agricultural cultivation were the major economic activities (see Hobsbawm 1964, p. 35). Labor was organized either through the nuclear family or through the extended family. The principal means of production were controlled by the clan. Kinship relations largely determined the appropriation of the product. Class distinctions were virtually nonexistent.

In contrast, the petty commodity mode of production was made up of congeries of individual producers residing in communities. The principal means of production, for both agriculture and handicraft, were owned by these individual producers. Production was oriented toward exchange rather than use, for long-distance trade was an essential precondition of this type of social organization (see Amin 1976, pp. 32–33). Political authority tended to be concentrated in the hands of a class of producer-merchants who controlled the appropriation of the product as well as the profits from trade. The principal class distinction was that between citizens and non-citizens (Hobsbawm 1964, p. 41).

Last was the feudal mode of production. Its basic unit was the manor; its major economic activity, arable agriculture. While the serf-tenant, as direct producer, owned some of the means of production, particularly tools and draught animals, he lacked control over the land. The landlord subjugated direct producers by charging rents and monopolizing such services as ovens and mills (Duby [1968] 1974, p. 130). A political system dominated by large landlords insured that the serfs could not own land. Feudal society was divided principally into two classes, lords and serf-tenants. However, since towns also tended to develop within the feudal mode of production, merchants and artisans were also present to some degree.


It must be emphasized that each of these modes of production is an ideal type that does not correspond to any actual social formation. All historical social forms represent combinations of several modes of production. However, within any social formation one mode of production tends to predominate. A mode of production is predominant to the extent that its characteristic class structure pervades the social form as a whole. Thus, observable patterns of stratification may be taken to indicate the presence of the underlying modes of production.

Elements of all three modes of production may be found in each of the 12th-century western European regions. For example, in the petty commodity zone some direct producers paid nonproducers in labor services. In the feudal zone some communal practices may have persisted in land ownership and livestock grazing. And in the sedentary pastoral zone it would have been possible to find both merchants and artisans. However, these classes—representative of secondary modes of production—were of lesser importance in each of these zones. The dominant mode of production in

each social formation circumscribed the extensiveness of each subordinate mode.

THE SEDENTARY PASTORAL ZONE

The sedentary pastoral zone was principally located in the strip of coastal territory stretching south from Norway to northwest Portugal (see map 2). (A predominantly agrarian variant of this mode existed in the Northern



MAP 2.—Late medieval modes of production in western Europe (around the 12th century). N.B.: This is a provisional map based on diverse secondary sources.

Netherlands [deVries 1974, pp. 24–41] and in East Anglia [Homans 1975].) In addition to the littoral, this type of social formation could be found in the Hebrides, Highland Scotland, Wales, Ireland, Man, Cornwall, western France, Galicia, the Basque country, and parts of Aquitaine (Flatrès 1959, p. 193).

As its name implies, the major form of agricultural activity in these regions was pastoralism. The existing arable was divided between the infield—land with richer soil where cultivation was intensive and continuous—and the outfield—poorer land surrounding the infield, serving continuously as enclosed pasture fields. Typically there was no field rotation (Flatrès 1959, p. 194; Smith 1967, pp. 210–14; Baker and Butlin 1973, pp. 617–18). The fields themselves were square and usually surrounded a dwelling. They were separated from one another by enclosures of trees, hedges, or dirt mounds. Land was most often worked by a group of descendants of a near and common ancestor dwelling in proximity. Households were clustered together in small hamlets where the inhabitants were grouped according to their distribution in kindreds (Vinogradoff 1911, pp. 15–16). Examples of this settlement pattern include the *treo* in Brittany, the *trev* in Cornwall, the *tref* in Wales, the *treen* in the Isle of Man, and the *townlands* in Ireland. This description of the *tref* is illustrative: “The *tref* was not an isolated farm. Neither was it a village. It was something between them in size—nine houses is the number mentioned in the law, and these houses seem to have clustered close to each other. It was a hamlet, too, in which the group of people lived who used one plough in common and kept their cattle in a single herd” (Homans 1975, p. 27). Throughout this region towns were rare; villages and hamlets were the predominant form of settlement.

Social life was organized by clan and family associations. The blood relationship of the agnatic group was the central principal of consociation (Koebner 1941, p. 51). This can be seen by considering the inheritance customs found in this mode of production. The system of inheritance was not concerned with the economic costs of excessive fragmentation of landholdings, but rather, with the continuity of the lineage. The norm of egalitarianism in this inheritance system thus tended to override all considerations of economic productivity (Le Roy Ladurie 1976, pp. 53–54). An equal and partible inheritance was obtained regardless of the genealogical position of the child. Each adult inhabitant (save in Normandy, where women were excluded) of the village or clan was entitled to an equal share in the village lands. Upon the death of the father, all previous arrangements made by him with respect to inheritance were nullified and all possessions were returned to a common pool. The primacy of the blood relationship of the agnatic group was so strong that it was the custom for a childless

couple to will its property from the paternal line to the local chief or tax collector rather than to the nonlineal outsiders from the distaff side (see 1906, p. 9; Le Roy Ladurie 1976, p. 58). These practices led to nuclear families⁵ because partible inheritance provided each member of the family with rights to land.

The extent of social stratification in this zone was moderate. Differences in wealth between chieftains and peasants were far less than elsewhere in western Europe in this period. The peasant, for his part, owned the means of production and had no regular personal service to perform (Nabholz 1941, p. 252). However, marked ranks and privileges existed, and these were to increase. Although land was regarded as common property of the clan, livestock and other goods were distributed without any regard to the allotment of shares. Through the practice of patronage, a ruling class began to emerge (Vinogradoff 1911, pp. 24, 31, 34). The Armorican accounts of the 9th through the 11th centuries mention tribal leaders (*Machtiers*) who furnished personal protection and insurance from famine for their men. Soon they owned the parish outright and dominated it by hereditary rule (Bloch 1941, pp. 262-63). Descendants of these chieftains were later to become the noble class of Brittany in the high and late Middle Ages (Bloch 1941, p. 272). Similar patterns may be observed in Wales and Ireland. Despite this rigidification of the class structure, neither urban burghers nor artisans were to be found in significant numbers, however.

Government in these regions was tribal. The chief of the tribe or clan could be chosen by an election of elders, or he could emerge as simply the wealthiest or most powerful individual in his territory. Clan members pledged their fidelity to the chief and were obliged to follow him into battle. Patrimonialism, albeit in a small-scale form, was at the basis of the political structure. Finally, the religious practices in this region were somewhat distinct, representing a syncretism of paganism having strong supernatural and magical elements with standard orthodox Christianity. Some have claimed this combination resulted in a type of Christianity peculiarly resistant to change, in part because it encouraged passive obedience and resignation on the part of parishioners toward their priests.⁶

⁵ The concepts of nuclear, stem, and joint family types were introduced, somewhat vaguely, by Le Play (1895): Types of family structures do not, however, vary independent of other social relations (see Godelier 1975, p. 4).

⁶ Tilly (1962, p. 110) quotes from Siegfried (1913): "In the Vendée, it is the priest who remains as in other days the peasant's real chief. [The peasant] is not only religious; he also feels a kind of sacred superstition regarding that priest toward whom ancestral habit prescribes passive obedience." See also Le Bras (1956, pp. 75, 83).

THE PETTY COMMODITY ZONE

The petty commodity region was found largely in the Mediterranean area, in lands stretching westward from north central Italy to Catalonia.⁷ But a similar system emerged also in southern Germany⁸ (in the region of Augsburg) and in Flanders (Slicher van Bath 1963; Anderson 1974*b*). Whereas pastoral agriculture played a dominant role in the first zone, in this one arable agriculture was practiced in a relatively commercial setting sometimes described as *un capitalisme précoce* (Vilar 1977, p. 136). For the most part cultivation was carried out in a two-field rotation, using the light scratch plow (the *araire*). Since this plow could be pulled rather easily, cultivation did not require extensive cooperation among producers. The light scratch plow did not make intensive use of scarce livestock: two oxen sufficed as against a team of horses. Moreover, the simple construction of the *araire* made it possible for peasants of merely moderate wealth to possess their own plow. Both factors aided the peasant in his emancipation from the collective restraints and obviated the need for collective obligations (Smith 1967, pp. 244–45).

Transhumant pastoralism tended to develop in the Mediterranean area (Bloch 1966, pp. 48–55). The seasonal migration caused by transhumance, coupled with an absence of collective restraints and a lack of manorial control, led to greater variability in the settlement pattern than existed elsewhere (Smith 1967, pp. 269–70).

The typical farm throughout the zone was a small parcel of land worked by a peasant family. As in the previous mode of production, the fields were square; however, these fields had no habitations on them (they were termed *Blockflur*, *champs ouverts et irréguliers*, and *terroir en puzzle*).

The entire system of farming in this zone was more flexible than that of northwestern Europe, and it could produce a much greater crop variety. The variety of soil conditions in the Mediterranean favored heterogeneous cropping—wheat in rich loams, beans in less fertile areas, and vines in marginal and rocky soils. Much of this agricultural production was oriented either to local urban markets, far more numerous in these regions than elsewhere in western Europe, or to long-distance trade (principally in wheat, olive oil, and wine). The relative density of towns encouraged a two-field system of rotation, because this kind of system was geared to crop specialization.⁹ As a consequence, cash cropping was most advanced in

⁷ These regions had many parallels with Islamic Spain in this period (see Lewis 1966, pp. 68–69, 122).

⁸ Smith (1967, p. 329) finds similarities in South German towns with respect to urbanization, specialization, and residence patterns.

⁹ Even in open-field areas, the nearness of markets often yielded a two-field system, as in the case of the Rhine rift valley (Smith 1967, p. 209).

this zone. To a much greater extent than elsewhere, the towns determined the nature of countryside activity (Merrington 1975; Fourquin 1976, pp. 24–25). Indeed, towns were the center of social, political, and economic life. Not only was the town a marketplace where peasants sold their surplus; it was also an administrative capital having council and magistrates, a center of manufacturing, a religious center, and a social center where landlords tended to reside. In contrast to the first zone, where farms were isolated from one another and peasants seldom had contact with urban institutions, here the typical farm was very much attached to the town (Sion 1974, p. 124). The bulk of the agricultural population lived in large villages or small cities (Agulhon 1970, p. 59).

In the early 13th century the inheritance pattern in these regions changed from a partible system to a distinctive system of unigeniture called *préciput* (Aubenas 1936, pp. 526–30; Lewis 1965, p. 352; Wakefield 1971, pp. 52–53; Le Roy Ladurie 1976, pp. 61–72). This change is often ascribed to increasing commercialization, and it is associated with the revival of Roman law (Aubenas 1936, p. 530; Vilar 1977, p. 173; Le Roy Ladurie 1976, pp. 61–63). *Préciput* followed from the Roman tradition of *patria potestas*, in that the wishes of the father with respect to inheritance were supreme. The father alone determined who was to inherit the land. He could will it to one of his children (Vilar 1977, p. 175) or divide it among many (Livet 1962, pp. 350–51). Thus *préciput* occasionally led to the fragmentation of landholding.

Commercialization caused considerable social mobility. Private property rights in land enabled wealthy merchants to acquire country estates. The distinction between aristocrat and bourgeois was very blurred in these regions. The petty urban nobility was favorably disposed toward the development of trade, taking a direct part in commercial activities. These lords were often townsmen, either nobles who had come at some time in the past to live in the city or burgesses who had bought estates. An essential element of the petty commodity social structure was the fusion of noble and bourgeois: nobles became bourgeois through business and bourgeois became enobled by law (Smith 1967, pp. 310–11; Hibbert [1953] 1974, pp. 157–59; Fourquin 1976, p. 213). The urban residence of the aristocracy was itself a reflection of the domination of the countryside by the towns. South of the Alps, country districts were not—as they were in the north—centers of economic, social, and political life. Cities retained this role, so *potentes*, both counts and warriors, maintained their urban residences. In the petty commodity social formation the law hardly recognized the connection between fief and military service, as witnessed by the *Jus Longobardorum* in north and central Italy (Fourquin 1976, pp. 74–75).

These fluid conditions were not conducive to the establishment of rigid class structures. Even distinctions between peasants and townsmen were

difficult to draw, since the local markets brought the peasants into frequent contact with urban life. Many cities abolished all forms of personal and material subjection, thus restricting the exactions of the lords. Competition among the urban lords for labor and political influence invariably strengthened the peasantry's hand. In these circumstances, the nobility could not demand personal services of the peasantry (Fourquin 1976, p. 179).

The city-state politics of these regions was dominated by urban patri-cians, half noble and half bourgeois. The power of this middle stratum resulted mainly from its control of markets and exchange rates. Leading families from this stratum controlled the courts, the banks, and the militia. They were also important in the struggle against episcopal attempts to control the towns (Hibbert [1953] 1974, pp. 158–59).

In this zone (as in the previous one) property tended to be alienable, and most of the land was made up of individual peasant allods (parcels of land that can be freely disposed of through sale or gift). Where land was held in tenure, the contract was explicitly to be reformulated at the time of each renewal (Bloch 1941, p. 234). The small free peasant proprietor dominated the region's agriculture, and landholding was relatively unconcentrated (Vinogradoff 1911, p. 68; Sion 1974, p. 124). The emphasis on individual private property rights emanating from Roman law stimulated the existence of peasant allods (Vilar 1977, pp. 168–69). The agriculturalist of this region found legal support for enclosing his property, as did his counterpart in the previous zone.¹⁰

Finally, religion in these territories was strongly reformist. This was in part, no doubt, a function of urbanization. This region provided fertile ground for heretical movements such as the Cathari movement of southern France (Wakefield 1971, pp. 79–80; Le Roy Ladurie 1978). And at a later date the Huguenots found their strongest social base among the urban populations of the Midi (Leonard 1955, p. 20; Scoville 1960, pp. 7, 11; Le Roy Ladurie 1966, pp. 342 ff.).

THE FEUDAL ZONE

The feudal zone is by far the best known. Feudalism arose most generally in the territory between the Loire and the Rhine; in Burgundy, South-eastern and Midland England, and—imperfectly—in parts of the Iberian peninsula, Southern Italy, and Lombardy (Bloch 1961, pp. 445–46; Duby [1968] 1974, p. 124; Fourquin 1976, p. 71). Agriculture was organized through the manorial system. The manor was a fief that provided revenue from which the landlord and his tenants were supported. Production and

¹⁰ In the Mediterranean, peasant rights to land were enhanced by the maxim "no lord without title," in contrast to the north where the law was "no land without a lord" (Fourquin 1976, p. 140; see also Livet 1962, p. 312).

distribution were both coordinated in the manor. The manor itself was divided into two parts: the demesne, or the reserve exploited by the owner, and the farms worked by dependent villeins. The demesne consisted of the arable, the meadowlands, and occasionally vineyards, water mills, breweries, and inns. The farm included house, garden, arable land, meadows, and sometimes vineyards. The villein also had the right to exploit woods, wastes, and fallow (Slicher van Bath 1963, p. 44; Duby [1968] 1974, pp. 124–25; Fourquin 1976, p. 164).

The mode of production that had developed in this third region employed a new system of agricultural organization and new techniques. The first mode basically employed ancient pastoral agriculture. Cultivation in the second was of secondary importance and tended to require traditional productive techniques and organization. The manorial system of the third region, however, made use of the heavy wheeled plow (the *charrue*), modern (horse) harnesses, and a three-field rotation.

Here the arable was laid out in open fields. No fences or hedges separated one field from another, and there was no habitation upon them. The open-field arable was subdivided into sections of considerable size, which in turn were subdivided into long strips (these have been termed open fields, *champs ouverts et allongés*, and *Gewannen*). Most often, a strip was that parcel of land the oxen could plow in a single day. Peasant families seldom had rights to contiguous strips; instead they farmed strips located in the different fields (Reynolds 1961, p. 132).¹¹ Normally one family's strip was bordered by strips of families that belonged to the same plow team, thereby fostering the coordination of plowing.

The manorial pattern of agriculture, based as it was upon collective grazing rights, the interdependence of arable and waste, the communal regulation of cultivation (*vaine pâture*), and the harnessing and pulling of the heavy wheeled plow clearly required extensive organization and peasant cooperation (Thirsk 1964). This system was naturally associated with the establishment of village communities.

Nucleated village settlement was the optimum pattern in the feudal regions. The three-field system encouraged the peasant to reside in a central location, since he owned strips in each field and needed to have quick access. Moreover, the collective obligations and the restraints of farming with the heavy plow also encouraged nucleated settlements (Smith 1967, pp. 269–71). These communities evolved a system of self-government and strong communal consciousness and unity (Vinogradoff 1892, pp. 9, 396,

¹¹ According to Dion (1934, p. 81), as long as arable and pastoral production were intertwined, open fields coexisted with the practice of collective grazing rights. This coexistence differed from the practice in the Mediterranean region, where the cultivators set aside land distinct from the arable for the purpose of pasturing. Dion attributes the pattern of separation of arable from pasture to the Roman practice of *ager* and *saltus*.

408-9; Dion 1934, p. 37; Flatrès 1964, p. 29). Villagers knew each other, shared their problems, worked and prayed together.

As the new agricultural techniques increased the efficiency of production, towns arose to fulfill central place functions. Unlike the towns of the petty commodity zone (many of which had persisted since Roman times) these new towns were exclusively involved in trade with their hinterlands. The class composition of these towns was less heterogeneous: burghers, artisans, and emancipated peasants were the most important groups. The landed aristocracy remained in residence on their manors. The aristocracy had little to say about what went on in towns of this third region; for here alone autonomous towns had developed.

Impartible inheritance, or unigeniture, was generally the rule, and it kept the size of tenement constant (Goody 1976, pp. 26-27; Le Roy Ladurie 1976, pp. 41-44).¹² The pressure toward unigeniture arose from the lord's interest in preserving his return from the tenement. Fragmentation not only threatened this return but also inhibited the application of technical innovations. The use of the heavy plow, for example, would make little sense in small holdings. Unigeniture in the feudal mode of production led to a high degree of social stability and to an extensive division of labor. Noninheriting offspring were forced to follow other pursuits in the growing urban centers, the developing bureaucracy, or the armies of the feudal kings. Unigeniture also led to a family structure in which the father and mother lived with the married inheriting child under one roof (Le Roy Ladurie 1976, pp. 44, 47). This system, however, differed from *préciput* in that the inheriting child was not chosen at the whim of the father, but according to customary formulae (thus, there was primo- or ultimogeniture).

The class composition of this region therefore differed substantially from that of the two previous zones. The peasant, for one, was more dependent upon his lord than elsewhere, and his labor was more intensively appropriated. The interstitial urban economy produced a bourgeoisie and artisanry of intermediate strength—stronger than in the first mode of production, weaker (because cities were far less numerically important) than

¹² Even in those occasional instances where the pattern of inheritance was not impartible, the lord in the open-field area could exert pressure on peasants to maintain the unity of the tenement: "Although it was hereditary, the land was held by a written, periodically renewable contract from the landlord, who had the legal right to approve every transfer effected through a marriage contract, inheritance settlement, or sale, and could deny any provisions that threatened to reduce his income. This was specifically aimed at preventing the peasants from dividing their holdings or burdening them with debts paid out as marriage portions" (Berkner 1976, p. 77). The lord's drive to insure that unigeniture was instituted often met with resistance because of the family's desire to split the holding, whether fief or farm, among offspring (Fourquin 1976, pp. 150-51).

in the second mode. Further, this was a relatively hierarchical class structure.

The political structure of this region was distinctive. The suzerain granted land to his vassal, who was bound by personal fealty. Personal loyalty linked each set of superiors and subordinates throughout the system as a whole. Bloch (1938) claimed these authority relations amounted to a form of parcelized sovereignty, and Anderson (1974a, pp. 148–49) has ably summarized their consequences: “political sovereignty was never focused in a single center. The functions of the State were disintegrated in a vertical allocation downwards, at each level of which political and economic relations were, on the other hand, integrated.” The stability of the system derived, in part, from the fact that feudal law did not recognize the concept of land ownership. The recipient of a fief did not have the right to alienate it, since in principle every tenement was held directly or indirectly by the king (*ius in re aliena*) (Ganshof 1964, p. 145). The practice of *relief*, surrendering the fief to the lord on the previous vassal’s death, which was widespread in areas of the strongest feudal presence, further strengthened the principle of the inalienability of the tenement (Fourquin 1976, pp. 148–49). Finally, the religious ideology of this zone was orthodox and antagonistic to mystical or individualistic versions of Christianity, such as Catharism (Le Roy Ladurie 1978).

This brief description must conclude with an important caveat. No single western European region can be adequately described by a general typology of this kind. For one thing, each of the differentiating factors discussed concerning these regions must be regarded as a continuous rather than a binary variable. For another, significant intraregional differences lent innumerable shadings to any particular territory. Differences between south and north Wales, eastern and western Ireland, Highland and Lowland Scotland, Basse and Haute Bretagne, as well as the existence of champion (open-field) areas in parts of Brittany, Normandy, Devon, Cornwall, Poitou, the French Alps, Aunis, and Saintonge illustrate the extent of variation within each of these regions. However, despite the importance of variations existing within each zone, at a macroscopic level the zones take on a reasonably homogeneous appearance.¹³

¹³ The uneven distribution of these modes of production in the territories of western Europe raises the problem of their origins. Why is the sedentary pastoral zone principally found on the Atlantic littoral and in northern Europe, the petty commodity zone oriented to the Mediterranean, and the feudal zone located in lands far from either sea? Basically two different approaches have been taken to this question. Some writers have insisted that each type of social organization ultimately had common cultural roots (Vinogradoff 1911; Gray 1915; Homans 1969). Others have favored explanations based on the different ecological endowments of the respective territories (Thirsk 1966; Baker 1966; Blum 1971; Hoffman 1975; Smith 1967). Anderson (1974b) has offered a historical interpretation emphasizing both cultural and geographical causes. He attributes the existence of three distinctive areas in medieval Europe to the differential

SOME CONSEQUENCES OF THESE DIFFERENCES IN
SOCIAL ORGANIZATION, 1000-1350

From the 11th century on, political units in the feudal zone gained territory and power at the expense of those in the sedentary pastoral and petty commodity zones. This is because the feudal mode of production was superior to its rivals in two important respects. First, feudal law gave these units definite political and organizational advantages. Second, the open-field system increased agricultural productivity so that economic development in the feudal zone was the highest in all Europe.

As late as the 12th century, the comparative superiority of the feudal zone was by no means obvious. After the collapse of Rome, prospects for political and economic development did not appear promising anywhere in western Europe. The Imperial traditions were kept alive in the eastern Mediterranean, while the West as a whole was plunged into a dismal period of instability and disintegration. Following the invasions the different regional social formations that were evolving coexisted for a time on a basis of mutual isolation and noninterference. Contemporaries undoubtedly would have believed that the West's best chance for development lay in the petty commodity zone. For during a period when Europe as a whole was peripheral to the international economy, these regions were by far the most civilized and urbane in all the West. From the 10th to the 12th centuries, the Italian city-states and the cities of the Midi and Catalonia all gained wealth and territory throughout the western Mediterranean. However, from hindsight it is evident that even by this time the center of gravity of western Europe was shifting from the Mediterranean toward those territories that were developing a feudal mode of production largely insulated from international markets.

The reasons for this shift northward, representing a sharp discontinuity of development in that the parts of Europe that were least commercial in the 6th century came to supersede the most commercial parts in the 11th

impact of Roman institutions with the Barbarian social formation in its hinterland. No monocausal theory appears adequate in the light of existing evidence, because counterevidence can be provided to show the limitations of each approach. The cultural determinists have difficulty explaining the variation of field systems occurring within each of the west European culture areas (see Baker and Butlin 1973). Further, their expectations about the origins of institutions such as the open fields do not jibe with the English and German historical record (see Thirsk 1966; Mayhew 1973, pp. 23-28; Slicher van Bath 1963, p. 56). The ecological determinists, on the other hand, have no ready explanation for evidence that common institutions existed within areas having significant geographical variations (see Bloch 1966, pp. 58-59; Dion 1934, pp. 29-30). Thus, regardless of the merits of each approach, reasonable doubt remains. It therefore seems prudent to accept Kerridge's (1976, p. 48) verdict that "very likely we shall have to reconcile ourselves to the reality that the early origins of field systems are unknowable." The same must be said for the genesis of these regional modes of production more generally.

century, have been at the center of one of the great historical controversies of our time. Pirenne (1939) argued that the Germanic invasions began to sever Mediterranean influence in the north, but that an Islamic blockade of the Mediterranean decisively ended this influence, forcing the West to live upon its own resources and to invent its own institutions. Islamic control of the Mediterranean thus provided an exogenous spur to development: Charlemagne would have been impossible without Mohammed. Apart from the dubiousness of his evidence (see Havighurst 1958), Pirenne did not offer a compelling account of the fact that European development occurred primarily in the particular regions where the feudal mode of production had its strongest hold; indeed, his analysis tends to downplay regional differences within western Europe during the Middle Ages.¹⁴

To understand the comparative superiority of the feudal mode of production it is necessary to begin with feudal law, for many of feudalism's ultimate structural and political advantages are direct consequences of its nonallodial property rights and system of impartible inheritance.

Customary law produced a contract based on personal fealty between lord and vassal, as well as between peasant and lord, that could not be abrogated by allodial transfer. Even in instances where free peasants paid monetary rents, they were obliged to render services and lacked rights to sell their property. Feudal law stipulated that each tenement was held directly or indirectly by the lord. By customary law the vassal could cede the fief only to the lord. The right of property was divided into two parts: *jus eminens*, the right of (lord's) ownership; and *jus utile*, the right of usufruct (Fourquin 1976, p. 139). But alienation and division were contrary to feudal custom. Both unigeniture and the nonallodial property rights basic to feudal law led to the consolidation of landholdings and therefore laid the basis for the emergence of relatively large political units, or principalities, by the 11th century.

Feudalism has often been viewed as a source of weak political power since it is identified with parcelized sovereignty. Yet in other respects the system of vassalage facilitated political coordination (Ganshof 1964, pp. 163-64, 167; Strayer 1968, p. 21). The vitality of feudalism can be seen in the context of the early Middle Ages in northwestern Europe. During the chaotic period from 1000 to 1200, the strongest principalities in western Europe were the most feudalized: in France, the Ile-de-France, Burgundy,

¹⁴ As does Hilton (1973, p. 26): "In spite of . . . widely differing physical environments, there was a basic similarity of social structure in the rural communities of medieval Europe. This arose from the simple fact that in a subsistence economy and in the climatic conditions of most parts of Europe, the most easily and cheaply produced foods were derived from cereals." But surely there are different ways to produce grain. Just as Pirenne was convinced long-distance trade was the fount of most historical dynamics, Hilton falls into a similar error by reifying the concept of class.

and Normandy; in Spain, Castile—rather than economically advanced Catalonia.

These principalities were ruled through a hierarchy of authority extending from the independent castellans to the counts and vassals and finally to the king (Fourquin 1976, p. 70). As such, they possessed all the administrative machinery and the corps of officers, if not the power, that the monarchies would exhibit at a later date (Fourquin 1976, p. 231). Though the authority of the feudal king vis-à-vis his lords was highly limited, under feudal ideology no lord could refuse to recognize the theoretical supremacy of the monarch. This may be illustrated by the case of the count of Ile-de-France, who was viewed as sacred because he was the heir to the title of Charlemagne. The king took advantage of his dual role as both sovereign and suzerain to increase his power (Strayer 1968, p. 19; Fourquin 1976, pp. 102–3).

By its effects on territorial concentration and hierarchical administration feudal law thus provided a material and ideological framework for political cohesiveness that was clearly lacking elsewhere. In the other zones of western Europe the traditions of partible inheritance and allodial property rights fostered the widespread fragmentation of landholdings (Berkner 1976). In the petty commodity regions the change in allodial ownership of all lands or rights given out by ruling families to those who were their subordinates weakened the territorial polities. Allodial ownership also emerged in the sedentary pastoral zone. And the partible inheritance characteristic of both regions prevented dominant landowners from creating large enough holdings to establish hereditary kingships (Lewis 1965, p. 352). Part of the reason for the failure of the powerful duchy of Normandy to defeat the Ile-de-France in the 12th century stems from a legacy of partible inheritance that created a division in the Norman leadership. Impartible inheritance in the Ile-de-France contributed to its more cohesive leadership (Haskins 1966, p. 123).

All told, the combination of personal fealty, impartibility, and the inalienability of property essential to the maintenance of the feudal pyramid of authority was absent in both the sedentary pastoral and petty commodity zones.

But the feudal zone had economic as well as political and organizational advantages. It is clear that by the late Middle Ages the agriculture of the feudal zone was among the most productive on the continent. The reasons for this have long been subject to debate. Climate has been held to be an important cause of this superior productivity. If it is accepted that the major advantage the North held over the South lay in its more productive system of agricultural organization—the open-field system—then the spring sowing, the chief economic novelty of this system, was unprofitable in the South owing to the scarcity of summer rains there (White 1940). However,

this explanation cannot easily account for the substantial variation among field systems in northern Europe. As has been suggested above, cultural, social structural, political, and geographic factors must all be considered determinants of the different modes of production.

Technological change is perhaps a more convincing factor than climate to account for the economic advance of the feudal regions. The wheeled plow used in this zone was more efficient in that it eliminated the need for cross-plowing, enabled better drainage of the fields, and improved the circulation of minerals and plant nutrients within the soil on account of its deeper furrows (Herlihy 1974, p. 17). Other agricultural improvements developed here were a more modern harness; triennial rotation, which dramatically increased the arable; the use of the horse in place of the less efficient ox; the planting of legumes, adding valuable sources of protein to the diet and simultaneously increasing soil fertility through their nitrogen-fixing properties. Some of these improvements could be adopted more efficiently in regions with large parcels of land. All told, the improvements led to a virtual agricultural revolution that permitted increased population densities in the feudal zone (Duby 1968).¹⁵ By the 12th century the most densely populated regions in western Europe were also the most feudalized—with the single exception of the northern Italian city-states, whose survival depended on long-distance trade (Russell 1972, p. 235). This relative population density gave these regions a decisive military advantage in the fluid political conditions of the high Middle Ages.

For the most part, the petty commodity regions did not take part in the agrarian technological revolution that occurred in the feudal zone (though Flanders and Lombardy may be cited as exceptions). The major landowners in this social formation did not reside in the countryside. Instead they lived in major urban areas, removed from the daily concerns of their holdings. It appears that these landholders did not apply to the management of their lands the spirit of initiative which they displayed in their commercial dealings (Fourquin 1976, p. 213). For in these regions the attraction of the market, and the two-field system of agriculture, had geared agriculture toward specialization and profit making. Thus cycles of expanding and contracting production continued to characterize the agriculture in the petty commodity zone (Smith 1967, p. 266).

Agricultural techniques in the sedentary pastoral zone were archaic, and production was oriented toward subsistence. Neither the technological in-

¹⁵ An alternative explanation of the relatively greater economic development of these regions has been offered by North and Thomas (1973, chap. 4). In their model, demographic growth is the exogenous variable that determines technological improvement. But this leaves the cause of population growth unexplained. The paucity of relevant data from the early Middle Ages makes a resolution of the issue unlikely in the near future.

novations occurring in the open-field areas nor the stimulus of commercial production in the South had parallels in the isolated regions of the Atlantic fringe.

By the early 14th century the feudal zone tended to have greater political cohesiveness, economic productivity, and, hence, military effectiveness than its two rivals. Its ultimate predominance in western Europe seemed all but assured.

THE EFFECT OF THE PLAGUES


Then came the plagues. The principal economic consequence of the plagues was to alter sharply the land/labor ratio everywhere in Europe. This increased the relative value of labor. But this single stimulus led to quite different results in the three zones. The feudal zone, which had possessed the most repressive system of labor control previous to the 14th century, subsequently developed the highest degree of peasant class consciousness. This relatively strong solidarity among peasants in the feudal regions promoted labor unrest and helped to ease peasant dependency. Since dependency inhibits the productivity of labor, the feudal zone emerged in the 15th century with still another comparative advantage.

The impact of sharply increased mortality varied in regions having different class structures. Not only were the class structures of the three zones different, but the solidarity of the various classes should be expected to have varied widely between zones. This is most evident for the peasantry. If class formation is considered to be at least partially a function of interaction patterns (see Hechter 1978), each mode of production should have produced different levels of peasant solidarity. Clearly the feudal mode, with its open-field agriculture based on peasant cooperation in the context of strong community institutions, would have produced the highest degree of peasant class consciousness. Just as clearly, class consciousness should have been weakest among peasants in the sedentary pastoral mode, owing to its field system composed of isolated farmsteads and to the scarcity of nucleated settlements. Finally, the petty commodity mode should have promoted an intermediate degree of peasant class consciousness—higher than in the sedentary pastoral mode, since agricultural laborers lived in villages or cities, but lower than in the feudalized areas, since agricultural production was individually rather than communally organized and the class composition of the cities in the petty commodity zone was so very heterogeneous.

In principle these ideas can easily be tested. If the mode of production affected class formation in this way we should expect to find that (*ceteris paribus*) 14th- and 15th-century peasant *jacqueries* occurred primarily in territories having a feudal and—less frequently—a petty commodity mode

Modes of Production

of production, rather than a sedentary pastoral one. In fact, such outbreaks occurred in southeastern England, the Paris basin, Flanders, Lombardy, the Rhine basin, and Barcelona, although there is no quantitative information about the relative strength of these movements (see map 3). Perhaps they arose, not because of commercialization, as Hilton (1973, p. 174) would have it, but because the modes of production of these regions provided a basis for the development of peasant solidarity.



MAP 3.—Principal areas of peasant rebellion in 14th-century western Europe (after Hilton 1973).

The high level of peasant solidarity in the feudal areas also worked to favor limited independence from landlords. A solidary peasantry was better able to resist the attempts of landlords to limit its freedom of action than a fragmentary peasantry. This partially explains regional differences in labor control within western Europe, as well as between western and eastern Europe. Basically, the labor scarcity induced by the plagues was associated with peasant dependency in eastern Europe (that is, the Second Serfdom) while at the same time the bulk of the western peasantry was gaining greater independence (see Brenner 1976). It is less appreciated that a similar pattern occurred within western Europe itself. Peasant solidarity in the feudal areas was one factor that led to independence, whereas peasant disorganization led to greater dependence. Under market conditions an independent peasant is likely to be more productive than his dependent counterpart because he reaps all the benefit from additional inputs of labor. Likewise, he gains from the adoption of efficient methods and techniques. On the other hand, the dependent peasant is by no means sure that he will get a reasonable return on the investment of more labor or capital than the amount he is obligated to provide. Thus, it is likely that the independent peasantry of the once-feudal areas tended to have greater labor productivity than the peasantry of the other zones. As a consequence, economic development was spurred to some degree in the former areas.

Whereas nonallodial property rights and the open-field system gave the feudal regions organizational and economic advantages relative to the other two zones, neither of these factors bears directly on the problem of state formation. The major argument of this paper is that the prospects for state formation were greatest in regions that were politically divided.

REGIONAL MODES OF PRODUCTION AND THE FORMATION OF MODERN STATES

The distribution of these three modes of production substantially influenced initial patterns of state formation in western Europe. This is evident because the core areas of the first modern states emerged for the most part in the feudal zone alone.¹⁶ In this period, state formation never occurred at all in the sedentary pastoral zone, and the petty commodity zone developed city-state forms that were eventually subdued by expanding feudal cores.

Ultimately, each of the three zones evolved distinctive types of political cleavages. The fact that political power in the feudal region was to some

¹⁶ Castile's social organization was not, however, strictly comparable to that in the Paris basin or southeastern England. While all three areas were characterized by parceled sovereignty, manorialism was much less important in Castile, where production was oriented toward the transhumant pastoralism of the Mesta (see Klein 1919).

extent divided between two competing classes, whereas in the other zones it was monopolized by a single class, enhanced the prospects for state formation in the feudal zone. As will be seen, the development of strong states is aided by the existence of political divisions within a society and hindered by the absence of them.

Here the critical factor was the rise of towns. In the feudal region towns grew up to fulfill central place functions in an increasingly productive agrarian economy. The framework of parcelized sovereignty made it possible for the towns to win municipal liberties and thereby to gain autonomy from the aristocracy. But neither of the other two modes of production developed both a significant bourgeoisie and a strong aristocracy.

In contrast, the cities in the petty commodity zone played an entirely different role. They were the places of residence of aristocrats gaining a *rentier* income from their countryside estates. Hence, these cities were more likely to be centers of consumption than the northern towns, which arose largely on the basis of intermanorial trade. Far from arising endogenously out of a relatively self-sufficient economy, the southern cities were dependent on long-distance trade. They gained revenues by being centers of transshipment and of the production of manufactures for export to the international economy. The transalpine towns of southern Germany and Switzerland arose to fulfill similar functions. Consequently, in these territories the bourgeoisie and artisanry were relatively more numerous than in any other part of Europe. The urban classes in these regions of the petty commodity zone established a kind of political monopoly that could not be achieved by their counterparts elsewhere. Catalonia, for instance, had the most developed estates system anywhere in Europe during the high Middle Ages (Anderson 1974a, pp. 64–65). The sedentary pastoral regions, on the other hand, had the fewest urban settlements of all. Here the landed classes dominated the polity. Therefore, while a balance between urban and rural classes had been struck in the feudal territories, the other zones had an entirely different distribution of political power.

Parcelized sovereignty did not occur elsewhere, because in the non-feudal regions a single class could in effect obtain political control.¹⁷ The modern state first developed precisely in those territories where the political authority of the dominant social class had been most limited in the Middle Ages. What was the nature of the political division in feudal areas?

It was basically a class conflict between a well-established landowning nobility and a rising and autonomous urban bourgeoisie. In general, the two classes tended to have competing productive imperatives, material interests, and ideological principles. The bourgeoisie was committed to

¹⁷ This argument has been made previously in Hechter (1977).

production for exchange; it thus had an interest in attracting labor from the countryside and in securing the widest possible markets for its products and services. Because its status rested on capital rather than land, it felt that capital, not ascriptive privilege, should be the arbiter of a man's worth. On the other hand, the aristocracy as a whole was committed to production for use, constrained factor markets, and the principle of ascription.

Some of the consequences of this class conflict can be appreciated by a reconsideration of the issue of peasant dependency. While high peasant solidarity may have limited the ability of lords to exploit their labor force following the plagues, the role of towns was undoubtedly much more significant. Faced with a relative shortage of labor induced by widespread mortality, individual lords in all of the European regions had an evident interest in agreeing not to compete amongst themselves for scarce labor. This is because competition would only serve to drive up the price of labor for each lord. The peasants, for their part, could flee a manor (or an estate) only if they had somewhere to go—a place where they would be welcomed and offered an alternative livelihood. To the degree that lords were able to collude, and thereby restrict competition for labor, the peasantry would be subject to maximal exploitation.

The existence of towns was therefore crucial, for the towns represented a safe refuge beyond the control of the lords. When the urban areas faced a shortage of labor (an event much more likely following the plagues) they could only look to the countryside for new supplies. In this situation collusion was out of the question, for towns and lords had opposing interests with respect to labor. A flow of labor from rural to urban areas would lower its price in towns but increase it in the countryside.

Thus in regions with thriving towns, the competition, and hence price, for labor increased *pari passu*. Under competitive conditions, when labor was a scarce factor of production it could gain at the expense of the other factors, and particularly at the expense of the lords. One of the things it could gain was independence; another was higher wages.

This illustrates how roughly similar degrees of labor scarcity could increase peasant dependency in regions having few towns (in eastern Europe generally, and the sedentary pastoral zone of western Europe), while it could have quite the opposite effect in relatively urbanized regions (in the feudal and petty commodity zones).

Marx often noted that feudalism was the first mode of production in history to cause an opposition between town and country, but he failed to analyze how this opposition presaged the formation of modern states. To account theoretically for the rise of strong, centralized states, one must explain why leading individual actors in a social form surrender

at least part of their power to the state, a corporate actor over which no individual has effective control. This can happen only if most of these individuals expect to gain, or to prevent the surrender of, enough resources by having a state apparatus to override the costs incurred by their loss of sovereignty (see Coleman 1973).

Now the outcome of this individual calculus of benefits and costs is decisively affected by the extent of political diversity within the society. All other things equal, state formation will be more likely to the degree that powerful individual actors form two groups on the basis of divergent economic and political interests. The reason is that, in politically divided societies, actors in the more powerful group always have an incentive to band together and create an organization—a state apparatus—to tax, repress, or otherwise expropriate the members of the weaker group. This incentive is magnified if, as in the case of late feudalism, the weaker group seems capable of mounting a challenge to the system of property rights under which the stronger group prospers.

Consider the feudal social formation. It was divided politically by two groups, a strong rural aristocracy and a weaker but growing urban bourgeoisie. As has been noted, this bourgeoisie was generally committed to freeing markets for land, labor, and capital as well as restricting the salience of ascriptive privilege in the social order as a whole. All of these principles were anathema to the lords. Were the bourgeoisie and their urban allies, the artisans, somehow to seize political power (perhaps with the aid of the peasantry) this would threaten not only the life-style but the livelihood of every aristocratic lord. Under these circumstances, seeing the handwriting on the wall, each lord might be willing to give up some of his power to a state that would maintain the prevailing social order.

Obviously such an outcome would grow more likely as the potential threat represented by the bourgeoisie appeared more credible. As this paper has shown, from the 14th century on the feudal social order was increasingly subject to challenge in two measurable ways. First, the feudal zone had witnessed a significant incidence of peasant rebellion; the docility of its labor force could no longer be taken for granted. Second, the link between the growth of towns and the rise of wage labor in the countryside could not easily be ignored. This explains why state formation did not begin in earnest until the 15th and 16th centuries: previous to this time the bourgeoisie cannot have been regarded as a credible challenging group by the bulk of the lords.

This analysis would therefore suggest that the first modern states in western Europe were set up at the behest of the landed aristocracy (this is a major theme in Anderson [1974a]). But a further point should be borne in mind. Class divisions were not the only kind of political divi-

sions that could promote state formation, as they largely did in the feudal parts of France and England. Cultural differences within a population could serve the same end. Thus, there is little doubt that state formation in the Iberian peninsula was fostered by the *Reconquista* directed against an internal enemy, the Moors. The common element in both types of examples is that group formation, and consequent organization, among actors in a given category is made possible by the recognition that each can either gain substantially, or preserve his position, by the subjection of an enemy within.¹⁸

Once the state gained power at the expense of its constituents it was free to pursue its own interests, subject, as always, to existing constraints. At first the modern state enacted policies on behalf of the landed aristocracy. In Spain, it preserved the property rights of the Mesta (North and Thomas 1973); in England, it braked the pace of enclosures, preventing the emergence of a free market in land (Polanyi 1957); in France, it circumscribed the mobility of labor and capital (North and Thomas 1973, p. 127) and never managed to levy taxes on the nobility at all. But gradually thereafter, modern western European history tells the story of how the state slowly deprived the landed aristocracy of its prerogatives, biting the very hands that had once fashioned its existence.

However, in the absence of such political divisions there was no compelling incentive for leading actors to surrender their power by creating a centralized state. While it might make sense for a particularly strong lord, or a particularly strong city-state, to attempt to dominate weaker neighbors, it was in the interest of the weaker actors to form coalitions to prevent this. Hence a system made up of relatively similar kinds of actors—be they individual actors, like feudal lords or tribal chiefs, or corporate ones, like city-states—will tend toward a balance of power composed of more or less stable coalitions. But this solution militates against the formation of a strong state encompassing all the actors in a given territory. Thus the urban burghers of southern Germany and northern Italy spent most of their energies competing against rival city-states for shares of trade and tribute.¹⁹

¹⁸ In *The German Ideology*, Marx and Engels argued that "the separate individuals form a class only insofar as they have to carry on a common battle against another class; otherwise they are on hostile terms with each other as competitors" (1970, p. 82).

¹⁹ In that eminent 16th-century treatise on state building, *The Prince*, Machiavelli clearly saw that the prevalence of autonomous city-states in Italy impeded that territory's prospects for political unification. "And whoever becomes the ruler of a free city and does not destroy it, can expect to be destroyed by it, for it can always find a motive for rebellion in the name of liberty and of its ancient usages, which are forgotten neither by lapse of time nor by benefits received; and whatever one does or provides, so long as the inhabitants are not separated or dispersed, they do not forget that name and those usages, but appeal to them at once in every emergency, as did Pisa after so many years held in servitude by the Florentines. But when cities or provinces have been accustomed to live under a prince, and the family of that prince

Likewise, the tribal chieftains of Ireland never yielded their individual authority to support a king from their midst.²⁰

The cumulative advantages of the feudal mode of production over its rivals may now be summarized. First, feudal law promoted the concentration of landholding and established a primitive hierarchical administrative structure capable of encompassing extended territories. This led to relatively powerful principalities by the 11th century. Second, the open-field system and the development and adoption of technical improvements in agriculture spurred economic and demographic growth in the feudal regions. But, most important, the existence of political competition between the bourgeoisie and the landowning aristocracy of these regions alone provided a setting in which leading aristocrats found it expedient to surrender their individual power and create a strong, centralized state. For this combination of reasons those territories having a feudal mode of production—with all that this implies—were most likely to subdue contiguous territories having other modes of production. Thus were formed the first modern states in western Europe.²¹

is extinguished, being on the one hand used to obey, and on the other not having their old prince, they cannot unite in choosing one from among themselves, and they do not know how to live in freedom, so that they are slower to take arms, and a prince can win them over with greater facility and establish himself securely" ([1532] 1952, p. 46).

²⁰ One of the best discussions of such a system comes not from western Europe at all, but from ethnographic research on the Berbers of the Maghreb conducted by Montagne ([1931] 1973). The Berbers have an institution called the *leff*—a system of alliances between cantons of a particular faction that involve reciprocal obligations of loyalty. Thus, "when a canton enters into a state of war with one of its neighbors it receives assistance from the next canton but one, and step by step there develops a sort of vast political chequer-board in two colours. These blocs are very stable and it is considered a great dishonour if a canton changes allegiance. We know from the history of the Marabouts of the High Atlas that they have hardly changed at all, at least during the last hundred and fifty years" (Montagne [1931] 1973, p. 37; see also Gellner 1969).

²¹ Feudalism, then, was a *sufficient* condition of state formation in western European history; it was not, however, a *necessary* condition. If the lack of internal political divisions in a social form proved fateful for subsequent state formation, this did not mean that modern states could under no circumstances emerge in the petty commodity or sedentary pastoral zones. If the leading actors in either of these areas feared conquest by external enemies which might threaten their vital interests (by exacting tribute or expropriating property) then they would have an incentive to support a state apparatus to defend themselves. While the nonfeudal regions lagged behind in state formation, once the comparative superiority of the first modern states—Portugal, Spain, France, and England—became evident, the lords in many of these territories were compelled to establish centralized states in order to avoid being dominated. This trend was undoubtedly reinforced by changes in military technology (the greater importance of the infantry, the maturation of the siege cannon, and the increasing size of armies) that favored the centralized state (see Bean 1973). Most of the modern states formed in the 17th century and later, especially after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, had never had feudal cores. The emergence of the Swiss Confederation (East

CONCLUSION

Social scientists have often considered late medieval western Europe an area that can be characterized by a single system of social organization. This system has been termed "feudal" by some, and "patrimonial" by others. To be sure, these writers have admitted the possibility of variations on the theme, most often variations on national grounds. Hence careful scholars are quick to note that the social structure in medieval England was somewhat different from that in medieval France.

In contrast, it is the claim of the preceding analysis that three quite different types of social organization coexisted in late medieval western Europe. These types—which we have termed the sedentary pastoral, petty commodity, and feudal modes of production—were found in specific regions on the continent and the British archipelago. But their distribution was seldom, if ever, coterminous with the emerging boundaries of our modern states.

Although the concept of the mode of production has a long history in social science, it has rarely been used effectively for comparative analysis. This paper provides but a single illustration of the utility of the concept once it is endowed with an operational form. Indeed, it is quite difficult to explain many regional economic and political differences in early modern western Europe unless these modes of production are given their due. Thus, aspects of the various modes have been seen to be important determinants of differential patterns of peasant rebellion and types of labor control in the various territories. However, their principal effect was on the initial formation of modern states. Feudalism provided a set of conditions that helped bring modern states into being, but state formation was inhibited in the sedentary pastoral and petty commodity zones.

Two issues implied by this argument—one methodological, the other theoretical—seem especially worthy of comment here. The first is the question of the most appropriate unit of analysis for the comparative study of early modern societies in western Europe. This paper argues that the region, a territory defined in terms of the homogeneity of its mode of production, is

1966) and the Netherlands (Wallerstein 1974, pp. 164–224) had much to do with conflicts among the great powers. Both were formally recognized in 1648 after the resolution of the Thirty Years' War. Swedish state building has been explained plausibly as a reaction against the threat of Danish overlordship (Anderson 1974a, pp. 179–84), though Sweden was itself the most feudalized region in all Scandinavia (Østerud 1978). The German core, Brandenburg-Prussia, was as far removed from feudalism as any territory in the Empire—despite the fact that areas like Westphalia had been highly feudalized; the same is true of the Italian core, Piedmont. In these two territories external enemies included both popes and Holy Roman Emperors, neither of whom had an interest in seeing his prerogatives usurped by upstart princes (Ganshof 1974, p. 164; Hintze 1975, p. 167; Rokkan 1975). Germany suffered from its proximity to the Emperors, just as Italy was crippled by its proximity to the popes.

the optimal unit of analysis rather than any unit circumscribed by a political boundary—such as the state. All the early states were made up of territories embracing more than one mode of production. Indeed, probably until the 19th century the feudal regions of England had more in common with the feudal regions of France than with the sedentary pastoral parts of England, and vice versa. To make comparisons between structurally heterogeneous units such as England and France in this period is therefore to invite considerable confusion.²² Since most comparative sociologists take states as their unit of analysis by convention (and convenience), this constitutes far from a minor claim. In fact, it suggests the need for some reinterpretation of modern European history.

The second issue concerns a very grand problem, related to the theory of the state. In one form or another the question of state origins lies at the heart of theoretical concern in sociology. This is because since the inception of the discipline, sociological theorists have argued, in contrast to economic and psychological theorists, that the most important determinants of human behavior are institutional rather than individual (see Parsons 1937). And of all the institutions in complex societies the state must take pride of place. Thus to understand the genesis of the state is to learn something significant about the evolution of social order in general.

In the view of contractarian theorists such as Hobbes, Maine, Spencer, and their contemporary followers (see Olson 1965, chap. 4) the state arises as a response to individual needs, that is, to the demand for its services. These services can be termed protection and justice, in short. The contractarian theory holds that when the demand for these services increases to some unspecified threshold, individuals will voluntarily surrender their freedom to the state to gain protection and justice. Writers in the tradition of Marx, Engels, and Weber, on the other hand, tend to see the state as a predator imposed upon the powerless by a ruling group anxious to extend or consolidate its privileges.

The evidence relating the rise of the modern state to the existence of political divisions in a social form makes little sense from the perspective of the contractarian theory. If the modern state first arose through the establishment of a contractual agreement among its potential constituents, the explanation would surely be that such a contract was in the mutual

²² A recent example of this confusion is offered by Macfarlane (1979). Finding evidence of widespread allodial property rights in parishes of late medieval East Anglia and Cumbria, the author rushes to the judgment that *England* never experienced anything like continental feudalism (p. 206)! But this evidence comes from two English regions lying outside the zone delimited by the feudal mode of production. As such it has no logical bearing on the characteristics of English feudalism. By failing to take cognizance of English regional diversity, Macfarlane is led to serious errors of interpretation.

interest of most of the leading actors, if not all of them. Yet if this were so, state formation would have occurred initially in regions having minimal political divisions, because these regions are composed of leading actors with the greatest commonality of interest. Instead, the first modern states arose precisely in regions where the leading actors had the least commonality of interest.

When the state is perceived as a revenue-maximizing institution providing a public good (Olson 1965)—namely, protection and justice for all within its borders—the explanation for this finding becomes evident. In societies without significant political cleavages, the strongest actor may have an incentive to establish a state to dominate weaker ones, but these weak actors, in turn, will likely coalesce in opposition to him. The typical result will be a standoff precluding the establishment of a strong centralized state. Leading actors will have an incentive to jointly surrender their power to a strong state only if they live in a politically divided society in which the weaker group can make a credible threat to change the rules of the game to their advantage and to the detriment of their opponents.

On the basis of the limited evidence presented in this paper we cannot hope to say anything definitive about a problem as deep as that concerning the origin of the state. Nonetheless, the finding that state formation occurred initially in politically divided regions casts some doubt on the contractarian theory of the state, while it is consistent with expectations derived from the predatory theory—particularly the Marxist version of it.

Marx insisted that group formation, on a class basis, was of cardinal importance as a cause of social change. Yet this analysis differs in one crucial respect from Marx's discussion of these issues. Marx always tended to assume that the bourgeoisie was the class within feudalism that generally attained consciousness first, presumably because it was destined to play a revolutionary role. But this assumption is far more tenable for the early medieval period, during which the burghers successfully pressed their claims for municipal autonomy, than for the later. In contrast, we argue that in late feudalism the nobility, not the bourgeoisie, was more likely to have attained class consciousness. The modern state was a direct result of this development. Thus, bourgeois class consciousness in the late medieval period did not grow from the seeds of a new, capitalist mode of production so much as reemerge in reaction to the policies of the first modern states.

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The Structure of Economic Segmentation: A Dual Economy Approach¹

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We note the need for a measure of economic segmentation based on current empirical data for a range of theoretically relevant indicators. Drawing on a dual economy interpretation of the relationship between economic organization and labor market structure, we identify a set of empirical indicators which relate to the degree of oligopoly versus competition in industrial settings. We use factor analysis to test the dual economists' expectation of a common dimension underlying indicators of economic concentration and scale and the characteristics of product and labor markets. After confirming this expectation, we use factor scores to define an index of segmentation for industrial categories. Finally, we demonstrate the application of dichotomous and continuous segmentation measures to the analysis of a simple earnings determination model.

In the past decade there has been a resurgence of interest in the economic structure of industrial capitalism (Galbraith 1967; Baran and Sweezy 1966; Shepherd 1979). One expression of this interest in the economic organization of industry is the literature on the dual economy (Averitt 1968; Bluestone, Murphy, and Stevenson 1973; Gordon 1972; Edwards 1975). This interest in economic structure has received added research impetus from a recent trend of reaction against individualistic research traditions in social stratification (Bibb and Form 1977; Beck, Horan, and Tolbert 1978; Horan 1978).

Although dual economy theory traces its intellectual origins to a diverse set of theoretical and empirical works, in recent years it has achieved a growing coherence as a view of the industrial structure of modern capitalism. In the present paper, we attempt to contribute to that coherence by examining the measurement of a key theoretical concept, the concept of "economic segmentation." We argue that despite the diversity in the original literature from which dual economy theory derives, there is sufficient consensus on empirical indicators to provide a basis for empirical specification of the economic sectors proposed in that literature.

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The basic theme which characterizes the dual economy approach—the importance of differences in economic organization for social structure and individual behavior—is one of long-standing interest in the social sciences. J. H. Boeke (1953), an early proponent of the importance of sectoral differences for colonial economic development, proposed a model of economic dualism which contrasted the Western industrial and the traditional agricultural sectors. Similarly, J. S. Furnivall's (1944, 1948) characterization of social and economic segmentation in the Far Eastern colonies as a "plural society" has inspired considerable interest among anthropologists interested in the British West Indies (see, e.g., Smith 1965; Rubin 1960). The effect of this anthropological tradition has been to deemphasize the importance of economic pluralism relative to cultural pluralism. In contrast, use of the concept of dual economy in the economic development literature has tended to emphasize the existence of sectors defined in terms of the social and economic organization of production.² Such an emphasis seems quite compatible with the approach to the dual economy employed here.

A more proximate origin for what is now referred to as dual economy theory is a set of studies of local urban labor markets conducted during the late 1960s (see, e.g., Baron and Hymer 1968; Wachtel 1970; Victorisz and Harrison 1970; Harrison 1972). Among the common themes noted by Gordon (1972) in his review of this literature are the relative separation of two historically defined labor markets (sectors) which he designates as "primary" and "secondary." The organization of work in the secondary sector is characterized by low-skill jobs and employment instability, whereas the organization of work in the primary sector provides job ladders, on-the-job training, and a differentiated wage structure.

The literature on economic segmentation exhibits substantial intellectual diversity. One important source of such diversity is the conceptualization of economic segmentation. Researchers in the dual labor market literature tend to focus on such characteristics as wages, working conditions, chances for advancement, and employment stability as delimiters of sectoral distinctions. In contrast, researchers in the dual economy literature tend to focus on industrial structure and the economic organization of production as the basis for sectoral distinctions.

At one level these differences may be treated as differences in emphasis. Dual labor market writers tend to stress the description of segmentation in labor markets, with relatively little concern for the origins of such segmentation. Dual economy writers acknowledge the existence of segmentation in labor markets, but treat it as the consequence of more funda-

² For an overview of the role of economic dualism in development literature, see Meier (1964), esp. chap. 2.

mental processes of segmentation in the economic order. "The central theoretical assertion . . . is that behavior observed in the labor market . . . reflects more fundamental processes in production itself. . . . To understand the labor market processes which 'produce' group differences in incomes, unemployment, and mobility, then, we must investigate the institutional arrangements governing production" (Edwards et al. 1975, p. 4).

The present effort to construct an empirical measure of economic segmentation employs indicators of labor market characteristics as well as indicators relating to the economic organization of production. While our analysis does not assume the primacy of one set of indicators over another, it provides a basis for evaluating the dual economists' suggestion that economic organization and labor market characteristics are interrelated.

OLIGOPOLY, COMPETITION, AND THE DUAL ECONOMY

Concern with the economic structure of contemporary industrial societies has come to focus increasingly on the distinction between competitive and monopoly capitalism. While neoclassical economists and sociologists have been content to base their theories and analyses on the assumption of a pure competitive market system, their counterparts in the dual economy tradition have questioned the applicability of a competitive model to those portions of the economy characterized by monopolistic or oligopolistic forms of organization.³ Baran and Sweezy (1966, p. 6) provide a clear statement of this position: "Today the typical economic unit in the capitalist world is not the small firm producing a negligible fraction of a homogeneous output for an anonymous market, but a large-scale enterprise producing a significant share of the output of an industry, or even several industries, and able to control its prices, the volume of its production, and the types and amounts of its investments. It is therefore impermissible to ignore monopoly in constructing our model of the economy and to go on treating competition as the general case."

Dual economists have attempted to use this distinction between portions of the economy characterized by competitive and oligopolistic organization as a basis for defining distinct economic sectors. Averitt (1968, p. 1) defines the dual economy in terms of "two disparate types of business organization" which he refers to as "center firms" and "periphery firms": "Center firms differ from periphery firms in terms of economic size, organizational structure, industrial location, factor endowment, time perspective and market concentration." Although Averitt identifies his

³ In what follows we use the term "oligopoly" to refer to all situations in which some subset of firms in an industry possesses market power. Oligopoly thus subsumes situations of pure monopoly, tight oligopoly, and loose oligopoly (Shepherd 1979, p. 62).

center and periphery economic sectors as consisting of "firms," he attaches a very different meaning to this term from that which might be suggested by a casual reading. Specifically, "[t]he word 'firm' refers to the business organization of industry" (Averitt 1968, p. 3). Later writers refer to differences between industries in the organization of production as "industrial" differences, a trend which we shall continue in the present paper.

For these writers the distinction between oligopolistic and competitive capitalism constitutes a major dimension in the industrial organization of production. Bluestone et al. (1973, pp. 28-29) describe a two-sector model of industrial segmentation as follows:

The core economy includes those industries that comprise the muscle of American economic and political power. . . . [t]he firms in the core economy are noted for high productivity, high profits, intensive utilization of capital, high incidence of monopoly elements, and a high degree of unionization. Workers who are able to secure employment in these industries are, in most cases, assured of relatively high wages and better than average working conditions and fringe benefits. . . .

Beyond the fringes of the core economy lies a set of industries that lack almost all of the advantages normally found in center firms. . . . The periphery industries are noted for their small firm size, labor intensity, low profit, low productivity, intensive product market competition, lack of unionization, and low wages. Unlike core sector industries, the periphery lacks the assets, size and political power to take advantage of economies of scale or to spend large sums on research and development.

Traditionally economists have sought to measure industrial oligopoly in terms of the market power concentration within an industry. Concentration refers to the portion of the business activity (market shares) within an industry which is controlled by a small number of firms. This is conventionally measured as the proportion of activity under the control of the four largest firms in an industry. In the past decade there has been a reaction against this overly simplistic, single-factor model of market power. Shepherd (1970, p. 47) presents the multifactor approach to monopoly as follows: "In summary, structural monopoly has a number of elements formal and informal, internal and external. They probably include (1) market shares and asymmetry . . . (2) barriers to entry and the whole range of cooperative arrangements which reflect informal or 'soft' structure . . . and (3) primarily relative size, diversification and vertical patterns among external elements." Shepherd argues that while no single element constitutes a satisfactory measure for the degree of market power present in an industry, "a combination of several elements may indicate a high degree of probability that market power is present" (1970, p. 47).

We follow Shepherd (1970, 1979) in seeking to base our designation of competitive and oligopolistic economic sectors on a set of multiple in-

dicators. For present purposes we can group the indicators of industrial oligopoly which are listed in table 1 into three general categories: (1) measures of the capacity for oligopoly in an industry, (2) measures of oligopolistic behavior in the industrial product market, and (3) measures of oligopolistic behavior in the industrial labor market.

The first group of variables includes factors that reflect the potential for exercising oligopolistic market power. Most central to this capacity for oligopoly is market concentration. Other related factors are indicators of economic scale, which may be viewed as concomitants of vertical integration and barriers to entry (both of which are elements of the potential for industrial oligopoly). As Shepherd (1979, p. 180) notes, the capacity for oligopoly does not necessarily lead to oligopolistic market behavior within individual industries. The "core" sector described by dual economy theorists is one in which industries act upon their capacity through oligopolistic behavior in industrial product and labor markets. In the product market we use profit levels and industry levels of political contributions and advertising expenditures as indicators of oligopolistic behavior. Edwards (1975) has argued that oligopoly has important implications for labor markets as well as for product markets. Our indicators of oligopolistic behavior in labor markets include measures of bureaucratic organization, wages, and work stability at the industry level.

In the analysis below, we bring together these multiple indicators of economic oligopoly in an attempt to construct a measure of economic segmentation. Heretofore, researchers interested in employing the dual economy distinction between core and periphery economic sectors have rather arbitrarily grouped industries according to narrative descriptions found in the literature. Bibb and Form (1977) follow Averitt's (1968) criteria and assign major industry divisions to core and periphery sectors. Beck et al. (1978) use the discussion of economic sectors in Bluestone et al. (1973) to classify industries in a similar two-sector scheme.

Although these operationalizations of the core/periphery concept have produced interesting results, neither is entirely satisfactory. First, the seminal treatments of dual economy theory by Averitt (1968) and Bluestone et al. (1973) do not always correspond on the allocation of industries to core and periphery sectors. Consequently, a comparison of the sector variables employed by Bibb and Form (1977) and by Beck et al. (1978) reveals some important discrepancies in the placement of specific industries. For example, the latter place wholesale trade, finance, and professional industries in the core, while the former place all of these in the periphery.

A second unsatisfactory characteristic of these operationalizations is that neither reflects a set of consistent empirical criteria applied to a

TABLE 1
VARIABLES, EXPLANATIONS, AND DATA SOURCES

Variable	Explanation	Source
X ₁ Adv.....	Mean expenditure on advertising by corporations (1972)	IRS (1972a), tables 4.1 and 5.1
X ₂ Assets.....	Mean assets of corporations (1972)	IRS (1972b), table 1
X ₃ Concen.....	Four-firm adjusted concentration ratio (1966)	Shepherd (1969), table A
X ₄ Fringe.....	Mean fringe benefit expenditure per worker (1972)	IRS (1972a), tables 2.2, 3.2, 4.1, 5.1
X ₅ Hrly wage.....	Mean hourly wage of production and nonsupervisory workers (1976; adjusted to 1972 dollars)	BLS (1977b), table C-2
X ₆ Mincome.....	Median annual income of workers (1969; adjusted to 1972 dollars)	U.S. Bureau of the Census (1973), table 1
X ₇ Polcont.....	Mean political contributions (1972)	Common Cause (1972), vols. 1 and 2
X ₈ Profit.....	Mean profit (or net income) of business units (1972)	IRS (1972a), tables 2.1, 3.1, 4.1, 5.1
X ₉ Psuper.....	Proportion supervisory or nonproduction personnel (1976)	BLS (1977a), tables B5 and B6
X ₁₀ Punion.....	Proportion of unionized workers (1970)	BLS (1976), table 142
X ₁₁ P5052.....	Proportion of workers working 50-52 weeks per year (1969)	U.S. Bureau of the Census (1973), table 6
X ₁₂ Quits.....	Mean number of voluntary or involuntary terminations per 100 workers (1976)	BLS (1977b), table D-2
X ₁₃ Receipts.....	Mean business receipts (1972)	IRS (1972a), tables 2.1, 3.1, 4.1, 5.1
X ₁₄ Tenure.....	Median years employed with same firm for males (1972)	BLS (1973), table E
X ₁₅ Wkly hrs.....	Mean hours worked per week by production and nonsupervisory personnel (1976)	BLS (1977b), table C-2
X ₁₆ Wkly wage.....	Mean weekly wage for production and nonsupervisory personnel (1976)	BLS (1977b), table C-2
X ₁₇ Wnworks.....	Mean number of workers per business unit (1970)	U.S. Bureau of the Census (1973), table 1

range of industries.⁴ Averitt (1969) presents a variety of descriptive information for a limited set of industries, primarily manufacturing. Bluestone et al. (1973) consider a variety of industries but focus primarily on wage data. There is a clear need for empirical evidence that covers the full range of industries and the full range of measures required by the dual economy concept. A systematic analysis of such data should help to eliminate discrepancies among existing measures of economic sector and thus provide a stronger foundation for further research.

The goal of this analysis is to provide a measure of economic segmentation which is consistent with dual economy theory and based on current empirical information. Dual economists use the concept of economic sector to emphasize the impact of economic organization on socioeconomic processes. However, the use of polar types such as competitive and oligopolistic capitalism does not deny the existence of a gradation in industrial competition ranging from highly competitive at one extreme to highly oligopolistic at the other extreme: "Oligopoly is complex for three main reasons. First, there are infinite gradients in the degree of oligopoly. . . . Second, the degree and effect of the interdependence *need not be strong*. Oligopolists may fight or coordinate, or simply ignore each other and pursue independent policies. . . . Third, the group's internal structure may influence the outcome. A symmetric group (all members equal) may behave differently from an asymmetric group (dominated by one firm). There are infinite varieties of such internal structures, both in theory and in actual markets" (Shepherd 1979, pp. 180-81).

Thus an industry with high market concentration does not necessarily operate in an oligopolistic fashion. This is one reason that the present analysis includes measures of economic scale and oligopolistic behavior in product and labor markets as well as concentration. Further, the "test" of dual economy theory which our analysis provides is not a test of the existence of a bimodal distribution or a "sectoral boundary" on one or more empirical indicators. Instead our analysis constitutes a test for the existence of an underlying dimension which is common to all indicators and which exhibits the patterns of relationships predicted by dual economy theory. The discontinuities suggested by dual economy theory are not discontinuities in the distribution of defining characteristics. Instead, they are discontinuities in the work situations and socioeconomic experiences of individual workers (Beck et al. 1978; Horan, Tolbert, and Beck 1979), a topic to which we shall return later in our analysis.

⁴ Hodson (1977) takes a step in the direction of comprehensiveness by analyzing five characteristics of roughly 200 industries. He presupposes three sectors in the economic structure: monopoly, competition, and state.

DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

The accumulation of data to be used in the measurement of economic segmentation was organized according to two principal considerations: (1) industries were to be the basic unit of analysis; (2) current, contemporaneous data were needed for a set of conceptually relevant indicators. Despite some variation in terminology, there is considerable consistency in the dual economy literature regarding the choice of industry as the appropriate unit of analysis. Bluestone et al. (1973) discuss the sectoral distinction in terms of industries, while Averitt (1978) focuses on "firms" which he defines in terms of the "business organization of industries." Shepherd (1970, p. 34) notes that "[m]arket power is held by firms but it is exercised in markets," while Spilerman (1977, p. 579n.) suggests that similarities in technology, organization, and demand make industry the appropriate unit of analysis in the study of internal labor markets.

The important point to keep in mind here is that the oligopoly/competition distinction is definitionally concerned with characteristics of industrial market situations, not with those of individual firms. In the present analysis, data on firms are averaged at the industry level and used, along with other industry characteristics, to provide an economic profile of industry groupings. Thus, industry is treated here as the major locus for variations in competitive structure as indexed by levels of economic concentration and scale, characteristics of product markets, and characteristics of labor markets.

The empirical indicators of oligopolistic/competitive market structure used in this analysis fall into one of the three basic categories introduced above: (1) measures of the capacity for oligopoly in an industry, (2) measures of oligopolistic behavior in the industrial product market, and (3) measures of oligopolistic behavior in the industrial labor market. As measures of the capacity for oligopoly we use the traditional measure of market concentration (X_3) and several measures of economic scale, including assets (X_2), receipts (X_{13}), and number of workers (X_{17}). As measures of oligopolistic behavior in the industrial product market we include levels of advertising expenditures (X_1),⁵ political contributions (X_7), and profit (X_8). Edwards (1975, p. 21) argues that internal labor markets are "a direct offspring of the consolidation of monopoly capitalist power and the consequent imposition of bureaucratic control." In addition to a measure of the relative size of the bureaucratic work force (X_9), our analysis employs measures of the extent of internal labor market development in an industry. The latter include unionization (X_{10}), levels of

⁵ Ornstein (1977) examines a variety of measures of advertising, particularly ratios of advertising to sales. He discovers little consistency in the findings of the economic research tradition. Thus, the simple mean advertising expenditure is employed here.

wages (X_5, X_6, X_{16}), fringe benefits (X_4),⁶ and job stability in both the short run (X_{12}, X_{15}) and the longer run (X_{11}, X_{14}).

In the initial stages of data collection, the 215 industry categories established by the U.S. Bureau of the Census (1971) were employed. For most of the variables of interest, however, data were not available for such detailed industrial categories. The industry categories employed here are aggregated to a total of 55 to correspond with the archival data sources and allow maximum use of available information.⁷ The professional and public administration industries are consistently omitted or underrepresented in the data sources and are deleted from our initial analysis. The problem here is that many of the variables concerning economic scale and oligopolistic behavior in product and labor markets are either not relevant to these industries or not available. (See table 1 for a complete listing of variables and data sources.) Following a discussion of the analysis for the other 55 industries, we shall return to a consideration of the professional and public administrative categories.

We have noted above that dual economy theory suggests empirical regularities in the relationship between industrial capacity for oligopoly (as indexed by economic concentration and scale) and indicators of oligopolistic behavior in product and labor markets. Given this conception of multiple indicators relating to an underlying dimension, the use of factor analytic procedures seems appropriate. Such an analysis will provide tests both on the existence of an underlying dimension and on the conformity of interrelationships among the indicators to theoretical expectations. If both tests are successful, the factor analysis procedure will also provide factor scores which can be used to specify the economic segmentation of industry.

The correlations, means, and standard deviations for the 17 indicators are presented in table 2. All of the variables appear to covary in accordance with theoretical expectations. The only negative relationships involve the "quits" variable, which is as expected. All other variables are positively related with one another. In fact, 18 of the correlations exceed 0.70 and are indicated by asterisks (*) in table 2. The multicollinearity indicated here is not a problem for the factor solution itself, but may raise problems for our computation of factor scores. Harman (1976, p. 369)

⁶ These benefits include employer contributions to pension, annuity, retirement, profit sharing, stock bonus, health insurance, and life insurance programs.

⁷ In a few instances where discrepancies remained between this industry classification and data sources, variable values were allocated on the basis of existing information. Data that were too detailed were simply summed to represent the aggregate industry category used here. In instances of lack of detail, a weighted disaggregation procedure was employed. Either the number of firms or the number of workers in an industry was used as a weight in an effort to approximate the variable value.

TABLE 2
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS, MEANS, AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF INDUSTRY VARIABLES

Variable	X ₁	X ₂	X ₃	X ₄	X ₅	X ₆	X ₇	X ₈	X ₉	X ₁₀	X ₁₁	X ₁₂	X ₁₃	X ₁₄	X ₁₅	\bar{X}	SD
X ₁ Adv.	..															54,304.74	188,125.34
X ₂ Assets	.41	..														5,765,473.92	14,650,229.59
X ₃ Concen.	.11	.33	..													49.89	20.95
X ₄ Fringe	.48	.76*	.54	..												572.53	682.40
X ₅ Hrlwyage	.49	.38	.68	.47	..											6.46	1.68
X ₆ Miscome	.02	.86*	.18	.49	.78*	..										6,377.32	1,664.30
X ₇ Polcont	.58	.78*	.22	.78*	.26	.22	..									17.13	75.38
X ₈ Profit	.12	.78*	.53	.32	.46	.63	.39*	..								247,797.24	827,768.64
X ₉ Esuper	.12	.28	.32	.32	.59	.88	.27	.27	..							33	.29
X ₁₀ Funton	.10	.01	.63	.48	.49	.80*	.23	.12	.30	..						65	.11
X ₁₁ F3052	.10	.30	.27	.42	.44	.42	.30	.23	.60	.24	..					1.71	.60
X ₁₂ Qutis	.23	.30	.27	.42	.44	.42	.30	.23	.60	.24	.29	..				3,801,088.24	12,409,668.26
X ₁₃ Receipis	.14	.82*	.22	.85*	.28	.26	.97*	.43	.30	.12	.25	.35	..			37.62	2.49
X ₁₄ tenure	.16	.42	.52	.51	.37	.32	.49	.43	.42	.19	.50	.29	.49	..		248.51	78.18
X ₁₅ Wklyhrs	.10	.22	.53	.45	.56	.67	.22	.24	.59	.55	.74*	.20	.26	.42	.71*	42.58	68.99
X ₁₆ Wklywage	.07	.22	.66	.53	.97*	.83*	.29	.28	.54	.62	.62	.44	.32	.43	.41		
X ₁₇ Wnwoitks	.57	.50	.36	.74*	.28	.30	.45	.68	.36	.28	.37	.36	.62	.41	.36		

*r > .70.

presents the widely accepted regression algorithm for the construction of factor scores:

$$\mathbf{B} = \mathbf{S}' \mathbf{R}^{-1}, \quad (1)$$

where \mathbf{B} is a matrix of scoring weights, \mathbf{S} is the factor structure matrix, and \mathbf{R} is the correlation matrix. From (1) we see that the correlation matrix must be inverted in order to compute factor scores. In the present case, the determinant of the correlation matrix (\mathbf{R}) is 0.12×10^{-11} , which means that \mathbf{R} is ill conditioned.⁸

The redundancies evident among the variables in table 2 can be eliminated by selecting variables which can stand as proxies for clusters of highly intercorrelated variables. As is evident in table 3, profit and median income provide the best proxies for redundant variables. In each instance of substitution, the proxy variables share at least 50% variance with the variables which they represent.

The results of a factor analysis on this reduced set of variables appear in table 4. This solution is unidimensional with all variables loading on the factor at 0.42 or higher.⁹ Clearly, the variables covary in a manner consistent with dual economy theory. Industries with large values on the economic concentration and scale variables exhibit characteristics associated with product and labor market powers as well. Factor scores were computed for this solution, and these are listed along with the industry categories in table 5. The highest ranking industries on the factor score are petroleum products and motor vehicles. The two lowest industries are

TABLE 3
DISPOSITION OF REDUNDANT VARIABLES

Redundant Variable	Proxy for Variable
(X ₁₁)P5052.....	(X ₆)Mincome, (X ₁₅)Wklyhrs
(X ₁₆)Wklywage.....	(X ₆)Mincome, (X ₁₅)Wklyhrs
(X ₅)Hrlywage.....	(X ₆)Mincome
(X ₄)Fringe.....	(X ₈)Profit, (X ₁₇)Wnworkrs
(X ₁)Adv.....	(X ₈)Profit
(X ₇)Polcont.....	(X ₈)Profit
(X ₂)Assets.....	(X ₈)Profit
(X ₁₃)Receipts.....	(X ₈)Profit

⁸ A factor analysis on all 17 variables produced an oblique (promax) solution with two factors correlated at .40, accounting for 72.0% of the variance. One factor was dominated by the economic scale and product market variables and the other by the labor market characteristics. Proportion of supervisory personnel, tenure, and concentration were weighted moderately on both factors. Although consistent with expectations derived from dual economy theory, the solution nevertheless produced highly unstable scoring weights and for this reason was not used.

⁹ Factors were retained if the eigenvalues were greater than 1.0 following principal axis iteration.

TABLE 4

RESULTS OF FACTOR ANALYSIS ON NONREDUNDANT VARIABLES

Variable	Factor Pattern	Communality	Scoring Weight
X_3 Concen.....	.721	.521	.180
X_6 Mincome*.....	.767	.588	.133
X_8 Profit†.....	.478	.228	.095
X_9 Psuper.....	.709	.503	.158
X_{10} Punion.....	.457	.209	.044
X_{12} Quits.....	-.424	.179	-.060
X_{14} Tenure.....	.598	.358	.130
X_{15} Wklyhrs‡.....	.770	.593	.246
X_{17} Wnworkrs§.....	.598	.358	.156
Eigenvalue.....	3.538		

* Serves as proxy for P5052, Wklywage, Hrlywage.

† Serves as proxy for Fringe, Adv, Polcont, Assets, Receipts.

‡ Serves as proxy for P5052 and Wklywage.

§ Serves as proxy for Fringe.

in retail trade: apparel sales and eating and drinking places. The mean of the factor score distribution is zero by construction. The symmetry of the distribution (skewness = 0.17), however, is not a technical artifact but an interesting empirical outcome. It indicates that the variables employed here are effective in differentiating uniformly among a variety of industries.

SPECIFICATION OF ECONOMIC SEGMENTATION

There are two distinct approaches to the use of economic segmentation data in the analysis of social structure and process. The emphasis in the present paper follows Beck et al. (1978) in interpreting economic segmentation as a contextual factor, which operates in such a way as to condition the effects of basic socioeconomic processes on individual workers. Such an interpretation, which we have associated with the dual economy perspective, calls for a categorical distinction between competitive and oligopolistic industries in that basic socioeconomic processes are expected to differ for oligopolistic and competitive environments.

A second approach to the use of economic segmentation data emphasizes the distinction between "structural" variables, such as the economic organization of industry, and "individual" variables, such as education and social background factors (see, e.g., Bibb and Form 1977). So long as the relationship between such structural and individual variables is assumed to be additive, researchers may prefer to avoid any possible loss of information due to categorizing data on industrial differentiation and rely instead on a quantitative measure of the level of competition/oli-

gopoly in the various industries. In the following, we define two measures of economic segmentation, one appropriate to each of these research strategies, and illustrate the application of these measures to analysis of simple earnings determination models.

Our first task is to use the factor analysis reported above to classify industries into core and periphery sectors. Other things being equal, a conventional point at which to split a symmetric distribution would be the mean of the distribution (in this case, zero). However, the data in table 5 exhibit a large break in the distribution just below the mean. Since there is no comparable discontinuity in the central part of the distribution, we use this point rather than the mean to divide industries into a core sector (≥ -0.06) and a periphery sector (≤ -0.28).

As mentioned above, this *preliminary* sectoral assignment excludes professional services and public administration from the factor analysis because of the unavailability or questionable relevance of most of the industrial indicators for them. Rather than exclude these industries from our sectoral specification, we will assign them initially to the core sector on the grounds that the structure of the professions and public administration effectively insulates them from a highly competitive market structure.

Another result of limitations in the availability of data on industrial characteristics is the aggregation of 215 detailed census industrial categories into 55 broad industrial categories. One negative consequence of this aggregation is the creation of a few relatively heterogeneous categories. For example, the transportation category includes taxi companies as well as airlines, while wholesale trade includes drugs and chemicals as well as scrap and waste materials. In an effort to reduce this heterogeneity and also to provide a check on our "arbitrary" assignment of the professional and public administration industries, we turn to the only two indicators available for detailed industry categories: median income (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1973) and profit (Internal Revenue Service 1972*b*). These data on a more detailed industrial breakdown (112 industry categories and 21 professional and public administration categories) allow identification of more detailed core/periphery industry placements with uncharacteristically high or low levels of either profit or income and adjustment of sectoral placement. These adjustments provided new sectoral locations for 10 of 21 professional and public administration industries and for 11 of 122 other industries.¹⁰ The final dichotomous sectoral distinction is presented in table 6.

¹⁰ Detailed industry categories were reallocated from the core sector to the periphery if their average profit was less than \$35,000 or if their workers' median annual income was less than \$5,000. For the professional and public administration categories, only the median income criterion was used, since profit data are neither available nor

Construction of a quantitative index of industrial differentiation requires an adjustment of the factor scores in table 5 to include professional and public administration categories. As noted above, only one of the nine indicators (median income) used in the factor solution is available for these two industries. To compute factor scores for professional and public administration categories, we use the standardized median income data and the overall mean values for all other variables (i.e., zero in standardized form in the factor solution). Applying factor weights to these values, we obtain index estimates of -0.07 for the professional category and 0.10 for public administration. In addition to the raw factor scores, table 6 presents rescaled scores that vary between 0 and 100.

THE IMPORT OF ECONOMIC SEGMENTATION

Thus far we have reviewed the historical foundation of theories of economic segmentation, identified a set of relevant empirical indicators, and defined two empirical measures of economic segmentation, one based on a dichotomous model of economic sectors and the other based on a conception of economic segmentation as a continuum ranging from highly oligopolistic to highly competitive. It remains to illustrate the substantive import of these measures for the analysis of socioeconomic processes. To do this we present analyses of a simple model of individual earnings determination for a sample of the experienced civilian labor force in the United States, drawn from the March 1976 Current Population Survey. This subset consists of all individuals age 16 or older who either were currently employed or had worked in the preceding five years and were seeking employment ($N = 62,568$).

Turning first to our dichotomous sectoral model, table 7 presents descriptive statistics by sectors for a set of relevant social and economic variables. The reader will note that there are significant differences between the two economic sectors for all of these variables. The two mea-

relevant for such industries. Detailed industry categories were moved from the periphery sector to the core if profits exceeded \$300,000 or the median income of workers was greater than \$7,500. Industries moved to the periphery include (1) manufacturing: miscellaneous plastics; (2) transportation: buses, taxicabs, and miscellaneous transportation services; (3) utilities: water and other sanitary services; and (4) professional services: hospitals, convalescent institutions, elementary and secondary schools, colleges and universities, libraries, educational services, museums, religious organizations, welfare services, and nonprofit organizations. In the 55-category scheme, the miscellaneous manufacturing industries category includes ordnance. The detailed data indicate that ordnance has quite high profit and median worker income, while the remaining miscellaneous industries closely resemble periphery industries. Thus, ordnance was left in the core and the miscellaneous category was moved to the periphery. Industries moved to the core include (1) manufacturing: textile finishing and dyeing and leather footwear; and (2) wholesale trade: drugs and chemicals, electrical goods, metals and minerals, and alcoholic beverages.

TABLE 5
RANKING OF INDUSTRIES BY FACTOR SCORE*

Industry	Factor Score
Nmfg: petroleum products.....	2.40
Dmfg: motor vehicles.....	2.21
Dmfg: primary metal.....	1.31
Nmfg: chemical and allied products.....	1.30
Dmfg: transportation equipment.....	1.25
Mining: petroleum and natural gas.....	.99
Nmfg: paper and allied products.....	.92
Utilities and sanitary services.....	.87
Nmfg: tobacco.....	.86
Dmfg: professional and photographic equipment.....	.85
Dmfg: electrical machinery.....	.83
Dmfg: machinery, except electrical.....	.81
Mining: nonmetallic quarrying.....	.68
Communications.....	.68
Mining: metal ores.....	.64
Mining: coal.....	.60
Dmfg: stone, clay, glass products.....	.46
Transportation.....	.45
Dmfg: fabricated metal.....	.43
Nmfg: food, kindred products.....	.42
Finance: security, commodity brokerage.....	.38
Miscellaneous manufacturing.....	.31
Nmfg: printing and publishing.....	.29
Nmfg: rubber and miscellaneous plastics.....	.27
Const: general, except building.....	.26
Wh Tr: machinery, equipment, supplies.....	.16
Finance: banking.....	.06
Const: general building.....	.05
Const: special trade contractors.....	.05
Finance: credit agencies other than banks.....	.03
Finance: insurance.....	-.01
Wh Tr: groceries and food.....	-.06
Nmfg: textile mill products.....	-.28
Finance: real estate.....	-.30
Agricultural services.....	-.39
Dmfg: furniture.....	-.47
Dmfg: lumber and wood.....	-.48
Agricultural production.....	-.56
Wh Tr: miscellaneous wholesale trade.....	-.58
Bus Serv: advertising.....	-.61
Nmfg: leather products.....	-.63
Rt Tr: building materials.....	-.68
Rt Tr: furniture, home equipment.....	-.86
Rt Tr: auto sales, service stations.....	-.88
Nmfg: apparel products.....	-.92
Bus Serv: miscellaneous business services.....	-.94
Bus Serv: auto repair.....	-1.00
Entertainment and recreation services.....	-1.03
Rt Tr: miscellaneous retail trade.....	-1.04
Rt Tr: food stores.....	-1.13
Rt Tr: general merchandise.....	-1.43
Hotels and motels.....	-1.45
Other personal services.....	-1.52
Rt Tr: apparel.....	-1.61
Rt Tr: eating and drinking places.....	-1.93

NOTE.— $\bar{X} = .43 \times 10^{-2}$; SD = .93; SK = .17.

* Key to abbreviations: Nmfg = nondurable manufacturing; Dmfg = durable manufacturing; Const = construction; Wh Tr = wholesale trade; Bus Serv = business services; Rt Tr = retail trade.

TABLE 6
INDUSTRIES, DETAILED CENSUS CODES, SECTORAL ASSIGNMENT,
AND CONTINUOUS SEGMENTATION INDEX

Industry	1970 Census Code	Sector*	Factor Index	Scaled Index†
Agriculture, forestry, fisheries:				
Agricultural production	017	Periphery	-.56	32
Agricultural services	018-28	Periphery	-.39	36
Mining:				
Metal mining	047	Core	.64	59
Coal mining	048	Core	.60	58
Crude petroleum and natural gas	049	Core	.99	67
Nonmetallic mining and quarrying	057	Core	.68	60
Construction:				
General building contractors	067	Core	.05	46
General contractors, except building	068	Core	.26	51
Special trade contractors	069	Core	.05	46
Not specified construction	077	Core	.05	46
Manufacturing—durable goods:				
Lumber and wood products	107-9	Periphery	-.48	33
Furniture and fixtures	118	Periphery	-.47	34
Stone, clay, and glass products	119-38	Core	.46	55
Primary metal	139-49	Core	1.31	75
Fabricated metal products	157-69	Core	.43	55
Machinery, except electrical	177-98	Core	.81	63
Electrical machinery, equipment	199-209	Core	.83	64
Motor vehicles and equipment	219	Core	2.21	96
Other transportation equipment	227-38	Core	1.25	73
Professional, photographic, watches	239-57	Core	.85	64
Ordnance	258	Core	.31	52
Miscellaneous manufacturing	259, 398	Periphery	.31	52
Manufacturing—nondurable goods:				
Food and kindred products	268-98	Core	.42	55
Tobacco manufacturers	299	Core	.86	64
Textile—knitting mills	307	Periphery	-.28	38
Textile—dyeing and finishing	308	Core	-.28	38
Textile—floor covering	309	Periphery	-.28	38
Textile—yarn, thread, fabric mills	317	Core	-.28	38
Textile—miscellaneous products	318	Periphery	-.28	38
Apparel and other related products	319-27	Periphery	-.92	23
Paper and allied products	328-37	Core	.92	66
Printing, publishing	338-39	Core	.29	51
Chemicals and allied products	347-69	Core	1.30	75
Petroleum and coal products	377-78	Core	2.40	100
Rubber products	379	Core	.27	51
Miscellaneous plastic products	387	Periphery	.27	51
Tanned, curried, and finished leather	388	Periphery	-.63	30
Footwear, except rubber	389	Core	-.63	30
Leather products, except footwear	397	Periphery	-.63	30
Transportation, communications, and other public utilities:				
Railroads and railway express	407	Core	.45	55
Street railways and bus lines	408	Periphery	.45	55
Taxicab service	409	Periphery	.45	55
Trucking service	417	Core	.45	55
Warehousing and storage	418	Core	.45	55
Water transportation	419	Core	.45	55
Air transportation	427	Core	.45	55
Pipelines, except natural gas	428	Core	.45	55
Services incidental to transportation	429	Periphery	.45	55
Communications	447-49	Core	.68	60
Electric, gas, and steam power	467-69	Core	.87	65
Water, sanitary, and other utilities	477-79	Periphery	.87	65

* See text for procedures used to allocate industry to sectors.

† Rescaled to range from 0 to 100.

TABLE 6 (Continued)

Industry	1970 Census Code	Sector*	Factor Index	Scaled Index†
Wholesale trade:				
Motor vehicles and equipment.....	507	Periphery	-.58	31
Drugs, chemicals, allied products.....	508	Core	-.58	31
Dry goods and apparel.....	509	Periphery	-.58	31
Food and related products.....	527	Core	-.06	43
Farm products—raw materials.....	528	Periphery	-.58	31
Electrical goods.....	529	Core	-.58	31
Hardware, plumbing, heating supplies..	537	Periphery	-.58	31
Not specified electrical, hardware.....	538	Periphery	-.58	31
Machinery, equipment and supplies....	539	Core	.16	48
Metals and minerals, n.e.c.....	557	Core	-.58	31
Petroleum products.....	558	Periphery	-.58	31
Scrap and waste materials.....	559	Periphery	-.58	31
Alcoholic beverages.....	567	Core	-.58	31
Paper and its products.....	568	Periphery	-.58	31
Lumber and construction materials....	569	Periphery	-.58	31
Wholesalers, not specified, n.e.c.....	587-88	Periphery	-.58	31
Retail trade:				
Lumber, building materials, hardware..	607-08	Periphery	-.68	29
Department, general merchandise stores	609-27	Periphery	-1.43	12
Food stores.....	628-38	Periphery	-1.13	18
Motor vehicles, gasoline, accessories...	639-49	Periphery	-.88	24
Apparel and shoe stores.....	657-58	Periphery	-1.61	07
Furniture, household appliances.....	667-68	Periphery	-.86	25
Eating and drinking places.....	669	Periphery	-1.93	00
Other retail trade.....	677-98	Periphery	-1.04	21
Finance, insurance, and real estate:				
Banking.....	707	Core	.06	46
Credit agencies.....	708	Core	.03	45
Security brokerage and investment....	709	Core	.38	53
Insurance.....	717	Core	-.01	44
Real estate.....	718	Periphery	-.30	38
Business and repair services:				
Advertising.....	727	Periphery	-.61	30
Automobile repair.....	757	Periphery	-1.00	21
Other business services.....	728-49, 758-59	Periphery	-.94	23
Personal services:				
Hotels and motels.....	777	Periphery	-1.45	11
Other personal services.....	769, 778-98	Periphery	-1.52	09
Entertainment and recreation services....	807-9	Periphery	-1.03	21
Professional and related services:				
Offices of physicians, dentists, practi- tioners, and health services.....	828-37, 847-48	Core	-.07	43
Hospitals, convalescent institutions....	838-39	Periphery	-.07	43
Legal services.....	849	Core	-.07	43
Educational services.....	857-68	Periphery	-.07	43
Museums and other nonprofit firms....	869-87	Periphery	-.07	43
Engineering and architectural firms....	888	Core	-.07	43
Accounting and auditing services.....	889	Core	-.07	43
Miscellaneous professional services.....	897	Core	-.07	43
Public administration.....	907-37	Core	.10	47

asures of financial well-being, annual earnings and the natural log of annual earnings, both differ substantially between sectors. Core workers clearly earn more than their counterparts in the periphery. The sex composition of the two sectors also differs considerably. Females constitute only 29.32% of the core, while they dominate the periphery labor force (53.86%). Furthermore, a larger proportion of the periphery is nonwhite (11.2% vs. 9.01% in the core). Thus, workers in the core are more likely to be white, male, and financially advantaged than workers in the periphery. The other variables in table 7, years of schooling and occupational prestige, also vary by sector. Although the difference in schooling is less than one year, core workers do have significantly more schooling than periphery workers. A relatively large discrepancy exists between the two sectors in mean occupational prestige (40.35 for the core and 36.12 for the periphery).

The last column of table 7 presents the zero-order correlations between each of the variables and our continuous measure of economic segmentation. The highest correlations here are for the earnings variables, with decreasing correlations for sex, occupational prestige, schooling, and race, in that order. These results indicate that the continuous and dichotomous segmentation measures have roughly comparable relationships with the individual variables. The biserial correlation between the dichotomous and continuous measures is 0.87.

In introducing the two measures of industrial segmentation, we em-

TABLE 7
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FROM 1976 CPS BY DICHOTOMOUS AND
CONTINUOUS SEGMENTATION INDICES

CHARACTERISTIC	MEANS BY SECTOR			CORRE- LATION WITH CONTIN- UOUS INDEX
	Core (<i>N</i> = 27,918)	Periphery (<i>N</i> = 34,658)	<i>t</i> -ratio	
Annual earnings.....	10,637.957 (8,077.570)	6,198.071 (6,627.535)	-76.132*	.296*
ln annual earnings.....	8.828 (1.434)	7.877 (1.956)	-67.844*	.289*
Sex (1 = male).....	.707 (.455)	.461 (.498)	-63.639*	.287*
Race (1 = white).....	.910 (.286)	.888 (.315)	-9.030*	.026*
Years of schooling.....	12.348 (2.770)	12.287 (3.096)	-2.564*	.075*
Occupational prestige.....	40.353 (13.101)	36.116 (14.970)	-37.184*	.237*

NOTE.—Standard errors in parentheses.

* *P* < .01.

phasized that the choice between them should rest on conceptual considerations. The dichotomous measure will be more appropriate for research on social and economic processes thought to be conditioned by the economic organization of industry. In such work researchers may be willing to sacrifice detail on the degree of competitiveness/oligopolism in exchange for the clarity of contrast between industry groups characterized by oligopoly as opposed to competition. The continuous measure, in contrast, treats a unit difference in economic differentiation as equivalent no matter where in the scale it appears. Users of this variable must be willing to give up the clarity of contrast between competitive and oligopolistic groups in return for the detail on levels of competition/oligopoly.

Because of the adjustments to detailed industrial categories used to construct the sectoral measure, that measure does not represent a simple dichotomization of the continuous measure. Still, it may be instructive to compare the application of the two measures to a simple model of earnings determination consisting of a set of individual characteristics from the CPS survey. The data for these comparisons are presented in table 8. Model 1 presents a baseline earnings model containing sex, race, occupational prestige, work experience,¹¹ and schooling. Models 2 and 3, respectively, add to this baseline earnings model the dichotomous and continuous measures of economic segmentation developed above. Finally, model 4 presents a covariance design that allows for the existence of differences in the earnings determination process between sectors, using the dichotomous sector variable.

Comparing model 1 with models 2 and 3, we see that the addition of either measure of economic segmentation represents a significant increment to the explanatory power of the baseline model containing only individual variables. While models 2 and 3 are roughly comparable in explanatory power, model 4 suggests that the assumption of homogeneity in earnings returns to individual characteristics may not be warranted. Each of the characteristics included in the baseline model has effects which vary according to sectoral location. All of these effects are greater in the core than in the periphery, with all slope differences being significant at the .001 level.

We interpret these results as confirming the utility of a dichotomous sectoral measure for analysis of the effects of economic segmentation on

¹¹ Work experience for males is defined as $\text{experience} = (\text{age} - \text{schooling} - 5)$. For females this expression is adjusted to take account of lower labor force participation, using parameters estimated from the National Longitudinal Survey. These adjustments are discussed in detail in Beck, Horan, and Tolbert (1979).

white ever-married females: $\text{experience} = 0.5483 (\text{age} - \text{schooling} - 5)$
 white never-married females: $\text{experience} = 0.8757 (\text{age} - \text{schooling} - 5)$
 nonwhite ever-married females: $\text{experience} = 0.6164 (\text{age} - \text{schooling} - 5)$
 nonwhite never-married females: $\text{experience} = 0.7731 (\text{age} - \text{schooling} - 5)$

TABLE 8
A COMPARISON OF DICHOTOMOUS AND CONTINUOUS SEGMENTATION INDICES IN A SIMPLE EARNINGS MODEL

TERM	MODEL 4			
	MODEL 1	MODEL 2	MODEL 3	MODEL 4
Intercept.....	-9,592.42*	-10,129.92*	-8,630.10*	-12,212.21*
Years of schooling.....	543.69*	576.23*	554.03*	771.01*
Work experience.....	121.32*	121.24*	118.46*	140.88*
Occupational prestige.....	157.32*	142.39*	140.77*	161.43*
Sex (1 = male).....	4,673.37*	4,090.94*	4,274.48*	4,973.02*
Race (1 = white).....	407.72*	361.84*	474.92*	725.40*
Sector (1 = core).....	...	2,418.85*
Continuous index.....	1,152.04*	...
R ² × 100.....	36.05	38.32	37.45	39.26

*P < .001.

socioeconomic processes. In cases where economic segmentation is assumed to have only additive effects on the variables under analysis, researchers may choose either dichotomous or continuous measures without substantial loss of explanatory power. In cases where researchers expect qualitative differences between economic sectors in relationships among variables, the dichotomous measure will facilitate a covariance design.

The apparent importance of dual economy theory for social stratification warrants further research activity aimed at developing a coherent research tradition. One prerequisite to such coherence is the development of empirical measures for basic concepts. In this paper we provide an empirical specification of economic segmentation which combines a range of theoretically relevant indicators with the best available data sources. We would be the last to claim that our findings should be interpreted as final, or written in stone.¹² Other analyses using different variables or data might well obtain different solutions or cutting points. Nonetheless, over the course of the present analysis we have been impressed with the stability of the basic solution over variations in choice of variables. The final demonstration of the efficacy of the measures of economic segmentation presented here must necessarily rest on future applications in research on social stratification and mobility.

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¹² While this manuscript was in press, Oster's (1979) work was brought to our attention. Oster undertakes a factor analysis on a set of 25 industry variables to test for the existence of a "dual economy factor" which loads significantly on relevant variables. He reports a solution in which loadings correspond to "... expectations about the existence of a core-periphery pattern of industrial stratification" (p. 36).

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Social Consensus on Norms of Justice: Should the Punishment Fit the Crime?¹

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Social consensus on norms of justice has long been of concern to sociologists. The present paper presents a model of justice norms as cognitions and tests the degree of cognitive consensus on the norm of just deserts (i.e., "letting the punishment fit the crime"). It is argued that consensus on justice norms should be tested using a combination of within-respondent and between-respondent techniques. Such tests can (1) simultaneously reveal the presence of consensus on the justice principle involved and on the evaluation of the specific social stimuli presented, (2) facilitate demographic comparisons on adhering to principle or agreeing on facts, and (3) reveal conflicts between these two versions of consensus. For testing the norm of just deserts, ratio scale measures of crime seriousness and punishment severity were employed, and a formula derived from both equity theory and psychophysics was utilized in model fitting. Results from a sample survey indicated dramatically strong use of the principle of just deserts by members of the public but less adherence to just deserts by demographically disadvantaged (low-income or black) respondents. A path model of the relation between aggregate and individual scores further demonstrated a fundamental tension between the two versions of normative consensus, in that the more respondents used the principle the more systematically they deviated from the group average response. The paper concludes by discussing the implications of both the substantive findings and the new methodologies employed for understanding normative consensus and the assessment of justice norms.

Sociologists have long been concerned with norms of justice. Such norms specify rules or standards of fairness in transactions between individuals

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and in the allocation of goods by societies to their members. The norm of reciprocity (Gouldner 1960), equity norms for income and other social rewards (Alves and Rossi 1978; Walster, Walster, and Berscheid 1978), and the norm of just deserts in criminal sanctioning (von Hirsch 1976) are all examples of such rules. One crucial research issue has always been whether such norms are objects of social consensus. For such norms to operate as shared standards, they must exist as cognitive representations *within* individuals, and these representations must be similar *across* individuals. The present paper focuses on examining justice norms as within-individual cognitive representations; it demonstrates the practical possibility and the substantive implications of such analysis. In the process, it will be seen that dissent on justice norms can take interesting forms not previously recognized.

We present a strategy for measuring, modeling, and comparing survey respondents' cognitive representations of the norm of just deserts in criminal sanctioning. In preparing the ground for this analysis, we shall indicate how certain previous investigations of normative consensus have begged problematic aspects of consensus by failing to consider within-individual concerns. The present research also extends previous work on consensus about crime seriousness, including the seminal research of Sellin and Wolfgang (1964) and the recent investigations of Rossi, Waite, Bose, and Berk (1974). In developing this extension, parallels between the norm of just deserts and recent research on equity theory (see Berkowitz and Walster 1976) will be demonstrated. We shall show that just deserts implies the same structure of criminal justice perceptions that Adams (1965) proposed for distributive justice perceptions. Thus the estimation strategy to be developed is also suitable for measuring consensus on norms of distributive justice and other complex justice norms.

Measuring Perceived Justice

To measure a justice norm as a within-individual representation requires the consideration of five elements. The norm of reciprocity (Gouldner 1960) provides an example. The starting point is a domain of acts. Associated with this domain is a subjective evaluation of the worth of the acts. Then there is a domain of reciprocations, and associated with it a second dimension of subjective evaluations. Finally, there is a linkage rule that describes the relation of moral entailment between the worth of initiating acts and the worth of reciprocating acts. More generally, justice norms incorporate inputs, outcomes, the subjective evaluations of each, and a linkage rule.

This model recognizes three features common to all justice norms. First, only some acts (in some cases, attributes) are relevant. Washing one's own

car, for example, does not fall under the norm of reciprocity. Second, it is the subjective meaning, usually value, of the acts and reciprocations that is at issue.² Although one can return like for like, it is quite acceptable to give something of comparable value. Most justice norms serve as transformation rules mediating the conversion of one kind of goods, services, and attributes into other positive values (or negative values in the case of disservices, etc.) Third, the operation of moral entailment does not directly link concrete acts but operates on subjective evaluations of worth. This makes it possible to justly return unlike for like as long as subjective value corresponds appropriately. This permits justice norms to sanction a far broader range of responses than a rigid requirement of concrete identity in response would allow. But this intermediary role of subjective meaning implies that it is not reasonable to describe the entailments of norms in terms of the linkage of concrete acts and objects unless consensus on the meaning of those acts and objects is assumed. The same rule may lead to different concrete results, depending on the evaluations of the person applying the rule.³

Justice norms taking this form reflect two principles. First, equivalence classes are established in the domains of acts and reciprocations, and class members are freely and fairly substitutable. In the example of distributive justice, this principle is reflected in the slogan "equal pay for equal work." Justice is indifferent to whether payment is by check or in cash but requires an equivalent reward for an equivalent contribution. The second principle is some rule of monotonic, or perhaps proportional, increases in each domain, as in "more pay for more work." This principle, in its proportional form, was first presented by Aristotle and has inspired recent

² This view is both an elaboration and a simplification of the analytic content of justice norms. It is an elaboration to treat as problematic differences in the perceived value or rank of what is offered. What is to one party a pleasing objet d'art may be to another a worthless piece of kitsch. But it is a simplification to suppose that differences in subjective meanings can be summarized in a unidimensional ordering. Complex acts or objects may mean several things at once (even in the perception of a single observer). The intricacies of elaborate rules of etiquette and one-upmanship disappear when subjective meaning is restricted to a single dimension. Nevertheless, the broad outline of individual cognitive representations is preserved and what remains is well suited for the interpersonal comparison of justice perception.

³ Two caveats require attention. The domain of acts and reciprocations and their corresponding dimensions of evaluation need not be distinct; for example, both may be reducible to dollar value. The distinction is made here because they are distinct in the empirical problem of criminal sanctioning which is to follow. Second, many would assert that the norm of reciprocity depends on some degree of indifference to the precise value of the objects or acts exchanged. Certainly, generosity in the guise of indifference breeds trust. It is quite possible that the linkage rule is vague and specifies only an appropriate range of response. But there is no doubt that an attempt to reciprocate a Rolls-Royce with a candy bar or an eight-course dinner with a Big Mac would leave most people feeling cheated.

theorists of distributive justice, including Homans (1961), Adams (1965), and Walster et al. (1978).

Distributive justice norms relate a domain of inputs or contributions to a domain of outcomes or rewards.⁴ Other justice norms or other models of distributive justice can also be represented in this form. The only modification to the model presented above is to substitute different domains of acts and different dimensions of evaluations. For example, Heath (1976) has suggested that the prevalent emphasis on desert as the basis of distributive justice overlooks the other important principles of need and of right. But a norm of justice based on need, for example, requires only the substitution of the evaluative dimension of need for that of desert. Of course, it does not follow that principles of need and of desert will lead to the same version of the ideal allocation of benefits, since these principles may be in conflict within (or between) individuals.

The norm of just deserts in criminal sanctioning has the same fundamental structure. Here, the inputs are crimes, evaluated on a dimension of seriousness. The outcomes are punishments, evaluated on a dimension of severity. The norm is the notion that punishment severity should be commensurate with the seriousness of the offense. While this norm is frequently identified with a retributive approach to punishment, von Hirsch's (1976) essay suggests that the principles of equal treatment for equivalent acts and worse treatment for worse offenses provide a more general underpinning of justice in punishing. He also notes that deterrence and desert are interdependent bases for punishment. Only rehabilitation as a basis for punishment would appear to stand out as inconsistent with just deserts, given that rehabilitation is both forward looking and geared to the offender rather than to the offense. Although we do not expect survey respondents to have training in legal philosophy, it seems reasonable to search for evidence of the most general underlying punishment norm, which appears to be just deserts. We should note, however, that the present study does not explicitly pit this norm against competing norms of justice and thus cannot properly be taken as evidence for the relative strength of this norm.⁵

⁴ Homans (1961) distinguished two sorts of contributions—costs and investments. The former are incurred in carrying out a contributory act; the latter are personal assets and attributes that increase the value of one's contribution. This addition of a second input dimension of assets is no problem in principle, since the linkage rule need not be one-to-one but could encompass multiple dimensions.

⁵ In particular, the present study does not directly contrast "fitting the punishment to the crime" and "fitting the punishment to the criminal" as alternative models of punishment. However, as will be described in more detail below, the study did include respondents' assessments of both abstract crimes, as used by Sellin and Wolfgang (1964) and Rossi et al. (1974), and concretely described offenses. Each concrete offense included from one to three experimentally manipulated characteristics of the offender or the offense, all in between-subjects designs. These manipulations incorporated a mixture of legally relevant aggravators or mitigators and technically irrelevant variables such

In addition to crimes, punishments, and their associated valuations, the linkage rule is the obvious key that spells out what is "just" according to the norm of just deserts. We should emphasize that when people assign punishments to crimes there are actually two linkage rules: one a concrete matchup of particular criminal acts and particular punishments, the other the match of subjective seriousness and severity. We concentrate on the latter since the former would give no guide at all to the subjective meaning imputed to various crimes and punishments. And as noted in the case of the norm of reciprocity, the relationship of moral entailment in the norm of just deserts holds between subjective evaluations, in this case those of crimes and punishments.

Normative Consensus on Justice

Altogether, there are three aspects to consensus on justice norms. First, there is the question of the extent to which people agree on the subjective evaluations of inputs (in this case, crimes). Second, there is the extent to which they can agree on the subjective evaluations of reciprocations or outcomes (in this case, punishments). Third, there is the extent to which their matchups reflect the operation of a common principle or linkage rule (in this case, to match crime seriousness and punishment severity). Consensus on a principle need not be accompanied by consensus on social evaluations, and vice versa. Consensus on social evaluations is a question of agreement across individuals; consensus on a principle is fundamentally a question of the use of the principle within individuals. Before conducting our own analyses, we shall indicate how certain other investigations have implicitly or explicitly made assumptions about various components of consensus.

Previous investigations related to crime by Rossi et al. (1974) and Sellin

as the offender's race or sex. The manipulations were omitted from the present data analyses because they accounted for very small proportions of the variation in either crime seriousness judgments or punishment assignments; thus they would have added considerably to the length of the report with relatively little gain in information. In general, the lack of impact of such variables on respondents' judgments suggests little inclination among these respondents toward individualized punishment. However, a study explicitly designed to pit alternative versions of justice against one another could arrive at quite different outcomes, as we try to suggest in our concluding remarks. In addition, the study focused on incarceration and the death penalty as potential forms of punishment. Historically, of course, a variety of nonprison punishments have been used. Among the more ancient statements of harm-proportional punishment, for example, is the Hebrew *lex talionis*: an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth. Victim restitution is a more palatable modern alternative to incarceration that can also be conceptualized in terms of equity or just deserts (see Brickman 1977). We should stress that the linkage here of the just deserts principle to incarceration reflects how the current system of criminal justice appears to be organized and does not reflect our views of how it should be organized.

and Wolfgang (1964) have looked only at crime seriousness. Thus, in a sense, they have looked at only half the problem. Both sets of researchers seemed to assume what we shall test—the existence of underlying agreement that the punishment should fit the crime. For example, as a validation of their scale Sellin and Wolfgang report its extraordinary correlation with the maximum terms allowed in the Pennsylvania criminal code. This is a validation only if maximum terms *should* reflect seriousness. Rossi et al. argue that consensus on crime seriousness “should be reflected in the criminal code, the behavior of judges and juries, and the actions of law enforcement agencies” (1974, p. 224). But data on crime seriousness imply something about sanctioning only if one again assumes agreement on the principle of just deserts. Overall, these and other investigations of crime seriousness appear to have assumed individual adherence to a principle of just deserts.⁶

A more serious flaw in the measurement of consensus is the use of measures of central tendency, such as mean ratings. Rossi et al. (1974), for example, correlated the means of different demographic subgroups in their search for disagreement. The absence of differences in profiles of means is important, but the absence of significant subgroup-based individual differences cannot be inferred. Such an inference would be subject to the ecological fallacy (Robinson 1950). A similar criticism applies to the use of regressions on data aggregated from many respondents. This procedure obscures the possibility of idiosyncratic but possibly meaningful response patterns that are apparent when the data are not aggregated.⁷

⁶ Among the variety of studies confirming the Sellin-Wolfgang scale are those by Akman, Normandeau, and Turner (1967), Normandeau (1966), and Velez-Diaz and Megargee (1970). In addition, three other studies have addressed both crime seriousness and punishment severity. Each appears to assume the norm of just deserts in ways similar to Sellin and Wolfgang's (1964) or Rossi et al.'s (1974). The earliest study, by Rose and Prell (1955), had respondents assign Thurstone scale ratings for both seriousness of crimes and severity of punishments. The major point of the article was that rated seriousness of the 13 minor felonies they used as stimuli did not correspond to ranges of actual punishments, which the authors took as evidence of a clash between law and normative structure. They also had respondents assign punishments to the crimes but focused only on demographic differences in rates and the effect of manipulated offender characteristics in analyzing punishment assignments. Gibbons (1969) was also interested in discrepancies between public sentiment and legal practices. His indicator of the perceived seriousness of offenses was the punishments which respondents assigned to them. Finally, White (1975) investigated the effects of manipulated offender and victim status on severity of punishment. He found negligible effects for these variables but a substantial effect for crime seriousness. In his study, seriousness was operationalized by assigning Sellin-Wolfgang ratings to the stimuli, and punishment severity by the ordinal 12-point scale employed by Gibbons. Thus White's study differs from the present one in its substantive focus and in imposing scale scores rather than obtaining subjective ratings from the respondents.

⁷ It is interesting in this regard to speculate whether Jasso's (1978) finding of a logarithmic “just earnings function” reflects the form of the subjective evaluation of money,

The most important application of a disaggregated measurement and estimation strategy occurs when the theory actually specifies the cognitive patterns of individuals. An important example is found in equity theory: Walster, Berscheid, and Walster have consistently claimed that equity "lies in the eye of the beholder." The extensive literature on this topic does not include any direct attempts to evaluate whether the structure of people's justice perceptions corresponds to the theoretical specification. Adams and Freedman's (1976) review of the literature indicates that most research begs the question of consensus, both on the evaluation of acts and outcomes and on the form of the appropriate linkup between them. The most common research strategy is to build consensus on the relative evaluations into the experimental instructions and then to examine subjects' mean responses for predicted patterns of anger, guilt, or cognitive distortion. Considering the lengthy debate on the correct form of the equity equation (e.g., Walster, Berscheid, and Walster 1973; Harris 1976; and Walster et al. 1978), it is surprising that no effort has been made to determine whether people's cognitive maps mirror the theoretical assumptions made about them. A within-individual analysis of whether respondents use the norm of just deserts is therefore relevant to this fundamental underpinning of equity theory, given the common normative structures of equity and just deserts noted above.

Examination of a justice norm as a principle within individuals takes on added importance in the light of Alves and Rossi's (1978) recent criticism of the Walster group. Alves and Rossi reject outright the notion that equity lies in the eye of the beholder, arguing that if it did so consensus would be an impossibility. They appear not to have realized, however, the distinction between consensus on a principle and consensus on social evaluations. As we have noted, the former is a question of within-individual use of a rule while the latter is a question of between-individual similarities in evaluation. Alves and Rossi have not, in fact, demonstrated either of these for distributive justice, although their data strongly suggest that respondents were evaluating stimuli in similar ways. Oddly, Nock and Rossi (1978)—in the same issue of this *Journal*—utilize within-individual modeling (but in a different substantive area) and argue that it is an important part of assessing normative consensus. In contrast, our model of justice norms argues that both use of the principle within individuals and social agreement across individuals are key aspects of normative consensus.

In summary, the current model of justice norms suggests that such norms can be found within individual respondents in the form of subjective eval-

which since Bernoulli has been frequently held to follow such a logarithmic form. Although money provides an objective cardinal scale, the subjective meaning of increased amounts of money follows a different form.

uations linked by rules of moral entailment. Consensus on such norms involves both whether individual respondents use the cognitive principle implied and whether such individuals agree on their subjective evaluations. The present study used the norm of just deserts in criminal sanctioning as an illustration of how these different versions of normative consensus can be measured and contrasted. Such tests are of direct relevance to students of consensus on crime seriousness. They are also of indirect relevance to equity theorists, for the common structure of equity and just deserts as norms will result in our testing whether certain principles held to be the underlying equity rule are in fact used by individual respondents as principles of just deserts. Finally, these tests are of relevance to all investigators of justice norms who may wish to assert that justice does—or does not—lie in the eye of the beholder.

METHODS

Sample and Stimuli

To measure the multiple levels of normative consensus, it was necessary to have a data set containing each of the components of the model of justice norms: objective inputs, objective outcomes, subjective assessments of each, and matches between inputs and outcomes. The data set chosen for analysis was originally gathered in connection with a project on the fairness of capital punishment and therefore featured relatively serious offenses and relatively severe punishments (Hamilton and Rotkin 1976, 1978). It did, however, have all the theoretical components for the measurement of justice norms as cognitive entities. For present purposes, its substantive focus means that the range of stimuli is attenuated relative to what it would be in a project developed to assess the norm of just deserts *per se*.

A 1976 quota sample of 391 respondents from the Boston SMSA was obtained.⁸ In a face-to-face interview, respondents were asked to evaluate the relative seriousness of a series of crimes and the relative severity of a series of punishments. Both crimes and punishments were described by abstract labels (e.g., taking \$50, forcible rape, five years in prison, 10 years in prison, etc.). Respondents were also handed a drop-off questionnaire containing two relevant parts. Overall, 81% returned this questionnaire. One portion asked respondents to match each previously rated crime

⁸ Blocks were drawn in proportion to representation in the 1970 census and an additional eight blocks were selected in which only black respondents were eligible, based on 1970 census blocks with 20% or higher black population. This strategy was chosen to ensure adequate black representation in the overall sample. Interviewers were assigned randomly to blocks, with quotas imposed for sex and age of respondents. A total of 391 interviews were obtained out of an original goal of 400.

to an appropriate punishment, using the punishment list rated in the main questionnaire. (Respondents were also encouraged to write in a response if no punishment on the list seemed appropriate.) Second, respondents were given examples of concrete crimes along with the appropriate legal labels and were asked to assess the relative seriousness of these acts and to assign punishments to them.⁹ This task provides an internal replication of the design with a more lifelike stimulus. The three sets of stimuli to be rated—the abstract crimes, the punishments, and the concrete crimes—are presented in table 1.

Scaling Procedures

The scaling procedure used to obtain subjective assessments of crime seriousness and punishment severity was the technique of psychophysical scaling (Stevens 1975). Originally developed in connection with human perception of physical stimuli, the technique rests on Stevens's law for the relationship between stimulation and sensation. He found that this re-

TABLE 1
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT STIMULI FOR PSYCHOPHYSICAL SCALING TASKS

Abstract Crimes	Concrete Crimes	Punishment
Taking \$50	Taking \$50	2 years in prison
Stealing and abandoning an auto	Assault without weapon	3 years in prison
Assault without a weapon	Assault with weapon	5 years in prison
Mugging	Mugging	7 years in prison
Politician accepting bribes	Armed robbery	15 years in prison
Assault with a weapon	Forcible rape (1)	20 years in prison
Spying for a foreign government	Manslaughter	25 years in prison
Manslaughter	Forcible rape (2)	Life, parole after 25 years
Armed robbery	Impulsive killing	Life, no parole
Hijacking a plane	Kidnapping	Death penalty
Forcible rape	Armed robbery/murder	
Impulsive killing	Planned killing (1)	
Kidnapping	Planned killing (2)	
Sale of heroin resulting in a death	Rape/murder	
Armed robbery in which victim is killed		
Planned killing		
Forcible rape in which victim is killed		

NOTE.—Each list is arranged in order of average seriousness or severity as determined by this sample. All lists were presented to respondents in random order.

⁹ As noted in n. 5, the concrete crimes included a combination of legally relevant and irrelevant manipulations. As an example, the least serious crime was presented as follows, varying race and sex of perpetrator: "The defendant was a 23 year old white [black] male [female]. Circumstances: The defendant had been working as a teller in a bank for several months. One week when he [she] was short of money, he [she] took an envelope that was deposited in the bank's automatic 24-hour deposit window. The envelope contained \$50 in cash. The defendant was charged with \$50 larceny."

lationship regularly fits a power function, such that equal stimulus ratios produce equal subjective ratios of sensation. Mathematically, this relationship is described by the equation

$$y = cx^n. \quad (1)$$

The relevant scaling procedures have recently been extended into the measurement of intensity of social and political attitudes such as occupational prestige (Künnapas and Wilkström 1963), social status (Hamblin 1971; Rainwater 1971), importance of political offices (Shinn 1969), support for political institutions (Lodge et al. 1976), and, of course, seriousness of crimes (Sellin and Wolfgang 1964).

Psychophysical scaling procedures ask the respondent to assess stimuli relative to one another, using multiplicative judgments. For physical stimuli, this means that respondents assess how many times more or less bright a light becomes, how many times more or less intense an electric shock is, and so forth, as the objective stimulation changes. Two modalities extensively used in psychophysics are readily adaptable to survey research: magnitude estimation (ME), the simple assessment of relative intensity by assigning numbers; and line production (LP), the assessment of relative intensity by drawing lines of relative lengths. These were the two modalities used in the present study.

In the case of subjective judgments of social stimuli, the use of two such modalities makes it possible to check whether the individual scales produced fit a power function (eq. [1]) as they are predicted to do. Respondents were first provided a training task in the assessment of number magnitude in terms of line length and vice versa. They were then asked to rate the relative seriousness of the 17 crimes in the abstract crime scale, first by making LP judgments and second by making ME judgments. The same procedure was followed for punishment severity. If each scale produced—crime seriousness and punishment severity—is a true psychophysical scale of a single dimension of intensity, the ratio of the ME to LP exponents for each should be approximately one. It is (Hamilton and Rotkin 1979; see also Dawson and Brinker 1971, regarding scale validation by use of two modalities). In the drop-off questionnaire, respondents were asked to judge the relative seriousness of the concrete crimes using LP alone, as it was felt that ME judgments might be affected by the proximity of the second task involving numbers of years in the punishment choices.

The resulting scales of perceived crime seriousness and punishment severity are ratio scales of *relative* intensity; thus we know what the respondents thought of each crime or punishment relative to the others, how much more or less serious or severe. It is then possible to find out whether, in relative terms, the respondents subjectively fit the punishment to the

crime. For each crime stimulus we can substitute its relative seriousness from the respondent's point of view; objective punishments can be treated in the same fashion. It is then possible to discover whether respondents individually use the norm of fitting the punishment to the crime and to find out the extent of agreement across individuals in perceiving the social stimuli involved.

Data Preparation and Modeling

Two steps were necessary in preparing the data for analyses. First, the fact that each of the individual scales was a ratio scale necessitated a logarithmic transform. (Errors in ratio judgments are multiplicative errors and therefore theoretically lognormal.)¹⁰ Second, the effect of each individual's arbitrary starting score ("modulus") had to be removed (i.e., the line/number they assigned to the first stimulus and to which they compared other stimuli). To accomplish these two requirements, each respondent's scores were logged and the respondent's mean score for each judgment task was subtracted from all scores for that task (equivalent to dividing the raw scores by the geometric means) to remove the effect of the respondent's modulus. Where we had both LP and ME judgments, we then used the average of the resulting two variables as a more stable estimate of relative seriousness/severity. (In the case of the concrete crimes' seriousness, only LP was obtained.) The final variables preserve each respondent's relative assessments of the crimes and the punishments and, of course, leave room for these relative assessments to differ across respondents.

The subsequent data analyses are unusual from the point of view of psychophysics in that individual respondents' scores are used rather than group means. The typical procedure of using group means is justified on the basis of the concern with underlying general form rather than with individual noise (e.g., Hamblin 1971; Stevens 1975). Here, however, the "noise" is part of the point in assessing the existence of a norm as an individual-level cognitive entity. Thus we will be asking more stringent questions of the data, in terms of individual-level model fitting, than is characteristically done.

The first data analysis task, assessing the existence of the norm as a

¹⁰ Although there is good theoretical reason to assume a lognormal distribution of errors (and therefore to use OLS procedures on the logged data), it was also possible to test whether each respondent's answers were distributed lognormally. Kolmogorov one-sample tests were performed comparing the observed distribution of logged responses to a theoretical normal distribution for each of the three stimulus sets of each respondent, or 929 tests in all. Slightly over 4% of the tests yielded a result greater than the .05 critical value. This provides no grounds for rejecting the assumption that the responses were distributed lognormally, although it does not prove it, of course.

principle within individuals, requires the choice of theoretically meaningful model(s) for how crime and punishment should be matched. One such model to receive prominence in the literature on equity was Adams's (1965) argument that equity is proportionality between individuals' input/outcome ratios. In its general form, this equation is

$$\frac{O_i}{I_i} = \frac{O_j}{I_j} \quad (2)$$

Since the operational application of this equation would require that the scales be ratio (as our measurement was), it is permissible to perform a multiplication resulting in

$$O_i = R \cdot I_i \quad (3)$$

However, this is simply the special case of a power function with the exponent equal to unity. Adding the exponent yields

$$O_i = R \cdot I_i^b \quad (4)$$

For the convenience of OLS estimation, taking the logarithm of both sides results in

$$\log(O_i) = \log(R) + b \cdot \log(I_i) \quad (5)$$

Thus, the regression in the logs estimates the ratio specification with the relaxed, power law, condition that the exponent is not constrained to unity. This equation can be estimated twice for each respondent, once for the abstract and once for the concrete crimes.

This double estimation also makes it possible to perform a reliability check for whether a power function best describes just deserts as a within-individual principle. If this model of justice truly holds at the level of the individual, respondents' exponents should be consistent across the two matching tasks. A simple measure of this consistency is the correlation between the two slopes estimated from the two regressions, conceived as a test-retest reliability measure.

Should the slopes fail this reliability test, a second readily available measure also has theoretical relevance: r , the within-individual correlation between perceived crime seriousness and associated punishment severity. This statistic is interpretable as the degree of monotonic fit, the criterion which Harris (1976) has argued is the central one for an equity specification. Thus alternative models, just deserts as a power function or as monotonic matching, can both be assessed using equation (5). For present purposes, the central issue is whether a high degree of structure is observed within individual respondents according to either version of what that structure should be.

Having assessed whether this norm can be found as a cognitive principle, we shall turn to more conventional concerns of agreement between

individual judgments and of demographic bases of disagreement either on principle or on social evaluation. Finally, we shall address the question of the relation between normative consensus as a within-individual principle and normative consensus as between-individual evaluative agreement.

RESULTS

The Norm as a Cognitive Principle

To assess whether the norm of just deserts exists as a cognitive principle, equation (5) was estimated. For each respondent separate estimates were made for the abstract and concrete stimulus sets, using that respondent's subjective assessment of the seriousness of the crime and the severity of the punishment and his or her own choices for which punishment should apply to which crime. The results of the 594 estimations of that equation are summarized in table 2.¹¹

In the more stringent of the two theoretical models of an equitable fit, just deserts as a power function, two features of the individual respondents' slopes are important. First, the size of the slope is of some interest. As was noted above, this size need not be 1.0 as is implicitly assumed

TABLE 2
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL MODEL OF JUST DESERTS: CORRELATIONS WITHIN
RESPONDENTS OF CRIME SERIOUSNESS AND PUNISHMENT SEVERITY
(*N* = 297)

	Abstract Crimes	Concrete Crimes	Correlation between Abstract and Concrete
Average <i>r</i> *.....	.67	.79	.33
Median.....	.74	.85	
Minimum.....	-.67	-.62	
Maximum.....	.99	.99	
SD.....	.27	.23	
Average slope.....	.94	1.19	.25
Median.....	.86	1.10	
Minimum.....	-.66	-.61	
Maximum.....	7.22	4.23	
SD.....	.73	.72	
Average intercept.....	-.16	-.14	.71
Median.....	-.09	-.08	
Minimum.....	-3.40	-4.35	
Maximum.....	1.30	1.39	
SD.....	.49	.53	

* *r*'s were normalized by Fisher *z*-transform before being correlated with one another.

¹¹ The *N* for each of these two sets of estimates is reduced from 314 to 297 because we include only those respondents who have both seriousness and punishment scores for both abstract and vignette crimes. This includes respondents who have some missing data but for whom regression lines can still be computed.

in a linear proportionality model. A second issue is, of course, the stability of the slopes as assessed by the correlation of the two slopes on the two matching tasks. If the slopes prove stable, a third issue of their range becomes important in addressing questions of aggregation from individual-level law to group-level law.

As table 2 indicates, the 594 separately estimated models show on the average a close one-to-one match between the perceived seriousness of a crime and the severity of the punishment assigned to it, as the average slopes from both tasks are quite close to 1.0. Substantial individual variability around that average is also observed for each task. The most crucial instability, however, is indicated by the significant but small correlation between the two slopes for each individual. Treating the correlation between slopes as a test-retest reliability measure, an r of .25 between scores is too low to indicate that individuals have a stable pattern which they apply to both tasks. Such results argue against a within-individual power function as the underlying model in these data.

The alternative argument that the underlying cognitive model is monotonic can then be examined through the within-individual r 's between crime seriousness and punishment severity. As table 2 indicates, these correlations are substantial for both the abstract and concrete tasks. Median within-individual correlations of such size are striking indeed. From one point of view, this tendency toward a monotonic fit is not highly stable across tasks, however, as the correlation between the two different r 's for each individual is only .33. (The correlation ratios were normalized by a Fisher z -transform [Anderson 1958] before this statistic was calculated.) Yet most of the discrepancies between these r 's were modest ones, and the tendency toward a monotonic fit was consistent in broad pattern if not in detail. Fully 82% of respondents who completed both tasks had correlations of perceived crime seriousness with assigned punishment severity of .5 or greater on both matching tasks. The scatter plot of the two sets of individuals' correlation ratios showed mainly a large "ball" centered in the sector where both r 's were greater than .5.

Thus a principle of monotonic matching appears to describe well most persons' response to the tasks, suggesting support for Harris's (1976) general argument regarding equity as conformity to a monotonic pattern. Given the instability of the slopes on the tasks, an argument that the underlying function is a proportional (power function) match appears less justified. The general theoretical question—whether the norm of just deserts is used by individual respondents in organizing their cognitions and associated judgments—appears to have been answered with a resounding, if monotonic, yes.¹²

¹² Readers familiar with the psychophysical literature might be curious about the relationship between the mean seriousness (SER) and severity (PUN) assigned to each

The Norm as Social Agreement on Evaluations and Actions

The fact that individuals structure their cognitions in line with a normative principle carries with it no necessary implication that they agree with one another on their conclusions. The typical measures of normative consensus involve these latter, between-individual agreements.

One indicator of consensus between individuals on this norm is provided by the ecological correlation between the average seriousness evaluation of a crime and the average severity of punishment assigned to it. The present data set provides two measures of this correlation between group averages: one for the abstract and one for the concrete crimes. For the abstract crimes, with an N of 17 (for the 17 crimes), the correlation between group average crime seriousness and group average associated punishment severity was .98 ($t = 18.2$, $P < .0001$). For the concrete crimes, with an N of 14, the corresponding figure was .97 ($t = 15.35$, $P < .001$). These figures indicate a very powerful concordance, on the average, between a crime's perceived seriousness and the judged severity of the punishment allocated to it.

A more finely tuned indicator of consensus between individuals is provided by the extent to which individuals agree with the group average in assessing each of the components of the norm. For example, the success of the individual at reproducing the average judgment of crime seriousness was used by Rossi et al. (1974) as the indicator of normative consensus (although, as noted earlier, that study was implicitly based on assumptions about the linkage of crime to punishment). Here it is possible to assess separately the extent to which individuals are in agreement with the average seriousness of a crime and with the average severity of punishment assigned to it. For the abstract crimes, the correlation between each

of the stimuli by the total collection of respondents. For the abstract stimuli the observed regression was

$$\text{PUN} = -.043 + 1.081 (\text{SER}) \quad N = 14$$

(.039) (.061) (standard errors in parentheses) (a)

with an R^2 of 96.3%. For the concrete stimuli the result was

$$\text{PUN} = -.102 + 1.053 (\text{SER}) \quad N = 17$$

(.052) (.082) (standard errors in parentheses) (b)

with an R^2 of 91.5%. These aggregate relations, which Stevens (1975) believes to be the best empirical representation of "social consensus," include within their 95% confidence region the rather elegant antilogged power law

$$\text{PUN} = (1) * \text{SER}^1 \quad (c)$$

This is, without any complication of scaling factors, the relationship posited by Adams (1965) for equity. But as the paper should make clear, we do not feel that this aggregate relation is the most important sociologically.

individual's seriousness judgment and the group average judgment was calculated, as was the correlation between each individual's associated punishment judgment and the group average evaluation. The average individual-to-group correlation was .71 for the seriousness of crimes and .73 for associated punishment severity. Corresponding individual-to-group average correlations for the concrete crimes were .77 for seriousness and .75 for punishment severity.

Overall, if normative consensus is defined in terms of between-individual agreement in evaluation and matching, these data suggest a high level of consensus on the norm of just deserts.

Normative Conflict as Group-based Disagreement

A standard approach to the existence of conflict over a norm involves the divergence of certain demographic groups from the average for the society. The central variables of interest are typically those indicative of hierarchical standing: race, income, education, and possibly sex. Here we can expand upon that traditional focus by looking for group-based cleavages at two levels. We can assess whether any of the demographic groups of interest show significant tendencies to differ from the group averages in evaluating the stimuli—the crimes and the punishments. We can also ask whether any such groups show less cognitive adherence to the norm—lower within-individual fit of the punishment to the crime. The first, more traditional, set of measures reflects similarity between individuals' judgments and the average judgments. The second, more cognitive, measure reflects individuals' tendency to use the general principle in question.

Table 3 presents the zero-order correlations of relevant demographics with the degree of within-individual fit to the principle and with degree of agreement with group evaluations. (All correlations were normalized by Fisher's *z*-transform before being treated as dependent variables in relation to the demographics [Anderson 1958]; partial correlations will be discussed below.) Where correlations are significant, they are in boldface type in order to facilitate visual presentation of the overall pattern of results.

The pattern is weak but consistent. Black respondents were less likely to fit the principle or to agree with the average evaluations; high-income respondents were more likely to fit the principle and to agree with the average. However, only two such correlations with the demographics were significant in both abstract and concrete data sets: the black tendency to disagree with the aggregate seriousness ratings and the high-income tendency to agree with the aggregate punishment evaluations.¹³

¹³ Rossi et al. (1974) performed a similar analysis on squared correlations of individuals with aggregate seriousness ratings. The rationale for squaring the correlation coefficients

TABLE 3
ZERO-ORDER MISSING DATA CORRELATION OF RELEVANT DEMOGRAPHIC
VARIABLES WITH MEASURES OF FITTING THE PUNISHMENT TO THE
CRIME AND OF AGREEMENT WITH THE AVERAGE

VARIABLE	DEMOGRAPHICS*			
	Race	Income	Education	Sex
Abstract Crimes				
r_{sp}	-.15** (299)	+.22** (281)	+.11 (293)	-.07 (300)
r_{sS}	-.15** (299)	+.01 (281)	+.08 (293)	+.07 (300)
r_{pP}	-.13* (299)	+.19** (281)	+.05 (293)	-.04 (300)
Partial r	-.03 (298)	+.16** (280)	+.07 (292)	-.17** (299)
Concrete Crimes				
r_{sp}	-.07 (301)	+.09 (282)	+.03 (295)	-.125* (302)
r_{sS}	-.14* (302)	+.07 (283)	+.08 (296)	+.02 (303)
r_{pP}	-.08 (301)	+.16** (282)	+.08 (295)	+.02 (302)
Partial r	-.02 (295)	+.02 (276)	-.00 (289)	-.185** (296)

NOTE.— r_{sp} = correlation of individual's crime seriousness with severity; r_{sS} = correlation of individual's crime seriousness with group average seriousness; r_{pP} = correlation of individual's punishment severity with group average severity; partial r = individual's partial correlation estimated from path model (b), fig. 1. All within-individual correlations were normalized by Fisher's z -transform before being correlated with the demographics. Significant correlations are indicated in boldface to facilitate presentation. N 's for each missing data correlation are presented below it in parentheses.

* Race and sex are coded as dummy variables, with black = 1 and female = 1. Education is coded in six categories from low to high and income in 15 categories from low to high.

* $P < .05$.

** $P < .01$.

was not offered, but it does reduce the skew in the marginal distribution and results in a metric with which sociologists are quite at home. However, the statistical properties of the square transformation are not as desirable as Fisher's z -transformation, which yields a theoretically normal distribution, and squaring is obviously inappropriate when both positive and negative correlations are found, a problem which exists for our data but is trivial in Rossi et al.'s. For comparative purposes, we performed an analysis like that of table 3 using squared correlation coefficients. The pattern of signs is the same and all of the statistically significant correlations of table 3 remain so. In addition, in the concrete-crimes portion of the table, three additional significant correlations were observed: race with r_{pP} ($r = -.12$) and education with r_{sS} ($r = .16$) and r_{pP} ($r = .12$). This analysis offers mixed replicative support for the Rossi et al. finding of a substantial education effect on the squared correlation of individual and aggregate seriousness, with a significant effect found only for the concrete-crime data and not for the abstract label ratings, which more closely resemble the Rossi et al. stimuli. The statistically more appropriate Fisher z -transformation yields no support. One can only speculate why our seemingly more complex measurement strategy failed to reveal the education-linked differences that Rossi et al. observed.

It is more graphic to display consistency in within-individual adherence to the principle in terms of cross-tabular analysis, remembering that 82% of the whole sample showed within-individual correlations of .5 or greater for both data sets. Both race and income prove significantly related to falling above or below this double .5 cutoff point. By this criterion, fully 33% of the black respondents showed "bad fit" (χ^2 for race \times bad vs. good fit = 4.58, $P = .03$). Similarly, fully 31% of low-income respondents, versus 18% of medium- and only 11% of high-income respondents, fell into the bad fit category (χ^2 for trichotomized income \times bad vs. good fit = 11.47, $P = .003$). Higher-order tabulation showed that among white respondents income continued to have a significant effect. The small number of blacks (27) made higher-order tabulation inappropriate for them. By this criterion, then, consistency in fitting the principle joins the other two findings regarding the connection between race and income and evaluations of crime seriousness and of punishment severity.

One set of potential effects is notable by its absence. The lack of any significant effects for education makes the interpretation of results for the income and race variables more clear. Since all these demographic variables are related, the simultaneous presence of education effects with either of the others could be interpreted in terms of such issues as knowledge or sophistication in handling a complex questionnaire task. But given the consistently weaker zero-order education effects, such interpretations do not appear viable. Further, regression analyses including all the relevant demographics did not improve the performance of education but maintained the independent importance of race and income. Thus we believe it is reasonable to assume that low-income and black respondents knew what they were being asked but disagreed systematically, if weakly, relative to the rest of the respondents.¹⁴

¹⁴ So far a more subtle possible form of disagreement has been ignored: not filling in punishment responses on some of the crime stimuli. Only a few respondents were missing an entire task; many respondents, however, availed themselves of the option of writing in a response on one or more crimes. For the least serious crime—taking \$50—fully 28% of the sample wrote in other answers for both abstract and concrete versions of the crime. On most such write-ins, respondents favored a punishment of less than two years, which anchored the provided scale. These write-ins are of course not represented in the association between psychophysical scale values. Thus the elimination of these responses from the measures might represent an artificial inflation of agreement on the principle. However, these missing data prove not to invalidate either the overall estimate of consensus on the principle or the assessment of the impact of demographic factors. The simplest summary indication that this interpretation is appropriate is provided by correlations between the number of missing responses on psychophysical values (including both write-ins and simple blanks) and all other measures. For both the abstract and concrete crimes, the number of missing psychophysical values is uncorrelated with dependent measures indicative of fitting the model, that is, with both slopes and with both r 's. Thus for the majority of respondents, having missing data simply represented using lesser punishments than were provided in the task, but within the same overall model of fitting the punishment to the crime. Missing data at the

Normative Conflict as an Inherent Property of Justice Norms

So far we have examined two apparently different aspects of normative consensus: within-individual use of the cognitive principle and between-individual agreement on social evaluations. Demographically based conflict on both aspects was identified. The relationship between these two versions of normative consensus—use of a principle and agreement with other social actors—has not yet been considered, however. In doing so it is important to note that genuine use of a *principle* of just deserts may not yet have been demonstrated at all.


At the outset of the paper we argued that justice norms as cognitive entities should involve the individual in the use of a principle or rule that orders perceptions and determines valuations. An alternative version of what norms mean involves the simple rote learning of the “way things are” in a given social world. Under this model, an individual’s apparent use of a principle like just deserts could represent nothing more than rote learning of the socially understood seriousness and punishments for various crimes—perhaps through a process of repeated association on TV, in the newspapers, and so forth. Under such a model, group averages reflect the outcome of this learning process, and individual judgments are imperfect reflections of these aggregate social facts. The extent to which individual responses display an apparent pattern would not reflect personal adherence to a principle of just deserts; instead, individual-level correlations would be a joint result of the extent to which group averages display a monotonic fit and the degree of the individual’s success in reproducing the group averages.

A rote-learning version of justice norms can be modeled for the norm of just deserts with a structure like that in figure 1, model *a*. Under the assumptions of this model, an individual’s seriousness evaluations and punishment ratings are each some reflection of aggregate evaluations. The individual-level fit of respondents’ seriousness judgments to their punishment severity decisions can be found by multiplying around the model (Duncan 1975). It would equal the product of the individual’s fit of seriousness to aggregate seriousness, the aggregate fit of seriousness to punishment, and the individual’s fit of punishment to aggregate punishment.

What is rote about such a model? Note that in model *a* arrows have also been drawn to represent the correlation of errors. These errors are the

individual level have no implication for the overall model. Further, the number of missing responses had only one significant demographic correlate (with sex on the concrete crimes), indicating that the conclusions about social status need no modification. In summary, the punishment scale provided appeared to be overly harsh from most respondents’ point of view, as evidenced by their willingness to write in less harsh alternatives at least once. But they appeared to want to extend the task rather than to change it.

Model a



Model b




FIG. 1.—Models of the determination of an individual's seriousness-severity correlations by sample average ratings, where S = the sample average seriousness ratings, P = the sample average severity ratings, s = the individual's seriousness ratings, p = the individual's severity ratings, and u and v are the deviations.

individual's deviations from the aggregate seriousness and associated punishment assessments. Uncorrelated deviations would indicate that apparent use of the normative principle at the individual level can be accounted for by agreement with group averages. The (positive) magnitude of the correlation of deviations indicates the extent to which individuals use a principle to order their judgments: the extent to which, if deviant on seriousness evaluations, the respondent is deviant in a consistent way on punishment assignments. Examining these errors for correlation is actually a conservative test for the extent to which individuals use a cognitive principle, given that a principled rule-applying respondent who coincidentally agreed with the average about the stimuli would not show correlated errors. However, the correlation of deviations from the model is unambiguously a reflection of individual application of a principle, while the portion of fit attributable in the model to consensual forces could reflect rote learning rather than rule learning of justice norms. For such a path model to "fail" in accounting for the 594 individual-level matches of the punishment to the crime—by showing correlated errors between the two judgments—would be an unambiguous indication that "error" between individuals is structure within individuals.

Model *a* is not always appropriate for all persons because its assumptions imply two identification restrictions. When these restrictions do not hold exactly, as they often do not with the small number of cases used to estimate each of the 594 applications of the model, estimates of the error correlation that exceed the boundaries of the interval $[-1, +1]$ can occur. For that reason, we actually estimate model *b* to measure the correlation of the deviations. The argument that correlation of deviations is an estimate of principle adherence that cannot be attributed to rote learning still applies for this just identified model.

Table 4 presents the relevant statistics on the extent of correlated error for each set of stimuli. The average correlations of errors actually mask the extent of such error, as they are affected by skewed scores. Thus the summaries in table 4 of the median correlated errors and of the percentage of respondents whose errors are positively correlated are more appropriate indices of use of the normative principle over and above agreement with the group. Despite the modest size of the average correlations, results clearly indicate that the vast majority of errors were positive ones. In short, when respondents deviated from the group evaluation of the seriousness of an offense they tended to deviate consistently on the severity of the punishment they assigned it.¹⁵

This conclusion—the finding of the use of a cognitive principle over and above consensus on evaluating social stimuli—hides a sharp edge. First, adherence to the principle that the punishment should fit the crime is actually a form of normative consensus that is very imprecise, as there is

TABLE 4
SUMMARY OF INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL CORRELATIONS OF
DEVIATIONS FROM AGGREGATE MEASURES: PARTIAL
CORRELATION OF CRIME SERIOUSNESS WITH PUNISH-
MENT SEVERITY CONTROLLING FOR SAMPLE AVERAGE
SERIOUSNESS AND SEVERITY
(*N* = 297)

	Abstract Crimes	Concrete Crimes
Mean.....	.35	.54
Median.....	.40	.62
Minimum.....	— .68	— .75
Maximum.....	.95	.99
SD.....	.34	.33
% greater than zero...	82	93

¹⁵ As table 3 shows, the only demographic correlate of principled dissent that was significant across both data sets was respondent's sex. Males showed higher levels of such dissent, as indexed by their partial *r*'s. Since no other effects for sex were consistently significant, and some were even inconsistent with respect to sign, we are left with no particular clues concerning the meaning of the results for sex.

considerable latitude left for disagreement about which punishment should be fit to which crime. More important, given any social disagreement about judgments of the specific stimuli involved, a fundamental tension emerges: the greater the adherence to principle, the more systematic the individual's deviation from the group. *Consensus on a normative principle implies potential principled dissent on its application.*

The two stimulus sets, the abstract and concrete crimes, represent an interesting contrast in this regard. As table 4 indicates, the average correlation of errors is larger for the concrete crimes. This is mathematically inevitable, given that the degree of agreement with the group about both crimes and punishments was similar in the two data sets, as noted above, and that in the concrete crimes individual adherence to the principle itself was higher (as presented in table 2). This finding simply demonstrates empirically the point that greater adherence to a cognitive principle is associated with more systematic deviation from the group. But it is conceptually interesting to speculate on why the concrete crimes are different. Because there are methodological differences between the procedures for the two stimulus sets, as described in the methods discussion above, we cannot be completely confident about explaining this difference substantively. However, we are inclined to believe that the greater use of the normative principle for the concrete crimes reflects their concrete quality: that respondents faced with a specific case were better able or more willing to link their assessment of its seriousness with the punishment they meted out in a way consistent with the principle of just deserts. If this interpretation is correct, the closer the situation is to actual cases—of real-world complexity and detail—the greater the incidence and degree of principled dissent is likely to be.

CONCLUSIONS

Summary of the Model

Norms of justice, like other norms, are "rules, standards, or patterns for behavior" (Williams 1968). In the present paper we have argued that investigations of normative consensus should take seriously the fact that people are presumed to hold norms of justice as cognitions as well as to apply such norms behaviorally. The cognitive model of justice norms that was suggested emphasized that individuals each have subjective evaluations of the relevant acts or attributes and reciprocations or outcomes. The overt actions that people take are based on their evaluations of "objective" stimuli, coupled with a rule of moral entailment that specifies how the two sides of the justice equation are to be linked. In other words, the individuals must decide how good, bad, worthy, worthless, needy, and

so forth, an action is; must similarly assess potential reactions; and must use some cognitive decision rule for producing justice.

Normative consensus then has two aspects. One question is whether the members of a social group use the principle. If the norm is a true cognitive rule, this question can be answered in its most stringent form by testing whether each respondent links subjective evaluations of stimuli according to a predicted pattern. In short, each respondent can become an individual instance of model fitting. In contrast, between-individual designs, whether in aggregated or disaggregated form, do not answer the question of whether or to what extent the principle is a cognitive rule. A second question, the more conventional one for students of social consensus, is whether there is agreement between individuals in the evaluation of the relevant social facts. Finally, the two versions of consensus—use of a principle and agreement on social facts—can be both analyzed separately for evidence of consensus and put together into a common model to see how they interrelate.

Summary of the Results

The norm that was assessed in the present study was public agreement on just deserts in criminal sanctioning, the notion that the punishment should fit the crime. To test the norm, psychophysically validated ratio scales of crime seriousness and punishment severity were used as the indicators of individuals' subjective evaluations. The first step was to assess consensus on the principle itself. The initial model fitted, derived from both psychophysics and equity theory, was one of individual respondents' proportional match between the seriousness of a crime and the severity of the punishment assigned to it (Adams 1965). Results indicated that the members of a block quota sample of the Boston SMSA did indeed fit the punishment to the crime, but according to a looser monotonic rather than a proportional matching (Harris 1976). Within-individual correlations between crime seriousness and punishment severity were substantial, however. Second, analyses of between-individual agreement on evaluations of the stimuli were conducted to assess the second aspect of normative consensus. These analyses revealed substantial agreement between individuals in evaluating crimes and associated punishments.

Two distinct forms of dissent were identified, however. A path model of the relation between aggregate consensus on stimuli and individual following of the principle revealed the existence of what we have called *principled dissent*: when any disagreement exists about the evaluation of specific stimuli, the more an individual holds to the cognitive principle the more systematic that individual's deviation from the group average. Thus

consensus on a principle inherently implies the possibility of principled dissent.

A second version of dissent, the more familiar demographic cleavage, was identified on both adherence to the principle and agreement with group averages. The consistent predictors of not fitting the punishment to the crime were telling ones: income and race. Lower-income or black respondents were less likely to exhibit the high within-individual correlations between crime seriousness and punishment severity which pervaded the data set. Income and race also related to divergence from group averages in evaluations of the stimuli involved. Higher-income respondents were more likely to agree with the average on punishments, while black respondents were less likely to agree with the average on crime seriousness. Thus conflict—of a sociostructurally meaningful kind—was identified both on adherence to the principle of just deserts and on evaluation of the social stimuli making up the equation of the punishment and the crime.

Relevance of the Findings

Such results may be of interest to three distinct groups: those interested in crime and crime seriousness, those interested in distributive justice or equity theory, and those interested in the general structure of normative consensus. In the specific area of crime seriousness, the results replicate with a more elaborate methodology the high level of public consensus often found previously. More important, the results provide support for what appears to have been an underlying assumption of previous researchers, that assessments of crime seriousness have something to do with punishment judgments as well.

For students of distributive justice or of equity theory, the results have both a specific and a general message. Specifically, the isomorphism between just deserts and equity as norms enabled us to test two theoretical forms that have been proposed as models of equity judgments—proportionality and monotonicity—as models of the just deserts principle. Although equity is theoretically held to apply at the level of the individual perceiver, to our knowledge no one has tested potential alternative forms for equity judgments within the individual. Our results suggest that it is certainly feasible to do so. Further, it would be substantively interesting to see whether distributive equity is also better modeled as a monotonic matching process.

In general, the results also provide a resounding contradiction to Alves and Rossi's (1978) contention that equity cannot lie in the eye of the individual beholder. Instead, by using a combination of within-individual and between-individual measures of consensus, we were able to show that individual perceivers *organize* their "errors"—their deviations from group

consensus on social facts—in such a way as to be consistent with a justice principle. In a sense, these results simply provide a confirmation of what gestalt psychologists have long known: that “errors” in perception and judgment across individuals often represent sensible structure *within* individuals (e.g., Neisser 1976). Human use of rules as guides to perception and cognition means that, just as errors in perception are not random, differences of opinion with others about perceived justice will not be random. Of course, consensus is not abandoned as a result of such findings; it is simply bifurcated into its component parts.

This theoretical bifurcation of consensus into use of a principle versus agreement on social stimuli may be of greatest interest to students of normative consensus. We have shown, in the case of a single norm of justice, that one can distinguish these two versions of consensus, measure each version separately, and interrelate the two. To the extent that other norms of justice take the same logical form as the norm of just deserts, they may show a similar structure of bifurcated consensus as well as an inherent tension between consensus on principle and agreement on social facts. Finally, to the extent that other norms in general incorporate broad rules or standards rather than an exact specification of appropriate actions, they may also exhibit this theoretical bifurcation of consensus.

Caveats and Suggestions for Further Research

Because the data set that was analyzed for evidence of just deserts was not designed with that analysis in mind, certain important caveats are in order about the meaning of the results. Most important, as we suggested early in the paper, the results do not tell us about the relative strength of just deserts as a norm or about people’s willingness to use alternative principles of justice. Respondents were asked to judge both crimes and punishments on a single dimension each, seriousness and severity; they were then asked to assign punishments to crimes. To the extent that the subjective dimensions proved to be both real and unidimensional to respondents, respondents who disagreed with the principle were essentially forced to fit the single model *less well*.

Thus some researchers might respond that the results found simply represent demand characteristics of the situation (see Orne 1962): that respondents were replying with what they thought was wanted by fitting the punishment to the crime. That critique, of course, does not invalidate the findings that respondents obviously knew the norm, used the norm, and generally agreed on its application. The critique does remind us that we do not really know whether they preferred it to other possible alternatives.

One question for further research concerns alternative response types—

whether people would give more nonprison-oriented answers in a fully open-ended inquiry, and what those answers would be. The option of write-ins, which we did provide, indicated that people respond primarily with less severe penal alternatives. But they also offered restitutive alternatives (usually fines), rehabilitative alternatives (such as psychiatric help), and what we can only call primitive alternatives (such as castration). Future investigations of public preferences regarding punishments should obviously be done in as open-minded and open-ended a fashion as possible. Researchers should, however, keep in mind that they may get some answers they would rather not hear.

A more general question concerns alternative principles of justice that may be brought to bear. We think it is instructive, for example, that it was low-income and black respondents who tended *not* to fit the punishment to the crime. We suspect that this is no accident and return to Heath's (1976) reminder that desert is not the only principle of justice. Equity in meting out punishments according to desert can obviously clash with prior inequity in meting out rewards according to desert, or needs, or rights. In Anatole France's famous aphorism, "The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread." It may well be that the low-income and black respondents were more sensitive to the larger societal injustices that surround the specific arena of criminal law.

Investigations of both distributive justice and punitive justice could benefit from systematic attention to principles other than desert. Despite the many studies of distributive equity, for example, only recently has any attention been paid to need as a determinant of reward (Jasso and Rossi 1977; Alves and Rossi 1978). And need is yet to be conceptualized or measured as a dimension; if that were done, a principle like "from each according to his ability, to each according to his need" could be pitted against desert-based reward or punishment. Ultimately, the relative strength of competing justice norms—rather than agreement about single justice norms—represents the key question for students of normative consensus.

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Max Weber's Types of Rationality: Cornerstones for the Analysis of Rationalization Processes in History¹

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Rationality has been recognized as perhaps the major theme in Max Weber's oeuvre. The commentators who have addressed this theme have generally constricted its polymorphous character. This article inventories Weber's usage of "rationality" and "rationalization" in *Economy and Society* and the *Collected Essays in the Sociology of Religion*. Four types of rationality are identified and compared with one another: practical, theoretical, substantive, and formal. Only "ethical substantive rationality" introduces methodical ways of life. All four types become manifest in a multiplicity of rationalization processes orchestrated at all levels of societal and civilizational process. Long-term rationalization processes are seen to be rooted in values rather than in interests. The dominance of practical, theoretical, and formal rationalization processes in modern Western societies implies immense consequences for the type of person likely to live in these societies.

Although "rationality" and its diverse manifestations in historical rationalization processes have been universally acknowledged as a major, and perhaps *the* major, theme in Max Weber's corpus, only a few commentators have endeavored to investigate this theme or to relate the various types of rationality to one another. The attempts by Schluchter (Roth and Schluchter 1979, pp. 14–15) and Weiss (1975, pp. 137–38) are plagued by a common shortcoming: both note "usages" or "dimensions" of rationality that cannot be consistently traced back to the frequent discussions of "rationality" and rationalization processes in *Economy and Society* (*E&S*) and the *Collected Essays in the Sociology of Religion*

¹ An earlier version of this article was presented in September 1977 in Gottlieben, Switzerland, at a colloquium entitled "Max Weber und die Dynamik der gesellschaftlichen Rationalisierung." A German version will appear in Seyfarth and Sprondel (1980). I would also like to express my deep gratitude to Guy Oakes of Monmouth College; Winfried Brugger, Winfried Gebhardt, Klaus Koziol, Gerd Schmaltz, and F. H. Tenbruck in Tübingen; David Herr in New York; Toby Huff in Boston; Donald Levine in Chicago; Richard Münch in Düsseldorf; Karl-Heinz Nusser in Munich; Guenther Roth in Seattle; Wolfgang Schluchter in Heidelberg; and Constan Seyfarth in Frankfurt.

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(CESR). Moreover, their definitions do not coincide with Weber's various historical-sociological analyses of the paths followed by rationalization processes in different civilizations. Donald Levine's (1979) recent discussion of Weber's notion of "rationality" avoids these difficulties by adhering largely to Weber's terminology, yet he does not comprehensively discuss this concept, nor does he touch on the issue of the manner in which the types of rationality combine or struggle against one another in history as separate rationalization processes. Furthermore, like Ulrike Vogel's (1973) and Ann Swidler's (1973) expositions, Levine's distinction between Weber's types of social action and his types of rationality is insufficiently differentiated.

Many explorations of Weber's understanding of "rationality" have failed to emphasize its multivalent embodiments. This approach is most clearly represented by the assertion that rationalization processes in Weber's corpus amount to nothing more than a "disenchantment of the world,"² bureaucratization, or an increasing lack of freedom. Other commentators have discussed rationalization as tantamount only to an increasing pervasiveness of the means-end (*zweckrational*) type of social action (Nelson 1973, p. 85; Münch 1980). Still other authors have limited their examinations of Weber's notion of "rationality" and its manifestations in historical rationalization processes to specific spheres of life, such as the religious sphere (Tenbruck 1975).

Weber himself is largely responsible for the lack of clarity that surrounds his analyses of "rationality" and the interplay of multifaceted historical rationalization processes. His scattered and fragmented discussions of this theme are more likely to mystify than to illuminate (e.g. [1946] 1958f, pp. 293-94 [266]; [1930] 1958a, pp. 26 [11-12], 77-78 [62]; 1968, pp. 30 [15], 85 [44], 424 [259], 809 [468], 333 [195-96]; 1951, p. 226 [512]; 1952, pp. 425-26, n. 1 [1-2]; see n. 2 regarding page numbers in brackets) and, despite its centrality, he nowhere offers a succinct explanation of this theme. His contorted style of writing also hampers all attempts to take an inventory of his major usages of "rationality" and "rationalization processes," as does his frequent carelessness: since the appropriate qualifying adjective often fails to precede "rational" in his

² This misinterpretation results in part from the frequent translation of *Entzauberung* as "disenchantment." *Entzauberung*—literally, "de-magification"—has a very specific significance for Weber: it is one of the two major axes followed by rationalization processes in the arena of religion (1951, p. 226 [512]; all references to Weber's texts give the English translation first, followed in brackets by the page numbers of the original German; bibliographic information about the latter appears in the list of references). It relates particularly to religious rationalization processes in the West, beginning with ancient Judaism, and characterizes especially the transformation from medieval Catholicism to Calvinism. "Disenchantment," a far more general term that conjures up images of the romanticist's yearning for the *Gemeinschaft* and an earlier, "simpler" world, has not the slightest relationship to Weber's usage of *Entzauberung*.

writings, the student of Weber is generally left with a choice between concluding that his usage is indeed unilinear and undertaking the unappealing task of systematically examining the hundreds of passages in which this term appears. Because of the varied translations of *Rationalismus*, *Rationalität*,³ and *Rationalisierung*, as well as related key terms in the numerous English editions of Weber's writings, the reader who does not have access to the German texts confronts a hopeless situation.

This article exhaustively surveys Weber's usage of "rationality" and "rationalization" as these terms appear in his major comparative-historical-sociological works written after 1904: *ES&S* and the *CESR*.⁴ The selection of these writings, rather than the methodological or political essays, has been determined by another aim of this article: to reconstruct, *at the purely conceptual level*, Weber's vision of a *multiplicity* of rationalization processes that variously conflict and coalesce with one another at all societal and civilizational levels.⁵ Because the discrete types of rationality constitute the cornerstones for these rationalization processes, an inventory of their defining features and interrelationships as they appear in Weber's comparative sociology must serve as the necessary prerequisite for such a reconstruction.⁶ Before scrutinizing the types of rationality, however, a number of preliminary issues should be dealt with in order to avoid unnecessary confusion.

I. GENERAL FEATURES OF WEBER'S TYPES OF RATIONALITY AND RATIONALIZATION

The conceptual status of Weber's four types of rationality in relation to his four types of social action will be clarified in this section, as well as

³ This and the preceding term are used synonymously by Weber. They have been generally translated as "rationality," though occasionally as "rationalism." "Rationality" as well as "irrationality" will be repeatedly placed in quotation marks in this article in order to emphasize the exclusive concern here with Weber's distinctive usage of these terms.

⁴ This three-volume work includes *The Religion of China*, *The Religion of India*, *Ancient Judaism*, and *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* as well as the "Author's Introduction." It also includes three essays printed in Gerth and Mills's *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (see Weber [1946] 1958c, 1958d, and 1958f): "The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism," "The Religious Rejections of the World and Their Directions," and "The Social Psychology of the World Religions."

⁵ This article, therefore, does not investigate Weber's distinction between "rational" and "empathic" understanding as it relates to the process of interpretative understanding. For a discussion of this distinction, see Weber 1968, pp. 5-14 [2-7]; Levine 1979, pp. 10-11; and Weiss 1975, pp. 48-50.

⁶ Whereas "rationality" and all "types of rationality" always refer, for Weber and in this article, to a condition, "rationalization" or "rationalization process" refers to a development. The "types" (*Arten*, *Formen*; see, e.g., [1946] 1958f, p. 293 [266]; [1930] 1958a, pp. 26 [12], 30 [15]) of rationalization are all based on the types of rationality.

two general characteristics of the types of rationality and of rationalization processes: their universality and their "sphere-of-life" specificity.

The Types of Social Action and the Types of Rationality

Weber's fourfold typology of social action—*affectual*, *traditional*, *value-rational*, and *means-end rational* action—refers to universal capacities of *Homo sapiens*. Instead of depending for their existence on societal, cultural, or historical constellations, these types of social action stand "outside of history" as anthropological traits of man.

Against 19th-century French anthropology, Weber argued that man did not acquire his "rationality" with the Enlightenment and that individuals in all previous epochs were not incapable of rational action. On the contrary, even everyday actions of "primitive" man could be *subjectively* means-end rational, as, for example, when specific religious rituals were performed with the aim of receiving favors from a god. In Weber's eyes, this pure exchange relationship as it existed in sacrifice and prayer (1968, p. 424 [258–59]; [1922] 1973, pp. 432–38) was identical in form to the modern businessman's calculation of the most efficient means to acquire profit. Likewise, the fact that the values in premodern societies diverged widely from modern values did not, for Weber, call into question the basic capacity of man to orient his actions rationally on the basis of values. On the other hand, traditional and affectual action were not uprooted and swept away to the degree that modernization movements advanced.

However universal the four types of social action may be, Weber confined the application of this typology to specific and delineated actions. As a comparative-historical sociologist, however, he wished to examine "more" than simply fragmented action orientations; regularities and patterns of action were of far greater interest to him. Patterns could occur at a plurality of levels of sociocultural processes, from those manifest in the dominant paths followed by entire civilizations to others that characterized long-term historical developments or short-term societal movements. Regularities of action surfaced as well within institutions, organizations, strata, classes, and groups in all societies. The typology of the types of rationality, a classification that must be sifted out of Weber's writings, is one of many conceptual schemes he utilizes to analyze such regularities and patterns. "Practical," "theoretical," "formal," and "substantive" rationality constitute this typology. The *conscious* regularities of action that all of these types of rationality introduce serve to master (*beherrschen*) fragmented and disconnected realities.

Since these types of rationality are anchored in means-end rational and

value-rational action,⁷ the patterns of civilizational and societal processes they identify involve simply conscious regularities of action orientations on the part of individuals⁸ and, in some cases, "ways of life" (*Lebensfuehrungen*).⁹ Like sociocultural processes, ways of life—or consistent "attitudes" that penetrate the entire organization of life—diverge widely in the extent to which they involve methodical action ([1946] 1958f, p. 293 [266]). Their broad range of diversity depends ultimately, for Weber, on a multitude of interacting ideas, values, interests, and economic, political, sociological, and historical factors. Rationalization processes of historic significance in societies and in entire civilizations have often originated when a constellation of factors crystallized that rewarded *methodical* rational ways of life. As will be noted below, Weber argues that precisely these ways of life were based on values rather than on interests.

The Universality of the Types of Rationality and of Rationalization Processes

The types of rationality and the various rationalization processes are often discussed by Weber in reference to Western civilization's distinctive modernization path. This predominant orientation is most clearly evident in the "Author's Introduction" to the *CESR*. In this essay, as well as in the *CESR* as a whole, Weber intends, above all, to address the issue of why the Chinese, Indian, and ancient Near East civilizations did not adopt those types of rationalization processes that characterize the European-American civilization.

Although Weber oriented these investigations to the question why "rationalized societies" arose only in the West, the types of rationality and

⁷ Theoretical rationality, which is rooted in cognitive processes rather than in action, is the only type of rationality not based on either means-end rational or value-rational action. It can, however, influence action indirectly, as is explained below. The relation between the types of rationality and the types of social action is discussed further in Section III below.

⁸ That individual action is, for Weber, the fundamental "atom" in all societal and civilizational processes must be kept in mind throughout this article. Even collective concepts are understood by Weber to be specifiable common action orientations of individuals in groups (1968, pp. 4 [1], 8 [3], 19 [8–9]; [1922] 1973, pp. 429, 439). Such social phenomena as a business corporation, a neighborhood, a family, or feudalism are constituted from the common subjective "meanings" given to them by groupings of individuals, as is even a bureaucratic structure of domination and a compulsory institution (*Anstalt*;) such as the modern state. Collective entities are not themselves capable of "acting"; on the contrary, they exist simply as a consequence "ultimately of a certain kind of development of actual or possible social actions of individual persons" (1968, p. 14 [6–7]; emphasis in original, translation slightly altered).

⁹ It is impossible to trace Weber's usage of *Lebensfuehrung* in the translations. It often appears, particularly in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, as "conduct," though also as "style of life," "type of attitude," or simply "life."

rationalization processes take shape, in greater or lesser degrees, universally. The "Author's Introduction" itself provides the most unequivocal evidence of this universality. In referring there to the particular types of rationality and rationalization processes that appeared in Western civilization, Weber implies that rationalization, albeit often of a different kind, takes place in non-Western civilizations as well ([1930] 1958a, pp. 25-26 [11], 30 [15]). He further frequently notes, for example, the "rationalism" of ancient Judaism (1968, pp. 610 [367], 618-19 [372]) and of Confucianism (1951, pp. 226-49 [512-36], 164 [452]; 1968, pp. 538-39 [326-27]) and the rationalization of mystical contemplation ([1930] 1958a, p. 26 [11]).

In an analysis of religious rationalization, F. H. Tenbruck (1975) has come to the same conclusion. After examining the original 1905 edition of Weber's *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (PE) and his later "Author's Introduction," "The Social Psychology of the World Religions," and the "Religious Rejections of the World," Tenbruck argues that the most significant thematic development here involves a broadening of Weber's understanding of "rationality" and rationalization processes (1975, pp. 669, 677-79). In the first edition of the PE, Weber's interest, in keeping with the prevalent intellectual currents of his time, focused exclusively on rationalization in the West. By the time he wrote the later essays, however, he had enlarged his notion of rationalization to universal-historical dimensions that included civilizational developments in the Orient as well (Nelson 1969, p. 6; 1974, p. 272; Parsons 1937, pp. 567, 752; 1963, pp. xxxii-iii; Bendix 1965, pp. 11-12; Münch 1980; Levine 1979, pp. 8-9).

The Sphere-of-Life Specificity of "Rationality" and "Rationalization" Processes

Weber does not employ the concepts of "rationality" and "rationalization" in a global manner to refer merely to a general unfolding of civilizations. Instead, qualitatively different rationalization processes that potentially advance at their own indigenous rates take place at various sociocultural levels and in different life-spheres, both in those relating to the "external organization of the world," such as the realms of law, politics, economics, domination (*Herrschaft*), and knowledge, and in the "internal" spheres of religion and ethics. Rationalization processes may be found also in the aesthetic and erotic arenas.¹⁰

Weber's conviction that rationalization occurs in diverse spheres of life

¹⁰ "Arenas," "realms," and "spheres" are used here synonymously (*Lebensbereiche*, *Lebenssphäre*). Spheres of life, such as those just noted, are often referred to by contemporary sociologists as "institutional orders."

compelled him to examine the degree to which a single realm could be designated as the "carrier," behind which all other rationalization processes fell in line to a greater or lesser degree. In posing this question, he wished primarily to scrutinize the Marxian emphasis on the economic sphere as the substructure for all others. In this regard, Weber found the Marxian stress wanting: for him, rationalization processes can take place in each arena independently from the others and at their own rates. A "rational" form of lawmaking, for example, did not originate in those countries that first introduced modern forms of capitalism. Instead, it arose and attained a highly rationalized form in ancient Rome. It was taken over in the Catholic countries of southern Europe long before the onset of industrialization in that area rather than by England, the earliest country to industrialize. Likewise, purely this-worldly "rational" philosophies emerged earliest in France with the Enlightenment rather than in England or Holland where economic "rationalism" had reached its highest stages. Moreover, after comparing the intense capitalistic activity in 14th- and 15th-century Florence with the economic backwardness of 18th-century Pennsylvania, Weber concluded that modern capitalism alone could not have given birth to an "economic ethic" ([1930] 1958*a*, pp. 74-77 [60-62], 25 [11]). Thus, he came to doubt all those theories that understood the advance of "rationality" as a unilinear evolutionary process occurring with equal intensity in all societal spheres. He then began to investigate the manner in which action was rationalized in particular arenas.

These preliminary remarks on the general features of Weber's types of rationality and rationalization processes have aimed only to provide a loose framework within which these concepts can be defined and examined for their interrelationships. Weber himself, particularly in his later writings, repeatedly admonished his readers to attend to the multivocality of his usage of "rationality" and "rationalization" ([1946] 1958*f*, p. 293 [266]; 1968, p. 998 [576]; [1930] 1958*a*, pp. 26 [11-12], 77-78 [62]).

II. MAX WEBER'S TYPES OF RATIONALITY: PRACTICAL, THEORETICAL, SUBSTANTIVE, AND FORMAL

In surveying the types of rationality, this section aims above all to demonstrate the polymorphous character of "rationality" in Weber's oeuvre. The Weberian axiom that very different patterns of action and ways of life may be "rational" will be repeatedly underlined.

Practical Rationality

Weber designates every way of life that views and judges worldly activity in relation to the individual's purely pragmatic and egoistic interests as practical rational ([1930] 1958*a*, p. 77 [62]). Instead of implying pat-

terns of action that, for example, actively manipulate the given routines of daily life in behalf of an absolute value system, a practical rational way of life accepts given realities and calculates the most expedient means of dealing with the difficulties they present. Pragmatic action in terms of everyday interests is ascendant, and given practical ends are attained by careful weighing and increasingly precise calculation of the most adequate means ([1946] 1958*f*, p. 293 [266]). Thus, this type of rationality exists as a manifestation of man's capacity for means-end rational action.

Wherever the bonds of primitive magic have been severed, the "capability and disposition" of persons for practical rational patterns of action appears, whether in ages deeply imprinted by ethical salvation religions or in fully secular epochs ([1930] 1958*a*, p. 26 [12]). Variations in practical rational regularities of action arise, for Weber, from differences in the relative sophistication of the means available to master daily problems ([1946] 1958*f*, p. 284 [256]; 1968, p. 30 [15]) and in the extent to which ethical religious doctrines intensify specific practical patterns of action by placing "psychological premiums" on them (1951, p. 247 [533]; 1968, p. 551 [334]; see below, Sec. III). As a result of their typical activities, all "civic" strata, in particular—merchants, artisans, traders—show a definite tendency to order their ways of life in a self-interested, practical rational manner ([1946] 1958*f*, pp. 279 [251], 284 [256]). This way of life particularly characterizes the daily action of "the people of the *Liberum arbitrium*, such as the Italians and the French" ([1930] 1958*a*, p. 77 [62]).

The pragmatic and this-worldly predisposition of practical rational patterns of action implies a subordination of individuals to given realities and a concomitant inclination to oppose all orientations based on transcendence of daily routine. Such persons often mistrust not only all striving after the impractical values of "the beyond," whether religious or secular utopian, but also the abstract theoretical rationality of all intellectual strata.

Theoretical Rationality

This type of rationality involves a conscious mastery of reality through the construction of increasingly precise abstract concepts rather than through action. Since a cognitive confrontation with one's experience prevails here, such thought processes as logical deduction and induction, the attribution of causality, and the formation of symbolic "meanings" are typical. More generally, all abstract cognitive processes, in all their expansive active forms, denote theoretical rationality ([1946] 1958*f*, p. 293 [265–66]).¹¹

¹¹ Weber also refers to this type of rationality as "intellectual rationality."

Weber discovered a great variety of systematic thinkers who practiced this type of rationality. In the earliest stages of history, sorcerers and ritualistic priests sought abstract means of taming nature and the supernatural. With the appearance of ethical salvation religions, ethical priests, monks, and theologians rationalized the values implicit in doctrines into internally consistent constellations of values, or world views (*Weltbilder*), that offered comprehensive explanations for the perpetuation of suffering. Philosophers of all shades have also pondered nature and society and have repeatedly refined conceptual schemes that "explained" their workings. Theoretical rationalization processes may also be carried out by judges who interpret the incipient world view found in political constitutions or by the disciples of a revolutionary theorist, such as those that have continually arisen to refine Marxian doctrine. Systematic thinkers have often been scientists dedicated to the theoretical rationalization of the scientific world view in the decades since Weber's death that have been devoid of either revolutionary hopes or religious fervor. Since it always seeks interrelationships and the construction of comprehensive "holistic" explanations, theoretical thought stands in a relationship of antagonism to the fragmented character of magic in particular.

Unlike the means-end rational action that provides the foundation for purely adaptive practical rationality, theoretical rationalization processes are undergirded and given their momentum, Weber argues, by the natural "metaphysical need" and "irrepressible quest" of thinkers and systematizers to transcend sheer given routine and to supply the random events of everyday life with a coherent "meaning" ([1946] 1958f, pp. 279–81 [251–54]; 1968, pp. 505–6 [307–8]). These persons have been motivated ultimately by their search for an answer to the question that has stood at the base of all metaphysics: "If the world as a whole and life in particular were to have a meaning, what might it be, and how would the world have to look in order to correspond to it?" (1968, p. 451 [275]). This conundrum, whether dealt with in its religious or its philosophical forms, has, Weber believes, played an immeasurably significant role in the efforts of intellectuals to break through daily realities and to understand the world as a "meaningful" cosmos. In the 20th-century theoretical rationalization processes, this question has been visible in only its most constricted forms.

Weber is convinced that a theoretical confrontation with reality can react back on the thinker's action and introduce new regularities of action, though this does not always occur. The modern scientist's alteration of a mathematical equation, for example, generally leaves scarcely an imprint on his routine action. On the other hand, the sorcerer's rational deduction, from common experience, that evil, metaphysical powers reside within or lurk behind trees, rocks, and other natural objects required new modes of interacting with the transcendent realm for himself and—given a con-

figuration of purely sociological factors that facilitated the dispersion of the sorcerer's thought—for his entire society (1968, pp. 399–403 [245–48]). For example, after the idea of the soul arose, burial procedures sought to provide the dead with amenities in their graves (1968, pp. 404–5 [248]).

When mighty gods arose as functionally specialized entities able to protect men against evils, yet failed to do so, logical thought was again engaged to confront this quandary: abstract thinking led to the conclusion that these gods were egoistic beings and that their anger could be calmed only by entreaties and supplications (1968, pp. 432 [264], 424 [258]). These purely “rational” conclusions themselves influenced social action in a number of ways. Perhaps most important, the necessity of appeasing the gods provided the impetus for the crystallization of a new stratum of religious practitioners to conduct worship services: priests. Priests, in turn, further theoretically rationalized conceptions of the metaphysical realm. In the process, the diverse methods of supplication and entreaty became ordered into a variety of regular worship forms, including prayer, tributes, penance, and abstinence. Priests also delineated “good behavior” as conduct agreeable to the gods, and worshipers learned how to attain favor by acting in accord with a divinity's expectations. Given a constellation of facilitating sociological forces, these modes of interacting with the epiphenomenal sphere became dominant throughout a society (1968, p. 423 [258]).

In a later stage of the religious rationalization process, world views arose as a result of the theoretical rationalization of conceptions of the supernatural realm. These comprehensive views of the universe and man's place within it purported to offer exhaustive explanations of man's plight and his repeated experiencing of injustice. In further purely cognitive rationalization processes, religious thinkers continually sought to reorder and systematize the religious values implicit in the world view into increasingly internally consistent doctrines in the hope of deducing patterns of action that would insure a state of grace for believers. According to Weber, religious doctrines themselves—such as the Indian doctrine of Karma, the Calvinist belief in predestination, and the Lutheran justification through faith—could, under certain circumstances, significantly influence practical ways of life. This occurred simply because of the plausibility these doctrines acquired from their consistent explanations for lasting suffering ([1946] 1958*f*, p. 286 [258–59]; [1946] 1958*d*, p. 324 [537]; 1968, p. 424 [259]; Tenbruck 1975, pp. 683–85).

Thus, even though theoretical rationality masters reality through thought, it contains a potential *indirectly* to introduce patterns of action. Indeed, Weber asserts that the abstract rationalization processes carried out by systematic thinkers played a decisive role in the de-magification

processes that characterized the transformation from medieval Catholicism to Calvinism ([1946] 1958*d*, pp. 350–51 [567], 357 [571]; [1930] 1958*a*, p. 102 [92]).

Substantive Rationality

Like practical rationality though unlike theoretical rationality, substantive rationality *directly* orders action into patterns. It does so, however, not on the basis of a purely means-end calculation of solutions to routine problems but in relation to a past, present, or potential "value postulate" (1968, pp. 85–86 [44–45]). Not simply a single value, such as positive evaluation of wealth or of the fulfillment of duty, a value postulate implies entire clusters of values that vary in comprehensiveness, internal consistency, and content. Thus, this type of rationality exists as a manifestation of man's inherent capacity for value-rational action.

A substantive rationality may be circumscribed, organizing only a delimited area of life and leaving all others untouched. Friendship, for example, whenever it involves adherence to such values as loyalty, compassion, and mutual assistance, constitutes a substantive rationality. Communism, feudalism, hedonism, egalitarianism, Calvinism, socialism, Buddhism, Hinduism, and the Renaissance view of life, no less than all aesthetic notions of "the beautiful," are also examples of substantive rationalities, however far they may diverge in their capacity to organize action as well as in their value content (1968, pp. 44–45 [85]).

In all cases, the substantive rationality is considered to be a "valid canon"; that is, a unique "standard" against which reality's flow of unending empirical events may be selected, measured, and judged ([1946] 1958*f*, p. 294 [266]). Since the standpoints represented by value postulates can be, in principle, infinite, action may be ordered into patterns and, indeed, into entire ways of life in an endless number of ways. Small groups, organizations, institutions, political entities, cultures, and civilizations are, in every era, ordered in terms of specifiable value postulates, even though these may be not readily identifiable by their participants and can be so fundamentally foreign to the values of the social researcher that he can scarcely imagine situations in which they acquire validity.

The infinity of possible value postulates points to a critical feature of Weber's notion of substantive rationality: its radical perspectivism. For him, substantive rationality and rationalization processes based on it always exist in reference to ultimate points of view, or "directions" ([1930] 1958*a*, p. 26 [11–12]): each point of view implies an identifiable configuration of values that determines the direction of a potentially ensuing rationalization process. Thus, no absolute array of "rational" values exists as a set of perennial "standards" for "the rational" and for rationaliza-

tion processes. Instead, a radical perspectivism prevails in which the existence of a rationalization process depends on an individual's implied or stated, unconscious or conscious, preference for certain ultimate values and the systematization of his or her action to conform to these values. These values acquire "rationality" merely from their status as consistent value postulates. Similarly, the "irrational" is not fixed and intrinsically "irrational" but results from the ideal-typical incompatibility of one ultimate constellation of values with another:

Something is not of itself "irrational," but rather becomes so when examined from a specific "rational" *standpoint*. Every religious person is "irrational" for every irreligious person, and every hedonist likewise views every ascetic way of life as "irrational," even if, measured in terms of *its* ultimate values, a "rationalization" has taken place. This essay, if it can make any contribution at all, aims to expose the multifaceted nature of a concept—the "rational"—that only appears to be a simple one. [(1930) 1958a, p. 53, n. 9 (35, n. 1); my translation, emphasis in original]¹²

At least one identifiable point of view rooted in a value postulate exists in every realm of life. The "rationality" and potential rationalization processes within a given arena refer back to these value postulates. Life-spheres, in a sense, defend their own value postulates as "rational" and label those of other life-spheres "irrational." From the point of view of efficiency and productivity in the economic realm, for example, all status monopolies, since they restrict the expansion of the free market, are "irrational," as is capitalism considered from the perspective of the values of feudalism, in which status monopolies were most pronounced ([1946] 1958f, p. 301 [275]). The calculation of the capitalist and the power interests of the politician are likewise "irrational" from the standpoint of all salvation religions of brotherhood, and the converse is also true ([1946] 1958d, pp. 348–49 [561–62], 331–40 [544–54]). Similarly, to the modern intellectual who trusts only science and empirical knowledge, the religious man's reliance on faith remains within the realm of the "irrational" ([1946] 1958d, p. 353 [566]; [1946] 1958f, p. 281 [253]).

Substantively rational points of view may also differ within a single sphere. Within the realm of religion, for example, a plenitude of ultimate value-standpoints and world views confront one another, each proclaiming its "rationality." The Hindu organic social ethics remains incomprehensible as a way of life to the mystic Buddhist who has chosen to pursue Nirvana through a life of contemplation, as does the ascetic's action in the world ([1946] 1958d, p. 338 [551–52]). To the ascetic, on the other hand, the paths to salvation in these Oriental religions remain wholly senseless ([1946] 1958d, pp. 352–56 [565–70]), as does the Confucian

¹² This footnote was added in Weber's 1920 rewriting of the *PE*.

gentleman's study of classical literature (1951, pp. 226–49 [512–36]). Similarly, within the arena of ethics, the proponent of the ethic of conviction (*Gesinnungsethik*) always claims that the adherent of the ethic of responsibility ultimately advocates an “irrational” position. The advocate of universal values makes the same claim about the supporter of particularistic values. The converse also holds in each of these cases.

Largely as a consequence of the secondary literature's general orientation to the *PE* rather than to the later “Religious Rejections of the World,” where Weber's radical value perspectivism is most apparent,¹³ interpreters of the types of rationality have nearly totally neglected this significant aspect. This neglect has resulted also, on the one hand, from the common tendency to reduce the multidimensionality of rationalization processes to a single dimension (e.g., bureaucratization) and, on the other hand, from the failure to distinguish, as Weber does, between a researcher's personal values and his attempt to define scientifically the historical foundations, sociological preconditions, and significant consequences of a social phenomenon. For example, Herbert Marcuse (1972, pp. 133–51), in particular, argues that Weber identified capitalism's formal rationality with rationality as such and supported this economic system in his scientific writings as one in conformity with the absolute value of Reason in the Hegelian sense. On the contrary, Weber's investigation of “rationality” and rationalization processes implies nothing about a desire on his part to advocate either their expansion or constriction.

Weber's radical perspectivism, his notion of substantive rationality, and his *verstehende* sociology as a whole all pivot on the conviction that values are not demonstrable by the methods of science ([1946] 1958e, pp. 150–51 [607]; 1949, pp. 52–55 [149–52], 58 [154–55], 60 [157]) but remain in the contemporary era the only domain in which the autonomous individual confronts his “own demons.” That even the most precise “technically correct” rationalization within, for example, the economic sphere, cannot be said to be legitimate and “valid” as “progress” at the level of values remains a constant assumption throughout Weber's sociological analyses. Nor can science, on the other hand, prove the values of the Buddhist monk or those of the Sermon on the Mount to be “superior” to any other value configuration (1949, p. 38 [530]; [1946] 1958e, p. 148 [604]).

Formal rationalities have stood in the most direct antagonism to many substantive rationalities. The recurrent conflict of these types of rationality has played a particularly fateful role in the unfolding of rationalization processes in the West.

¹³ This essay confronts the reader with an overwhelming cascade of examples in which Weber puts himself in the position of an ideal-typically constructed “subject” and examines the cosmos from the perspective of that subject.

Formal Rationality

Unlike the intercivilizational and epoch-transcending character of the practical, theoretical, and substantive types of rationality, formal rationality generally¹⁴ relates to spheres of life and a structure of domination that acquired specific and delineated boundaries only with industrialization: most significantly, the economic, legal, and scientific spheres, and the bureaucratic form of domination. Whereas practical rationality always indicates a diffuse tendency to calculate and to solve routine problems by means-end rational patterns of action in reference to pragmatic self-interests, formal rationality ultimately legitimates a similar means-end rational calculation by reference back to universally applied rules, laws, or regulations.

To the degree that sheer calculation in terms of abstract rules reigns, decisions are arrived at "without regard to persons." An orientation of action to formal rules and laws is tantamount to a rejection of all arbitrariness: universalism and calculation in reference to enacted regulations stand here strictly opposed to decision making in reference to the personal qualities of individuals concerned. Distinct personalities—even charismatic ones—no less than differences in regard to status are subjected to the dictates of formally rational procedures. The personal grace or favor given by the lord of a manor, for example, is totally alien to the "spirit" of bureaucracy (1968, pp. 979 [565], 244 [141], 225 [129]).

Weber refers to bureaucratic domination as formally rational because action oriented to intellectually analyzable general rules and statutes predominates here, as well as the selection of the most adequate means for continued adherence to them. From a technical point of view, the most "rational" type of domination is found in the bureaucracy simply because it aims to do nothing more than calculate the most precise and efficient means for the resolution of problems by ordering them under universal and abstract regulations (1968, pp. 975 [562], 226 [130]; [1946] 1958*f*, p. 295 [267]).¹⁵

Legal formal rationality exists when formally trained jurists carry out laws that apply to all citizens of the state in a manner such that "... only

¹⁴ The major exception is noted below in the discussion of formal rationality in the religious realm. Roman law is also an exception.

¹⁵ Weber naturally does not deny the fact that "red tape" can significantly diminish the efficiency of a bureaucracy. His discussion of this form of domination's ideal-typical features is nearly exclusively oriented toward a comparison with patriarchal, feudal, and patrimonial forms of domination, none of which can even approach the bureaucracy's efficiency, dependability, etc. Moreover, in spite of its uneven functioning, Weber believes that industrial societies cannot dispense with this form of administration or substitute a different form. Any high hopes that this can occur are, to him, sheer illusion (1968, pp. 223 [128], 988 [570]).

unambiguous general characteristics of the case are taken into account in terms of purely processual and legal factors" (1968, pp. 656–57 [396]; translation altered). This mode of juridical procedure opposes legal substantive rationality, where decisions are arrived at in strict reference to a postulate of ultimate justice. Similarly, in the economic sphere, formal rationality increases to the extent that all technically possible calculations within the "laws of the market" are universally carried out, regardless of either their effect on individual persons or the degree to which they may violate ethical substantive rationalities (1968, p. 85 [44–45]).

As opposed to the formulation of hypotheses, which belongs to the domain of theoretical rationality, experimental scientific procedures are also judged, by Weber, to be fully formally rational. Calculation proceeds in this case in relation to the common rules of experimentation. These are very likely to be carried out in a more sophisticated manner than rules in the bureaucratic form of domination or in the economic and legal spheres: strict empirical observation, quantification, and systematic measurement attain here a peak of methodical control, especially in the laboratory. Just as in the other life-spheres, the execution of all technically possible means-end rational calculations takes place "without regard to persons." Rule-oriented, pure calculation that reacts directly back on action occurs also in the realm of religion, though only in a few special cases. Formal rationality in religion is described by Weber as action "ordered according to plan" (*Planmässigkeit*): methodical techniques, such as contemplation or yoga, are executed here in accord with fixed procedures ([1946] 1958f, pp. 293–94 [266]).

III. COMPARING AND CONTRASTING THE TYPES OF RATIONALITY

A comparison and contrast of formal, substantive, theoretical, and practical types of rationality must be turned to now. This can take place most feasibly within the context of an examination of the aspects common to the four types of rationality, the relation between the four types of social action and the types of rationality, and the manner in which the different types of rationality introduce regularities and patterns of action as well as, in some cases, ways of life. Once these themes have been discussed, all the preliminary steps will have been taken for an analytic discussion of the multiple rationalization processes charted by Weber.

Aspects Common to the Four Types of Rationality

However much they may vary in content, mental processes that consciously strive to master reality are common to all the types of rationality. Regardless of whether they are characterized by sheer means-end cal-

ulation, the subordination of diffuse realities to values, or abstract thought processes; regardless also of whether they take place in reference to interests, formal rules and laws, values, or purely theoretical problems—all of these processes systematically confront, for Weber, social reality's endless stream of concrete occurrences, unconnected events, and punctuated happenings. In mastering reality, their common aim is to banish particularized perceptions by ordering them into comprehensible and "meaningful" regularities.¹⁶

Mental processes are of interest to Weber primarily in regard to the extent to which they can be translated into patterns of social action. In some cases, such as practical rationality, regularities of action follow so closely on the calculation in relation to self-interests that the mental process itself is scarcely visible. Theoretical rationality, on the other hand, illustrates the opposite extreme: here cognitive processes often do not introduce patterns of action, though they may do so indirectly. In general, a quite direct linkage exists between the mental process and action oriented to formal and substantive rationalities (see table 1).

Constellations of historical and sociological factors determine, for Weber, whether a particular type of rationality in fact found clear expression as a mental process alone or also as regularities of action that became established as sociocultural processes, whether at the level of groups, organizations, societies, or civilizations as a whole. This common potential of the types of rationality to master reality consciously exists as a cornerstone in Weber's analysis of the unfolding of diverse rationalization processes in various civilizations.

The Types of Action, the Types of Rationality, and Legitimate Orders

As conscious regularities of action that aim to master reality, practical and formal types of rationality are based typically on man's capacity for means-end rational action; substantive rationality derives typically from value-rational action. Even though theoretical rationality, on the other hand, is rooted in abstract cognitive processes instead of action, rational action—and even patterns of rational action—may follow indirectly from theoretical rational thinking (see table 2).

Substantive, formal, and theoretical types of rationality do not, in Weber's scheme, remain simply amorphous sociocultural regularities of action. Instead, given configurations of facilitating sociological and historical factors, they are institutionalized as normative regularities of action with-

¹⁶ Though a conscious, systematic mastery of reality is not, of course, the only means by which, according to Weber, regularities arise (see 1968, pp. 33–38 [17–20]).

Weber's Types of Rationality

in "legitimate orders":¹⁷ organizations,¹⁸ traditional (patriarchal, patrimonial, feudal) and rational-legal (bureaucratic) forms of domination, types of economic structures, ethical doctrines, classes, and strata. The diffuse, problem-solving character of practical rationality generally confines it to the domain of routine, everyday, pragmatic difficulties.

TABLE 1
CONSCIOUS MASTERY OF FRAGMENTED REALITIES THROUGH
REGULARITIES OF ACTION

Type of Rationality	Mental Processes	Relation to Action	Reference for Mental Processes
Theoretical.....	Various abstract processes	Indirect	Values or purely theoretical problems
Practical.....	Means-end calculation	Direct	Interests
Formal.....	Means-end calculation	Direct	Rules, laws, regulations
Substantive.....	Subordination of realities to values	Direct	Values

TABLE 2
ANTHROPOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF INDIVIDUALS AND
CONSCIOUS PATTERNS OF RATIONAL ACTION

ANTHROPOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF INDIVIDUALS		TYPES OF RATIONALITY	CONSCIOUS PATTERNS OF RATIONAL ACTION
Types of Social Action	Mental Processes		
Nonrational:			
Traditional.....	Nonrational	...	No
Affectual.....	Nonrational	...	No
Rational:			
Value rational.....	Subordination of realities to values	Substantive	Yes
Means-end rational...	Means-end calculation	Formal, practical	Yes Yes
*.....	Various abstract processes	Theoretical	Yes

* Rational action can be produced indirectly.

¹⁷ Weber's interest here is not, of course, to argue that certain orders possess absolute legitimacy while others do not but, rather, to note the various possible reasons individuals may have for *ascribing* legitimacy to an order or for *guaranteeing* its legitimacy (1968, p. 33, n. 20). His use of "order" (*Ordnung*) and "legitimate order" (*legitime Ordnung*) are particularly difficult to trace in *Economy and Society* because these terms are variously translated as "order" and "norm."

¹⁸ "Organization" (*Verband*) is Weber's general term for, e.g., the enterprise (*Betrieb*) and the voluntary association (*Verein*) as well as for the compulsory political and religious institution (*Anstalt*) (1968, pp. 48-56 [26-30]). It must be kept in mind that for Weber these organizations as well as all legitimate orders result from nothing more than the common action orientations to them of individuals in delineated groups.

Clear "elective affinities" (Howe 1978) exist between certain legitimate orders and particular types of action. When substantive rationalities are formed by prophets, priests, and theologians into ethical salvation doctrines and institutionalized in an organization, whether a church, sect, or hierarchy, the devout *typically* feel obligated to uphold this "ethical substantive rationality" for value-rational reasons. However, this need not occur. Many persons, for example, do not possess, according to Weber, the "religious qualifications" to pattern their actions consistently in behalf of a value constellation. Thus, they believe in these values not as absolute ethical principles but as mere guidelines for action that can be upheld or discarded according to momentary demands. In this case, the ethical substantive rationality is often upheld simply in a means-end rational manner. Other persons—though these are definitely not representative of sect or church members—may view an institutionalized ethical substantive rationality in terms of their own interests and nothing more. This possibility is illustrated by the means-end rational motives of the businessmen who joined Calvinist sects simply in order to acquire reputations for impeccable honesty and thereby secure the trade of sect and other community members ([1946] 1958c, pp. 305–8 [210–13]). In this case, substantive rational patterns of action are not believed in value rationally. Instead they exist as mere means-end rational means toward running a successful business (1968, pp. 26 [13], 85–86 [45]).

In other cases, elective affinities between legitimate orders that institutionalize a type of rationality and types of social action clearly exist only when these orders are examined in reference to an epoch's peculiar value constellation. The bureaucracy as a legitimate order characterized by formal abstract regulations may be maintained for a number of different reasons. Prussian civil servants of the 19th century performed their tasks efficiently and began their workdays punctually at eight because of their belief in a value constellation: according to the "bureaucratic ethic," duty required dependability, precision, efficiency, punctuality, discipline, stability, and reliability. In this extraordinary case, an impersonal¹⁹ substantive rationality itself became a means appropriate for the fulfillment of formal rational patterns of action (1968, pp. 26 [13], 85–86 [45]). In other societies and other eras, the same systematic execution of tasks in reference to universal rules takes place because the official simply adheres to custom (traditional action) or because he is aware that failure to do

¹⁹ Here I am distinguishing between "personal" and "impersonal" values. Both types may occur as constellations, thus forming substantive rationalities. This distinction, which, to my knowledge, Weber never explicitly discusses, is one that I have extracted from his oeuvre. Impersonal values, such as those specific to the "bureaucratic ethic," fail to take persons into account as do, e.g., the values of compassion, brotherly love, or forgiveness.

so would mean loss of his job (means-end rational action) (1968, p. 31 [16]).

Similarly, capitalism as a legitimate economic order can be maintained for a variety of reasons. Weber argues that the origin of modern capitalism cannot be fully understood without reference to the value-rational orientations of the Puritans to an ethical substantive rationality: the believer religiously inspired to value disciplined, methodical work and the accumulation and reinvestment of money brought a systematic component to economic activity that proved far more effective than the utilitarian orientations of the "adventure capitalist" in bursting the bonds of economic traditionalism ([1930] 1958a, pp. 47–78 [30–62]). In this unusual and significant case, the Puritan's selection of the means-end rational *means* (a constellation of impersonal values) to fulfill his goal of resting secure in the certainty of salvation (a goal that could be realized only by the acquisition of wealth) eventually provided *one* impetus for the formal rational organization of economic enterprises (1968, pp. 26 [13], 85–86 [45]).

The modern capitalist, on the other hand, may adhere to the abstract laws of the market for traditional or means-end rational reasons, or even as a result of a value-rational belief in them as "correct." Indeed, he may even, as did the Calvinist, value-rationally believe in an impersonal substantive rationality—methodical work, efficiency in the performance of tasks, dependability, etc.—as the most adequate means to fulfill his goal of succeeding in business.²⁰ He can, as well, constantly change his motivation for acting, though according to Weber this does not typically occur. All this does not alter the fact that formal rational patterns of action are necessary in order to insure the success of a business enterprise (1975, p. 193 [133]; 1930, pp. 70–73 [54–59], 55–56 [37]; 1968, pp. 585 [353], 1186 [709]). It does, however, explicitly call into question those views of history that see modern societies as the product of a unilinear advance of either means-end or value-rational action (1930, pp. 74–78 [60–62]).

Thus, for Weber, a legitimate order that institutionalized a particular formal or substantive type of rationality can call forth various types of social action and even further types of rationality. Dozens of examples such as those above can be extracted from Weber's sociological writings. Theoretical rationality, as well, regardless of whether it is institutionalized

²⁰ Precisely such a belief in the "spirit" of capitalism has died out in our time, Weber believes. Its demise has not, however, led to a weakening of capitalism's "economic rationalism": its present existence as an all-encompassing "cosmos" effectively coerces individuals to conform to its demands. In Weber's words: "The Puritan *wanted* to work in a calling; we are *forced* to do so" (1930, p. 181 [203]; emphasis in original). Or, "... the idea of 'duty in one's calling' prowls about in our lives like the ghost of dead religious beliefs" (1930, p. 182 [204]).

in organizations that pursue scientific, religious, or secular-ethical endeavors, can lead indirectly to a variety of action orientations.

The Capacities of Different Types of Rationality to Introduce Methodical Ways of Life

Despite their common capacity to master reality consciously, the types of rationality confront heterogeneous realities in distinctly different ways and introduce regularities of action with varying degrees of effectiveness. Ways of life are called into being only by practical and substantive rationalities. These ways of life diverge widely from one another in methodicalness and continuity: only values, for Weber, and particularly a unified configuration of values, are analytically capable of introducing methodical rational ways of life.²¹

The practical rational way of life, according to Weber, lacks a methodical character. Based on subjective interests, this way of life continually reacts to changing situations instead of ordering them, for example, under an ethical postulate or an abstract rule. Nonetheless, however much the individual merely deals with the disparate difficulties presented by external factors in the most feasible means-end rational way, an element of consistency remains: self-interests regularly guide action here and introduce a way of life grounded in them.

The various cognitive processes characteristic of theoretical rationality actively confront given realities and seek to manipulate them abstractly. They do so by searching for interrelationships among discrete, seemingly unconnected arenas. Yet their power to introduce a way of life or to suppress practical rationality remains definitely constricted. The modern scientist's formulation of hypotheses only rarely directs his practical action orientations either inside or outside the laboratory, and the ratiocinations by sorcerers, priests, monks, or theologians regarding the sources for evil and suffering react back on their daily action only when the "empty" quality of theoretical processes is banished by an association of them with values.

Formal rationality is only slightly more successful in subduing the practical rational way of life than is theoretical rationality. As long as the civil servant, the lawyer, the businessman, and the scientist execute the tasks typical of their professions, their orientations to given abstract rules and laws insulate them from the random flow of fragmented events as well as from practical rational confrontations with daily problems. These formally rational patterns generally fail, however, to characterize the action of these persons in their personal relationships, in their capacities

²¹ Following Weber, I am employing the expressions "methodical ways of life" and "methodical rational ways of life" synonymously.

as parents, in their leisure hours, or in their choice of hobbies. Thus, the imprint of formal rationality remains circumscribed, and the bureaucrat, for example, may well act in a practical rational or any other manner as soon as he leaves his office. No consistent attitude that comprehensively characterizes action and introduces a way of life can be found here.

Only action oriented to substantive rationality has the potential to introduce methodical ways of life that subjugate the practical rational way of life based on interests, the formal rational orientation to rules, and reality's stream of disjointed occurrences. This development occurs most effectively after the values of a given substantive rationality of delimited magnitude have been rationalized, through *theoretical* rationalization processes, into internally unified value constellations that *comprehensively* address and order all aspects of life. The *value content* of these substantive rationalities, which determine the *direction* of such *value-rationalization processes*,²² varies across a wide secular and religious spectrum. Most important for Weber in the introduction of methodical rational ways of life is the fact that only substantive rationalities place "psychological premiums" on *ethical* action in the world.

Weber defines an "ethical" standard as ". . . a specific type of value-rational *belief* among individuals which, as a consequence of this belief, imposes a normative element upon human action that claims the quality of the 'morally good' in the same way that action which claims the status of the 'beautiful' is measured against aesthetic standards" (1968, p. 36 [19]; translation altered, emphasis in original).

This purely formal definition can be given a concrete reference by an infinite number of value-rational beliefs, some of which—those which involve an orientation to value postulates—elevate ethical standards to the status of an *ethical substantive rationality*. When believed in value rationally, the ethics of solely this-worldly and secular value postulates, such as Communism, are designated by Weber as ethically rational²³ no less than the ethics of all but the most primitive religions, regardless of whether a monotheistic God or pantheistic gods punish and reward (1968, pp. 429 [262], 518 [314], 325 [191]).

Ethical rationality does not involve simply the memorization of rules for proper conduct that putatively contain the cumulative wisdom of past generations. Instead, ethical action implies, first, an imperative for conformity to a moral good that is felt to be internally binding or obligatory

²² In this case, since values exist as the reference points for theoretical rationalization processes, "value-rationalization process" can be used synonymously with "theoretical rationalization process."

²³ Since ethical rationality is itself a type—and only one type—of substantive rationality, it is properly referred to as "ethical substantive rationality." To avoid this awkward phraseology, however, I will often use the briefer expression "ethical rationality."

and, second, a disjunction between a normatively valid canon that claims ethical status and the empirically given flow of fragmented realities. According to Weber, daily action can be decidedly influenced by ethical rationalities even if "external" guarantees for them are lacking and even, at times, in spite of opposing social forces. When an ethical rationality penetrates practical rational action, Weber refers to the resulting action as "practical-ethical" (1968, pp. 36 [19], 528 [321]; [1946] 1958*f*, pp. 286 [258–59], 293–94 [266], 280 [252]; [1946] 1958*d*, p. 324 [537–38]). Of greatest significance for all practical-ethical regularities of action are the values constituting the corresponding ethical rationality. Yet these values vary not only in relation to content but also in their comprehensiveness and degree of inner unity.

Value rationalization refers, for Weber, to the theoretical rationalization of substantive rationalities, whether ethical or not: their comprehensiveness (the extent to which they claim to order all action) and their inner unity are enhanced. Inner unity is rationalized according to the degree to which the values within a given substantive rationality, however comprehensive or limited it may be, are ordered and systematized. As rationalization proceeds, these values come to stand in a relation of consistency not only to one another but also hierarchically under an ultimate value. In the religious sphere, for example, value rationalization implies the breaking down of the discrete values of isolated ritual practices, unconnected magical ceremonies, and a pantheon of gods, each of which demands sacrifices and loyalty, and the molding of these amorphous values into increasingly comprehensive and unified world views.²⁴ Whenever they appear as substantively rational religious doctrines, fully unified world views offer coherent explanations of all injustice and suffering in terms of principles of right and wrong that are accepted on faith as "truth."

To the extent that value-rationalization processes expand a substantive rationality's comprehensiveness and inner consistency into a secular or religious world view that exists as an ethical standard, and to the degree that social action is value rationally oriented toward this value constellation, the dispersed happenings of daily life, the practical rational way of life oriented to interests, and formal rational patterns of action are all replaced by ethical claims. Thus, for Weber, the chance that action will become substantively rationalized to conform to a given salvation ethic or other ethical substantive rationality depends not only on the strength of antagonistic *interests* but also on the motivations of believers and the

²⁴ This is only one axis of the extremely intriguing course of religious rationalization (see, e.g., 1951, p. 226 [512]; 1952, pp. 425–26, n. 1 [1–2]). This rationalization process, which has been only partly dealt with by Schluchter (Roth and Schluchter 1979, pp. 11–64) and Tenbruck (1975), cannot be discussed here. I have recently commented extensively on these articles in a review essay (1979).

relative value rationalization of the ethic: the more an ethic approaches the point of absolute comprehensiveness and inner unity and the more value-rational action prevails, the more powerful become the psychological premiums placed on action systematically directed toward ethical goals. To Weber, the individual who value rationally orients his action to an internally unified and comprehensive ethical substantive rationality acts methodically in reference to an *ethic of conviction* (*Gesinnungsethik*) and rationalizes action "from within" in *all* spheres of life to conform to its internally binding values (1968, pp. 424 [259], 450–51 [275], 578–79 [349–50]; 1951, p. 244 [530]; [1946] 1958*b*, pp. 120–27 [551–59]).

As the determinant of the direction for a potential value-rationalization process, the content of the substantive rationality's values has, according to Weber, the effect of guiding action into specific channels and directing it away from others. This occurs when the value-rationalization process fails to reach its end point of development, though also when an ethic of conviction arises ([1946] 1958*f*, p. 287 [259]).

In the religious arena, for example, this content was particularly important in regard to the potential influence of a belief system on the pragmatic action of its followers ([1946] 1958*f*, p. 289 [261]). When believers oriented their religious action to a world view, such as that implied by the classical Buddhist doctrine of the eightfold path to salvation, practical rational as well as all other action orientations "in the world" were radically denigrated as "senseless" and generally suppressed. Many types of "practical ethics" ([1946], 1958*f*, p. 294 [266]), on the other hand, such as Catholicism's lay ethic, ancient Judaism, Lutheranism, and Hinduism, placed ethical premiums on practical rational regularities of action, though they failed to do so in a consistent and comprehensive manner. Practical rational action patterns were *consistently*, and for *all* believers, awarded psychological premiums by Calvinism and Catholicism's virtuoso dogma for monks. In placing enormous premiums on disciplined work and methodical ways of life, these doctrines *comprehensively sublimated* practical rational action, whether in the monastery or "in the world," into practical-ethical action. Instead of being suppressed, practical rationality now became consistently penetrated by an ethical dimension, acquiring in the process a heightened intensity (1968, p. 551 [334]; 1951, p. 247 [553–54]). These types of practical rational ways of life, which Weber emphasized as containing the most fateful consequences for modern man (1930, p. 26 [11–12]), were not to be rediscovered in the value content of any other ethical salvation religion of historical significance (1968, p. 556 [337]; [1946] 1958*f*, p. 290 [263]).

Substantive rationalities in the secular arena also vary infinitely in value content, degree of comprehensiveness, and internal unity. For Weber, fragmented occurrences are theoretically rationalized to conform to a

secular value postulate when, for example, persons elevate an ideal of friendship to the level of an ethical standard and consider themselves internally bound to uphold all the standards of brotherhood. When they are value-rationalized, secular ethical rationalities may exhibit a more general applicability that influences social action more comprehensively. The Renaissance rejection of traditional bonds and its faith in the power of the *naturalis ratio* ([1946] 1958/, p. 293 [266]) permeated diverse spheres of life, as did the Enlightenment's faith in Reason and classical liberalism's credo of the Rights of Man and freedom of conscience (1968, p. 1209 [725-26]). Similarly, the upholding of egalitarianism may affect not only its adherents' purely political and legal activities but also their social and even their economic endeavors.²⁵

Such ethical rationalities, whenever their values are further theoretically rationalized, become components within more comprehensive and internally unified ethical rationalities. This occurs if, for example, the orientation of action toward social justice as an ethical ideal is value-rationalized to such an extent that a closed world view implying an explanation of all past, present, and future human misery arises. Secular political, social, and philosophical movements of this total degree of comprehensiveness and inner consistency prototypically blossomed in 19th-century Europe. In Marxian socialism, for example, the ideals of brotherhood, egalitarianism, and social justice no longer remained isolated ethical principles or vague hopes but fused into a systematically unified world view that explained man's past and present plight. It also promised, if the tenets laid down were correctly implemented, the future abolition of all earthly hardship. As a unified belief system that claimed absolute truth, Marxism, when believed in value-rationally, ethically ordered *all* spheres of life "from within." For Weber, the power of such a secular ethic of conviction to centrally rationalize all social action in behalf of its values is no less strong than that of a religious ethic of conviction. Of critical importance in both cases is an acceptance of the ethic on faith and a *belief* in it as an absolute beyond all compromise.²⁶

²⁵ In certain periods and in certain cultures, as a result mainly of economic and political factors, the belief in egalitarianism may extend into spheres of social action from which it has been traditionally barred, such as minority rights and sexual preferences. That the claims for equality of nearly all minority movements in the United States, from abolitionism to the civil rights, women's, and gay movements in the 1960s and 1970s, have been rooted in ethical rationalities from the Enlightenment and classical liberalism, such as the "natural rights of man" and "equality of all" as embodied in the U.S. Constitution and Bill of Rights, constitutes support for Weber's emphasis on the potential influence of ethical rationalities.

²⁶ That Weber considered Marxism a belief system based on faith rather than a science is clear (1968, pp. 515-16 [313-14]). He is, however, reluctant to refer to Marxism directly as a religion. He prefers to stress that this closed world view exhibits a number of characteristics generally associated with religions, such as its nature as an "economi-

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In sum, substantive rationality is the only type of rationality that possesses the analytical potential to introduce methodical rational ways of life. Although theoretical and formal types of rationality are also capable of indirect and direct conscious mastery of reality, neither introduces consistent attitudes toward life. Even though endowed with the capacity to do so, practical rational patterns of action remain simply reactions to heterogeneous realities. Thus, the practical rational way of life, characterized by a means-end rational calculation of interests, lacks the methodical element called forth when values, particularly those believed in as ethical standards, regulate action "from within." Only substantive rationality possesses the analytical potential to master—or rationalize—reality comprehensively. It does so by consciously and methodically organizing action into patterns that are consistent with explicit value constellations (see table 3).

IV. RATIONALIZATION PROCESSES IN GENERAL AND RATIONALIZATION IN MODERN SOCIETIES

For Weber, a purely analytic discussion such as the one immediately above regarding the potential of the different types of rationality to introduce methodical rational ways of life has little relationship to the question whether this potential was actually realized in societies. In history's battleground, interests have struggled against interests, and values and "ideas," regardless of the clarity of their formulation or their intrinsic plausibility, have died a sudden death unless anchored securely within social and economic matrices. By the same token, irrespective of whether they were based on practical, theoretical, formal, or substantive types of rationality, rationalization processes have been set in motion as significant sociocultural developments only when firmly rooted social strata have appeared as their "carriers."

TABLE 3
TYPES OF RATIONALITY IN RELATION TO WAYS OF LIFE

CONSCIOUS MASTERY OF REALITY		REGULARITIES OF ACTION
Lack of a Way of Life	Way of Life	
Theoretical rationality	Practical rationality	Nonmethodical
Formal rationality	...	Nonmethodical
...	Substantive rationality	Methodical

cally eschatological faith." The beliefs of its followers are referred to as "quasi-religious" or "equivalent to a religious faith" (see further, 1968, pp. 486 [296], 873-74 [501]); Guenther Roth (1976, p. 262) makes the same point.

Rationalization Processes: Interests and Values

Substantive rationality is most responsible for both the diffuseness and the perspectival nature of Weber's rationalization theme. This type of rationality combines with the notion of ethical substantive rationality to constitute the pivotal concepts in his analysis. Only ethical rationalities are capable of permanently suppressing practical rational regularities of action or, just as important, intensifying them by transforming them into practical ethical action. In addition, only ethical rationalities possess the analytical vigor to subdue formal rationalization processes fully. Finally, only ethical rationalities provide a value content for theoretical rationalization processes, set them in motion in specific directions as value-rationalization processes, and give rise to comprehensive, internally unified value configurations. These value constellations, even though for Weber they are themselves largely manifestations of "*irrational*" historical, economic, political, domination, and even geographical forces ([1946] 1958f, p. 281 [253]), constitute rationally consistent world views to which individuals may orient their action in all spheres of life. Whenever these world views acquire the social and economic anchorage necessary for their diffusion throughout a civilization, they lay down the "tracks" (*Gleise*)—or boundaries—within which the everyday altercations among economic, political, and other *interests* take place.²⁷

All of these achievements of ethical rationality derive from a single postulate that underlies Weber's historical sociology and methodological writings no less than his fundamental anthropological view of man: action cannot be understood as simply an adjustment to "given" realities, whether daily routine or bureaucratic statutes, as manifest in practical, theoretical, and formal rationalities. Nor can a residual status be assigned to the component of human action that falls outside routine and adaptive behavior. Instead, according to Weber, *action motivated by values* and resistant to and counterpoised against environmental molding by interests has been of the greatest historical consequence.²⁸

For Weber, the worldly wisdom and utilitarian common sense of an Alberti could not have given birth to modern capitalism, nor could the initial impulse for social, philosophical, or religious movements that professed to alter given realities crystallize from practical rationality ([1930] 1958a, pp. 76–78 [61–62]; 56, n. 12 [38, n. 1]; 158, n. 16 [168, n. 3]). Even less could formal rationality have planted the seeds for its own germination. Nor have these regularities of rational action alone ever been

²⁷ Weber's memorable statement on the relation of ideas and interests must be understood in this context (see [1946] 1958f, p. 280 [252]).

²⁸ As well as of pivotal interest to a *verstehende* sociology. An overriding aim of Weber's sociology is to make individuals sensitive to values.

capable, Weber asserts, of giving birth to ethical substantive rationalities, value-rationalization processes, world views, or a unified way of life: no ethical action monitored by an internalized standard, regardless of whether it involves a circumscribed ethical rationality such as friendship or an ethic of conviction, can result solely from means-end rational action.

Neither the means-end rational action that provided the foundation for practical and formal rationality nor value postulates devoid of an ethical aspect could transcend and order daily routine to a degree sufficient to set a *comprehensive and continuous rationalization* of given realities into motion. Such a development could emerge only after value-rationalization processes rooted in an ethical rationality had led to the formation of at least an incipient world view in reference to which, irrespective of its particular value content, everyday routines could be qualitatively assessed, found wanting, and rejected. Weber's notion of ethical substantive rationality and his emphasis on the *divergent* directions followed by rationalization processes rooted in values accounts for his opposition to all explanations of the advance of rationalization as a manifestation of either adaptation to given realities or the conflict of sheer interests.²⁹

Precisely this Weberian assertion explains his unwillingness to side with Marx in endowing economic interests with a generalized significance, even though he refused to underestimate their strength. Only ethical rational action, not simply the thrust of interests, possessed, for example, the potential effectively to rupture traditional ways of life and attitudes. For Weber, specific types of ways of life have often demonstrated a greater affinity with certain types of economic action because of ethical rational influences rather than because of intensive economic pressures ([1930] 1958a, pp. 26–27 [12]), in spite of the fact that the very origins of ethical rationalities themselves must be in turn understood as largely the result of economic factors. Such distinctions at the levels of “meaning” and motivation for action have been of enormous significance for an understanding of the meandering routes rationalization followed in different civilizations.

Interests as the Basis for Rationalization Processes: Affinities, Antagonisms, and Sociological Anchorings

The centrality of ethical substantive rationality and rationalization processes based on this type of rationality in Weber's scheme must be viewed as an *analytical* centrality. Its conceptual significance, which derives from

²⁹ This interpretation of Weber's fundamental view of history and social change is fully supported by Tenbruck: “His entire oeuvre testifies to his conviction that a comprehensive and continuous rationalization of reality cannot arise out of interests” (1975, p. 689).

its unique capacity to call forth methodical rational ways of life, tells us nothing whatsoever about the role it has played in history. Far from ends in themselves, the types of rationality were, for Weber, merely the basic heuristic tools he employed to scrutinize the historical fates of rationalization as sociocultural processes. In doing so, he wished to ascertain which rationalization process or processes typically penetrated into the different spheres of life and to assess the strength of these processes by examining the stability of their sociological roots.

Having utilized his ideal-typical concepts—the types of rationality—as means of orientation that guided him to critical historical watersheds, Weber as historical sociologist, whether investigating the multidimensionality of rationalization or any other theme, directly confronted history's raw "irrationality." Instead of being subject to a transcendental meaning, the inexorable dialectical advance of "Reason," evolutionary laws, or even the centrality of the economic sphere as a general rule, history was understood by Weber as a realm characterized by the immutable clash of "irrational" interests regulated only at their extremes by established world views. Even these world views were originally determined by the victory of certain interests, power, historical chance, and other random factors. For Weber, all questions of historical development and change, of the circumscription of some movements and the struggle to positions of hegemony by others, inevitably run up against the purely "irrational" drift and flow of interests and interest constellations. Far from simply an internally consistent concept, "rationalism" is a historical concept that contains a world of contradictions within itself" ([1930] 1958a, p. 78 [62]; [1946] 1958f, p. 281 [253]).

At times, owing to a sheer accidental juxtaposition of factors, interests crystallized to form a cohesive stratum. This stratum could, if another random configuration of historical forces congealed, "carry" a specific rationalization process. Civil servants, for example, carried formal rationalization processes as a consequence of their typical daily activities in organizations. Other strata, as often as not, carried rationalization processes antagonistic to those upheld by bureaucrats, as, for example, when religious intellectuals propounded substantive rationalization processes. As further carriers of still other rationalization processes became institutionalized in legitimate orders within a society, a labyrinth of such processes evolved. Some of them fused in elective affinity relationships, while others clashed. Still others split apart and then later converged, merging into, struggling with, and overlapping myriad other rationalization processes all along their expanding and contracting paths.

Rather than capable of being arranged along a line of linear development, such as the "disenchantment of the world," multifaceted rationalization processes recurrently surfaced and then faded away amidst a

tapestry of shifting balances and kaleidoscopic interweavings. Paradox and irony abound in Weber's charting of this polychromatic net. The best-known instance occurred when the "irrationality"—when viewed from a purely eudaemonistic perspective ([1930] 1958a, pp. 78 [62], 70 [54])—of the Calvinist work ethic contributed to patterns of action and entire ways of life thought to exemplify the highest peaks of civilization, yet ones that came to enslave individuals in the 20th century within an impersonal "iron cage" saturated by formal, theoretical, and practical rationalization processes ([1946] 1958f, p. 281 [253]; [1930] 1958a, pp. 181–82 [203–4]; Loewith 1970, pp. 114–15). Time and again, Weber notes the manner in which groups of individuals create realms of freedom by responding, through rational regularities of action, to fragmented realities. In carrying these regularities to extremes, however, the same groups may construct veritable networks of bondage.

Nearly all rationalization processes are of short duration for Weber as a historical sociologist casting his glance down through the ages. Only a very few—those based on the ethical substantive rationalities that form the tracks for the unfolding of civilizations—reach across millennia. Even though, once entrenched as accepted world views, these substantive rationalities and the "ideas" that legitimate them acquire an autonomous (*eigengesetzliche*)³⁰ power to focus the belief and action orientations of entire populations (Tenbruck 1975), their perpetuation is guaranteed, according to Weber, only when they become institutionalized within legitimate orders and carried by established social strata. The vast majority of rationalization processes are rooted in interests and fail to legitimate themselves adequately at the level of values. Thus, they are suppressed whenever a more powerful constellation of antagonistic interests appears on the horizon.

Modern Rationalization Processes in the West: The "Type of Person"

Practical, theoretical, and formal rationalization processes strongly dominate substantive rationalization processes in modern Western societies. The Judeo-Christian world view, which provided the point of reference for major groupings of substantive and ethical rationalities as well as for the theoretical rationalization of their values, has been largely replaced by the scientific world view. With this axial shift and with the definition of science—mainly by Weber himself—as a mode of knowledge analytically distinct from values, values could be no longer defined as the legitimate subject matter of the 20th century's major theoretical rationalization pro-

³⁰ Unfortunately, Weber's notion of *Eigengesetzlichkeit*, which has been dealt with by Tenbruck (1975) in only one of its multiple incarnations, cannot be explored here.

cesses. This holds true even though the scientific world view as a whole is itself a substantive rationality. Simultaneously, formal rationalization processes in the scientific arena as well as in the economic and the legal spheres and in the bureaucratic form of domination coalesced to give birth to a network of patterns of action, all of which pointed in the same direction: suppression of value-oriented action. Thus, ethical rationalities lost the constellation of interests that enabled them to stand effectively in direct opposition to the impersonal character of all formal rationalities and to circumscribe the influence of the latter by subsuming them under an ethical postulate ([1946] 1958*d*, p. 331 [544]; 1968, pp. 1186 [709], 585 [353], 600 [361]; 1927, p. 357 [305]).

With the eclipse of substantive rationality's power to order comprehensively all aspects of life in behalf of values, a resurgence of the practical rational way of life could take place ([1946] 1958*f*, p. 281 [253]). This way of life, in turn, which formal rationality subdued only to the degree that action took place within enterprises (*Betriebe*) and bureaucracies, began to compete freely with formal rational patterns of action. Concomitantly, wherever value-rational actions within bureaucracies, such as those typical of the Prussian civil servant, were weakened as a consequence of the general uprooting of substantive rationalities, purely means-end rational action penetrated these organizations more easily. However much some individuals and groups may desire a reinstatement of the "bureaucratic ethic," attempts to reinstate it confront firmly entrenched interests now institutionalized within legitimate orders. In such cases, Weber repeatedly emphasizes that the plausibility or "reasonableness" of a desire for change can provide only a stimulant. This prerequisite acquires significance only if a constellation of facilitating factors anchored in interests crystallizes.

For Weber, the rise of science as a mode of knowing and experiencing foreboded particularly fateful consequences, if only because it threatened to pull even values out of the arena of "belief" and place them in the realm of calculation: with the advent of the scientific world view, even values could become subject to empirical observation, mathematical measurement, and testing ([1946] 1958*e*, p. 139 [594]; 1922, pp. 473-74). This development, he emphasized, stood in the most principled opposition to all religious world views which, as ethical postulates, asserted the "meaningfulness" of worldly life and certain actions simply as a result of their valuation for particular salvation paths. In all religions, values existed as eternally "valid" absolutes, and the world existed as a cosmos ordered in a final manner by gods and doctrines ([1946] 1958*d*, pp. 350-53 [564-66]). Precisely the theoretical rationalization processes that had, in ages past, molded the fragmentary values of "primitive" religions into internally unified configurations of values that comprehensively explained the per-

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petuation of this-worldly suffering now became emancipated from their subjugation to values. Once clearly focused within the domain of science in the 20th century, these processes came to exist as "empty" abstract thought processes that labeled religion as a realm characterized by a "sacrifice of the intellect" and the "irrational" ([1946] 1958*d*, pp. 351–52 [564–66]; [1946] 1958*f*, p. 281 [253]) (see fig. 1).

When it combined with formal, practical, and other theoretical rationalization processes unbridled by values, this shift of theoretical rationalization from religion to science became of paramount significance for the destiny of methodical rational ways of life. In the past, both the direction of such ways of life and their methodical aspect had originated from a rationalization in reference to values. Wherever ethical rationalization processes had been set in motion, their values were—as a rule and often decisively—*religious* values ([1946] 1958*f*, p. 287 [259]). The banishment of these values led Weber to ask a specific question: "What *type of person* [*Menschentyp*] will—or could—survive in the modern cosmos?" (1949, p. 27 [517]; [1930] 1958*a*, pp. 180–82 [203–5]).

He wanted to know, above all, what type of person would be the carrier of Western civilization in an age when the life-sphere that had previously united the personality into a force capable of standing in opposition to the "stream of material constellations" had lost its sociological anchorage. Would this type of person be little more than a pale reflection of the formal rationality characterizing his merely adaptive action in the legal, economic, and scientific spheres as well as the bureaucratic form of domination, and of the practical rational orientations required to handle life's daily tasks and difficulties? The type of person capable of systematically rationalizing action "from within"—in relation to a unified value constellation—and of thereby lending his or her entire existence an unambiguous "direction" and "meaning" was viewed by Weber as a *historical* subject bound to historically and sociologically unique traditions, cultural values, and social-




FIG. 1

economic structures. Casting his glance down through the ages from the perspective of the dawning of the 20th century, he saw the fading away of the distinct configuration of sociological factors that carried the historical subject which, to him, embodied Western civilization's highest ideals: the autonomous and free individual whose actions were given continuity by their reference to ultimate values.

Weber saw no social stratum firmly anchored in Western industrial societies capable of replacing ethical salvation religions as an institutionalized carrier of ethical rationality and value-rationalization processes. The crystallization of such a stratum was rendered all the more unlikely by the unfolding of the major life-spheres along their particular and "autonomous" routes of rationalization: devoid of the personal dimension, the realms of the economy, law, and knowledge, as well as all bureaucratic structures of domination, now developed solely in relation to abstract rules, laws, regulations, and external necessities. These arenas thus remained outside of and unrestrained by all ethical claims (1968, p. 585 [353]; [1946] 1958*d*, p. 331 [544]; 1927, pp. 357–58 [305]). Without the cultivation of a conscience in the normal socialization of children, all ethical demands of them as adults were destined to fall on deaf ears. The type of person to whom ethical claims are alien could scarcely master his reality consciously and direct action consistently. Instead, such persons remained subject to the random—or, in Weber's terms, "irrational"—flow of interests in their environment. The overwhelming strength of sociologically entrenched spheres unable in principle to generate value-rationalization processes condemned the *unified personality* to exist "at the edges" of modern society in small and intimate groupings ([1946] 1958*e*, p. 155 [612]). Moreover, to the extent that the values of the political sphere—such as those incorporated in the Bill of Rights—are swept away by the onslaught of formal, practical, and theoretical rationalization processes, politically oriented action will become increasingly characterized by a mere means-end rational calculation of self-interests. If this trend is not reversed, the rule of authoritarian force will, according to Weber, inevitably spread and suppress all political freedoms.

Far from treating Weber's overall view of historical rationalization processes in any comprehensive manner, this article has only taken a first step toward doing so by discussing the types of rationality as concepts and their manifestation in rationalization processes. The comparative-historical sociology that is laid out in *E&S*—so often between the lines—and "applied" in the separate studies on the religions of China, India, and the ancient Near East took Weber far beyond the level of analysis limited to analytic concepts into a realm vastly more congenial to him personally. In his comparative-historical sociology, he searched for typical patterns

that might provide clues to the general circumstances under which strata that carried specific rationalization processes were constricted or allowed to spread and establish durable traditions. Such investigations utilized the conceptual level simply as a means of orientation to locate significant historical junctures.

Instead of being an end in itself, as many commentators on Weber's methodological writings seem to believe, the formation of clear concepts was simply the unavoidable first step in undertaking a sociological analysis. For Weber, it was not the concept, however clearly and even aesthetically shaped, that was of primary interest but, rather, the question how historical processes advanced *sociologically* within given civilizations. If one wishes to follow Weber's methodological procedures, the purely conceptual inventory of the multiple Weberian types of rationality and their manifestation in a multiplicity of rationalization processes undertaken here can serve as the logical prerequisite for an exploration of the vicissitudes of rationalization processes in history at all levels of sociocultural process.

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From Weber to Parsons and Schutz: The Eclipse of History in Modern Social Theory¹

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Sociologists have generally dissociated theoretical synthesis from historical research, but the triumph of general theory over historicism is a hollow one. Efforts to formulate general theories of society devoid of historical limitation have created serious problems for theoretical work. This article examines two important examples of this tendency: Parsons's and Schutz's use of Weberian sociology to derive general theories of social action. A historically grounded procedure for generating concepts was central to Weber's work. It united explanatory and interpretative analysis within a reflexive framework that responded to the intellectual and political interests of the theorist. Early writings of Parsons and Schutz surmount, in different ways, Weber's strictures on the limits of general theory by eliminating the historical component of Weber's thought. This development reversed Weber's theoretical achievement, decomposing his synthesis into hostile theories based on key fragments of his analysis.

Originally, sociological theory linked historical reflection and theoretical synthesis. This fusion of history and theory laid the foundation for the conceptual schemes of classical sociology that continue to inform contemporary analysis. However, theoretical developments in the 20th century, completing the transformation of classical sociology into an academic discipline, gave rise to increasingly abstract theories divorced from historical work. This article traces these developments in one major branch of sociology: action theory. It shows how the creation of general theories of action with an analytic or phenomenological orientation eliminated central historical concerns that animated Weber's work. Moreover, it suggests that these efforts are responsible for some important problems confronting contemporary theoretical work in sociology.

The central problem raised by this study—the eclipse of history in sociology theory—cannot be resolved by references to misinterpretations of Weber. Misinterpretation cannot account for similar trends in the action theories of Parsons and Schutz, which are guided by essentially antithetical

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philosophies of science. Nor can purely intellectual histories of sociology (e.g., Hawthorn 1976) explain the causes and consequences of this separation of history and theory. More salient is analysis focused on the internal theoretical issues (epistemology and methodology) and the external ideological interests (e.g., the attack on historical materialism) that combined to exclude the problem of historical knowledge from theoretical work. The eclipse of history in modern social theory is not unique to action theory. However, striking differences between the role of historical research in Weberian sociology and in later action theories said to be derived from Weber make these theories a crucial case for the study of more general theoretical trends. Examination of these issues is timely because of rising interest in the status of historical inquiry in sociological theory. The recent publication of previously untranslated works from Weber's *Wissenschaftslehre* (1975, 1977) and of the Schutz-Parsons correspondence (1978) will probably heighten interest in these issues.

Expositions frequently cite Weber's seminal definition of action theory in *Economy and Society* (1978, p. 4), regarding it—correctly or not—as an alternative to a Marxian approach to social theory. Action theory takes as its point of departure actors' subjective orientation to their projected action. These premises indicate the theoretical and ideological interests shared by Weber, Parsons, and Schutz. But, in very different ways, the writings of Parsons and Schutz in the 1930s revised Weber in order to formulate general theories of social action. Both revisions eliminated the problem of historical knowledge in theoretical work to overcome Weber's deep-seated suspicion of general social theory and transhistorical concepts not related to particular moral and political interests.

FACT AND THEORY IN WEBER

The problem of historical knowledge determines the structure of Weber's theory of social action. Weber's preoccupation with this problem accounts for the importance he attached to the notion of *Wertbeziehung* (value-relevance). The problem of historical knowledge, in turn, cannot be dissociated from the attack on historical materialism by the neo-Kantian school associated with Rickert, Simmel, and Weber. The following remarks clarify Weber's strictures on *Wertbeziehung*, causal analysis, and ideal types, as well as their relation to the problem of historical knowledge. Afterward, I reconstruct critical links—often muted in Weber's later writings—between neo-Kantianism and the polemic on Marx.

Weber's neo-Kantian position on facts is a critical one. Empirical facts are constructed in view of well-defined theoretical interests. Objects and events are not automatically facts because of some inherent "facticity"; rather, they are formally delineated in advance of empirical work. This is

true for all disciplines in the natural and social sciences. What unites different disciplines in the common pursuit of science is the precise specification of the categorical forms of the facts they study.

Various theoretical interests that define different forms of facts establish differences between natural and social science.² This is an epistemological distinction. Nowhere did Weber assert the currently familiar argument (see Bershadsky 1973, p. 26; Berger and Luckmann 1967; Freund 1978, pp. 167–68; Giddens 1971, p. 134; Hirst 1976, pp. 51, 57; Schutz 1962, pp. 5–6, 10, and 1972, pp. 3–5; Walsh 1973) that innate differences between matter and spirit, nature and culture, or the meaningless and the meaningful account for the differences between natural and social science. Such arguments exhibit what may be termed an “ontic fallacy”: ontological distinctions between units studied by natural and social science are in large part reflections of different formal principles that guide the construction of facts (Rickert 1921a, pp. 173, 469; Weber 1949, pp. 64, 68, and 1975, pp. 68, 120, 185).

For Weber, facts are selective assertions about reality. Empirical statements cannot describe events and objects exhaustively. The infinite complexity of reality is unknowable in the absence of epistemic norms that designate one-sided principles of selection (Weber 1949, p. 72; 1975, p. 57). Facts are, therefore, selectively *constructed*. Theoretical interests formally specify principles that justify and guide the construction of different types of facts. The reduction of quality to quantity in constructing certain facts logically follows from the theoretical interests of natural science. Demands for quantitative data make sense in view of the natural scientific interest in forming increasingly abstract, general laws for prediction and control. When selectively viewed “as if” it were subject to causal laws (or to statistical probability), an event or object becomes a quantitatively enumerated fact.

On the other hand, the social sciences have different theoretical interests. Their formal presupposition is that individuals are “cultural beings” who lend significance to the world they inhabit (Weber 1949, p. 81). This strictly formal presupposition is not subject to empirical validation, but it provides a selection principle for constructing social scientific facts: cultural significance. Value-laden estimates of individuality or uniqueness establish the cultural significance of an event or object (Rickert 1921b, p. 92; Simmel 1972, p. 90; Weber 1949, pp. 90, 143). Qualitative features of social facts logically follow from attempts to understand the “characteristic uniqueness” (Weber 1949, p. 72) of social life.

² Social science, in this paper, is used in place of Weber's references to “historical science,” “socio-cultural science,” and “sociology.” Empirical research (history) and theoretical synthesis (sociology) are, in a Weberian perspective, subdivisions of the socio-cultural sciences.

Uniqueness and individuality are the province of historical research. Out of history's infinite complexity, historical research isolates discrete events whose significance (however estimated) justifies their selection as objects of inquiry. According to this thesis (Rickert 1921*a*, p. 169), the theoretical interest in cultural significance logically implicates historical inquiry as the methodology of empirical social science. Historical research provides the methodological counterpart to the theoretical interests of the social sciences because of its ideographic orientation, its orientation to unique, nonrepeatable events.

Value-Relevance and Causal Analysis

Empirical objects of analysis in social sciences are culturally significant events. Such objects are "one-sided" representations dependent on the researcher's values (Simmel 1972, p. 82; Weber 1949, pp. 72, 82, and 1975, p. 259). By providing the criteria of cultural significance, values establish selective points of view that create discrete events out of the infinite flow of history. This point is a basic tenet of the neo-Kantian school to which Weber belonged. Rickert (1921*b*, pp. 90–94), Simmel (1972, pp. 76–77), and Weber (1949, pp. 62, 117–18) argued that "those elements . . . of events which we value" are "thrown into relief," isolated from their empirical context which, in its entirety, is incomprehensible because of its infinite complexity. Value-laden judgments of significance held by researchers thus supply a selection principle for the historical methodology of social science: "reflection concerning value-relevance is the ultimate basis of the historical interest" (Weber 1975, p. 102).

Selection of facts as potential objects of analysis implies not simply a choice of studying *A* or *B*, but a value-oriented construction of *A* and *B*. Weber did not argue merely that objects of analysis presuppose "points of view [that] are oriented to values"; he said that "selection or *identification* [emphasis added] of the object of empirical explanation is 'determined' by its relation to values" (Weber 1975, p. 256; 1977, p. 122). Thus, the principle of *Wertbeziehung* is linked to the construction of social facts. Weber was most emphatic on this point (1949, pp. 84, 159–60): empirical objects of analysis are constructed interpretively on the basis of values. Habermas stressed correctly (Stammer 1971, p. 61) that *Wertbeziehung* "is not related in the first place to the choice of scientific problems, but to the construction of possible objects of cultural scientific knowledge." Commentators often fail to grasp this point, equating the principle of value-relevance with a principle governing problem choice in science (see Burger 1976, pp. 89–90; Freund 1969, pp. 51–55; Giddens 1971, p. 141; Hirst 1976, pp.

54, 63; Parsons 1967, p. 87).³ Even when two researchers select the same problem, they can construct different empirical objects of investigation, with different dependent and independent variables. Consider, for example, stratification research. Status-attainment research uses a set of interrelated variables that are implicitly specified by the value-laden notions of meritocracy in functionalist theory and its economic analog, human capital. Status variables that measure, among other things, occupational prestige and education are the salient "facts" of this stratification model. On the other hand, Marxist approaches, with their value-laden notion of class conflict, specify different variables. Ownership of the means of production and exercise of authority in work constitute the salient "facts" of this stratification model. Both models can and do use some identical variables (e.g., education), but, as Horan (1978, p. 537) observes, the key variables of the two models are not translatable.

Interpreting the cultural significance of events is not, of course, the sole task of empirical research. This is a preliminary, but necessary, procedure that constitutes a potential object of analysis, the "historical individual," whose historical genesis must then be explained. This explanation reveals "the causes to which the 'valued' characteristics of the 'individual' are related in a causal regress" (Weber 1949, p. 159). The tasks of empirical research are thus twofold: "to understand on the one hand the relationships and the cultural significance of individual events in their contemporary manifestation and on the other the causes of their being historically so and not otherwise" (Weber 1949, p. 72). These two tasks of research represent, respectively, synchronic and diachronic levels of analysis. Assessments of cultural significance are essentially "static" (Weber 1949, p. 147), but they selectively pinpoint aspects of human behavior motivated by values. Because only the individual can produce meaningful conduct (Weber 1968*b*, p. 439), cultural significance is seen as the teleological result of individual efforts to implement valued characteristics of the object of analysis.

Thus, the principle of cultural significance not only designates objects of analysis, it also tentatively indicates their causes. Weber discussed the two phases of analysis as follows: "The former type of analysis reveals the 'valued' components of the object, the causal 'explanation' of which is the problem of the latter type of analysis" (1949, p. 149; see also 1975, p. 181, and 1977, p. 121). These two phases of analysis, interpretation and explanation, are of equal importance for empirical research. Rickert (1921*b*, pp.

³ Only in view of this failure could a recent writer assert (Brown 1978, p. 19) that Weber's interpretive sociology "assumes one can look at another historical (or social) situation without being historically located oneself." Weber's doctrine of *Wertbeziehung* emphasized the historical location of the theorist whether he studies his own or another society.

107–9) and Weber (1975, pp. 75, 102–8, 120) criticized positivist attempts to determine the significance of cultural events from the nature of their antecedent causes or their causal implications for subsequent events. Establishing statistical uniformities, though it checks interpretation, does not fulfill the function of interpretation (Weber 1975, p. 65; 1978, p. 12).

Theorists establish the point of departure for causal analysis by constructing empirical facts, by interpreting the cultural significance of events. However, causal analysis is not dominated by strictly quantitative techniques in contrast to qualitative value-analysis in the first stage of research. Causal explanation in social science, which reveals the serial causality of an event, is not identical with the search for universal, causal laws in natural science (Rickert 1921a, pp. 282–85; Weber 1948a, p. 292).⁴ Analytic reduction in the formation of causal laws is an abstracting process that progressively effaces individuality and uniqueness and therefore overlooks the cultural significance of events. Rigorous reduction deletes precisely those elements of the object of analysis that social science seeks to understand (Weber 1975, pp. 197, 218). Thus, causal explanations in social science do not attempt “to subordinate ‘facts’ under abstract concepts” but to integrate “the ‘particular fact’ . . . as a real causal factor into a real, hence concrete *context*” (Weber 1949, p. 135; 1975, p. 197).⁵ These strictures limit not only the degree of abstraction but also the number of causal factors in sociological explanation. All historically antecedent causes of an event need not be considered. A potentially infinite chain of causes (Weber 1977, pp. 88, 103) is delimited by the one-sided accentuation of significant elements in the event to be analyzed (Weber 1949, pp. 78, 81; 1975, p. 102). The construction of empirical facts “creates the points of attachment from which there are to be regressively traced the web of causal connec-

⁴ Bershady (1973, pp. 26–41) badly misrepresents the historicist doctrine of neo-Kantianism that Parsons attacked in *The Structure of Social Action*. Citing Dilthey and Windelband, Bershady argues that neo-Kantians precluded causal analysis in historical research, permitting only descriptive, ideographic research. This is true for Dilthey and Windelband, but Rickert and Weber hold precisely the opposite view. According to Rickert and Weber, the concept of causality is equally important in the natural and the social sciences. Natural and social science differ, in this regard, only because the former searches for general causal laws while the latter reveals the concrete serial causality of events.

⁵ Failure to understand Rickert's and Weber's distinction between two concepts of causality—the concrete, serial causality of events and general causal laws—has led to much confusion. This confusion is evident in the claim that Weber's analysis of meaningful action seeks “to explain it in terms of nomothetic causal relations” (Brown 1978, p. 17; see also Freund 1969, p. 90; Hempel 1965, pp. 161–63) or that his causal analysis assumes “that all qualitative differences were ultimately reducible to ‘purely quantitative differences’” (Kapsis 1977, p. 355). Kapsis quotes Weber (1948a, p. 292) but so completely out of context that Weber's argument is inverted. Parsons (1949, p. 628) offers similar arguments but, being aware of their divergence from Weber's views, regards them as an interpretation of the hidden analytic dimension in Weber's thought.

tions" (Weber 1949, p. 149). Causal analysis considers only those antecedent factors of an event that are relevant to its culturally significant elements.

Social reality is understood, then, as the outcome of efforts to implement values; and this reality is logically comprehended by the methodology of historical research. " 'Meaningfully' interpretable human conduct ('action') is identifiable by reference to 'valuations' and 'meanings'. For this reason our criteria for *causal* explanation have a unique kind of satisfaction in the 'historical' explanation of such an 'entity' " (Weber 1975, p. 185). Non-subjective factors that condition the pursuit of values are also relevant for causal explanations. The significance of an event imputes a second-order significance to those nonsubjective factors which meaningful action takes account of as objective conditions (Rickert 1921*b*, pp. 106-7; Weber 1949, pp. 64-65, and 1968*b*, pp. 430-31).

Causal analysis is subject to verification and is not affected by the vicissitudes of value-relevance. The criteria of causal adequacy are universal; the criteria of cultural significance depend on the values of the researcher. It is the construction of empirical facts, not the "determination of the historical 'causes' for given objects," that is "subjective" (Weber 1949, p. 159; 1975, p. 273). Causal analysis is variable only because the range and types of empirical objects in social science vary with changes in the values of social scientists.

How do these issues bear on Weber's substantive research? Consider his work on Protestantism and capitalism. Weber's preoccupation with rationalization establishes "a definite point of view" (1948*a*, p. 293; see also 1968*b*, p. 438, and 1975, p. 188), the value-relevances guiding his construction of the empirical object of analysis, that is, rational capitalism. Of capitalism's infinite number of causal antecedents, only some are relevant to a genetic explanation of its origins. It is the historical genesis of capitalism's rational elements that concerns Weber. Weber's comparative methods are, in turn, required by the nature of genetic explanation. A comparative (occidental/nonoccidental) analysis of legal and religious factors promoting rational conduct (1961, pp. 250 ff.; 1978, p. 551) demonstrates "the historical uniqueness of European cultural development" (1949, p. 156) that led to the rise of rational capitalism in the West. This attempt to understand the historical genesis of uniqueness underlies Weber's comparative analysis of capitalism. Thus, he remarked that "without the universal diffusion of these [Protestant] qualities and principles . . . capitalism today, even in America, would not be what it is" (1948*b*, p. 309).⁶ Without reference to

⁶ Cf. Weber's remarks (1949, p. 72) quoted on page 1184. Weber also stresses the use of comparative methods in causal explanations of uniqueness in his sociology of ancient civilizations (1978, p. xxxvii).

the general problem of identifying and explaining uniqueness in social life, the empirical analysis of religion and economic life in Weber's writings cannot be properly understood. Consequently, his argument loses much of its force and intelligibility when formalized so as to overlook or ignore the comparative perspective that is used to analyze uniqueness.

Ideal Types and General Laws

How do Weber's earlier methodological writings square with the ideal types presented in *Economy and Society*? Because explanations of social action involve those contextual (nonsubjective) factors that may either hinder or promote the realization of values, general analytic laws may play a part in formulating type concepts. But, because of its concern with cultural significance, social science uses analytic laws, for example, the theory of marginal utility, as strictly heuristic aids in creating ideal types (Weber 1949, p. 100).⁷ Formation of ideal types with the aid of analytic laws does not, however, lead to new analytical laws (Weber 1975, p. 150).

There is, then, no decisive "break" between Weber's earlier and later writings or between his methodological and substantive investigations as is often alleged (Freund 1978, p. 164; Lazarsfeld 1962, p. 464; Mommsen 1974, pp. xiii-xiv, 13-17; Parsons 1949, p. 502; Rex 1971, p. 18). The problem of historical knowledge that informs Weber's early writing clearly dominates his theoretical work in *Economy and Society* (1978, pp. 19-21). This continuity is evident in Weber's strictures on the functions and limits of ideal types. Ideal types are tools of causal analysis and, therefore, are indirectly governed by the principle of *Wertbeziehung* that guides the construction of objects of analysis. Moreover, the comparative method of Weber's historical research is preserved in the conceptual structure of ideal types. Comparison between ideal types and empirical cases allowed Weber to generate genetic accounts of unique configurations at a high level of generality. However, the level of generality never equals that of analytic "laws" because of the incompatibility of rigorous analytic reduction with analysis of cultural significance. Ideal types are indeed general concepts, but, unlike nomological concepts, they reveal "not the class or average character but rather the unique individual character of cultural phenomena" (Weber 1949, p. 101). Thus, social theory, in the form of ideal types, demands a balance between generalizing abstraction and concrete analysis (Weber 1975, pp. 62-65, 196).

Ideal types combine interpretative and explanatory functions. They caus-

⁷Cf. Weber (1968a, p. 396): "Sobald wir diese [empirischen] Wirklichkeit selbst, in ihren kulturbedeutsamen Bestandteilen, erfassen und kausal erklären wollen, enthüllt sich die ökonomische Theorie alsbald als eine Summe 'idealtypischer' Begriffe."

ally relate formal features of social life to their culturally significant elements, to typified subjective meanings seen as antecedent causal factors. Ideal types are heuristic aids designed to help impute causes to events shaped by both subjective and nonsubjective factors (Weber 1949, pp. 106, 111, 130). As an empirical generalization and interpretive scheme, the ideal type pinpoints adequate causes of many unique configurations or historical individuals" (Weber 1949, p. 187; 1975, p. 189; 1977, p. 107). Ideal types facilitate explanatory and interpretative analyses while maintaining a "subjective point of view" because empirical generalization never achieves nomological status. As a discipline concerned with ideal-type construction, sociology occupies a middle ground between the nomothetic search for highly abstract concepts, subsuming events under analytic laws, and the ideographic interest in the serial causality of unique events.

One consequence of Weber's view of ideal types is the impossibility of general theory per se. His strictures on theory, stressing its heuristic and mutable nature, are a direct result of his concern with the problem of historical knowledge. The principle of *Wertbeziehung* and the task of analyzing the genesis of uniqueness in social life condemns theory to a noncumulative proliferation of paradigms (Weber 1949, pp. 84, 105, 159–60).

Value-Relevance and Historical Materialism

The ideology of the neo-Kantian school to which Weber belonged can now be outlined. Opposition to Marxism within this school was part of a broader attack on evolutionary and positivist social theories (Bendix and Roth 1971, p. 245). This opposition focused specifically on the positivist and evolutionary presuppositions in the crudely materialist versions of Marxism that flourished at this time. Simmel and Rickert upheld the "epistemological idealism" of neo-Kantianism against all forms of historical and conceptual "realism" (Rickert 1921*b*, p. 131; Simmel 1972, pp. 186, 199) that included major versions of Marxism. In their view, historical materialism displayed an egregious disregard for the doctrine of *Wertbeziehung*. A materialist philosophy of history and the personal "conviction" of "political democracy" are inseparable: adherents of "democratic and socialist politics," responsible for promulgating economic interpretations of history, appear to be particularly prone to conflating *Wertung* and *Wertbeziehung* (Rickert 1921*a*, pp. 341, 344). Thus, the importance attached to economic factors was thought to represent an implicit selection principle based on unacknowledged value-relevances. So-called laws of historical materialism, according to Rickert (1921*b*, pp. 131–32) and Simmel (1972, pp. 194–95), are rooted in values of the least common denominator that appeal to "large

masses" by invoking "material" or "animal" values, values of the "stomach."⁸

Simmel (1972, pp. 89–90) and Weber (1949, p. 103; 1977, pp. 88–89) argued that laws of historical materialism are necessarily partial and heuristic and, at best, represent only one possible array of ideal types. Weber regarded historical materialism as a monocausal doctrine of economic causality (Mommsen 1974, p. 51; Weber 1977, p. 92). Despite his positive opinion of the heuristic value of economic approaches to historical explanation, Weber strenuously attacked any notion of monocausality. His strictures on concept formation in the social sciences deny the possibility of building theories that, like Marxism, seek to explain the totality of social life. For Weber, every social theory is necessarily partial.

Weber's epistemological idealism refutes historical materialism only by denying the possibility of creating a general and total theory of society. He demoted the privileged claims of economic determinism while acknowledging the many substantive insights of Marxist interpretations of cultural events and processes. The Marxist interpretation remains but one among the infinite number of possible interpretations shaped by different, ever-changing cultural interests. It is, therefore, incorrect to allege (Hirst 1976, pp. 65–66, 76) that Weber's typologies are automatic consequences of his neo-Kantian framework. Precisely the opposite is the case. Weber's theory of social action does not claim any special permanence or privilege beyond the continued relevance of those cultural interests that Weber brought to his work. These concerns, related to the problem of rationalization and the "uniqueness" of the West (Hawthorn 1976, p. 163), shape the ideal types outlined in *Economy and Society*. Views of Weberian typologies as definitive guides for non-Marxist research parody Weber's own views and obscure those critical elements that made his work possible in the first place.

Critical students of Weber, such as Parsons and Schutz, have understood the impossibility of establishing, within a strictly Weberian framework, general theories of action that uphold, in opposition to Marxism, the "subjective point of view." The subjective point of view could form the basis of a general social theory only if the critical principle of *Wertbeziehung* and the associated problem of historical knowledge were detached from Weber's work. To follow this development, I turn to the early work of Parsons and Schutz.

⁸ Cf. Simmel's remarks, in another context, on the valuational inferiority of the mass compared with the individual (1950, pp. 31–33). Similarly revealing is Rickert's blunt remark that, in view of the value of individuality, "Goethe zu einem solchen Menschen ['Durchschnittsmenschen'] sich verhält wie die Diamant Kohinoor zur einem Stück Kohle" (1912a, p. 246).

WEBER, PARSONS, AND SCHUTZ: THE UNIT ACT

The action theories developed by Parsons and Schutz in their early writings begin with the problem of meaning posed by Weber. All three theorists argued that emergent features of social life result from the pursuit of ends that have meaning for actors. Weber, however, insisted that identification of meaningful ends of action presupposes a set of value-relevances: the theorist's cultural interests limit the potentially infinite number of causally efficacious motives of action. Parsons and Schutz radically changed this feature of Weber's work, eliminating the principle of *Wertbeziehung* and the problem of historical knowledge from their theories of social action. One consequence of this development is the uncritical view of "facts" that their theories take.

A preliminary observation shows how Parsons and Schutz diverged from Weber, and from each other, on the issues of value-relevance and the role of theory in constructing facts. All three based their theories of action on the analysis of irreducible "unit acts." Weber (1968b, p. 439) regarded "the single individual and his action" as the basic unit of analysis. This definition stresses cultural significance relative to specific evaluative pre-suppositions of the theorist. Unit acts, for Parsons (1949, pp. 731, 739) and Schutz (1972, p. 11), are, respectively, composed of certain analytic elements or "nothing else than processes of meaning-establishment and understanding occurring within individuals." Parsons's definition of unit acts has a strictly analytic status and is therefore not logically tied to the actor's account of action. In explicit opposition to Parsons, Schutz defined unit acts from the actor's account of them; only the actor "is qualified to 'breakdown' his own action system into genuine 'unit acts'" (Schutz and Parsons 1978, pp. 37-38, 41). Curiously enough, Weber's doctrine of *Wertbeziehung* straddled the positions of Parsons and Schutz on this point. Because Parsons and Schutz abandoned this doctrine, they lost sight of critical links between the interests of the theorist and the construction of the most fundamental "fact" in social science, the unit act. The following remarks trace the exclusion of historical issues from Weber's work, first by Schutz (1972) and then by Parsons (1949).

SCHUTZ: INTERNAL TIME-CONSCIOUSNESS AND
SELF-INTERPRETATION

The initial premise of Schutz's phenomenological interpretation of Weber implies the irrelevance of *Wertbeziehung*. A phenomenological approach to theory requires suspension of all judgments of the adequacy or causal efficacy of subjective meanings. No basis for such judgments is possible as this would violate the premise of the *epoché*, the "bracketing" of judgment in phenomenological analysis (Husserl 1962, pp. 96-99; 1965, pp.

106-7). Units of social action, for Schutz, are immediately presented to the observer in actors' accounts of their action. Thus, the observer's criteria of significance cannot constitute possible objects of analysis. "It is methodologically inadmissible to interpret a given series of acts as a unified sequence without any reference to a project and then ascribe to them a subjective meaning" (Schutz 1972, p. 216). "Projects," subjective meanings of anticipated action, are both the interpretable object of analysis and the yardstick of analysis. Despite Weber's pronouncements on the subject, Schutz claimed that Weber was not concerned with the subjective meaning of action but "with the external course of the act quite apart from any concern with the conscious experiences of the actor" (1972, pp. 226-27).

For Weber, *Wertbeziehung* epistemologically justified interpretive procedures in sociology and practically oriented it to specific tasks. Schutz turns instead to an ontological description of certain invariant features of consciousness as a guide for interpretive understanding. "The meaning-structure of the social world can only be deduced from the most primitive and general characteristics of consciousness"; namely, the "internal time-consciousness" in which meaning is "constituted originally and in its most generic sense" (Schutz 1972, pp. 12-13, 40; Schutz and Parsons 1978, p. 35).

The following implications of internal time-consciousness are relevant for the production of meaning. Like Husserl (1962, pp. 290-92; 1964, pp. 175-81), Schutz regards meaning as an attentional modification of lived experience. This modification isolates past experiences from the uniform stream of consciousness. Meaning "is merely the special way in which the subject attends to his lived experience" (Schutz 1972, p. 215). This attention to lived experience has pragmatic roots. Anticipated actions, "projects," are guided by past ("because") motives of similar completed actions. Thus, "self-interpretation of lived experience" presupposes all anticipated action in present experience; "every project 'interprets' the meaning being constituted in the projected action by referring it back to analogous acts" (Schutz 1972, pp. 90, 94, 105). For Schutz, temporality is crucial because meaning links lived experience with anticipated actions; meaning "elevates experience into an action" (1972, p. 215). This is as true for the interpretation of social action as it is for self-interpretation.

Time and Social Meaning

The simplest social action involves the face-to-face encounter with its "simultaneity . . . of two separate streams of consciousness" (Schutz 1972, pp. 102-4, 134, 163, 131, 219). All interpretive understanding of others *implies* this simultaneity (Schutz 1972, pp. 135-36), most completely approximated in direct encounters between consociates. Anticipated

action is oriented toward consociates by isolating previously shared experiences relevant to the contemporary project; "only a previously projected piece of behavior can be oriented" to others (Schutz 1972, pp. 144-45). Thus, as in the case of individual consciousness, "meaning in the social world is itself conditioned by time" (Schutz 1972, p. 220).

The temporal parameters of social meanings, however, are more variable than those of self-understanding. Interpretive understanding of others presumes shared experience. Schutz traced "the modifications this assumption undergoes in the different regions of the social world" (1972, p. 105). From intimate contacts between consociates in present time, regions of increasing anonymity radiate in concentric circles toward past and future time. Within each region exists "a way of perceiving and a way of understanding the subjective experiences of others" (Schutz 1972, pp. 135, 139, 219). Increasing anonymity implies decreasing simultaneity of separate flows of consciousness and, therefore, greater reliance on more depersonalized, fixed, general, and typified forms of meaning (Schutz 1962, pp. 71-72; 1972, pp. 184-85, 193-95, 203, 219). Interpretations of "contemporaries" and "predecessors" can proceed only "in an ideal-typical way" (Schutz 1972, p. 226).

For Schutz, all social meanings are invariably organized "within the framework of the categories of familiarity and strangeness" (1962, p. 72). Social meaning is not, in this scheme, a "predicate" variously attached to different types of action; social action itself is a complex of meaning (Schutz 1972, pp. 215-16). The production of meaning, not the attainment of meaningful goals or ends, is central to Schutz's theory of action. Social action is accomplished by the intersubjective creation of meaning, while contextual problems raised by the problem of attaining ends fade from view.

Schutz proscribed the implicit causal analysis incorporated in Weber's ideal-typical concepts. For Schutz, ideal types are typified meanings, called "cookbook knowledge" or common sense, used by actors to interpret action (1962, p. 73). According to Schutz, the contextual problem of action, implementing goals or values, led Weber to idealize actors. Actors in Weberian theory are fictitious "puppets," responding automatically to theoretical concerns not evident in the naive attitude of everyday life because the depicted consciousness of such actors "is not subject to the ontological conditions of human existence" (Schutz 1962, pp. 81-82).

The ontology of everyday life in Schutz's analysis underlies his general theory of action. This theory circumvents central issues in Weberian sociology raised by the problem of historical knowledge. Historical estimations of adequate causes and of significant consequences of efforts to realize valued ends are foreign to Schutz's use of ideal types. Instead, he reduced history itself to a subjective field of experience, to categories of intimacy and anonymity. This stance is also evident in recent phenomenological ap-

proaches to social theory. Historical research in sociology becomes a study of *conceptions* of existential historicity because in history "there is only a succession of 'presents' and of prevailing notions of the past in relation to them" (Lyman and Scott 1970, p. 190; Lyman 1978, p. 94). Uniform conditions of establishing meaning in the social world, for example, the rupture between individual streams of consciousness and "objective" time, shape the historical dimension of social life (Berger and Luckmann 1967, pp. 58, 93). These views are completely antithetical to Weber's preoccupation with unique conjunctions revealed by historical inquiry.

FROM WERTBEZIEHUNG AND IDEAL TYPES TO NORMS AND LAWS

Parsons's enthusiasm for Weber has two sources. First, more than any of the authors examined in *The Structure of Social Action*—Durkheim, Marshall, Pareto—Weber worked within both idealist and positivist theoretical traditions. Weber's synthesis avoided the extremes that vitiated both traditions: the idealist disregard for "obstacles to the realization of norms" and the positivist dismissal of "normative aspects of action" (Parsons 1949, pp. 486, 638, 683, 732). Second, Parsons saw in Weber's writings a non-Marxian foundation for general theory. Parsons argued (1949, pp. 503, 510, 715) that Weber's "anti-Marxian interpretation" of the origins of capitalism stressed "ultimate values and value attitudes" and led directly to "an analytical sociological theory." The formal and substantive outlines of Parsons's action theory, an analytic framework stressing the centrality of norms (Burger 1977, p. 326), can thus be discerned in Weber's writings. For Parsons, Weber's seminal contribution was to combine idealism and positivism in a general theory that upheld, in opposition to historical materialism, the subjective point of view.

Parsons's interpretation of Weber is idiosyncratic and unduly stresses normative aspects of meaning (see Cohen, Hazelrigg, and Pope 1975) for the following reason. Weber "refuted" historical materialism, but only at the expense of general theory per se. For Weber, the untenable features of historical materialism were merely specific instances of a more widespread fallacy: the attempt to go beyond ideal-typical analysis to develop a general theory of society. Parsons's concern with normative dimensions of social life, a concern evident in his earliest writings (1935), was, as we shall see, inseparable from the analytic turn Weberian action theory takes in *The Structure of Social Action*.

According to Parsons, Weber failed to see that ideal types, while representing the unique configurations of historical individuals, are themselves analytically reducible. Parsons sought to defend an "analytic view" in opposition to historicist conceptions of theory (Bershady 1973, p. 6), which, in Parsons's view, unduly constrain Weberian theory. An ideal-typical con-

cept is a specific "set of relations between the values of the analytic elements" of a more general theory (Parsons 1949, pp. 616-18; 621). Parsons claims that Weber was unaware of the general analytic theory implied by his ideal types (1949, pp. 626, 716) and therefore "did not exhaust the analytic possibilities" presented by his empirical research (Parsons 1949, pp. 577n., 628-29, 633-35, 685). The following assertion guided Parsons's interpretation of Weber: "A complete scientific theory is not attained until all concrete types of a class of historical individuals . . . can be thought of as exemplifying different combinations, according to laws, of the same analytical and structural elements" (Parsons 1949, p. 624). Given the universal character of analytic knowledge, ideal types must be "systematically related to one another" (Parsons 1949, pp. 618, 626) irrespective of the value-relevances of different theorists that shape them.

Parsons's discussion of the three types of action shows how his emphases on normative constructs and on general theory are mutually supportive. He asserted (1949, p. 684) that "one principle aspect of the ideal type is its normative character." Since Weber's antipathy toward general theory concealed this, he regarded the three types of action as irreducible. Parsons observed that it was possible to analytically reduce these three types to structures of rational action governed by different norms (1949, p. 648). For traditional action, "the adaption of means to ends" is "rational" within the limits established by norms, for example, "a traditionally fixed standard of living" (Parsons 1949, pp. 616-17, 646). Thus, traditional action, as *zweckrational* and *wertrational* action (1949, p. 645), can be reduced to analytic elements of the unit act.

In general, *The Structure of Social Action* attempts to rectify Weber's "employment of ideal-type concepts in place of more general analytic concepts" (Parsons 1949, p. 619).⁹ This, in turn, implies loosening the limits that the problem of historical knowledge imposed on analytic theory in social science. Weber, we saw, relegated analytic knowledge in social theory to the task of specifying relevant nonsubjective conditions that hinder or promote the pursuit of values. If the problem of implementing values and realizing ends dominates social theory, it is possible to enlarge the role of analytic knowledge proportionately. This precise strategy underlies Parsons's interpretation of Weber.

This strategy for developing a general theory within an action framework led to the preoccupation with normative dimensions of values characteristic of Parsons's work. The subjective meaning of action, for Weber, was selectively constituted by the interests of the theorist and empirically demon-

⁹ Cf. a later formulation of the same point by Parsons (1967, p. 75): "It is now possible to go somewhat beyond the concept of the ideal type, by making a more sophisticated and thorough use of the concept of system."

strated by historical methods that preclude rigorous analytic reduction. Parsons circumvented these limitations by recasting the problem of meaning in normative terms. His earliest writings argued that the ultimate ends of action innately tend toward normative integration (1935, p. 295). For Parsons, norms are objective features of society (1949, p. 75). They are simply selected and not selectively constituted by the principle of *Wertbeziehung*. Parsons's discussion of this principle suits this distinction: the " 'subjective' direction of interest of the scientist," understood by Weber as the basis for selectively constructing facts, is for Parsons an interest determining "a choice of variables" (1949, pp. 585n., 683). Objectively specified norms establish the subjective meaning of the means-end relationship of action.

Thus, Parsons transformed the inherent autonomy of value-choice, presumed by Weber, into the normative determination of value-choice. Parsons's emphasis on the normative dimension of values radically solves the problem of meaning in Weberian sociology. It becomes possible to apply a rigorously analytic theory to the study of action because norms objectively specify for actors the appropriate means and ends of action. This objective specification eclipses the theorist's value-related selection of causally significant meanings. As Horton (1964, p. 294) observed, "The problem of the perspective of the observer . . . is avoided by interpreting values not as political and utopian ideals, but as neutral objects of the social system being observed."

The major issue confronting Parsons's action theory is the implementation of normatively sanctioned values. Meaning itself is no longer a problem. Thus, Parsons's emendation of Weber preserved Weber's synthesis of idealist and positivist thought but also avoided the problems of *Wertbeziehung* and historical knowledge. This emendation achieved its desired goal of loosening the limits posed by these historical problems to the development of analytic social theory.

Science and Action

Parsons's analytic emendation of Weber is clearly incompatible with a distinction between the logic of concept formation in the natural and the social sciences. For Parsons (1949, pp. 591, 595, 597, 623), differences between the two sciences are not logical, as Weber thought, but substantive. Theoretical interests in explanation or control and interpretation do not delineate boundaries between natural and social science. The development of analytic theory with "the motive of control" characterizes sociology as well as the natural sciences (Parsons 1949, pp. 595-98). The point about control is valid given Parsons's subordination of the problem of meaning to the problem of implementing values. The "motive of control" not only

applies to the social scientist but also is an integral feature of rational action. An inherent interest in control is a prerequisite for achieving one's ends.

Rational action requires empirically valid propositions to enable the selection of means to proceed in accordance with the norm of rationality. The instrumental utility of empirically valid knowledge thus establishes the solidarity of science and action. In many early works, Parsons defended this solidarity despite the unsystematic nature of empirically valid propositions used to guide action in everyday life (1935, pp. 286-88; 1938, pp. 654-56; 1949, pp. 586, 599-600, 699). The solidarity of science and action is a basic assumption that guides Parsons's concern with "the role in action of the norm of rationality in the sense of a scientifically verifiable intrinsic means-ends relationship" (1949, p. 683).

The interest in control common to action and science underlies Parsons's effort to develop an analytical theory of action. The "susceptibility of rational action to general causal analysis" and, hence, the importance of general analytic concepts in social science follow from the convergence of science and action: "Does not the solidarity of scientific knowledge with rational action imply the existence of a formal schema of elements of action which is . . . exempt from the relativity of concrete knowledge?" (Parsons 1949, pp. 584, 638, 715). Weber (1975, p. 186) had made the same point but with the following caveats (p. 188): (1) rational selection of means to achieve determinant ends "functions *exclusively* as an hypothesis or as an ideal typical construct" having "heuristic" value (emphasis in original); (2) when such rational action is analyzed, "interpretation" is minimized and consists of the general dictum that individuals act "purposefully." Parsons easily disposed of these troublesome caveats because (1) he eliminated by fiat the problem of historical knowledge posed by *Wertbeziehung* and (2) he stressed the normative component of ends that objectively "fixes" interpretative issues. Parsons thus created a theory of action that is analytic rather than heuristic; yet this analytic theory also retained a place for "idealistic" elements in the analysis of highly rationalized activities.

This analytic recasting of Weberian theory, though it retains "idealistic" elements, reduces interpretive tasks to empirical specification of norms. The essential "tension" between "normative" and "conditional" elements of action is, then, not as acute as Parsons suggested (1949, p. 732); such "tension" exists in the problem of attaining normatively sanctioned ends. If the autonomy of value-choice is "fixed" by the normative determination of ends and means, obstacles to the attainment of ends will preoccupy theoretical work. This focus on empirical obstacles to sanctioned ends in *The Structure of Social Action* displays intimate links between analytic action theory and systems theory. Cybernetic developments in Parsons's

later writings on evolution (1966, 1975) do not represent a qualitative change in the direction of his work. The problem of attaining normatively sanctioned ends is analytically similar to the cybernetic problem of specifying "goal state" variables of self-regulating systems. In both cases, the same issues of control are raised by the congruence of empirical processes and science. Hermeneutic issues are equally irrelevant for both phases of Parsons's work.

Because Parsons did not distinguish between concept formation in natural and in social science, he reintroduced a rigorous separation between historical and sociological research. Sociology sees in "historical individuals" merely single instances that demonstrate the operation of general laws; history regards the historical individual for its own sake (Parsons 1949, pp. 598-99, 760). No longer is historical research an integral moment of theoretical work in sociology. For Weber, historical reflection established the theorist's relation to his subject matter and constituted potential objects of analysis. For Parsons, historical work retrospectively tests general theories of society. Thus, history is reduced to the field of validation for general propositions that are developed in isolation from the problem of history.

CONCLUSION

Clearly, little common ground exists between the action theories extracted from Weber by Parsons and Schutz. They applied different formal and substantive interests to Weber's work, interests that were shaped by contrary philosophic temperaments. Aside from staunch convictions that their work represented the subjective point of view in sociology, only the following similarities stand out in the development of Parsons's and Schutz's action theories: (1) Weber's heuristic view of concepts is reworked, in antithetical ways, to justify general theories of society, and (2) the centrality of historical inquiry for theory is abolished. For Schutz, ideal types were not heuristic tools of inquiry but products of the mundane theorizing of actors. An ontological analysis of certain invariant features of consciousness demonstrated the source of these ideal types. Fealty to the subjective point of view required analysis that refrained from substituting second-order concepts for the actual type-concepts used by actors to establish social meaning. Parsons resolved the unsatisfactory status of ideal types by analytic reformulation. An epistemological analysis showed that ideal types were combinations of elements analytically relevant for all concrete types of action. Parsons's normative definition of values that motivate action created a subjective point of view that was compatible with a general, analytic theory of action.

The extraction of general theories from Weber's work by Parsons and Schutz severed critical links between historical research and theoretical synthesis. This conclusion does not imply that Weber perfected a *rap-prochement* between history and sociology, only that their intimate connection in his work disappeared in the early works of Parsons and Schutz. Singularity and uniqueness in history are ignored by Schutz's ontology of the temporal parameters of social meaning. Historical dimensions of social life acquire the character of a subjective drama in which individuals reconcile their inherently free intentionality with established social meanings. The singular nature of historical reality is thus transformed into its opposite: a wholly abstract, universal relationship between predecessors and the present. Parsons, on the other hand, delineated sharp boundaries between historical and theoretical work. His positivist view of history depicts it as a succession of discrete space-time events, and the historical dimension of social life becomes a fund of empirical data to be used for testing general theoretical propositions.

Both Parsons and Schutz acknowledged the incompatibilities of their emendations of Weber. Parsons sharply disavowed Schutz's ontological approach (Schutz and Parsons 1978, pp. 66, 73-74, 85, 88); Schutz reproached Parsons for not appreciating the central importance of internal time-consciousness (Schutz and Parsons 1978, p. 104). Many theoretical controversies in contemporary sociology focus on this and other differences between their action theories. They disagreed sharply about the existence of a single rationality governing science and action. Moreover, Parsons's explanatory analysis of implementing normatively sanctioned values and Schutz's interpretive analysis of meaning-establishment characterize antithetical positions in the ongoing positivist-phenomenological debate in sociology. It is ironic to observe that Weber did not conceive of the tasks of explanation and interpretation as antithetical. The strands of Weber's synthesis of positivist and idealist theories, unraveled by Parsons and Schutz, have come to form hostile theoretical camps within sociology.

Are today's theoretical problems in sociology due in no small measure to efforts to derive general theories without historical reflection? I have suggested this idea elsewhere (Zaret 1978), and this case study supports that thesis. Central to Weber's theoretical work was a historically grounded procedure for generating concepts. It united explanatory and interpretative analyses and was reflexive in a historical sense: it took into account the historically conditioned interests—intellectual, moral, political—of the theorist. Contemporary debates between practitioners of positivist and phenomenological sociology focus precisely on these elements of Weberian sociology: explanation, interpretation, reflexivity. Dividing historical and sociological work has been a penny-wise and pound-foolish economy in terms of our ability to surmount current controversies and generate new

theories. As Stinchcombe recently suggested (1978, p. 17), benefits of a division of labor between history and sociology may be more illusory than real because sociologists "do much better theory when interpreting the historical sequence than they do when they set out to do 'theory'."

Still, a wholesale conversion of sociology to Weberian practices will not resolve the theoretical issues raised in this article. These issues apply to a broader spectrum of theories than those examined here. The eclipse of history in the rise of academic sociology is not limited to Parsons's and Schutz's revisions of Weber. Consider, for example, the transition from evolutionism to cybernetic theories, from the positivist school of Comte and Durkheim to current work on theory construction, from Marx's research to the arid structuralism of Althusser, Hirst, and Poulantzas. Moreover, Weber's skeptical view of theory as a noncumulative collection of paradigms is clearly unsatisfactory. A skeptical view of theory is not, however, a necessary consequence of a thoroughly historicized sociology but depends, instead, on the manner in which theory is historically grounded. Can historical interests of the theorist be grounded in something other than or in addition to personal values? Weber's work reveals the problems to be solved more fruitfully than their solutions. Thus, the widespread assumption in Western sociology (Bershady 1973, pp. 1-10) that historicism has been irrevocably laid to rest may yet be premature. Development of historically grounded theory still remains one of the vital tasks confronting sociology.

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Child Care as a Constraint on Employment: Prevalence, Correlates, and Bearing on the Work and Fertility Nexus¹

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This study examines the extent to which the unavailability of satisfactory child care is a constraint on employment for mothers with children under five years of age. It also explores some of the social and demographic correlates of constraint and the role child care plays in the relationship between labor-force participation and fertility. The analysis is based on data from the June 1977 Current Population Survey for the United States. A substantial minority of mothers with young children, both nonemployed and employed, feel that if child care were available at reasonable cost, they would seek employment or work more hours. Child-care constraint seems to be most prevalent among mothers who are young, black, single, with low education and with little income. The relatively low fertility expectations among those prevented from working by the unavailability of child care suggests that not just current employment, but also the intention or desire to work, is related to fertility behavior. The differential in births expected by labor-force status is minimized by the inclusion of "constrainees" with the nonemployed.

The labor-force participation of women has increased substantially in recent years. The most dramatic change has been for women with pre-school children. Although their participation rates have remained lower than for women as a whole, the gap has been decreasing. In 1950, 13.6% of women with children under six years of age were in the labor force, compared with 33.9% for all women—a difference of 20.3 percentage points (U.S. Department of Labor 1976, 1977). By 1977, the labor-force

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participation rates for women with children less than six years old had increased threefold to 40.9%, compared with 48.0% for all women—a difference of only 7.1 percentage points (U.S. Department of Labor 1978).

This narrowing gap is a remarkable phenomenon when we consider the fact that most women with preschool-age children must arrange for someone else to care for their children if they are to work outside the home either full or part time.² Moreover, as we shall see, most employed mothers are employed full time. There have been numerous studies of the types of child-care arrangements women make and the extent to which they are satisfied with such arrangements (for a review of this literature, see Woolsey and Nightingale [1977]). However, the relationship of the availability of child care to employment and fertility decisions has received minimal attention. To our knowledge, only two studies consider the unavailability of child care as a constraint on employment among nonemployed mothers. Dickinson (1975) found that among nonemployed mothers with children less than 12 years of age, 68% felt that, if they wanted to take jobs, some child-care arrangements could be made; 16% felt such arrangements were definitely not available, and the remaining 16% were uncertain. This finding is based on the 1973 wave of the national Panel Study of Income Dynamics. In the Westinghouse study (Westinghouse Learning Corporation 1977), 18% of nonemployed mothers said they were not employed because they could not make (or afford) satisfactory child-care arrangements. This finding relates to a population of women in families with annual incomes of \$8,000 or less and with a child under nine years of age.

In this paper, we address the issue of whether the problem of child care represents a substantial constraint on employment for mothers with preschool children, either by keeping them out of the labor force or by restricting the number of hours they spend on the job. We also consider some of the social and demographic correlates of constraint and whether employed women using some types of child care are more likely to feel prevented from working more hours than those using other types of child care.

We further examine how the separation of the subgroup of “constrainees” may help to specify the relationship between employment and fertility. Theoretically, it has been argued by some that child care, by reducing the burden of child rearing, might increase fertility desires (Reddaway 1939; Myrdal 1941). Others have argued that, by permitting women to engage in nonfamilial activities, child care may serve to lower

² It is the wife's, not the husband's, employment that is generally viewed as contingent on the arrangement of suitable child care, but as traditional sex-role behavior changes this may change also.

fertility desires (U.S. Commission on Population Growth and the American Future 1972; Schultz et al. 1972). Although these positions have been taken in the absence of data, recent empirical evidence relating to nonemployed mothers of young children supports the antinatalist position: among such mothers, child-care users expected fewer children than non-child-care users (Presser 1978*b*). Child care may be used as a means of reducing the "burden" of parental responsibilities regardless of whether such relief is to facilitate finding employment. Since desiring such relief may be related to lower fertility and because we have no measure of the perceived burden of child rearing, the relationship among child care, employment, and fertility cannot be established unambiguously in this analysis. We know that women in the labor force have somewhat fewer children than women not in the labor force. It may be that, among the latter, fertility is relatively low for those who would like to work but cannot do so—and one reason for this inability to work may be the unavailability of satisfactory child care at reasonable cost. Accordingly, we might expect that differences in fertility by labor-force status would be greater if such women were excluded from the nonemployed. Because the data we analyze to consider these issues are cross-sectional, we shall be considering fertility expectations but not subsequent fertility.

SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS

The June 1977 Current Population Survey was based on a sample of approximately 53,500 interviewed households. Child-care questions were asked of all women in these households aged 18–44 with children under five years of age residing in the household. (The five-year-olds were excluded because most attend kindergarten and thus are not truly preschoolers—an important restriction when analyzing child-care arrangements.) Stepchildren and adopted children were included along with natural children. Our subsample consists of 8,331 women: of these, 2,996 were employed and 5,335 were nonemployed (that is, either unemployed or not in the labor force).

This national sample for June 1977 indicates that an estimated 35.4% of all women with children less than five years old were employed, 5.5% were unemployed, and the remaining 59.1% were not in the labor force. Of all employed women with children less than five years of age, 65.1% worked full time and 34.9% part time. Employed mothers in this sample differ little from nonemployed ones with respect to selected social and demographic characteristics, namely, age, marital status, race, and education. Family income was only slightly lower among the nonemployed than the employed. Also, for married women, husband present, there was little

difference by employment status in husband's socioeconomic characteristics, namely, his education, labor-force status, and occupation. The critical distinction between employed and nonemployed mothers relates to their stage of family formation, not their socioeconomic status. Nonemployed mothers tended to have larger families, more children less than five years old, and more very young children under five than employed mothers.

THE PREVALENCE OF CHILD-CARE CONSTRAINTS

The high employment rate of mothers with young children might lead us to expect that almost all such mothers who want or need to work are able to find satisfactory low-cost child care without much difficulty. Our data suggest, however, that many more mothers with children less than five years of age would be working or working more hours if suitable child care were available.

Mothers who were nonemployed and not looking for work were asked the following question: "If satisfactory child care were available at reasonable cost, would you be looking for work at this time?" A substantial minority, 17.4%, said yes, and an additional 5.6% did not know. Thus, close to one out of five mothers with preschool-age children and not in the labor force said they would be looking for work (or employed) if suitable child care were available (more than one out of five if the "don't knows" are included). Of course, attitudes do not necessarily predict behavior, and it is possible that women overestimate their readiness to seek employment. On the other hand, there may be an underestimate of readiness for employment, since improved availability of child care might increase demand for its use and stimulate interest in employment. In the absence of data for either position, we shall regard the actual response to the question as our best estimate of child care as a constraint on employment. It is in line with the estimates previously cited for different samples of nonemployed mothers.

Employed mothers were asked, "If you could find additional satisfactory child care at reasonable cost, would you work more hours?" Again, a substantial minority answered affirmatively: 16.2% said yes and 3.3% did not know. As might be expected, those employed part time were much more likely to feel prevented by the unavailability of suitable child care from working more hours than those employed full time. As table 1 shows, about one out of four part-time employed mothers indicated they would work more hours, compared with about one out of eight full-time employed mothers. Although relatively low, the prevalence of child-care constraint among full-time workers is surprising—these women usually work at least 35 hours a week.

TABLE 1
EMPLOYED MOTHERS WITH CHILDREN LESS THAN FIVE YEARS OLD WHO ARE
CONSTRAINED IN THEIR LABOR-FORCE PARTICIPATION BY THE
UNAVAILABILITY OF CHILD CARE, BY EMPLOYMENT STATUS (%)

EMPLOYMENT STATUS	WOULD WORK MORE HOURS IF CHILD CARE WERE AVAILABLE			Total
	Yes	Don't Know	No	
Part time.....	23.5	5.3	71.2	100.0
Full time.....	12.2	2.3	85.5	100.0

CORRELATES OF CHILD-CARE CONSTRAINT

What demographic and social factors are associated with mothers feeling constrained by the unavailability of suitable child care? We have taken a conservative approach, regarding only those who said yes as constrained: the "don't knows" are treated as "nos."³ It should also be noted that we excluded from this analysis the group of women looking for work, since they were not asked questions about child care as a constraint on employment. This does not mean that child-care arrangements are not problematic for such women; indeed, for some this problem may prolong their period of looking for employment.

We find that family formation factors (age of youngest child, children ever born, and number of children in the household less than five years old) are not relevant correlates of child-care constraint on employment, among either part-time or full-time workers (data not shown). As noted earlier, such life-cycle variables are found to be associated with whether a mother is employed. Apparently, they are not related to the extent to which child-care unavailability keeps the nonemployed from seeking employment or the employed from working more hours.

Other demographic and social variables (which are *not* related to whether mothers are employed) show some association with child-care constraint on employment. As may be seen in table 2, women who are most in need of employment are most likely to report that the unavailability of satisfactory child care at reasonable cost affects their labor-force participation: the young mother (18-24), the unmarried mother, the black mother, the woman who did not graduate from high school, and the woman whose family income is less than \$5,000. Data not shown indicate little

³ The alternative of combining "don't knows" with "yeses" was explored. While the proportions who felt constrained were higher, the relationships were generally similar to those presented in table 2. It should also be noted that table 2 excludes all cases in which there were missing values for any of the variables analyzed, thereby reducing the sample size.

**TABLE 2—MULTIPLE CLASSIFICATION ANALYSIS OF THE PERCENTAGE OF WOMEN WITH CHILDREN
CONSTRAINED IN THEIR LABOR-FORCE PARTICIPATION BY THE UNAVAILABILITY OF CHILD CARE, ACCORDING TO
SELECTED DEMOGRAPHIC AND SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS, SEPARATELY BY EMPLOYMENT STATUS***

SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS	NONEEMPLOYED, NOT LOOKING (Grand Mean=.18, N=4,599)				EMPLOYED PART TIME (Grand Mean=.24, N=964)				EMPLOYED FULL TIME (Grand Mean=.12, N=1,802)			
	Unadjusted		Adjusted ^b		Unadjusted		Adjusted ^b		Unadjusted		Adjusted ^b	
	Deviation	η	Deviation	β	Deviation	η	Deviation	β	Deviation	η	Deviation	β
Mother's age:												
18-24.....	.07		.03	1,355	.10		.06	277	.03		.02	558
25-29.....	-.01		.00	1,565	-.02		-.02	348	.01		.01	673
30-44.....	-.05	.12	-.03	1,679	-.06	.16	-.03	339	-.04	.08	-.03	571
Marital status:												
Married.....	-.03		-.01	3,963	-.02		-.01	866	-.02		-.01	1,403
Married, spouse absent.....	.15		.05	215	.04		-.00	25	.02		-.02	106
Widowed, divorced..	.15		.08	169	.20		.18	39	.10		.09	174
Never married.....	.23	.20	.04	252	.26	.16	.12	34	.10	.13	.03	119
Race:												
White.....	-.03		-.02	4,025	-.02		-.02	870	-.02		-.02	1,417
Black.....	.24		.17	439	.21		.15	78	.08		.06	307
Other.....	.08	.21	.08	135	.07	.15	.09	16	.11	.13	.12	78
Education:												
0-8.....	.01		-.04	321	.03		-.01	34	.06		.07	88
9-11.....	.11		.05	860	.12		.06	122	.06		.05	253
12.....	-.01		-.00	2,157	.00		-.01	434	.01		.00	935
13-15.....	-.06		-.03	734	-.01		.01	210	-.04		-.05	281
16.....	-.08		-.02	422	.11		-.07	114	-.05		-.03	161
17+.....	-.02	.15	.04	105	-.02	.14	.05	50	-.08	.11	-.05	84
Family income (\$):												
1,000-4,999.....	.17		.08	672	.12		.00	97	.12		.06	176
5,000-9,999.....	.04		.02	1,046	.06		.02	180	.02		-.01	439
10,000-14,999.....	-.04		-.02	1,244	.05		.06	286	.00		-.00	463
15,000-19,999.....	-.05		-.02	821	-.09		-.06	205	-.05		-.03	361
20,000+.....	-.09	.21	-.05	816	-.08	.18	-.04	196	-.03	.14	.01	363
Multiple R.....							.270				.228	
Multiple R ²073				.052	

* Women looking for work are excluded (see text)

^b Net of other selected variables

variation by occupation in the prevalence of constraint among part-time workers but some variability among full-time workers. Among the latter, constraint is most prevalent for craftspersons, operatives, and service workers (except private household). Women in these categories may be especially likely to work on an hourly basis or do seasonal work and thus—though usually full-time workers—indicate that without child-care constraint they would work more hours.⁴

It is important to consider the associations between each of these socioeconomic factors and child-care constraint when controlling for the effect of other variables. The adjusted figures in the multiple classification analysis presented in table 2 address this question. Overall, race has the strongest net effect, even though for part-time employed mothers it shares primacy with marital status and income. The net effects of all the variables, however, including race, are small. Altogether, these five variables explain only 8% of the total variance in the prevalence of child-care constraint for nonemployed mothers not looking for work, 7% for part-time employed mothers, and 5% for employed mothers.

It may be that the most relevant factors affecting child-care constraint are structural, relating to employment opportunities and the types of child care available as well as cost. While we cannot assess the relevance of employment opportunities, we can examine the type of child-care arrangements currently made by employed mothers.

CHILD-CARE ARRANGEMENTS AND CHILD-CARE CONSTRAINT

For employed women, child care was broadly defined to include any care while the mother is working, day or night, unlike the usual definition of child care, which is essentially day care.⁵ Information was obtained on the location of the care, who provides it, and whether the family pays for it (but not the amount paid or whether subsidized). Information on the place and person providing the child care was combined into the following typology: nuclear family (child's father, sibling, or other child); the mother herself while working either at home or away; a relative in the child's home; a relative in another private home; a nonrelative in the child's home; a nonrelative in another private home; and institutionalized child care such as preschool, nursery school, or day-care center. (For women with two or more children, this typology refers to the care used

⁴ We also considered for married women the characteristics of husbands in relation to child-care constraint. Husband's occupation was not clearly related to wife's reporting of constraint. Husband's education and family income are inversely related to child-care constraint.

⁵ Nonemployed women were asked whether they regularly used child care but not about the type of arrangement.

for the youngest child.) Among all employed women with children under five, 12% care for the child while working, 17% have the child cared for by others in the nuclear family (almost always the father), and 27% by another relative either in the child's home or in another home. Only 12% use institutionalized facilities, 6% have a nonrelative come to (or live in) the child's home, and 22% take the child to a nonrelative's home. When the child is cared for by a nonrelative, 95% pay for the care; when the care is by a relative, 56% pay.

Forms of child care vary in the extent to which they allow flexibility in hours, add commuting time to the day, are costly in terms of money or concern for the child's welfare, or create indebtedness with relatives. Does the type of child care currently being used by employed mothers differentiate the prevalence of constraint from working more hours? As may be seen in table 3, there appears to be some relationship. Institutionalized child-care arrangements are associated with the lowest report of constraint on employment, followed by care by a nonrelative in a private home. The latter (often referred to as family day care) is also the most prevalent single form of child-care arrangement made. Among full-time workers, those using a nonrelative in the child's home show the highest prevalence of constraint; among part-time workers, those using a relative

TABLE 3

EMPLOYED MOTHERS WITH CHILDREN LESS THAN FIVE YEARS OLD WHO ARE CONSTRAINED IN THEIR LABOR-FORCE PARTICIPATION BY THE UNAVAILABILITY OF CHILD CARE, BY TYPE OF CHILD CARE AND PAYMENT, SEPARATELY BY EMPLOYMENT STATUS (%)

TYPE OF CARE AND PAYMENT	WOULD WORK MORE HOURS IF CHILD CARE WERE AVAILABLE					
	Total	N	Full Time	N	Part Time	N
Nuclear family.....	19.3	497	15.8	240	23.0	257
Mother.....	16.9	356	11.8	169	21.4	187
Relative, child's home:.....	18.8	291	15.4	199	26.1	92
Pay for care.....	16.8	131	12.6	87	25.0	44
Do not pay.....	20.6	160	18.9	112	27.1	48
Relative, other home:.....	16.7	511	11.7	366	29.3	145
Pay for care.....	16.8	316	14.8	243	23.3	73
Do not pay.....	16.4	195	4.9	123	36.1	72
Nonrelative, child's home:.....	21.9	195	19.2	119	26.3	76
Pay for care.....	22.7	185	20.5	112	26.0	73
Do not pay.....	a	10	a	7	a	3
Nonrelative, other home:.....	12.4	667	9.4	498	21.2	169
Pay for care.....	12.2	648	9.6	490	20.3	158
Do not pay.....	a	19	a	8	a	11
Institutionalized:.....	10.6	349	8.2	267	18.3	82
Pay for care.....	10.5	324	7.9	252	19.4	72
Do not pay.....	12.0	25	a	15	a	10

* N < 20.

in a private home report the highest. This would imply that payment for care is not generally the critical constraining factor, since care by a relative tends to be inexpensive and care by a nonrelative in the child's home and institutionalized child care tend to be the most expensive forms of care (U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 1976).

While paying for child care is related to the type of care and the type of care is related to feeling constrained from employment, there is no consistent relationship between paying for care and feeling constrained (table 3). The types of care that have the highest and lowest percentages of women reporting constraint almost all required payment and are the most expensive. For those types of care where some women pay and some do not, there is no clear pattern regarding paying and feeling constrained. Full-time workers who have a relative in the child's home are more likely to report constraint when the relative is *not* paid; when a relative cares for the child in another home they are more likely to report constraint if the relative *is* paid. Among part-time workers there is no difference in constraint according to whether a relative in the child's home is paid or not; among women who have a relative care for the child in another home, those who pay are less likely to report constraint—the opposite of the relationship found for full-time workers. The complex relationship may be affected by other considerations such as the amount paid or the nature of the relationship with relatives (e.g., quality, availability, location).

EMPLOYMENT, CHILD-CARE CONSTRAINT, AND FERTILITY

As noted earlier, women in the labor force have fewer children than women not in the labor force. Fertility differentials for our sample of mothers with children under five are shown in table 4. We see that the mean number of children ever born and the number of total births expected is

TABLE 4
FERTILITY DIFFERENTIALS FOR MOTHERS WITH CHILDREN LESS THAN
FIVE YEARS OLD, BY EMPLOYMENT STATUS

Employment Status	Mean Number of Children Ever Born	Mean Number of Total Births Expected, Excluding Uncertain
Not employed, not looking for work.....	2.35 (4,836)	2.86 (4,355)
Looking for work.....	2.03 (440)	2.50 (401)
Employed part time.....	2.10 (1,002)	2.70 (922)
Employed full time.....	1.95 (1,888)	2.42 (1,696)
Total.....	2.21 (8,166)	2.72 (7,374)

NOTE.—Numbers in parentheses are *N*'s.

highest for women who are not employed and not looking for work. Part-time workers have higher fertility and fertility expectations than do full-time workers, and those looking for work (most of whom are looking for full-time work) fall between. These data clearly support the body of literature relating employment characteristics to fertility behavior. They include a further dimension which can be used to differentiate constrainees from nonconstrainees within employment categories. One might expect nonemployed women who feel prevented from working to be more similar in fertility to women already in the labor force, just as women actively looking for work are more similar to those already employed. Likewise, women who are working only part time, but who would like to be working more, might be expected to have lower fertility than part-time workers who do not want to increase their employment.

Within employment categories, do women who feel constrained in their labor-force participation because of child-care unavailability expect fewer children than those not constrained? Table 5 shows the distribution of total births expected separately for women of first, second, and third parity. Women constrained by child care are generally more likely to expect no more births than those not so constrained. This is most apparent for the first-parity mothers of all employment statuses (the only exception to the general pattern is full-time workers with two or three children). Thus, to the extent that birth expectations are predictive of future behavior, there is support for the notion that fertility differentials by labor-force status would be greater if we took into account the extent to which women with young children reduce their labor-force participation as a result of child-care constraint.

DISCUSSION

This study was designed as a modest beginning in the analysis of child care in the context of both women's employment and fertility. We do not have data on job skills, the availability of jobs where the respondents live, the cost of child care relative to expected wages, or husbands' attitudes regarding their wives' employment or the use of child care for pre-school-age children—all factors which, along with the problems of arranging child care, might keep women out of the job market. There are numerous other data needs relating to child care, such as its relation to welfare dependency and men's contribution to child rearing. (For a discussion of these and other child-care issues in the context of existing literature, see Presser [1978a]).

We believe that our findings present a strong case for pursuing this topic. The high rate of employment of mothers with young children *plus* substantial hidden unemployment due to child-care constraint is an issue

TABLE 5
MEAN AND PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL NUMBER OF BIRTHS EXPECTED^a
AMONG MOTHERS WITH CHILDREN LESS THAN FIVE YEARS OLD,^b BY
EMPLOYMENT STATUS, CHILDREN EVER BORN, AND WHETHER
CONSTRAINED BY CHILD CARE

NUMBER OF CHILDREN EVER BORN AND WHETHER CONSTRAINED BY CHILD CARE	PERCENTAGE EXPECTING 1-4 BIRTHS				MEAN	TOTAL	N
	1	2	3	4			
Unemployed, Not Looking							
1:							
Would look.....	36.4	44.8	13.4	5.4	1.93	100.0	239
Would not look...	23.8	52.6	16.8	6.7	2.11	100.0	969
Don't know.....	40.7	39.0	15.3	5.1	1.88	100.0	59
2:							
Would look.....	...	78.8	15.2	6.0	2.30	100.0	250
Would not look...	...	75.0	18.0	7.0	2.37	100.0	1,171
Don't know.....	...	85.1	14.9	0	2.14	100.0	67
3:							
Would look.....	90.2	9.8	3.14	100.0	143
Would not look...	85.9	14.1	3.21	100.0	639
Don't know.....	96.7	3.3	3.03	100.0	30
Employed Part Time							
1:							
Would work more	30.5	43.9	22.0	3.7	2.00	100.0	82
Would not work							
more.....	21.3	51.9	19.6	7.2	2.14	100.0	235
Don't know.....	c	c	c	c	c	100.0	17
2:							
Would work more	...	82.4	11.8	5.9	2.26	100.0	85
Would not work							
more.....	...	71.4	21.1	7.5	2.42	100.0	213
Don't know.....	c	c	c	c	c	100.0	18
3:							
Would work more	93.5	6.5	3.06	100.0	31
Would not work							
more.....	86.3	13.7	3.24	100.0	102
Don't know.....	c	c	c	c	c	100.0	4
Employed Full Time							
1:							
Would work more	46.9	38.5	12.5	2.1	1.70	100.0	96
Would not work							
more.....	38.5	44.3	14.1	3.1	1.84	100.0	644
Don't know.....	c	c	c	c	c	100.0	16
2:							
Would work more	...	80.0	11.7	8.3	2.28	100.0	60
Would not work							
more.....	...	83.3	11.2	5.5	2.22	100.0	437
Don't know.....	c	c	c	c	c	100.0	12
3:							
Would work more	76.0	24.0	3.24	100.0	25
Would not work							
more.....	93.9	6.1	3.08	100.0	212
Don't know.....	c	c	c	c	c	100.0	4

^a Excludes women who report they are uncertain about their future birth expectations.

^b Includes only women of first, second, or third parity.

^c N < 20.

of great concern—from both a theoretical and a policy perspective. Why do a substantial minority of women feel constrained in their labor force participation because of the unavailability of child care when so many women do arrange such care? Economists have paid considerable attention to the job-search process but have neglected the child-care-search process, which is an integral part of the job search for mothers with young children. The limited number of questions included in this study restricts us from considering the personal and familial consequences of child-care constraint. We need to explore further how the ability or inability to make child-care arrangements affects women's current and long-term employment and fertility, as well as the effect of fertility on employment and child care. We especially need detailed histories and longitudinal data that will permit a dynamic view of these relationships.

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Public Opinion and Public Ignorance: The Fine Line between Attitudes and Nonattitudes¹

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The majority of people asked their position on a highly obscure bill before Congress gave a "don't know" (DK) response in two different national surveys, but between 25% and 30% offered an opinion. The latter figures dropped to 10% or less when the DK alternative was provided as part of the question. Contrary to findings concerning most issues, more educated persons showed greater willingness to admit ignorance in these cases involving an unknown object. For those persons who did express opinions, more than mere guessing seemed to be involved: respondents appeared to interpret the wording of the question in a way that had meaning for them, and then to express a more general attitude toward that constructed object.

Most attitude survey questions incorporate assumptions not only about the nature of the attitude to be measured (e.g., by specifying only some of the possible responses) but also about the attitude's very existence. The typical unfiltered question assumes an opinion by asking what its direction is. This assumption would pose no difficulty if respondents were always willing to challenge it and freely report instances in which they had no opinion. But critics of attitude surveys have argued that respondents do not behave in this fashion and instead sometimes offer opinions on issues they know nothing about. Considering the frequency with which the criticism is made, it is remarkable how little direct evidence there is that bears on it.

A study sometimes cited as relevant is Gill's (1947) report that 70% of a sample was willing to give opinions on a fictitious "Metallic Metals Act." Payne's widely read book on question construction (1951) discusses the Gill report twice, and others (e.g., Weissberg 1976) have continued to refer to it. But examination of the original Gill account reveals that it is hardly more than an anecdote. The population sampled is identified only

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as "a group of people," and the size of the sample is never given. Hence the report that 70% of those questioned offered an opinion on the nonexistent act has little meaning. More solid but indirect evidence comes from Philip Converse's (1970) analysis of "nonattitudes"; Converse shows that the inconsistencies in a set of panel data fit a model assuming mostly random responses. Also of some relevance to this general issue is Hartley's (1946) study of social distance: large majorities of college students provided attitudes toward three nonexistent nationality groups, "Danireans," "Pireneans," and "Wallonians." All three of these sources suggest that there are appreciable amounts of uninformed answering, but none offers direct data from the national population.

This research note provides recent direct evidence on the issue of nonattitudes and does so in the context of ongoing experiments concerning how the "don't know" (DK) option is presented to respondents (Schuman and Presser 1978). The experiments use a split-ballot design to compare "standard questions," where DK is allowed but not offered, with "filtered questions," where the DK option is explicitly provided as one of the alternatives. In work reported thus far with a range of issues, filtered questions have usually added 20%–25% to the DK category; regardless of the content of the question or the percentage of DK on the standard form. The near constancy of this range has been striking, and it is of interest to see whether it persists even when we use an issue about which the ignorance of the general population can be presumed to be complete.

DATA

Two forms of a question about the "Agricultural Trade Act of 1978" were included at the end of November and December 1978 Survey Research Center telephone surveys of the American adult population.² The Agricultural Trade Act (ATA) was not fictional, since we did not wish to lie to respondents, but it is so little known (as confirmed by inquiries to generally well-informed colleagues) that we presume virtually no respondents were

² Random Digit Dial (RDD) sampling procedures were employed. Two consecutive monthly surveys were used in order to increase sample size. The November RDD sample had an *N* of 667 and a response rate of 70%; the corresponding December *N* was 510 and the response rate 67%. Unexpectedly, the DK percentage is significantly higher in November than December for the filtered form (92.3% vs. 86.9%; $\chi^2 = 6.33$, *df* = 1, $P < .02$), although the difference for the standard form is nonsignificant and trivial (69.1% vs. 69.5%). The November questionnaire was considerably longer than the December one, and our interpretation is that some November respondents were more eager to end the task by saying DK but did so only when the filtered form made a DK response easy to give (see Schuman and Presser [1978, p. 252] on the effects on DK of impatience with telephone survey length). Since the DK difference just described is small and does not interact significantly with other variables discussed in this paper, we present the November–December data as a single merged sample.

familiar with its nature or contents. Of course they could make some unsupported inference from the wording of the question, and we had interviewers record all comments that respondents offered when giving their answers. Selection of which respondents received the standard or filtered form was done on a systematic random basis, though a $\frac{2}{3}$ to $\frac{1}{3}$ ratio was used for reasons unconnected with this particular experiment.

RESULTS

Univariate Effects

The percentage of respondents answering DK to each form of the question is presented in table 1. To the standard form, which allows DK only when offered spontaneously by respondents, 31% of the sample gave an opinion about the Agricultural Trade Act and 69% said DK. Thus it is not correct—for this question—to claim that the majority of Americans will offer an opinion on an issue unknown to them. Nevertheless, the proportion that does so is quite substantial: nearly a third of the population.

A filtered form of the question increases considerably the willingness of respondents to answer DK. In this case only 10% of the population feel called upon to offer an opinion. This is still not a trivial percentage, but it is much more congenial to the assumption of a public willing to indicate its ignorance when that is appropriate. The tenability of the assumption evidently depends on the form of the question as well as on the respondent: if ignorance is to be revealed, it should be legitimized. Moreover, the difference of 21% in DK percentages produced by the two forms fits very closely the range found in previous comparisons of standard and filtered questions. Even when a ceiling is placed on the DK percentage possible,

TABLE 1
RESPONSE TO AGRICULTURAL TRADE ACT QUESTION BY FORM (%)

Standard (N = 387)	Filtered (N = 787)
The last question is about a different subject. Congress has been considering the Agricultural Trade Act of 1978. Do you favor or oppose the passage of this act?	The last question is about a different subject. Congress has been considering the Agricultural Trade Act of 1978. Do you favor or oppose the passage of this act or do you not have an opinion on that issue?
Favor.....19.4	Favor..... 6.4
Oppose.....11.4	Oppose..... 3.7
DK (if volunteered).....69.2	DK.....90.0
Total.....100.0	100.1

Full table: $\chi^2 = 74.78$ $df = 2$ $P < .001$.
Favor vs. oppose: $\chi^2 = 0.00$ $df = 1$ N.S.

as is very nearly the case for the ATA question, the 20%–25% DK increment due to filtering continues to appear.

Finally, the difference in DK percentages does not seem to affect the distribution of substantive (favor or oppose) choices. The ratio of favoring the act to opposing it is a little less than 2:1 on each form. Thus here, as in most of our previous DK experiments, provision of a filter does not appreciably alter the division of opinion once DK is removed.

Education and the DK Response

Education has been the variable most strongly associated with the DK response across a wide range of issues (J. Converse 1976–77). Particularly when knowledge of public affairs is needed, less educated persons have been found more apt to give “no opinion” responses. Therefore the results in table 2 are surprising, as we move to this limiting case where none of the respondents is assumed to possess the requisite knowledge to express an opinion. On the standard form, willingness to say DK *rises* with education, that is, it is the most educated who most readily admit ignorance ($\gamma = 0.24$, $SE = 0.09$, $P < .01$). Results for filtering also differ from past findings, since on this form there is no relation of DK to education ($\gamma = 0.04$, $SE = 0.09$), with all the educational categories producing quite a high DK percentage. The linear component of the three-way interaction for education, form (standard vs. filtered), and opinion versus DK does not quite reach conventional levels of significance ($\lambda = 0.15$, $SE = 0.08$, $P < .10$), but

TABLE 2
AGRICULTURAL TRADE ACT RESPONSE BY EDUCATION AND FORM (%)

RESPONSE	EDUCATION (Years)		
	0–11	12	13+
Standard Form			
Favor.....	28.4	19.9	15.0
Oppose.....	14.8	10.3	10.2
DK.....	56.8	69.9	74.9
	100.0 (81)	100.1 (136)	100.1 (167)
Filtered Form			
Favor.....	7.1	7.2	5.4
Oppose.....	1.8	5.0	3.6
DK.....	91.1	87.8	91.0
	100.0 (169)	100.0 (279)	100.0 (333)

NOTE.—N's in parentheses.

identical patterns occur in the November and December surveys taken separately, giving us some confidence in their reliability.³

When all DK responses are omitted and the relation of education to only favor versus oppose is examined, neither form shows a reliable relation between education and position on the issue, and there is no evidence of three-way interaction.

It is instructive to compare the results for the ATA with earlier results for an item on the 1974 Portuguese revolution (Schuman and Presser 1978).⁴ The latter would seem to be almost equally esoteric, except that the vicissitudes of the revolution occupied newspaper headlines for a period in 1974 in a way that the ATA never did. Thus we might expect persons with a considerable interest in serious news to have known about Portugal in 1974 when the question was asked, while even a devoted reader of the daily *New York Times* in 1978 would be unlikely to know anything about the ATA. In fact, the proportions giving an opinion on Portugal are quite similar to those doing so on the trade act, but it turns out that this conceals an important difference in the relation of education to statement of an opinion on the two items.

Unlike the trade act, the Portugal item shows on all forms the relation of education to DK responses that is usually found—more DK with less education. Moreover, a higher proportion of college-educated Americans (13+ years of school) offer an opinion on the Portugal item than on the trade act, whereas among the least educated (0–11 years of school) the

³ When a five-category education variable is employed the results for grade-school respondents and those with some high school are virtually identical, and results for the some college and the college graduate groups are likewise essentially the same. Hence the relation on the standard form is stepwise, rather than strictly monotonic. We also looked at the effects of three other widely used background variables: age, sex, and race. Controlling for education, younger people are more likely than older respondents, men more likely than women, and blacks more likely than whites to give an opinion, but these findings hold true mainly for the standard form. Finally, we looked at the responses of farmers in the November survey (occupation was not asked in the December survey) and found them to differ little from those of others. Of the 17 farmers in the sample, only four gave an opinion, three in favor and one opposed. (All tests for multivariate interaction are based on Goodman [1971]. λ is an effect parameter produced by the computer program ECTA. It is used here to evaluate a linear trend.)

⁴ There were three forms of the Portugal item. The standard agree-disagree version asked: "How about this statement: 'The new Portuguese military government is trying to maintain its own control without concern for democracy in Portugal.' Do you agree or disagree?" The filtered form asked first whether the respondent had an opinion on the issue and asked the agree-disagree question only of those who had answered affirmatively. A standard forced-choice form asked: "In your opinion, is the new Portuguese military government trying to move toward democracy, or is it trying to maintain its own control without concern for democracy in Portugal?"

trade act produces an opinion more often than does Portugal.⁵ The former trend is easily explained by the greater knowledge that the most highly educated presumably had of the Portugal issue than of the ATA. But what explains the tendency of the least educated respondents to offer an opinion on the ATA more frequently than on Portugal? We assume that the least educated know little about either issue, and suspect that two other factors produce the surprising results. First, the trade act item deals with the United States ("Congress has been considering . . .") and therefore may appear to require an opinion more urgently than do the remote affairs of Portugal. Second, the question about the trade act allows a fairly simple (even if inaccurate) guess as to the subject matter of the question; it may be more difficult to comprehend the Portugal item and to figure out a position on it. Of course, linked to both these factors is the possibility that the least educated respondents are especially susceptible to pressures in the interview to give an opinion even when they have none.

Sources of Favor and Oppose Responses

Opinions on the ATA cannot be "real" in the conventional sense assumed in attitude surveys, since respondents have never heard of it before being asked. Yet the favor-to-oppose ratio of nearly two to one also departs substantially from the 50-50 coin-flipping model that generally has been assumed for "nonattitudes" ($\chi^2 = 13.6$, $df = 1$, $P < .001$). This suggests that respondents who offer opinions on the ATA are able to construct some meaning from the question. We have interviewer recordings of some 35 spontaneous asides by respondents, and in most of these cases it does appear that individuals made interpretations of the ATA that facilitated or were at least consistent with their substantive choice, for example, "We need more trade" (favor), and "Shipments from Japan are killing our products here" (oppose).

While this interpretive process might seem narrowly limited to the words

⁵ For comparison with table 2, the percentages giving an opinion on Portugal in 1974 by education are shown in the table below. All the relevant interactions for response by education by item (Portugal vs. ATA) are significant ($P < .01$).

OPINION	EDUCATION (Years)		
	0-11	12	13+
Standard (agree-disagree) (%).....	30 (153)	32 (156)	46 (188)
Standard (forced-choice) (%).....	17 (161)	24 (167)	34 (155)
Filtered (agree-disagree) (%).....	5 (147)	10 (175)	19 (188)

NOTE.—N's in parentheses.

of the ATA item, it is likely that respondents call on more general attitudes to help with their specific evaluations. Indeed, general attitudes can be conceptualized in just this way—as broad orientations that provide guidance about how to respond in novel situations (Allport 1935). If this is the case, we ought to find associations between substantive responses to proposed congressional action on the ATA and responses to other items that are similar to it in some way. As table 3 shows, this is indeed the case for an item on confidence in the economic policy of the government: those favoring the act show more confidence in the government's management of the economy than those opposed to the act. (No difference approaching significance occurs between filtered and standard forms in this or other relations discussed below; admittedly, the samples are small for detecting such a three-way interaction.) On another item, concerning the honesty of government officials, there is a nonsignificant trend for those opposing the ATA to perceive more "crookedness." These two results, plus a replication reported below, suggest that one basis for arriving at an opinion about the ATA is confidence in government economic action, or perhaps in government more generally.⁶

Our clearest conclusions; therefore, are first, that some people favor or oppose congressional passage of the ATA on the basis of their general confidence in government, regardless of the specific content of the act, and second, that some people reach an opinion based on what the words "Agri-

TABLE 3
EVALUATION OF GOVERNMENT ECONOMIC POLICY
BY RESPONSE TO AGRICULTURAL TRADE ACT (%)

Question	Favor	Oppose
As to the economic policy of the government—I mean steps taken to fight inflation and unemployment—would you say the government is doing a good job, only fair, or a poor job?		
Good job.....	20.0	11.0
Only fair.....	57.5	41.1
Poor job.....	22.5	47.9
Total.....	100.0 (120)	100.0 (73)
$\chi^2=13.63$ $df=2$ $P<.001$ $\gamma=0.43$ $SE=0.11$ $P<.001$		

NOTE.—Standard and filtered forms combined; *N*'s in parentheses.

⁶ This kind of interpretation also fits Hartley's finding that attitudes about his three nonexistent nationality groups were related to, and could be thought of as part of, prejudice against real groups. (We also examined the relations between opinions on the ATA and several other attitude items that were available in the survey; although one other item showed a significant association [$P<.05$] we are uncertain of its meaning [those favoring the act were more likely to favor liberalizing marijuana laws].)

cultural Trade" suggest to them. How much these two bases for constructing an opinion overlap cannot be determined from the present data.

REPLICATION: THE MONETARY CONTROL BILL

In an April 1979 survey we attempted a partial replication by asking a national RDD telephone sample ($N = 692$) about the Monetary Control Bill of 1979, employing in all other respects the same wording as for the ATA. (The Monetary Control Bill [MCB] was then a real issue before the House of Representatives but also one not at all likely to be known by respondents. Its actual content concerned banking practices.) As table 4 shows, basic results for both overall marginals and relations to respondent education are quite similar to those for the ATA in tables 1 and 2. The overall DK proportions are slightly higher for the new question, but the form difference is again about 20%. On the standard form, the proportion of DK responses rises significantly with education ($\gamma = 0.19$, $SE = 0.08$, $P < .05$), although a little less steeply than for the ATA; while on the filtered form there is no sign of a relation.⁷

TABLE 4
MONETARY CONTROL ACT RESPONSE BY EDUCATION AND FORM (%)

RESPONSE	EDUCATION (Years)			
	0-11	12	13+	Total
Standard Form				
Favor.....	15.8	12.9	12.2	13.2
Oppose.....	16.8	15.7	9.2	13.2
DK.....	67.4	71.3	78.6	73.6
Total.....	100.0 (95)	99.9 (178)	100.0 (196)	100.0 (469)
Filtered Form				
Favor.....	5.0	3.3	2.2	3.1
Oppose.....	.0	4.3	4.4	3.6
DK.....	95.0	92.4	93.4	93.3
Total.....	100.0 (40)	100.0 (92)	100.0 (91)	100.0 (223)

NOTE.—*N*'s in parentheses.

⁷ The effects of race and sex are similar to those for the ATA (see n. 3 above) in that men and blacks are more likely to offer an opinion (controlling for education), but for the Monetary Control Bill these effects are stronger on the filtered than on the standard form. The age results are similar to those for the ATA—younger people are more apt to give an opinion—except that an earlier hint of a reversal among the college educated is more pronounced (the older, well educated give an opinion more often than expected).

Substantive responses (favor and oppose) approximate a 50-50 split on both forms, but our experience with the ATA advises against assuming that this indicates mere guessing. (The 50-50 split here also argues against an interpretation of the ATA 63-37 split as due to an acquiescence effect.) Since there is no sign of a relation of the favor/oppose division to education (as was also true for the ATA), we shall again turn to other attitude questions for evidence that substantive choices involved interpretations of the question rather than a purely random process of responding.

Only two directly relevant attitude items are available from the April survey, but these two have readily interpretable associations with substantive responses to the MCB. A direct replication was hypothesized for the question on evaluation of government economic policy, since the MCB, like the ATA, is presented as an economic issue before Congress. Results parallel those reported in table 3: of respondents who favor the act, 20% say the government is doing a good job, 47% say a fair job, and 33% say a poor job, compared with 8%, 45%, and 48%, respectively, for those who oppose the act ($\gamma = 0.30$, $SE = 0.14$, $P < .05$). This finding provides further evidence that general confidence in government is a source for answers regarding both the ATA and the MCB.

At the same time, opinions on the MCB are also significantly related to a question on whether the respondent believes "unemployment or inflation" will "cause the more serious economic hardship for people during the next year or so." Of those who favor the bill, 83% choose inflation; of those who oppose the bill, 69% choose inflation ($\chi^2 = 5.0$, $df = 1$, $P < .05$). This suggests that some of the people favoring the MCB do so because they believe it is intended to reduce inflation, a hypothesis supported by some recorded respondent comments, for example, "That's a bill that has to do with controlling inflation" (favor). However, a wide range of other plausible (but equally incorrect) interpretations were offered, such as, "Well, it must be about a balanced budget" (favor), ". . . bill has to do with controlling pay raises" (oppose). We should also note that not all respondent comments suggest such an effort at rational interpretation, for example: "I don't know what it is, so I'll oppose it" (oppose). "It has a bad ring to it" (oppose). One thing does seem clear: the association with the unemployment/inflation question is specific to the MCB, since the same question showed no significant relation to the ATA and in fact a trend in the opposite direction (fearing inflation goes with opposing the ATA).

DISCUSSION

Our analysis of questions about two issues unknown to the American public leads to several conclusions. First, a substantial minority of the public—

in the neighborhood of 30%—will provide an opinion on a proposed law that they know nothing about if the question is asked without an explicit DK option. This figure is certainly lower than the “majority” sometimes bruited about, but it is obviously large enough to trouble those assessing attitudes or beliefs concerning public issues. It is important to note, however, that in some of these cases interviewers recorded comments indicating considerable respondent uncertainty (e.g., “Favor—though I really don’t know what it is,” “You caught me on that. I don’t know, but from the sound of it I favor it”). Moreover, we can tell from other cases where marginal comments are available that some respondents initially confessed ignorance and then chose favor or oppose only after the interviewer inappropriately repeated the question, contrary to our instructions to accept DK responses and not probe in any way. Thus it is not true that all those who give an opinion do so in order to avoid admitting ignorance. Indeed, this evidence of respondent willingness to admit ignorance may account in good part for the finding that the DK level rises dramatically to 90% or more when that option is fully legitimized for *both* interviewers and respondents by being read as part of the question.⁸

Second, while we clearly cannot rule out the possibility that some respondents answer on a random basis, it is evident that many do not respond by merely flipping mental coins, as the classic concept of nonattitude might suggest. In earlier research (Schuman and Presser 1978) we argued that respondents lacking opinions about the particular issue referred to in a question may construct answers by drawing on an underlying disposition not specific to the issue but relevant to it. A similar process appears to apply here. Respondents make an educated (though wrong) guess as to what the obscure acts represent, then answer reasonably in their own terms about the constructed object. Such responses resemble nonattitudes in the sense that there was no prior thought about the attitude object, but our evidence on the way the responses are linked to general confidence in government (as well as to other issues) suggests that the attitudes themselves are quite real. Indeed, opinions on the acts bear more than a slight resemblance to opinions on many better-known but equally complex and remote subjects, like the safety of nuclear power plants or strategic arms limitation agreements. Few of even the best-informed respondents know much about these issues, especially when phrased in terms of proposed laws. Whether in opinion polls, referenda, or issue-related elections, respondents may make inferences only a little more firmly based than those pertaining to the ATA and MCB. Thus it is probably a mistake to attempt to add to “attitudes”

⁸ As we were completing this paper we learned of similar results from a Cincinnati survey that asked about a fictitious “Public Affairs Act.” To a standard form, about a third volunteered an opinion; to a filtered form, about 7% (see Bishop et al., in press).

and "nonattitudes" a third concept such as "quasi attitudes" or "pseudo attitudes," as we were tempted to do initially.

Third, there is one noteworthy finding in the present experiments that does distinguish them from most other attitude data. Usually willingness to give a DK response is negatively related to education, but for the two issues dealt with here DK is voiced more often by those with more education. Apparently more highly educated respondents can more readily tell the difference between questions that are difficult and questions that are impossible and are more willing to assert ignorance about the latter. The least educated, on the other hand, are more apt to offer an attitude when pressed. This distinction should not be overdrawn: even the most educated include some 20%–25% willing to offer opinions about attitude objects that are unknown to them.

Fourth, we believe that the most useful way to extend this line of inquiry is to adopt the strategy used in Philip Converse's work on nonattitudes. Our evidence for a significant proportion of meaningful responses is, it must be recognized, compatible with as large a proportion of responses, or an even larger proportion, best treated as randomly generated. Panel data with issues like those used in the present paper would help in determining what the relative proportions are of the two types of response. (We plan to re-interview the original MCB respondents after six months for this purpose.)

Finally, the evidence in this paper suggests that DK filters should be used by investigators who are interested in assessing what might be called "informed opinion" on public issues. Investigators more concerned with measuring underlying dispositions, however, might well prefer standard items that omit or even discourage the DK option. In this sense, there appears to be no general solution to the problem of which form of question is better.

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Commentary and Debate

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A REEVALUATION OF A TEST OF KANTER'S HYPOTHESIS¹

In "Token Women," Spangler, Gordon, and Pipkin (*AJS* 84 [July 1978]: 160-70) report research findings which they argue support Kanter's (1977) argument that the proportion of minority persons in a group is causally related to minority achievement. This comment suggests that the findings do not support Kanter's hypothesis. The investigation suffers from at least three major difficulties. The authors misinterpret the meaning of difference scores, do not investigate the potential effects of interaction among the independent variables, and do not address the problem of making inferences across levels of analysis. The result is a paper which does not test Kanter's argument and does not add to our knowledge of the effects of proportions on group life.

Effects of Proportions on Group Life

Kanter (1977) argues that the proportion of minority persons in a group affects the behavior of minority persons in the group. Minority persons or *tokens* in skewed groups (those with minority/majority ratios of approximately 15:85) face conditions different from those faced by tokens in tilted

¹ I would like to thank Mary L. Fennell, Susan Olzak, and Rosabeth M. Kanter for helpful comments on earlier drafts.

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groups (those with ratios approximating 35:65). Specifically, tokens in skewed groups face significantly greater performance pressure, increased boundary heightening, and increased stereotyping.

Spangler, Gordon, and Pipkin propose a test of Kanter's arguments using questionnaire data collected at two law schools with significantly different sex ratios. School A has a tilted sex ratio (0.33) while school B has a skewed sex ratio (0.20). The authors predict that, compared with women in the tilted group (school A), women in the skewed group (school B) "... (1) will do less well academically (performance pressure), (2) will be less integrated into the law school (social isolation), and (3) will be more likely to demonstrate traditional female preferences in study strategies and career choices (role entrapment)" (p. 162).²

Data Analysis

The authors analyze the data by comparing the magnitude of differences in men's and women's scores on dependent measures at the two schools. They argue that women's scores reflect differences on school variables as well as differences attributable to the effects of sex ratio. They propose to partition the effects of those variables by calculating difference scores for men and women and subsequently performing data analysis on those difference scores. They argue that the difference score "reflects only the impact of the sex ratio ... [and] is free from school effects" (p. 162). The authors conclude that their hypotheses are supported because the observed magnitudes of differences are greater at the school with the skewed sex ratio.

Problems with the Analysis

An initial problem is the authors' interpretation of the difference scores. An adequate test of the argument depends on specification of the effects of variations in sex ratios. The difference scores which are reported reflect both more and less than such effects. The problem can be illustrated by casting the argument in a multiple-regression framework (β 's refer to population parameters):

$$Y = \alpha + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \beta_3 X_3 + \beta_4 X_1 X_2 + \beta_5 X_1 X_3 + \beta_6 X_2 X_3 + \beta_7 X_1 X_2 X_3 . \quad (1)$$

Equation (1) suggests that individual scores on dependent measures (Y) are determined not only by the direct effects of gender (X_1), sex ratio

² It should be pointed out that Kanter suggests at least two possible responses to both increased performance pressure and increased boundary heightening. The authors' hypotheses refer to what Kanter believed to be predominant tendencies.

(X_2), and other school variables (X_3) as the authors suggest but also by interaction effects of these independent variables. Men and women who attend the same school face the same structural conditions and are assumed to differ on only one individual variable, gender. Consequently, variations in differences between men's and women's scores (Y_d) are attributable to direct effects of gender and interaction effects of gender with other independent variables as specified in equation (2). Comparison of difference scores across schools provides a test for *all* these effects and does not partition the independent effects of sex ratio as suggested:

$$Y = \alpha + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_1 X_2 + \beta_3 X_1 X_3 + \beta_4 X_1 X_2 X_3. \quad (2)$$

The second major problem involves the treatment of interaction. In effect the authors argue, as does Kanter, that the interaction of gender with sex ratio is significant, in other words, that variations in the sex ratio affect women differently from men. However, the proposed test assumes that all other interactions are insignificant. Yet the authors provide no independent evidence for the accuracy of this assumption. As a consequence, even if the analysis consisted of a test of the difference between differences—an appropriate test for significance of interaction—the results would be suspect given the possibility of more than one significant interaction.³ An appropriate test of Kanter's hypothesis requires a more sophisticated research design or the use of more sophisticated analytical techniques.

A final problem is that of making inferences across levels of analysis (see Firebaugh [1978] for a recent discussion of this problem). The authors utilize both individual-level and aggregate-level data. Sex ratio is an aggregate-level variable, and it is assumed that differences in sex ratios of institutions have implications for *all* members of the institutions, not women alone. (Kanter takes this into account when she attributes increased performance pressure, for example, to reactions of others in the organization to variations in proportions of minorities.) The problem of making inferences may be illustrated by proposing a hypothetical finding of "no difference" in difference scores for schools A and B. The aggregated difference score of zero might be taken as an indication that no relationship exists. On the other hand, an examination of the distribution of scores might suggest that although there are no statistical differences between scores for schools A and B the findings are an artifact resulting from the existence of a bimodal distribution of scores among women in school B. As a consequence, while the relationships of the mean scores of men and women are the same in both groups, individual responses are different. The existence of such a

³ The nature of the test the authors use is unclear. They report significance levels for Y_d within schools but not for significance of differences of Y_d between schools or significance of the differences in Y_d , that is, $(Y_{da} - Y_{db})$.

bimodal distribution might correctly be taken as evidence for Kanter's hypothesis.

Summary

While the problems posed in Kanter's (1977) work are important for both theoretical and practical reasons, Spangler, Gordon, and Pipkin's proposed test fails on methodological grounds. The authors misinterpret the difference scores they use in the analysis, disregard the possibility of significant interactions in both their argument and research design, and in addition fail to recognize the problem of cross-level bias which arises in their utilization of both individual- and aggregate-level data. An appropriate test of Kanter's hypothesis awaits a more sophisticated research design, more powerful analytical techniques, or both.

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REPLY TO WALKER

Walker's comment imposes a burden on our research note that we believe is excessive, if not inappropriate. Kanter's (1977) hypothesis, that the minority representation ratio in a group will affect the performance of the minority group members, is a recent theoretical formulation. Her support for it was based on qualitative data concerning face-to-face interactions in an industrial organization. The questions we sought to address in our note, though preliminary, are important for any new theory: Is the theory plausible? Can the hypothesized relationships be found in analogous, but disparate, settings and with other kinds of data than those used for the development of the theory? Walker would have us go beyond that task to test for sources of spuriousness before the primary relationships have been established. Though we believe our research note carried out well the reasonable task we set for it, Walker's comment should be discussed.

Walker observes correctly that the use of difference scores associated

with performance measures and gender alone fails to control for interaction between gender and effects other than sex ratio. This problem did concern us. Aptitude, age, and marital status were used as control variables when their influence on performance could be anticipated. As indicated in our note, adjustments for these individual-level variables did not affect the comparisons of difference scores; this fact strengthens the suggestion that the influence was contextual.

Ideally, to control for unknown spurious contextual effects, our comparison groups should have been the same in all respects except sex ratio. Our analysis was a secondary use of data collected for another purpose. Such ideal comparability did not exist in the data set, nor, judging from examination of gender ratios, does it appear to exist in the population of law schools from which these data were drawn. It may well be that the conditions supporting variance in sex ratio will leave all research on this question in natural settings vulnerable to charges of spuriousness. Although we cannot rule out the possibility of spuriousness in our findings, we have no reason to believe that it is present.

Walker also states that the problem of lack of control for spuriousness lies in the statistical technique we used. His illustration implies that regression analysis would have been better. That is incorrect. Regression analysis cannot be used for this problem because the sample was representational of the groups, and therefore necessarily produced multicollinearity between gender and the aggregate variable, sex ratio. Further, the problem is compounded in a study utilizing two comparison groups, because sex ratio and other contextual variables, when binary, are perfect linear functions of each other. Moreover, given the nature of the law schools studied, if contextual variables were computed by group means they would also be likely to be highly intercorrelated. Under conditions of extreme multicollinearity the correlation matrices of the independent variables could not be inverted and regressions could not be performed; when multicollinearity is less extreme, independent effects cannot be reliably partialled owing to the great variance in the estimated coefficients (Hanushek and Jackson 1977). Further, even if more than two groups had been used in the analysis, it is not clear that sex ratio is sufficiently independent of other contextual variables that its effects can be partialled by regressions. That is to say, the conditions associated with biased membership ratios may be organizationally pervasive. But whether these conditions create spuriousness in the relationships specified by the theory is a problem of theory more than method. Again, until this is resolved, such studies as ours are open to charges of spuriousness. We accept Walker's criticism on this point, but his approach is no solution.

We appreciate his reference to the article by Firebaugh (1978) on cross-level bias associated with the joint use of individual- and aggregate-level

data in regression analysis. However, Walker is in error in citing that article as applicable to our note. We did not make cross-level inferences: performance was not predicted from the aggregate variable, sex ratio. Instead, the analysis was contextual: the magnitudes of differences in gender performance were compared across levels of aggregation. Perhaps, however, Walker's greater error lies in confusing the point by his illustration. It is certainly true that one can commit a type I error by comparing means from distributions of differing shape (an error we did not make, incidentally, because we used frequency responses rather than means), but this has nothing to do with cross-level inference.

Even though Firebaugh's article is not relevant to our research note, it does raise an interesting issue for further research in this area. Firebaugh posits that cross-level bias causes a misestimation of effects in regressions when aggregate-level (\bar{x}_1) effects on the dependent variable (Y) controlling individual-level effects (x_1) do not equal zero ($Y/\bar{x}_1 \cdot x_1 \neq 0$). According to Kanter's hypothesis, and as correctly noted by Walker, the sex ratio of a group is presumed to affect the interactions of all members, not just women. Therefore, by theory, $Y/\bar{x}_1 \cdot x_1 \neq 0$. Consequently, if the theory is correct, downward cross-level bias will always be a problem when the construct of sex ratio is used in regressions. Firebaugh's solution is to substitute individual-level variables for the aggregated one. Therefore, the variable sex ratio would need to be disaggregated into individual-level, independent variables of "minorityness"—an interesting problem for theory.

In summary, Walker's comment highlights difficulties that further research on sex ratio effects must confront. We feel that his comment, while correct in faulting us for failure to control unknown sources of spuriousness, is not a particularly significant critique. We agree with Blalock (1964, p. 129) that "no matter how careful the study, it is always possible to assert that some unknown and mysterious variable, which has been uncontrolled, is operating as a confounding influence in the sense that it is upsetting the 'true' relationship between X and Y There is a burden on the skeptic at least to name the confounding influence involved, and ideally he should attempt to measure it and design an alternative study in which the presumed confounding influence is controlled." The control of all sources of spuriousness can never be accomplished in social research. Furthermore, the search for sources of confounding influence goes beyond the task of our note, which was to test the plausibility of Kanter's theory, and, very probably, could not be achieved with data from law school populations. Walker's own suggested analytical technique would also fail to meet his criteria, and he seems not to understand cross-level bias.

We agree with him that Kanter's hypothesis is important for both theoretical and practical reasons, and, of course, more sophisticated research designs and more powerful statistical techniques are welcome. We hope

Retrospective Review Essay: Ethics, Politics, and Holistic Social Science

The Structure of Evil: An Essay on the Unification of the Science of Man.
By Ernest Becker. New York: Free Press, 1976. Pp. xviii+430. \$2.95 (paper).

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During his lifetime, Ernest Becker wrote and published on a wide variety of topics, including psychiatry, anthropology, the history of American sociology, perversions, and alienation. *The Structure of Evil*, originally published in 1968, is the culmination of his work. It calls for a unitary "Science of Man."

This new science (as Becker uses that term) will "grasp the world as a whole" (p. 307); will merge with philosophy, and will not separate fact from value. Hence, it will be a secular theodicy, or "anthropodicy"; that is, it will include "a program for analyzing and remedying the evils that befall man in society" (p. 31). And it will have "as its primary task that of changing society, so that it [becomes] a product of human freedom rather than of blind necessity" (p. 30).

The concept of progress will be important in the new science of human beings. But it will not view "progress" as an objective process which determines the fate of human beings independently of their own choices. For "the individual subjectivity, as the creator of values, must occupy the center of the new science" such that it studies "human regularities, but only to design greater freedom and not in order to determine man's conduct" (p. 158).

Another goal of the new science is to link biology and culture so as to allow for the harmonious merger of "the physical or organismic body, and the culturally constituted symbolic self" (p. 174), as happens in aesthetic experience. Still another is to overcome "historical alienation," which requires the attempt "to achieve maximum individuality *within* maximum community" (p. 251, emphasis in original).

In Becker's view, Western social thought and social science have been converging on this new science for over 200 years. Very briefly, human thought has aspired to holistic integration "ever since mankind passed out of the stage of mythology" because "human dignity and social order are impossible" in the absence of some view of the world "as a totality which would give meaning to all experience" (p. 307).

By the 18th century, earlier theological syntheses had broken down, and it was no longer possible to read nature to find ethical meanings.

Hence, Enlightenment thinkers such as Diderot correctly saw the necessity of creating a new "unitary vision" (p. 7) that made human beings the "center from which all sciences radiate" (p. 12, emphasis in original omitted) and that considered all sciences in relation to human needs.

Most of this book, over 300 pages, traces the progress (in Becker's view) toward the new science of human beings, together with the obstacles and false or aborted starts along the way. One obstacle, for example, was "mechanical determinism," as in Spencer, which left human beings "powerless to do anything about evil" (p. 312). One aborted attempt was sociology, which began (as in Albion Small) as a value-laden "unitary vision" of human beings in society, but then became just another specialized discipline.

The progress, in contrast to the false starts, consisted of "contributions" from psychology, social psychology, psychiatry, sociology, and other fields which could be synthesized into a unitary science. For example, the merger in 19th-century psychology of materialist empiricism and of idealism (as in the later work of Wilhelm Wundt) made it possible "to connect, theoretically, the organismic with the symbolic levels of existence" (p. 105). In this way, value was "injected into nature from a wholly anthropocentric position" (p. 112), just as the Enlightenment program for a new unitary vision had called for. Or, to cite another example of synthesis, a "union of Marx and Freud" (p. 211) into a historical psychology makes it possible to have a science which remains centered on human subjectivity, but which can explain differences between historical epochs in terms of "the range of choices people have in a particular social context" (p. 211).

As these quotations suggest, much of Becker's intellectual history of the progress toward the new science is highly general. He skips over the details in most of the thinkers he takes up. For example, he alludes to or discusses Marx, with no mention of "organic composition of capital"; or Kant, with no mention of the distinction between "reason" and "understanding"; or Cooley, with no mention of "primary group." Becker tends to deal, instead, with general characterizations of literally dozens of philosophers, social scientists, and other scholars and to synthesize these general characterizations. The result is a synthesis of "contributions" by various thinkers which contains very little substance. For example:

The romantics, by stressing some inner nature prior to social and empirical reality, were actually creating a form of mystical conservatism that could be used to frustrate wise efforts at social reconstruction. The problem was thus one of reconciling the utilitarian and the romantic currents of thought in a synthesis that would take into its scope the whole man, but would be progressive at the same time. And this reconciliation is precisely the one that we have achieved, by reinterpreting the problem of neurosis as a problem of cognition, of the restriction of one's active powers. We have been able to understand that human self-contradiction is not a medical or a narrowly biological problem, but is always and at heart a social problem—a problem of what society will allow people *to know* and *to do*.

The effect of this reinterpretation of Freud was to rejoin the full En-

lightenment current which he had temporarily sidetracked. It provided for a synthesis of the rationalist and romantic views of man, but without bowing to the irrationalists. We are able to reconcile these two positions, and keep the full cogency of both. When we talk about the bind in which early training places the individual all through his life, how anxiety-based learning obscures broader, more spontaneous perceptions, we are actually keeping the romantic intuition of the primacy of the total, striving organism over any partial, rational world view. But at the same time, we leave open the possibility for man to continually broaden and change his world view, to permit broader and freer action. We thus keep the high place for the rationalist position. We have, in sum, lifted the problem onto a plane of higher scientific cogitation. The romantic position is given scientific footing, but is deprived of any obscurantism. We are ready to speak of the *whole* man in terms intelligible to the scientific reason. [P. 165]

Concrete examples, or syntheses of specific findings, or more substantive propositions rarely follow, or lead up to, passages of this sort. Instead, Becker continues along in much the same vein. For example, the passage quoted above is followed by a discussion of the "merger of psychiatry and social criticism" (p. 165).

After 13 chapters that consist largely of such passages, Becker presents the substantive foundation of the new science, "*the single unifying principle*" on which it is based (p. 327, emphasis in original). This single foundation, or major premise, is "The Principle of Self-Esteem Maintenance," a "universal principle of human action akin to gravitation in the physical sciences," whose discovery means that "we have arrived at a Newtonian maturity" (p. 328). "Just as gravity explains the northward course of the Rhine and the southward course of the Rhone, so the principle of self-esteem maintenance 'explains' both schizophrenia and depression, sadism and masochism, hypersexuality and homosexuality, passivity and aggression, and so on" (p. 329).

To be sure, this principle alone does not explain everything. It has to work in tandem with "a properly elaborated theoretical structure" (p. 329). But given this single unifying principle, we now have an "invariant point of reference" (p. 337) which links biology with culture and which provides an "automatic ethical imperative" (p. 337).

Thus the highest vision of Enlightenment science is fulfilled: science and ethics are shown to be inseparable, and a reading of nature in the service of man is realized in the most basic and direct way. The science of man in society, linking the individual subjectivity with the social, institutional roles via the principle of self-esteem maintenance, then becomes itself a wholly ethical edifice. There is no need to place ethics in front of sociology, as Comte did, precisely because this edifice is based on a continuing facilitation of human well-being. Lotze and Ward saw that life itself, "the great heart of nature," is the subject matter of science. To further human desires is to further nature, and a science devoted to this will be inescapably ethical and educative. Human desires, to quote Ward again, . . . "constitute the only good from the standpoint of sociology." [P. 337] .

In short, Becker equates holistic social science, or unitary vision, with integrated thought which is based on a single unifying principle. Suppose that such a single principle is impossible. Suppose that all work in social science, no matter how specialized or holistic, and no matter how empirical or speculative, must begin (as I believe it must) in the middle of things, and that there is no single point of departure from which we can make everything else follow. Must we then give up all attempts at a unified social science?

I do not believe that this conclusion follows, but I do not think that Becker's version of a synthesizing social science is likely to be fruitful either. Most works of social science, unless they are exploratory or purely descriptive, and all works which aspire to be theoretical, seek to maximize (1) generality, (2) complexity, and (3) precision. But as Richard Levins, the population biologist, has suggested, it is usually not possible to maximize all three values at the same time, or in the same theory or the same work. For example, as I read, say, the works of Leo Schnore on American cities and suburbs in the 20th century, he is maximizing complexity and precision, not generality. For generality we have to go elsewhere, perhaps to Simmel or to Wirth or to some other source in which we might also find either complexity or precision, but not both. Similarly, as I read Marx's *Eighteenth Brumaire*, he is maximizing complexity and precision, at the cost of generality. For generality (at the cost of complexity) in Marx we have to go elsewhere, such as to the analysis of the wage relationship in *Das Kapital*.

Since we cannot do everything that we want to do in any single work, or in any single theory, we cannot have a "single unifying principle" which serves equally well, no matter which goal, or which two goals, we are trying to maximize in a given work. But we can have overlapping theories which vary in the extent to which they maximize any one of the three central goals. A work of synthesizing social science which maximizes complexity and precision, at the cost of generality, is likely to be historical, including studies of the present as history. One which maximizes generality and complexity, at the cost of precision (as this book tries to do), might take the form of discursive theory. One which maximizes generality and precision, at the cost of complexity, might fit more easily into deductive or other systematic formats which are logically or mathematically elegant. If there is overlap in substantive content, the findings and conclusions discovered within each of these styles both qualify, and are qualified by, works written in the other styles. (Hence, thinkers such as Marx or Freud who write in more than one style often seem to contradict themselves.)

The unity of social science would consist, then, of these mutual qualifications which stem from the overlapping content of works which vary in the extent to which they maximize generality, precision, or complexity, or at most two of these three values. This unity does not consist of a single general theory, written in a single format, flowing out of a single

unifying principle, under which everything else in social science can be subsumed.

Analogously, to touch only briefly on the ethical side of Becker's work, it seems most unlikely that any single principle, unless it were completely vacuous, could possibly provide an ethical imperative for all situations. In a universalistic context—say, drafting divorce laws which apply to everyone—we may have to maximize the generality and the precision of the rules. In a particularistic context—should my best friend, who comes to me for help, get divorced?—we may have to maximize complexity and the normative analogue of precision. And of course, doing the right thing—such as publicly admitting a grievous mistake, or giving food to the starving—is sometimes incompatible with maintaining one's own self-esteem or the self-esteem of others.

Becker's version of the unity of science, together with its one, central ethical imperative, also has political implications. That imperative is the maintenance, not the creation or the fulfillment, of a state of affairs (self-esteem) which is assumed to already exist. This ethical imperative is static.

The politics of almost any single truth that is coupled with almost any single moral value (the divine right of kings, or what is good for General Motors, or maintaining the worker's state, or the authority of the church, or maintaining self-esteem, or whatever) is inherently conservative. Becker associates progress with choice, and social science with the freedom to choose. Hence, like most of the founders of American sociology, he opposes laissez-faire capitalism. We are not supposed to be passive objects of impersonal market processes. But like most of the founders, his alternative to laissez-faire is not socialism or communism or anarchism. It is, apparently, welfare-state capitalism.

Becker's attacks on "the degradation of commercial advertising" (p. 274), on the "price man pays for allowing the forms of commercial society to take precedence over the vital life process" (p. 279), and on "our present profit-oriented and mythologically based commercial society" for being an "obstacle" to "an ideal program for progressive education" (p. 302) remain ethical or cultural critiques. His "ideal program" cannot be realized "so long as we have an *uncontrolled* commercial distributional system" (p. 302, my emphasis).

As far as one can make out—and Becker's political program is not very clear or specific—this is a call for more of the interventionist capitalism that we already have. In very general outlines, at least, Becker's political views are similar to those of Albion Small or Charles Horton Cooley. Such views were progressive at the turn of the century. Today, as with the ethical imperative to maintain self-esteem, such views are conservative. Or, more accurately, Becker wanted to maximize a venerable liberal value, individuality, within (as he writes) a venerable conservative value, community; but his thinking did not go beyond the general outlines of the kind of society that we already have.

Ernest Becker would beg to differ with many of these judgments. He

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was a very learned scholar who attempted to synthesize both social science and ethics under a single principle. He was also a very modest scholar who announced "the inadequacy and unfinished nature" (p. xiv) of his work. He was a loner and a heretic whom we should have welcomed. He was too young to die. He should still be with us, so that we could talk with him, and so that he could continue to work on and to write about these issues.

Book Reviews

Harold D. Lasswell on Political Sociology. By Harold D. Lasswell. Edited by Dwaine Marvick. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977. Pp. vi+456. \$22.00.

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During a professional life that lasted more than 50 years, Harold Lasswell (1903–78) published over 4 million words. Dwaine Marvick has extracted from this formidable corpus 22 essays, clustered around five main themes. In addition, Marvick, a talented dialectician with an extraordinarily accurate ear for personal idiosyncrasies of speech, has produced a longish, informative, biographical and critical introduction more or less in Lasswell's own style, a touching act of homage whether fully intended or not.

The sections embodying the five themes of *Harold D. Lasswell on Political Sociology* are "Elite Analysis and the Contextual Approach," "The Use of Developmental Constructs," "Political Communications: The Work of Symbol Specialists," "Political Psychiatry," and "Intellectuals and the Political Process." It seems unlikely that readers of this *Journal* would be unaware of Lasswell's pioneering contributions to each area; indeed, in some cases scholarly work proceeds on these themes in a vocabulary almost entirely invented by Lasswell.

I suppose that of all these areas political psychiatry takes first place. Marvick quotes Leo Rosten's anecdote about Lasswell's discovery of Freud, as extraordinary a tale as Aubrey's account of Hobbes's first encounter with geometry: "He was raised in Decatur, Illinois, and spent summers in Indiana with an uncle who was an M.D. This uncle, baffled by his inability to relieve a patient of a paralysis of the arm that had no physical cause, heard of the work of a certain doctor in Vienna who was curing cases of 'hysterical paralysis.' The Indiana medic wrote to Europe and ordered some German books by one Sigmund Freud. Young Harold, then fourteen or fifteen, read them. They seemed rather sensible" (quoted from Arnold Rogow, ed., *Politics, Personality and Social Science in the Twentieth Century* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969], p. 6). This would have been in 1917 or 1918. "It was not until I was a junior at the University of Chicago," Lasswell said, "that I discovered that Freud was controversial."

Nobody says when or how the teenaged Middle Westerner learned enough German to tackle Freud. Those who knew the affably aloof Lass-

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well of later years can readily imagine a ferociously curious, gifted, rather solitary youngster, with a lot of time on his hands, learning enough German on his own to get by. A more plausible version of the story, however (p. 17), is that it was Freud's Clark University lectures of 1909—in English—that Lasswell read. Accounts of Lasswell's life are filled with unresolved details of this sort. An undoubted prodigy, Lasswell cultivated a public posture of unruffled omniscience that has discouraged his admirers from seeing any limitations at all to the reach of his intellect. His detractors, on the other hand, of whom he has had his share, insist that his life's work consisted of an elaborate shell game.

The detractors are clearly wrong, on at least two counts. There is, first of all, the record of Lasswell's efforts to synthesize in writing disparate traditions in social analysis for the purpose of monitoring and forecasting significant social and political trends. In many of these efforts (e.g., the empirical study of ideology, the study of political socialization, and the content analysis of mass communications) Lasswell was a full generation ahead of anyone else in the social sciences. It is not surprising that under the circumstances he developed a distinctive expository style, filled with code words and highly individual compressed language, or that, after the empty spaces around him filled up with thousands of social scientists working away at aspects of the intellectual agenda he had earlier envisaged, he persisted in his own vision and his own vocabulary rather than accommodate to the prevailing academic culture.

Second, there is the record of his influence, direct and indirect, on younger social scientists. For example, virtually all political scientists who work in the clinical tradition of political psychology trace their intellectual roots directly to him. But his influence extends far beyond that. He is the immediate precursor of the entire modernizing generation of political scientists, now in their sixties, who made political science a social science. A fair number of these (e.g., Gabriel Almond, V. O. Key, Herbert Simon, Nathan Leites, Ithiel de Sola Pool) were affected as students by his presence at the University of Chicago until 1938. But others located elsewhere, such as Robert Dahl and Heinz Eulau, freely acknowledge the liberating effects of his writing on their own thinking about politics.

The essays collected in *Harold D. Lasswell on Political Sociology*, then, are in one sense a record of the changing preoccupations of a pioneering social scientist. They can also be read as accounts of the developing agenda of a goodly portion of social science itself, as a series of prototypes and exemplars in the application of objective methods—greatly varying in their rigor—to problems of both analysis and policy. I imagine that these efforts will always remain controversial, but there is no doubt about their importance. Marvick has assembled a collection highlighting many of the strengths of Lasswell's work. Consequently this volume can serve as an excellent introduction to an impressive body of social science by Lasswell and others.

Revolution and the Transformation of Societies: A Comparative Study of Civilizations. By S. N. Eisenstadt. New York: Free Press, 1978. Pp. xvi+348. \$15.95.

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University of Chicago

Revolution and the Transformation of Societies advances the proposition that pure or true revolution was a European phenomenon of the 17th–19th centuries which is disappearing from the realm of the probable in the 20th century, and never existed in other societies, owing to the absence of suitably complex coalitions among dissentient groups in traditional (i.e., patrimonial, city-state, tribal, imperial, and what the author calls imperial-feudal) regimes.

It seems to me that the argument is largely logomachy. S. N. Eisenstadt first defines true revolution in such a fashion that his analysis only fits events in early modern Europe and then treats the implication of his definition, elaborately worked out in dreary polysyllabic prose, as a great discovery. If one chose to alter the definition of true revolution, entirely opposite results would ensue. Hence I fail to see what importance can be attached to the way Eisenstadt works out the logical consequences of his definition, unless, of course, one assumes that his formulations exhaust the truth and carry conviction in and of themselves.

What I think Eisenstadt may really wish to tell us is that large-scale political violence is unlikely any longer to lead to the establishment of freer polities than existed in whatever old regime the violence may succeed in sweeping away. If by freer one means providing greater scope for private innovative activity and less control by public bureaucracy, such a proposition seems quite plausible to me. But, being value free, Eisenstadt does not use terms like "freedom" or "liberty." Instead, he tells us that "... the movements of rebellion, protest, and intellectual antinomianism that crystallized into the great revolutions tended strongly to combine themes and orientations of protest with relatively realistic orientations towards the formation of centers and collectivities and towards institution building" (p. 174). This, he says in the next sentence—too long to quote here—is what "distinguished these revolutions from all other movements of protest."

Even when self-styled revolutionaries successfully took over power, as in Russia in 1917 and China in 1911 and again in 1949, Eisenstadt finds important continuities between the old and new regimes of those countries which make them fall short of his ideal type of "true revolution." Similar continuities of course may be found also in 17th-century England and 18th-century France, but these two archetypical instances of "true" revolution meet Eisenstadt's definition (more accurately, his definition was designed around them) and so no discrepancy arises. How could it?

I find little to admire in such word games and deplore three qualities of the book. First and foremost, it is written in a private jargon that is hard for the uninitiated to penetrate. The first half of the book amounts to a condensed summary of typologies of political society Eisenstadt worked out at greater length and (one hopes) with more intelligibility elsewhere. In this book he feels free to take very debatable distinctions for granted as self-evident. Accordingly, he uses terms like "centers of society," "segregative change," etc., in idiosyncratic ways, without bothering to explain to the unwary reader what he means.

Second, Eisenstadt uses his private language in a way that is so general as to be well-nigh meaningless. For example: "The crucial link between the degree of autonomy of the institutional entrepreneurs, the main aspect of the institutional structure, and the processes of change is the scope of resources and activities not embedded in ascriptive collectivities and, hence, the scope of institutional markets (i.e., markets of money, prestige and power) that cut across the major ascriptive communities, as well as the freedom of flow of such resources among the most important institutional markets of the society" (p. 104). Careful reading of that sentence will show that it is grammatical; but what in the world does it mean? It comes in a chapter entitled "Patterns of Change in Traditional Societies" and is clearly meant to apply to all traditional societies. But when I try to flesh it out with an example I am completely at a loss. I simply do not know what he means. Much of the book, like this sentence, leaves me floundering for a foothold in fact, to which his generalizations might perhaps adhere. On the occasions when he does favor the reader with specific examples he is intent to save the system, not to test the applicability (or inapplicability) of his terminology to details of what happened. Occasionally, too, there are plain errors, as on page 74, where some carelessness of proofreading, perhaps, gives us Akkad in the 3d century B.C., Mongols in the 2d century A.D., Germanic and Slavic tribes settling in Europe in the 1st century A.D., and Mesoamerican kingdoms in the 2d century A.D. Such indifference to chronology implants the suspicion that in the thrust for generality whatever does not fit has been conveniently discarded.

Third, I feel that Eisenstadt is a dogmatist at heart. He assures us, for example, that his "analysis identified the combination of structural and cultural characteristics of societies, on the one hand, and historical circumstances or conditions on the other, that is most conducive to the occurrence of revolutions and of revolutionary transformation as the major mode of social change" (p. 215). No "perhaps" about it. The truth has been stated, and lest the reader not recognize it, the author is there to tell us what he has achieved. Nevertheless I remain unconverted; Eisenstadt's polysyllables have not exhausted the truth about revolutions, nor, I think, done anything to illumine my understanding of them.

Antireligious Propaganda in the Soviet Union: A Study of Mass Persuasion. By David E. Powell. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1975. Pp. xi+206. \$25.00.

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Considering the major difficulties inherent in producing a study of this kind, David Powell is surprisingly informative. In a well-documented and sensitive manner, he indicates the rationale, nature, and effectiveness of various propaganda techniques aimed at eradicating traditional religious commitment in Soviet society. But although the reader will find extensive information in *Antireligious Propaganda in the Soviet Union*, there is an underlying theoretical inadequacy which mars (at least sociologically) an otherwise useful book.

Powell rightly starts with the Soviet aim to change people radically. He cites leaders from Trotsky to Krushchev who have played variations on the New Man (*sic*) theme. Among other things, the Communist party has always had on its agenda the need to destroy the power of the Church and to induce people to renounce their beliefs, as a prelude to proper "communist upbringing." Powell's book is faithful to its title in that the focus is on the effort directed at the erosion of belief instead of on attempts at resocialization. A historical introduction documents the early stages of crude antireligious activity entailing both physical violence and tasteless propaganda films and discusses the League of the Militant Godless; the main text explores the different types of propaganda persuasion used. Powell notes the more diffused nature of antireligious activity since the 1950s in the Knowledge Society, the school system, and atheist clubs and museums. He shows how secular holidays and ceremonies (*rites de passage*) have aimed explicitly not only at supplanting religious ones but also at bolstering communism at every point. His treatment of the mass media leaves something to be desired, in that he implies that there exists a kind of impartiality in Western news reporting, as opposed to the Soviet "agitation via facts." The work of the Glasgow University Media Group, among others, has begun the task of giving contrary evidence here (*Bad News* [London and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977]).

The contrast between mass oral propaganda and face-to-face work of atheists is an interesting one. Powell does not remark, when observing the relatively greater potential of individual work, that here the atheist organizations are aping precisely those tactics which appear to have most success among proselytizing groups of the so-called religious variety. On the other hand, he demonstrates fairly well why the individual approach is not enjoying wide success (mainly because the atheist agitators seldom have the competence and knowledge to address appropriate messages to particular groups sensitively).

In his general assessment, Powell concludes that antireligious propa-

ganda does not achieve its hoped-for aims, for a variety of reasons. Propaganda seldom reaches believers. The suprarational character of religion is unrecognized by the atheists, who tend to imagine that rational arguments demolish "faith." The propagandists themselves are often relatively unskilled in their art and sometimes lacking in enthusiasm. Thus, the author argues, their efforts are misconceived, misdirected, and clumsy.

It is what Powell omits that makes his argument less useful in a broader context. The argument is, admittedly, about mass persuasion, but the context is equally that of secularization. Therefore Powell could have made more use of the kind of argument recently advanced by David Martin (*A General Theory of Secularization* [Oxford: Blackwell, 1978]) relating political sociology to the sociology of secularization. Powell mentions what Martin calls "ideological monopoly" but fails to see its wider consequences. Because Marxist dogma in the Soviet Union is a "sacred canopy," one ought to see that the Communist party has no option but to persecute. When truth and power are aligned, alternative realities must be quashed.

This leads to another consideration left untouched by Powell. Given that the Soviet authorities have realized the low impact of their propaganda, what do they do? Powell rightly notes that propaganda is a relatively harmless ritual, performed because terror is too obvious, and the party lacks the patience to wait for the natural death of religion. But having failed to see the inevitability of some form of persecution, Powell does not comment on the contemporary tactic of psychiatric incarceration. (See, for example, *Psychiatric Terror*, by S. Bloch and P. Reddaway [New York: Basic Books, 1977].)

Last, and again following from the secularization theme, Powell is unconvincing when he deals with the persistence of belief in the USSR. He uses a mixture of Soviet and Western arguments to indicate why belief should persist. The well-worn emotional and psychological reasons are given, along with comments about family influence, broadcasts from outside, and the dubious idea (given that Church power has been severely eroded) that the clergy gives an organizational base to religious "survival." Christel Lane, whose study *Christian Religion in the Soviet Union* (London and Boston: George Allen & Unwin) appeared in 1978, proposes a more plausible theory. She argues (specifically in "Some Explanations for the Persistence of Christian Religion in Soviet Society," *Sociology*, vol. 8, no. 2. [May 1974]) that religion becomes (at least) a vehicle of ideological protest when the dominant and exclusive ideology fails to integrate and satisfy significant groups in a given population. (She also comments far more extensively than Powell on the differences between religious groups.) It is hardly surprising that the Soviets could not countenance this explanation, which exposes their own ideological inadequacy in the eyes of some. But if Lane is correct, we may expect Christian religion to grow in the USSR.

As Martin reminds us in his general theory of secularization, the political and the religious simply cannot be separated in any adequate analysis. In the Soviet Union it is clearer than in many other societies that religious

life entails political dissent and political life involves religious faith. And who is to gainsay the believer who argues that the true explanation for persistence is that Christ is building his church?

An exploration of these kinds of complexities would have made Powell's useful study even more significant.

Revolution at Work: Mobilization Campaigns in China. By Charles P. Cell. New York: Academic Press, 1977. Pp. xix+221. \$14.95.

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University of Chicago

China presents a challenge to our attempts to understand revolutionary regimes and the dynamics of social change. For a long time, China appeared to stave off the thermidorian reaction so typical of revolutionary regimes as well as the Soviet-style bureaucratization, restratification, and rigidification which seemed to be the fate of all socialist states. Charles Cell's *Revolution at Work* tries to come to grips with China's revolutionary dynamism by examining the role of mobilization campaigns over the past quarter-century.

Since 1949 there have been a multitude of such campaigns in China (Cell gives an incomplete list of 71 national ones), in which the population has been mobilized for goals as simple as raising their awareness of a new constitution and goals as complex as ridding the society of feudal remnants, incipient bureaucratism, restratification, overspecialization, and careerism as in the Cultural Revolution. The simplest campaigns have been only media blitzes. The most complex have bypassed the existing bureaucracy, using special ad hoc work teams to implement new programs and calling the total population into mass study, criticism, and struggle sessions. The Cultural Revolution starting in 1966 went furthest, tossing even work teams aside and using mass attacks to virtually destroy the existing governmental, educational, and industrial bureaucracies. Though the goals are quite various, Cell suggests that campaigns can be categorized into three broad types—economic, ideological, and struggle—depending on whether the main goal is to change economic conditions, change people's consciousness, or attack individuals seen as illegitimate in the existing system.

A host of methodological questions can be raised about this study. It includes data from official Chinese media and from a personal visit to China, but primarily it rests on the detailed evaluation of 36 campaigns by 13 refugees and émigrés interviewed by the author in Hong Kong during 1971–72. The data are sparse. Most campaigns were evaluated by only two informants. No campaign was evaluated by more than three informants, and some were evaluated by only one informant. Given this heterogeneity of sources on different campaigns, there should have been checks

on whether the differences in backgrounds and views of informants influenced the pattern of results. Though these checks easily could have been tabulated from the interview schedule, none are presented. Nevertheless, the author deals with many other questions about bias and reliability in refugee interviews carefully and convincingly, and response bias may well be no more than a minor source of difficulty.

More serious questions can be raised about the author's decisions on coding. The three major scales in the study are the levels of mobilization, shortcomings, and achievements in campaigns, with each scale consisting of 17–29 Guttman scaled items. The decision was apparently to record short- as opposed to long-term effects of campaigns. This produces some anomalies, especially for the combined Great Leap Forward, Commune, and Backyard Furnace campaigns starting in 1957–58. All three are coded as achieving improved collective economic conditions, broken production records, and new material achievements, while the first two are coded as improving family material conditions. In fact, over the three-year period from 1958 to 1961 after the start of these campaigns, agricultural production plummeted by a fifth, hunger and malnutrition were widespread, and the death rate went up. The heady and sometimes false reports of successes at the start of these campaigns hardly justify ignoring their long-run negative effects. The difficulties presented by ignoring these negative effects are compounded by there being no place in the coding of shortcomings for economic failures. The shortcomings scale includes items like the reinvestigation of errors after campaigns, excessive labeling of targets, and politically induced suicide, but no counterparts to the economic conditions which constitute so much of the achievements scale. Given these coding decisions, one is suspicious of the finding that the balance of achievements and shortcomings is greater for economic campaigns (including the Great Leap Forward, Commune, and Backyard Furnace campaigns) than for ideological and struggle campaigns. This finding may be as much an artifact of coding as a statement about the real world.

The problem of coding also vitiates Cell's critique of the use by G. W. Skinner and Edwin Winckler ("Compliance Succession in Rural Communist China," in *A Sociological Reader on Complex Organizations*, ed. Amitai Etzioni, 2d ed. [New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1969], pp. 410–38) of Etzioni's normative, coercive, and remunerative modes of compliance to analyze Chinese campaigns. No bother. The critique is misdirected anyway. Skinner and Winckler discuss these modes of compliance as stages that any major campaign must pass through; Cell believes any campaign to have one of them as its single dominant goal (normative = ideological, coercive = struggle, and remunerative = economic). The issue is poorly joined.

Despite these difficulties, Cell's major conclusion must be correct—it fits what we know from other sources and is highly plausible. The greater the mobilization (including more slogans, study sessions, slide shows, books, rallies, and struggle sessions), the longer a campaign continues and the more both its achievements and shortcomings accumulate. Achieve-

ments and shortcomings are not independent but closely related, since both are determined by the level of political mobilization in a campaign.

This states well the central dilemma in using a campaign strategy to bring about social change. When the goals are drastic ones like ridding the countryside of landlords and old established elites, eliminating corruption, and suppressing "counterrevolutionaries," campaigns with widespread mobilization may be one of the few ways to bring about rapid change. However, indiscriminate attacks can generate additional opposition groups and eventually a severe backlash.

One of the secrets of the Chinese success in sustaining revolutionary change for so many years may have been that for a long time Peking was able to restrict the scope of campaigns and limit the number of groups alienated by them. The Maoist model of major and minor contradictions is explicit on this issue, insisting that attacks on targets should not be indiscriminate and that an alliance with the majority of social groups should be maintained even when there are minor contradictions with these groups. The failure of the Great Leap and the even greater failure of the Cultural Revolution may have occurred precisely because these limits were violated. The Cultural Revolution especially went beyond the threshold into intolerable radical change. The number of people threatened and under attack was too great. Social order was destroyed, and a conservative backlash developed. Cell, writing in late 1976, could only begin to touch on this issue. But by 1978 it was clear that the Chinese intellectual and bureaucratic elite who were so threatened by the Cultural Revolution were seeing to it that their position would never be threatened again and that a moderate regime would be insured for years to come. Moreover, they were doing so with abundant popular support from those alienated by the radical programs of the 1966-76 decade. The thermidorian period so typical of other revolutionary regimes appeared finally to have arrived in China as well.

Even though completed before the conclusion of this thermidorian transition, Cell's analysis of the inextricable link between achievements and negative side effects in radical mobilization campaigns gives us the tools by which to understand the dynamics (the dialectics, if you will) of radical thrust and conservative response in revolutionary regimes as well as the threshold beyond which radical programs cannot be pushed.

Class Differences in American Kinship. By David M. Schneider and Raymond T. Smith. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1978. Distributed by University Microfilms International. Pp. 132. \$8.75.

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This small book is an important addition to the growing literature on family life and kinship. Written by two anthropologists, *Class Differences*

in American Kinship examines variations in family structure and kinship vis-à-vis a comprehensive theoretical framework that incorporates ideas not only about normative and behavioral systems but also about cultural systems.

David M. Schneider and Raymond T. Smith set about to explain why there is considerable uniformity in the values that people place on marriage and a "normal" family life, while at the same time considerable variation exists in family norms and behavior. The uniformity is present in the abstract cultural conceptions of kinship. Americans of all social classes and ethnic groups share the same fundamental notions of how "blood" is transmitted and creates imperishable bonds between people, have the same definitions of motherhood and fatherhood, and internalize the same meaning of marriage. The variation in kinship patterns is seen both in the normative rules for the formation of families and in behavior of family members toward each other. These variations, which develop when abstract conceptions of kinship are actually embodied in social roles, are essentially class-based differences that cannot be fully explained without a consideration of both the American culture system and its social structure.

Schneider and Smith argue that American culture, with its strong emphasis on egalitarianism and individualism, is heir to the complex belief systems that developed with the "transformation of European societies from collections of closed estates to relatively open class societies" (p. 20). Bourgeois individualism, the dominating ideology of American society, has given rise to a special emphasis on the value of rationality. In the middle class, rationality has become the cultural orientation that stresses "the use of universalistic standards in making choices" (p. 26). In the lower class, rationality has become the cultural disposition to maximize security in a social world perceived to be "unpredictable and largely uncontrollable" (p. 119). And the stress upon security is the main reason why traditional criteria and particularistic standards are used to establish lower-class family relations.

The difference between middle-class and lower-class rationality is most clearly reflected in the sex-role components of kinship which, according to Schneider and Smith, constitute the most important class-based variation. Whereas in the middle class sex-linked roles are deemphasized in favor of universal criteria for determining specific tasks, in the lower class sex-linked roles, embodied in notions of maleness and femaleness, are strongly emphasized. Whereas in the middle class the particular form of a relationship between a man and a woman is less important than its intrinsic quality, in the lower class relationships between a man and a woman are clearly defined in terms of segregated, albeit complementary, roles. Whereas in the middle class, the nuclear family is treated as a unique and independent unit within the domain of kinship, in the lower class, the nuclear family roles represent diffused solidarity involving cooperation with and often dependence on a wide range of kin.

However, in addition to the variation in the structuring of norms in American families, there are also significant differences in actual behavior.

For example, whereas unemployment, welfare dependency, drug addiction, drunkenness, and petty crime have persistently plagued lower-class families (even though they do not typify the lives of these families), these aspects of behavior have had far less effect on the lives of middle-class families.

Schneider and Smith contend that the class-based differences in family norms and behavior are inextricably tied to the structure of American society. Thus the differences in sex-role components are primarily and fundamentally related to differences in family positions in the occupational and status systems. Likewise, differences in familial behavior derive mainly from differences in the relationships of families and individuals to the American economy. "Steady employment for males, with involvement in a range of welfare plans such as medical and unemployment insurance, savings and life insurance, and home purchase schemes, provide a stabilizing effect upon marriage and reinforce middle-class normative stress upon the nuclear family," write Schneider and Smith. "Unemployment and irregular employment, coupled with high rates of female participation in the labor market, has the opposite effect" (p. 107).

Not all of the attention is devoted to lower- and middle-class families in this useful book. The working-class family represents an intermediate stage between the lower- and middle-class families. It has a firmer economic base for sustaining conjugal unions than the lower-class family, but it continues to exhibit the lower-class pattern of sex-role differentiation and extended kinship ties. Although the working-class family is oriented toward mobility, it is mobility in search of greater security. In short, its intermediate position in terms of family norms and behavior reflects its intermediate position in the American occupational and status systems.

Ethnicity and kinship are also examined by Schneider and Smith. Ethnicity does create distinguishable communities within the lower class, but "the very traditionalism, rural origin, and adjustive functions of these subunits provides a certain structural uniformity which coincides with and reinforces the general lower-class orientation derived from similar positions in the occupational, power, and prestige hierarchy of American society" (p. 39). Even among poor black families, the patterns of kinship frequently defined as being ethnically distinct are in fact class-based phenomena.

This is a very thoughtful book. However, it is not easy to read. Throughout, complex distinctions are made without sufficient elaboration. The dense, ponderous prose would have been much easier to follow if Schneider and Smith had made greater use of their field notes (based on interviews with 59 Afro-American, Spanish-American, and southern white families living in Chicago) to illustrate complex theoretical arguments or conceptual distinctions. Indeed, some of the most interesting parts of the book are those infrequent passages that include the comments of informants about lower-class family life. But I would like to emphasize that failure to make extensive use of the case materials does not in any way diminish the importance of this study. In fact no student of American kinship and

social stratification can afford to ignore it. *Class Differences in American Kinship* is filled with theoretical and substantive insights, and it offers a unique and sophisticated approach that convincingly links the abstract conceptions of culture with the more directly observable aspects of social and behavioral systems.

The Liberation of Women: A Study of Patriarchy and Capitalism. By Roberta Hamilton. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1978. Pp. 117. \$16.25 (cloth); \$7.50 (paper).

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The Women's Liberation Movement of the 1960s challenged many long-established patterns of male-female relationships. As traditional practices were questioned, new explanations of the subordination of women were put forward, explanations which crystallized a debate between a revised Marxist analysis and a new radical feminist analysis. In Roberta Hamilton's *The Liberation of Women* we now have the first detailed analysis of this debate and a tentative approach to a more comprehensive understanding of women's subordination.

Two basic questions are asked: Why have women occupied a subordinate position in society? and How can changes over time in the form and degree of women's subordination be explained? Hamilton examines the first question in a brief but insightful discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of both the Marxist and the feminist responses to it. "The feminist analysis has been able to account for the differences *among* women. The Marxist analysis has been persuasive in explaining class differences, but is much less adequate in its explanation of the omnipresence of the status difference *between* men and women" (p. 13).

Rather than elaborate on the differences between these approaches and attempt a synthesis, Hamilton turns to an examination of the second question, concentrating on a specific historical period, 17th-century England. Her strategy is to present both a Marxist and a feminist analysis of changes in women's roles during this period and then to contrast them to reveal their differing emphases and their areas of overlap. The strategy is an exciting one which promises the reader a chance to evaluate the possibilities and limitations of each analysis.

Much of what Hamilton does is well done. She is best in her persuasive and thought-provoking critiques of earlier Marxist and feminist analyses. She has a facility for getting at the basic issues and stating them clearly. Ironically, her very strengths as a critic led to my disappointment in her work as a theoretician developing feminist analysis.

Although she emphasizes the importance of biological differences in creating different "life chances" for men and women, she does not discuss

how these biological differences are institutionalized into typically male and typically female life possibilities. In her discussion of the importance of patriarchal ideology, it is never clear whether she views ideology as *creating* social change or as *legitimizing* change which has already occurred. Without a more explicit discussion of her positions and her reasons for holding them, the theoretical basis of her feminist analysis remains obscure, and the relationship among biological differences, patriarchal ideology, and the position of women remains abstract and ahistorical.

In contrast, Hamilton's Marxist analysis is clearly specified. Changes in the mode of production are accompanied by changes in social relationships generally, and in the family particularly. Together, these changes affect women's position in society and in the family. The historical investigation based on that theory is logically structured and precise. We see how the shift from feudal to capitalist production undermined the family as an economic unit in production, how social relationships between husbands and wives were affected by these changes, and how the position of women differentiated with the emergence of bourgeois and proletarian family units.

In her analysis of 17th-century ideology, the theoretical problems inherent in her feminist analysis remain. From her detailed exposition of shifts in patriarchal ideology during the Protestant Reformation and her allusion to Max Weber, I assumed she took the position that ideology was a primary factor in creating social change. However, she reports that there is little evidence of social changes related to the ideological changes. Unfortunately, she does not explain or even discuss this lack of relationship between changes in patriarchal ideology and changes in the status of women. Such a discussion could have advanced our understanding of feminist theory.

In a final summary of the historical material, Hamilton shows that the patriarchal ideology of the 17th-century Protestant clergy was transformed by the rise of capitalism and that, in its new guise, this ideology was used to legitimate new ideas about family life, sexuality, and the "nature" of women. This summary illustrates the promise of analyzing the intersection of capitalism and patriarchal ideology to explain the forms of women's historical oppression, but it does not outline a theory or method for a separate feminist analysis. That task remains to be done. The author comes closest to attempting it in the final chapter, in which a psychoanalytic approach is suddenly introduced as providing both a theory and a method. Brought in without any preparation, this suggestion fails even to clarify the problem.

One additional problem is Hamilton's concluding argument for separate development of Marxist and feminist analyses on the grounds that a combination would produce an intellectually inferior product. This is a strange argument because she does not review any of the attempts to provide a combined Marxist/feminist analysis. It is also ironic since her own analysis is most successful where it has combined Marxist and feminist approaches. There are valid grounds for supporting separate theoretical development, but these are grounds for arguing that separate development

should continue, not that integration should not occur. To disallow the latter seems doctrinaire.

The author has made a significant contribution in establishing the advantages and limits of Marxist analysis of the position of women. My disappointment is great only because she did not make a similar contribution to feminist analysis although she seems to have such a contribution to make.

The Pursuit of Equality in American History. By J. R. Pole. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978. Pp. xv+380. \$14.95.

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There is little doubt that the American ideology, given its traditional and deep-seated commitment to equality, appears rife with paradox. How does one explain, for example, the complacency with which vast inequalities of wealth and power in this society are tolerated? Why does the idea of a negative income tax, such as George McGovern proposed, meet with such widespread reprobation? How does one juxtapose the putative love of equality with the simultaneous fear that socialism would produce a society of equally mediocre individuals? The most widely accepted response has been that within the American ideology equality competes with liberty as a normative commitment and that, in the final analysis, concern for the protection of the individual takes precedence even when the consequence is considerable inequality.

The Pursuit of Equality in American History both complicates and illuminates the matter. For J. R. Pole, the paradox stems not from the tension between the ideological commitment to equality and liberty but, instead, from contending and crosscutting understandings of equality itself. Thus, this book makes an important and, I believe, profound contribution to a sociological understanding of American ideology. It suggests that the American commitment to equality is more complicated than it may appear on the surface. Moreover, the book serves to illuminate the ideological obstacles to achievement of a more equitable society.

The author charts the career of the idea of equality, first as it emerged through theological and intellectual currents prior to the American Revolution, then as it influenced and, in turn, was influenced by new constitutional structures, and as it provided the ideological impetus for several reform movements throughout our history. Pole argues that historically the American commitment to equality has been, in fact, a commitment to two different understandings of equality: equality of esteem and equality of opportunity. He demonstrates that concern for the two kinds of equality was seldom coincident, that they embodied contending conceptions of the

ideal society, and that they presented alternative agendas for social redress. In short, equality as a generalized value fueled two separate social commitments in the society. At different times in American history, one or the other was ascendant as an ideological and political weapon to promote a more equal society.

Pole claims that the contemporary public commitment to equality, and the broad national consensus which supports it, emerged only recently with the Warren Court. The current concern is a culmination of a historical process in which the two kinds of equality have become incorporated into a broader, more catholic national commitment. Yet equal esteem and equal opportunity remain, in many respects, in conflict with each other. The collapse of these separate concerns into one accounts for the consensus that currently embraces the idea of equality; yet the tensions which remain between the two explain the contemporary confusion that reigns concerning both the means to achieve more equality and the conception of the ideally egalitarian society. Only by understanding the nature of the dual commitments to the idea of equality as they emerged historically, Pole argues implicitly, is it possible to understand the contemporary impasse.

The distinction he draws between esteem and opportunity is a familiar one to sociologists. Esteem is concerned with hierarchies of status and prestige. The commitment to equality of esteem implied efforts to equalize respect between individuals and groups. Equality became an important ideological force during the American revolutionary period, for example, because the colonial relationship was interpreted as denying equal status: British rule was an affront to America's self-esteem. Equality of esteem, generated by English common law and natural-rights philosophy, first expressed itself politically as a demand for equal political rights, as in "no taxation without representation," and for equality under the law, with American colonists demanding equal protection against official searches and seizures. In this context, equality pertained to the rights of individuals to be protected from abuse as a consequence of status differences. Here, equality and status hierarchy peacefully coexist. Political equality or equality under the law challenges prevailing status distinctions only to the extent that they infringe upon the individual's right to be treated as an equal member in the public realm.

The commitment to equality of esteem concerned with individual rights, has, ironically, expressed itself in movements to protect group pluralism. For example, the emergent doctrine of the separation of church and state in the 18th century was propelled by an egalitarian argument. As Pole argues, the religious revival movement of the 18th century furthered the struggle for equality, not because of theological doctrines but as a result of political exigencies. Only by promoting an understanding of equality which denied the morality of the government's special support for one denomination as opposed to another could religious practices be protected against governmental interference. Through the doctrine of church-state separation, the public commitment to equal esteem became more fully

entrenched. Other groups in the society, most significantly racial and ethnic groups, subsequently insisted on an American pluralism accompanied by minimal governmental interference. They justified their demands with claims to equality similar to those of religious groups.

Equality of esteem, then, represents a commitment to the protection of individual rights to insure free expression. It is achieved through the preservation of an American pluralism and predicated on limited governmental interference in public affairs. The role of government is a defensive and protective one: it insures sufficient procedural guarantees to protect individuals from the abuses of an inegalitarian, but unavoidable, status hierarchy.

Whereas esteem is concerned with prestige and status, opportunity, in contrast, refers to hierarchies of class and economic stratification. Equality of opportunity originally emerged as a "formal cover" for individual incentive and private aspiration. As Pole describes it, the problem faced by the new nation was how to legitimate private ambition by individuals in the society and reconcile it with the public interest, or public good, itself strongly influenced by a conception of equality. In this setting, equality constituted a commitment to insure that each individual be free to compete for the rewards the society had to offer. Yet, the sanctity of individual incentive was tempered by a commitment, first made prominent by Thomas Jefferson, that personal success should in some degree be publicly regulated to be consistent with some meritocratic standards. It was, therefore, Jefferson's suggestion that the government should go into the business of education to promote the creation of a leadership class imbued with knowledge and public virtue. Through its sponsorship of educational institutions, the government was obligated to identify and reward talent.

Equal opportunity came to imply a commitment first to individual incentive and then, in addition, to meritocratic criteria. Personal success would not be unprincipled and random but would conform to some agreed upon normative standards. The contemporary concern with equal opportunity demonstrates the continuity with earlier formulations. Education continues to be the pivotal factor in insuring equal opportunity, and while not often overtly expressed, the issues of individual incentive and the commitment to reward personal talent are still just beneath the surface of public debate.

This conception of equality, defined as the ability of an individual to achieve personal success regardless of class position, crystallized in American history later than the belief in equal esteem. Nevertheless, Pole demonstrates that the reform movements of the 19th and 20th centuries alternately embraced these different understandings of America's commitment to equality. Slavery and later racial and ethnic discrimination were attacked largely for their denial of basic individual rights to members of the society. Equality was defined and understood in the context of esteem and was to be promoted through the tolerance of a racially pluralistic society. On the other hand, the post-Civil War industrial revolution and

the excesses of a capitalist economic system came under attack through equal-opportunity claims. Working-class and trade union movements identified inequality as emanating from privileges accrued through social position and education and sought to provide increased access and opportunity to those not similarly privileged. Political movements embracing such a conception sought specific social outcomes involving individuals' access and opportunity to compete for social rewards.

These reform movements resulted in specific changes in American society; individual rights are now more strongly protected and opportunity is more widely distributed. In addition, these movements served to articulate more sharply the American understanding of equality. Since ideological commitments so strongly influence the direction of social policy and action, it is important to understand the different implications of these two conceptions.

Whereas equal esteem promotes American pluralism, equal opportunity embraces a conception of American society based on a rather stark individualism. The commitment to individual incentive filtered through a meritocracy sanctifies the individual and tends to deny the salience of any mediating group. Equal esteem endorses a restriction of governmental interference in the society except to protect individual rights; equal opportunity insists upon increasing governmental regulation of private interests to promote initiative and meritorious standards. Thus, equal esteem envisions a society in which status distinctions do not interfere with the achievement of equal respect for all individuals, while equal opportunity envisions status and class structure as products of a constantly renegotiated system in which individual initiative and merit reign supreme.

Pole's argument, in part, is that the politics of equality following World War II and the political and judicial response to these movements reflected an understanding of equality in which status and class concerns were collapsed into a broader, less well-defined, concept. The consequence has been that equality holds a more central place in the political rhetoric and is embraced by a larger proportion of the public than formerly. But, in addition, the contradictory meanings held within the one concept lead to confusion and dissension concerning the strategies and goals for a more egalitarian society.

For example, the rationale and objectives for school integration and busing remain confused and contradictory. On the one hand, they derive partly from the concept of equal esteem. Segregation has been interpreted as a denial of equal rights for members of certain status groups. Integration is legally mandated to protect individuals from discriminatory treatment. The rejection of the "separate but equal" doctrine implies a commitment to protect individuals publicly from the application of invidious status distinctions, to prohibit stigmatization. It envisions a society in which no group is denied equal treatment. On the other hand, integration and busing are justified as measures of equal opportunity, necessary to provide minority-group members with equal access to competition for so-

cial rewards. The integration and busing policy is seen as an affirmative commitment to benefit individuals historically denied opportunities because of group membership. It constitutes a movement toward a society in which any individual can compete, with groups no longer being salient social categories. Thus two different social objectives are involved, each implying a different role for government; yet both are defended in terms of a concern for a more egalitarian society. It is little wonder, given the fact that integration and busing policies emerged in the courts principally as a result of a concern for equal esteem and are now defended largely in the context of equal opportunity, that little public support remains for school busing. Similar confusion exists within the public debate over affirmative action and special admission programs.

Pole's analytic distinction between esteem and opportunity is, I believe, essential to the understanding of the complexity of the current debate over equality and its expression in contemporary racial politics. He achieves more in this book than I have indicated. His detailed discussions relating equality to specific periods of American history and his chapter on women and equality are important contributions to the study of these ideas and their relation to political and social developments. But it is his separation of equality into two distinct components which makes his book both profound and provocative. For sociologists concerned with the American ideology and for those interested in American racial and ethnic relations, this book is very important.

Policy Analysis: A Political and Organizational Perspective. By W. I. Jenkins. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978. Pp. x+278. \$19.95.

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The analysis of public policy, despite a vast and often brilliant literature, is hampered by a number of difficulties: the topic is inherently complex; many scholars approach it from a limited disciplinary perspective, working in splendid isolation from the data, the methods, the models of other disciplines; and analysis is often entangled with evaluation, in many instances obscuring the purposes of the study. *Policy Analysis*, by W. I. Jenkins, senior lecturer in interdisciplinary studies at the University of Kent, Canterbury, is a bold attempt to keep such difficulties fully in mind while examining basic issues in public-policy analysis.

Adapting a statement from G. K. Roberts, Jenkins defines public policy as "a set of interrelated decisions taken by a political actor or group of actors concerning the selection of goals and the means of achieving them within a specified situation where these decisions should, in principle, be within the power of these actors to achieve" (p. 15). Implementation,

as he notes, is not built into this definition; but he emphasizes that the analysis of policy must include the examination of the manner and extent of implementation.

Although he draws primarily on political science, Jenkins explicitly seeks to combine insights into public policy derived from political science with those from the sociology of organizations and, in some measure, from economic and psychological studies as well. The book is intended as a text for advanced undergraduates and graduate students, but the compression required to deal with such a range of views in a relatively short book makes it closer in style to an "annual review" than to a text. (One might hope that sometime soon some ambitious publisher and editor would undertake reviews of the literature and problems of a series of such topics, with the explicit aim of emphasizing their multidisciplinary qualities.)

Jenkins's discussion is closest to systems theory—not closed and equilibrated models, but open and messy models, if that is not a contradiction in terms. In effect, he asks: How can we combine into one system the explanation, or at least the explication, of a policy process that includes at least the following aspects: situational factors (demographic, economic, etc.), policymaking processes within varying authority structures (this must include internal political contests as well as the political setting of the structure); personalities of individual policymakers, their goals, the dilemmas they face; the demands and reactions of clients; policy outcomes; the output of those policies (these are not automatically the result of policy decisions); policy effects and feedback processes that flow from them. It is scarcely surprising that policy analysts have sought to bring "order" to such a complex system by emphasizing some elements of it as basic—cost-benefit analysis, or internal political processes, or bureaucratic structure.

In his discussion of these numerous issues, the author draws upon a wide range of studies and theoretical systems. He is undogmatic in his assessment, preferring to describe the strengths of numerous authors while pointing out what he sees as their limitations.

The chapter on evaluation is especially valuable to those of us brought up on the notion of unencumbered research—or research encumbered only by intractable nature, the shortage of funds, and our own ineptness. The epistemological line between policymakers and policy analysts, vague at best, often fades nearly away in the process of evaluation, with its close link to implementation. Jenkins quotes Wildavsky's remark that "... to say that one will first think of a great idea and then worry about how it might be implemented is a formula for failure" (p. 204). Perhaps one ought to add that to think primarily about implementation is to run the risk of being co-opted, to court the danger of being unimaginative, banal. I think of implementation as standing between policy analysis and evaluation. If it is merged entirely into the former, utopianism may be the result; if it is merged entirely into the latter, it will do scarcely more than confirm the established policies.

Jenkins briefly discusses various methods of evaluation—controlled experiment, retrospective studies, cost-effectiveness techniques, and what he calls ad hoc methods (miscellaneous, informal processes)—but he examines none of them in detail. A full study of American income maintenance programs, for example, would have been of great value in his discussion of the links between policy and evaluation. If he is correct, and I think he is, in sharing the view of many that evaluation is inherently political, then it is crucial in these times, when evaluation research has become so important a part of policy, that we know the ways in which and the degrees to which various methods are politicized. Sociologists have been notoriously (or wisely) slow in entering the evaluation field. Is it because we are particularly sensitive to the conflict between “Is it true” and “Is it in the bureau’s self interest”? Or is a large amount of outsiderism essential to the skills, or at least self-selection, of sociologists? Whatever the cause of this neglect of evaluation—with, of course, some notable, and a probably growing number of, exceptions—sociology must at the least study the evaluation process (evaluate it, if you will). And that may suggest the need for other kinds of involvement.

It might be well to summarize the strong and weak points of *Policy Analysis*, as I see them. American sociologists will profit by two enlarging perspectives, furnished by the use of British studies and illustrations and by major reference to other social sciences. Emphasis on the value of the integration of case studies with comparative and analytic studies is valuable. Jenkins recognizes that nondecisions as well as decisions require examination. This opens up many issues in policy analysis which are usually neglected and for which methods of study are poorly developed. His nondoctrinaire systems approach allows him to examine the interactions of a large number of factors essential to policy analysis.

At the same time there are some weaknesses. The writing style is convoluted, sometimes repetitive. (“This is basically, very basically, a starting point.”) I believe that a much more thorough examination of bureaucracy than he gives is essential to policy analysis. Because he deals only with public policy, he loses the opportunity to draw on the extensive literature dealing with policy formation in the private sector. That literature is valuable both for the differences between private and public policy formation that are revealed—highlighting by contrast—and for the similarities. Herbert Simon’s rather abstract model of “administrative behavior” does not fit Jenkins’s multivariable model of policy analysis very well, but the study of how corporations reach decisions can tell us a great deal about how public bodies do.

In sum, *Policy Analysis* is a valuable discussion of many questions fundamental to all the social sciences. As a text, it poses many of the problems that require study, but it would need strong support from other sources and from the instructor to compensate for the brevity of its treatment of most issues.

Sociology in the Balance: A Critical Essay. By Johan Goudsblom. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977. Pp. viii+232. \$12.50.

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The Dutch sociologist Johan Goudsblom has set himself a difficult and important task: to survey and evaluate the state of contemporary sociology. His tone is right, critical yet without unnecessary polemic. He writes in a clear and accessible style, and his references range broadly over European and American sociology. Yet, despite certain interesting contributions which should not be neglected, Goudsblom's effort is seriously flawed. It suffers because he is not specific or coherent enough in his critiques; not penetrating or deep enough in his knowledge; and, at crucial times, too limited and one-sided in his perspective.

Sociology in the Balance offers a general framework within which the sociological enterprise should be judged: its precision about empirical facts, its sophistication in abstract systematization, its scope, and its relevance. These matters do indeed seem central, and the framework promises an interesting if somewhat impressionistic means for talking about certain fundamental and recurring problems of the sociological enterprise. Sociology should seek precision without being methodologically inhibited; it should try to systematize without turning concepts into fetishes; it should achieve a broad scope without eliminating the barriers between sociology and common sense; it should seek relevance without irresponsibility. Beyond asserting these important generalities, however, Goudsblom's argument is highly ambiguous. To each of the four elements in his framework he devotes a chapter of analysis and discussion. In none of these chapters are his purposes consistently clear and, unfortunately, they are often inadequate.

Chapter 2 ("Attempts at Fact-finding in Sociology") is concerned with the problem of precision and considers a variety of methodologies by examining specific instances of research: the "rhetoric of induction" in Znaniecki's life histories; the "rhetoric of experimentation" in the urban research of the Chicago school and in the Hawthorne factory studies; survey research in a Dutch analysis of leisure-time use; field studies in the work of Warner and the Lynds. Goudsblom's evaluation of these methods consists merely in quotation from earlier, and widely familiar, critical studies, to which he adds hardly any commentary of his own. To refute specific points, however, he does briefly invoke general argument: Znaniecki's facts were thoroughly impregnated by theory; the Chicago school's concepts were too abstract to be tested by their experimental method; the Hawthorne experimenters were blinded by political bias; the leisure survey ignored historical context; Warner's field studies never developed a theory of power. But while such points may refute the particu-

lar studies at hand, what of the general issues? Is experimentation necessarily doomed to finesse theory or to be damaged by political bias? Do surveys necessarily ignore history? Are field studies always a-theoretical? Goudsblom never addresses himself to this level of abstraction, and we are left with an analysis of certain attempts at fact-finding but not with an approach to the problem of fact-finding itself.

In chapter 3 ("On System-building in Sociology"), Goudsblom attempts a more general analysis but with highly uneven results. His focus is the antithesis of positivistic fact-finding, namely, the role of deduction, classification, and concept formation in sociology. While he argues, against positivism, that it is necessary to differentiate concept formation from the finding of fact, he criticizes Parsons on the grounds that he deals with abstractions rather than human beings, a critique that commits the positivists' own error of misplaced concreteness. Yet Goudsblom goes on to criticize Homans on the very opposite grounds—that he has sacrificed truly general abstractions for overly specific empirical propositions—and he concludes this chapter by calling for more systematic theory in sociology. Once again, no general arguments about the problem are attempted. What, for example, is the difference between formalism and good systematic theory? How do the different elements of sociological theorizing relate one to the other: models to concepts, concepts to philosophical presuppositions, presuppositions to methods, methods to ideological commitments? These are the questions which Goudsblom's analysis implicitly raises, but he leaves us without any answers.

The title of chapter 4 is "Problems of Scope in Sociology." Although we are provided with workmanlike summaries of the theories of Comte, Marx, and Durkheim, the critical problems of what "scope" is and why contemporary sociology has failed to achieve it are never defined. Scope apparently involves both theoretical breadth and historical perspective. While Goudsblom argues strongly for history, contemporary sociology is too often historical to be characterized as lacking scope in this dimension. A more likely problem is theoretical breadth. Goudsblom argues that it is sacrificed when sociology is too narrowly disciplinary; yet he is also afraid that disciplinary barriers will be completely broken down. Thus, he applauds Durkheim for creating the disciplinary framework for sociology while criticizing him for being too narrowly sociological.

In another approach to theoretical breadth, Goudsblom argues for synthetic as against one-sided theorizing. Once again, however, he is more successful at criticizing than constructing a general perspective. He praises Marx for producing the base-superstructure formulation but criticizes Marxists for being too economicist. He lauds Weber for his study of religion but warns against freeing ideas from their class context. He stresses the need to combine power and values, voluntarism and social determinism, and concludes with a long presentation of Norbert Elias's *The Civilizing Process* (New York: Urizen Books, 1977), which he treats as the prototype for any sociology that would have historical perspective and theoretical breadth. Yet, granting the penetration of that book, Elias is

certainly not the only sociologist to interpenetrate personality with social system in a historical way. If there is something unique about his attempt—apart from the undoubted importance of its specific historical topic—we could discover it only on the basis of some analytic standard of “scope.” But to produce such a standard Goudsblom would have had to engage in the kind of general theoretical confrontation he steadfastly avoids.

The final chapter (“Problems of Relevance in Sociology”), on the fourth element in Goudsblom’s schema, is similarly elusive. Although he expresses dissatisfaction with the argument that sociology must be aimed exclusively at social relevance, he argues, nonetheless, that sociological thought should be regarded simply as an ideological search for the meaning of social life, and that every practitioner expresses this meaning from the perspective of a particular social group. Although he argues tentatively that the contemporary strands of individualistic action theory, conflict theory, and consensus theory should be regarded, respectively, as extensions of 19th-century theories of middle-class liberalism, working-class Marxism, and aristocratic conservatism, this argument is stated rather than developed. Goudsblom’s own position on relevance is never specifically formulated. In the end we are still uncertain whether he views this alleged connection of sociology to social groups as good or bad, as productive or unproductive of sophisticated intellectual discourse.

Goudsblom’s critical framework for sociology, then, is never successfully applied. The questions are good ones, but we finish the book without knowing the answers. The problem, it seems, is that Goudsblom’s theoretical perspective is either vague or, when specific, too narrow. He states his general perspective in chapter 1, in the form of “points of departure”: (1) human beings are interdependent, (2) societies undergo continuous change and development, (3) social structures result from unintended consequences, (4) the crucial contexts for human action are large-scale social “figurations.” These are laudable principles, but who would argue with them? Goudsblom’s discussions of interdependence and unintended consequences never go beyond this banal level, but he develops the second and fourth principles in more specific ways. Despite its rich connotations, however, “figurations” turns out to be basically synonymous with political and economic context, and it is the logic of exchange theory we hear whenever “social figurations” are discussed. As for the developmental principle, although Goudsblom makes some fascinating forays into the sociology of knowledge, he pushes this emphasis on change toward an extreme historicism. He equates the historical explanation of a theory with its analytic evaluation. He also argues, in a similar vein, that the abstract, analytic concepts of sociology are doomed to fail because they can never transcend the historical context of their creation. If we differentiate economics from politics conceptually, he asks, how can we study primitive societies in which the two dimensions are fused?

In his concluding pages, Goudsblom notes that some critics will no doubt accuse him of a lack of conceptual clarity. He argues, in response, that the “margin of vagueness” (p. 197) is justified because his concepts are

sensitizing rather than definitional, and because any greater specificity would give to sociology only a false illusion of intellectual clarity. But surely a theoretical discussion of sociology must transcend the intellectual confusion of its subject. Although Goudsblom has set himself an extraordinarily difficult challenge, there is a sense in which his book is still not ambitious enough. But even though he has not succeeded, he must be praised for making the attempt. Sociology needs more of this kind of intellectual courage.

The Melancholy Science: An Introduction to the Thought of Theodor W. Adorno. By Gillian Rose. New York: Columbia University Press, 1978. Pp. x+212. \$17.50.

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The reception of the critical theory of the Frankfurt school in the Western world in the early 1960s and then again in the late 1960s and the 1970s has been fraught with contradictory motives and interests. On the one hand, there were attempts to disavow Frankfurt school thought for being short of so-called praxis; these missed the intent and purpose of its critical theory as a sublimation of and a testimony to the defeated possibilities for the realization of Marxian socialism in Europe in the 1930s and 1940s. On the other hand, the thought of Adorno, Horkheimer, and Marcuse found a small responsive audience, who sought to defend or elaborate upon the philosophy of these quite different thinkers. Most notably the appeal was oriented toward psychoanalysis, aesthetics, and philosophical critique as it attempted to explain both the political failure of the working class and the victory of fascism in the West. Now in the late 1970s Gillian Rose has written a book on Theodor Adorno which tends for the most part neither to dismiss critical theory nor to defend it, but instead to unravel some of its concepts through a cogent analysis of Adorno's philosophical and sociological writings. *The Melancholy Science* is clearly a contribution to the ongoing discussion of Frankfurt school thought. The book is extensive in scope and substantial in insight, ranging from Adorno's critique of Hegel, Kierkegaard, Husserl, Heidegger, and Durkheim to his debates with Lukács, Benjamin, and Brecht. One could not have hoped for more, considering the difficulties in communicating this rather abstruse tradition to an English-speaking audience. As an introduction to Adorno's thought—and no other claim is made by the author—this volume serves Adorno well and can be seen as complementary to another recent book on him by Susan Buck-Morss, *The Origin of Negative Dialectics* (New York: Free Press, 1977).

Those who are oriented toward a more "nuts and bolts" approach to Marxism might be sidetracked by Rose's suggestion that "if Lukács has

turned Marxism into method, Adorno has turned it into the search for style" (p. 139). Nevertheless, the chapter on style is indeed interesting and original because of the claim made for the influence of Nietzsche on Adorno. But lacking in this chapter and the others as well is the historical context for the evolution of Adorno's "style." How does one reconcile his early formal philosophical works with the shrill tone of his polemics in *Jargon of Authenticity*, *Prisms*, and *Minima Moralia*? Central in all of this was the experience of National Socialism and the haggling over who was to blame among intellectuals, as if intellectuals in the academy had the requisite power and means to bring about the horror of National Socialism and then withstand it. Unfortunately, at this point Adorno's "style" transformed itself into "method." His so-called immanent critique of Simmel, Mannheim, and jazz music, to name but a few examples, becomes "external" critique, leaving much to be desired. Also unfortunately, Rose, who is all too convinced of the success of Adorno's method, does not allow those who are criticized to have their say.

A positive feature of Rose's book concerns Adorno's aesthetics. She has succeeded in differentiating his conception of the autonomy of art from the views of Lukács, Benjamin, and Brecht. For Adorno, art is not to be reduced to political practice or to the social milieu in which it arose. After working out the nuances of the seemingly irresolvable problem in Adorno of art as both social fact and autonomous movement (pp. 109-14), Rose ultimately contents herself with the criticism that Adorno "was never able to distinguish between the *political effects* of different forms of popular art" (p. 148; my italics). Does that mean that there are forms of popular art that will incite the masses toward the better society? Here I prefer Adorno to Rose. More to the point is the question whether a Marxist aesthetics is possible or even desirable. The tragedy of Adorno is to be found in his posthumously published *Aesthetische Theorie*, in which he wants historical materialism and the transcendental nature of art to exist peacefully side by side (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1974 [pp. 374 ff.]). Whether such a resolution is conceivable is not taken up by Rose.

The fundamental task of *The Melancholy Science* is to dissect Adorno's concept of reification, with its rather bleak conclusions. Indeed it is hard to be encouraged by Adorno's remark that in a world of total reification "even the most extreme consciousness of doom threatens to degenerate into idle chatter" (*Prisms* [London: Neville Spearman, 1967], p. 34). Reification is not to be reduced simply to the Marxian notion of commodity fetishism, in which things are misperceived as human and humans misperceived as things. Instead, Rose claims, Adorno's theory of reification was grounded in Marx's theory of value in a "highly selective" fashion (p. 47) and is to be differentiated from the theories of Lukács and Benjamin. For Adorno, the driving force in modern society was the principle of exchange, which not only corrupts the cultural forms themselves but obscures consciousness of the underlying relations of production. According to Rose, in the process of generalizing Marx's theory of

value to society and consciousness as a whole (total reification), Adorno has closed the door on social change, neglecting the all important agency for political change.

Hoping to solve problems that arise when Marx's theory of value is oriented only toward an epistemology, Rose relies on a Marxian theory of power which would supposedly fill in the gaps left by Adorno. For Rose, Adorno's "neglect of social forms diminishes his ability to offer a compelling analysis of political organization and the relations of power in capitalist society" (p. 141). She blames this flaw on his faulty interpretation of Marx. Adorno "sacrificed the unique advantage of a Marxian approach: the derivation of political relations and of the state from an analysis of the productive and social relations of a specific kind of society"²⁴ (p. 141). These are indeed important criticisms which may allow us to exit from the labyrinth of "total reification" which Adorno has spun. But I doubt whether a significant concept of power will arise from Rose's reliance on Marxist formulas.

In fact, disdain for a market-oriented economy as such was the foundation for the "critical theory of society." Because Rose overemphasizes the "value" side of Adorno's concept of reification and implausibly links his *Tauschprinzip* with Marx's use value-exchange value scheme, she misses this connection and therefore ignores the fact that a market-oriented economy does not always necessarily issue into capitalist relations of production. At this point one might suggest that critical theory expresses some unresolved dualisms in its perception of liberalism. Indeed its concept of the individual and its stress on ego autonomy and private space places it among the most libertarian traditions in Marxism. However, the dualism between liberal and Marxist social-philosophical tenets remains unresolved. In this context it was mainly Horkheimer who pointed out the need to emphasize the aspect of preservation in dialectical thought. Indeed, the fundamental tenets of liberal thinking were not to be merely dismissed but were to be preserved and realized in what he came to call "the right society." But the dualism of the critique of the market economy and the glorification of the concept of the individual persist in the thought of Adorno as well as in Horkheimer and Marcuse. What seems to be a fundamental dilemma in the critical theory of the Frankfurt school turns out to be a central problem in the Marxist tradition itself, namely, the inability to derive economic policy (market oriented or not) from Marxist theory and the profound weakness in developing a socialist conception of law which would preserve individual rights. The problem, therefore, is not so much an uncertainty whether critical theory is moribund or can be preserved as the fact that socialism is once again on trial, and the verdict does not appear likely to be favorable.

Book Reviews

Sociology for Whom? By Alfred McClung Lee. New York: Oxford University Press, 1978. Pp. 236. \$10.00 (cloth); \$3.00 (paper).

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For those familiar with Lee's work this will be a familiar book, for all of the chapters have appeared in various forms elsewhere. They range from public presentations such as Lee's 1976 ASA presidential address to articles and chapters carrying essentially the same message. Although Lee has sometimes provided minor transitions from one chapter to the next, *Sociology for Whom?* does not flow in the sense that there is an argument which progresses and builds on what has preceded. Many of the chapters use the same terms, for example, plutocracy, military-industrial complex, establishment sociologists, corruption, and so forth. This is not to deny that these things exist or to say that we should not be forcefully reminded of them. It is simply to point out some redundancy.

For those unfamiliar with Lee's work a brief overview might be useful. Lee begins this collection by wondering about the human future and sociology's role in it. He offers a vision: "The wonder and mysteries of human creativity, love, and venturesomeness and the threatening problems of human oppression and of sheer persistence beckon and involve those with the curiosity and courage to be called sociologists" (pp. 16-17). (More on the right kind of sociologist later.) The first chapter, "Sociology for Whom?" is based on Lee's address to the ASA. Essentially it says that sociologists ought not to be captured by and work for established interests. The sociological profession is bureaucratized and served by entrepreneurial technicians, but if sociologists are to serve humanity, they must "... act principally as critics, demystifiers, reporters, and clarifiers" (p. 36). This conclusion, which really does not follow from what Lee has said in this chapter, acts as a bridge to the next one, "Demystifying Theories about Human Life and Living."

It is in this second chapter that Lee begins to lay the groundwork for his version of humanistic sociology. "Humanism," of which he identifies five varieties (liberal humanism, Marxist humanism, "religious" humanism, humanistic psychology, and humanist social science), is valued because it contributes to a process of demystifying social thought and encourages people involvement, especially in the form of a social science which makes participant observation a central methodological focus.

In "Feuds between Sociologists and Social Workers," Lee argues that each discipline has much to learn from the other. "Key Issues in Sociologies as Weapons" draws a fine distinction between positivistic sociology and humanistic sociology and gives seven ways in which we can tell one from the other. The message is that humanist sociologists fight against elitist efforts "... to sanction the power of social scientists and at the same time to strip individuals of their sense of personal control and re-

sponsibility" (p. 92), while positivist sociologists do not. These sociologies, then, are significant weapons in the struggle for the control of the "manipulable normal" members of society, who are the focus and subtitle of chapter 5, "The Stakes: The 'Manipulable Normals.'" They are seen as "the masses" by members of the cultish self-reproducing intellectual elites, as "social material" by intellectuals who serve actionist elitists, and, as you may have guessed by this point, as "human beings" by humanist intellectuals with broad social experience (p. 110).

Chapter 6, "Strategies for Social Change," breaks the pace somewhat, for it is based on an interview in *Journalism History* in which Lee discusses propaganda analysis and notes that we do not really do it anymore. We should, he implies, because it could be a tool for demystification and thereby contribute to social change. "A Sociological View of Human Survival" treats the issue of the potential sources for change and the countervailing powers. I will list them because I wish to return to them when I deal with the question of what, really, constitutes a humanistic sociology and the implications of this position. The things that might prevent change are (1) the dehumanizing tendencies of the social sciences, (2) the pressures that exist to reduce people to worker-consumer-voter automats, (3) the encouragement of divisive and destructive popular movements, (4) the scientific "sharpening" of mass-media manipulation, (5) the growth of plutocratic imperialism as represented by multinationals, and, finally, (6) warfare in the plutocratically imperialistic world. Now what could check this? First, we have (1) humanist-existential-democratic social science, then (2) the expansion of the power of the people as represented by their vertical invasion of the seats of power, (3) the revolt of the young, (4) increasing individual autonomy, (5) the inefficiencies and inconsistencies of large government and industrial organizations, and (6) pressures to achieve a more rational and tenable basis for a participatory community (pp. 153-54). Now I would like to be optimistic too, but where does Lee get the evidence to demonstrate the trends he sees? Is he talking about the same youth that formed the bulk of the support for George Wallace when he was involved in the presidential primaries? What evidence is there that the seats of power are opening up to the masses? Are there fewer men and women of wealth and power in Congress now than at some other time? Is individual autonomy represented by California hot tubs, Transcendental Meditation, rising divorce rates, or "doing your own thing"? In this chapter, as in many others, contradictory evidence is simply brushed aside with a rhetorical flourish, and evidence is offered which does not really support the points being made. Evidence for the upward expansion of the masses comes from the "fact" that sons of workers sometimes have white-collar jobs. That does not take into account changes in occupational structure, nor does it deal with the issue of the cooptation of those who "move" up the ladder. To take one final example from this chapter, the author says, "In the society that is coming, dominated by the great body of people, such restrictions cannot persist" (p. 162). (Restrictions refer to such things as racial,

ethnic, religious, and class characteristics.) He then footnotes, among other things, Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward's *Regulating the Poor* (New York: Pantheon, 1971). Now I may have missed the point of Piven and Cloward's work, but I thought it was that welfare is a means of controlling people. How, then, can one take this particular work as evidence of the supposed fact that society is going to be dominated by the people?

"Responsibility and Accountability in Sociology" is my favorite chapter. Originally given as an Alpha Kappa Delta symposium address, it deals with some of the thornier ethical problems of our discipline and provides an excellent discussion of the events surrounding the disgraceful treatment of Professors Margaret Cussler at the University of Maryland and Paul Nyden at the University of Pittsburgh. I believe that Lee is at his best when he assumes the simple role of rescuer without the ideological trappings. Finally, there is, "What Future Has a Humane Sociology?" which was an address given at the founding conference of the Association for Humanist Sociology. To build a future for a humane sociology, sociologists are urged to develop a society of cooperative friends and eschew competitiveness, to be critical of power and its abuse in the discipline, to be skeptical of the printed word, to critically examine fads and to suspect theories, to see problems from the perspective of the underdog, to examine the worldwide problems of colonialism, and to explore and publicize the manipulative policies of those in power. And what is wrong with that, you may well ask? Nothing at all, and I quite approve Lee's goal. But how are we to get there, and is humanistic sociology, as presented by Lee, the way? My concern with this book is that readers may try to treat it as programmatic, which it is not. It is one thing to point to what is wrong, but quite another to decide what has caused a particular problem and how the problem may be solved. Throughout these chapters, the world is divided into two camps, the humanists and the nonhumanists, the establishment sociologists and the nonestablishment sociologists, the plutocrats and those who are not. Everything good is listed under the humanist column, and whatever is annoying, evil, or uncomfortable under the other. By what logic? Let us examine Lee's vision of humanistic sociology, compare it with a standard philosophical version, and then consider the implications.

Humanism, for Lee, is a position of thought grounded in the works of the sophists and the belief that "man is the measure of all things" (p. 42). Any objections, such as Plato's that this results in relativism, are seen by Lee in the following light: "This Platonic sneering, this anti-intellectualism, is a sample of the innuendoes with which elitist philosophers have tried to destroy the teachings of such sophists as Protagoras . . ." (p. 42). The virtue of the sophists' teachings for the humanist sociologist is that "they had had direct participation in social change—in other words, field-clinical experiences with social and cultural reorganization—thrust upon them" (p. 43). I should note that this is one of the reasons why Lee and other humanist sociologists place such a high value on par-

ticipant observation as *the* methodological tool. To continue, though, sophism is seen as a philosophy rooted in change. Humanism, like sophism, has suffered problems when trying to label just what it is. "It is shifty, and it is sticky" (p. 44). The problem of definition can best be solved, it is argued, "... by realizing that humanism most accurately labels not a body of doctrine but a kind of mind-changing social experience. It is a recurrent ingredient in social movements, not a specific idea or social philosophy" (p. 44). Basic to this are one-to-one experiences that contribute to the humanization of investigators as they empathize with others. Humanism, then, has been identified with a wide variety of religious, political, and academic movements. Lee lists atheism, capitalism, classicism, communism, democracy, egalitarianism, populism, naturalism, positivism, and pragmatism, among others. In short, it is not really stretching things to say that it is everything to Everyman. The author adds that humanism is always "concerned primarily with individuals, with human expression and creativity, with human society and socializing, and with people's ability to persist and flourish" (p. 45). "Humanism is heady stuff" (p. 48). Although I could continue to list Lee's "definitions" of humanism and humanist sociology, I think that the above will suffice. What remains in the articles are largely injunctions and exhortations to humanist sociologists: they must fight entrenched interests, value the views of the common man, be empathetic, eschew positivistic methods, and struggle for change.

As has been noted, humanism is not a theory but a commitment, and a vague one at that. This is not the place to go into all the criticisms of naive humanism that have been raised, but the problem of cultural and individual relativism cannot be ignored. In arguing for the virtue of change, Lee writes, "Such frequent rebellions would keep society sufficiently responsive to popular needs to avoid rigidification" (p. 118). Led by whom and to what ends? Surely Lee is not unfamiliar with the fact that "frequent rebellions" have, in an increasing number of societies, contributed to a greater level of repression. Some theories suggest that rebellion will result in positive consequences only at specific historical moments. The point that I want to make is simply that some philosophical/theoretical systems carry with them tools for analysis and a praxis that focus the problem and the solution. Humanism, as presented in this text, does not. For that reason we have a listing, as noted above, of signs of a better world, all related to change. Thus, individualistic enterprises are praised, as is advertising, which "prods all groups to be dissatisfied with aspects of how they are currently living" (p. 165). It also, of course, purveys dehumanizing substitutes to fill the very gaps in the psyche it has created. Humanism simply does not provide us with the tools to analyze industrial capitalism and its problems. It does not tell us where the roots of the problems are, or what might be done. It says that we ought to be concerned. But unguided concern is like an unlaidd egg. Lee cites approvingly the work of the early Chicago school of urban sociologists for getting down to the level of their subjects and describing their misery. But

as has been shown by a growing number of radical urban sociologists, those methods and findings contributed to a set of social policies that were ultimately conservative, and they totally ignored the political economy of urban areas.

If humanism were only, as Lee claims, a mind set that said we ought to have as our goal the development of a humane world, there would be no problem. But it is more than that. For instance, as Ted Benton in *Philosophical Foundations of the Three Sociologies* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977) has noted, modern humanism accepted a positivistic definition of science, which was incorrect, and then argued that a science of man required a different form of science, or rather methodology. (This is, of course, the neo-Kantian problem, and there are doubts whether their view of empiricism, as opposed to positivism, is an accurate one.) In any event, as Benton argues, "... the humanist is led to suppose that the epistemological problems and methodology of the natural sciences can be put aside as of no relevance to the development of an adequate methodology in the social studies, and may even be led to complete epistemological scepticism or agnosticism" (p. 47). The nature of the social world also becomes problematic for the humanist. Alienation, coercive power, and an unintelligible world become phenomenal forms, and not the essence of society, because man is the measure of all things and created his order. I should note, too, that the problem of voluntarism/determinism is not handled by Lee, or by humanists in general.

Humanism can be used as a vehicle to criticize the ASA and establishment sociology, but it can do little more than contemplate the problems of the larger society and the gap between politics and sociology. Philip Abrams, when reviewing John Owen's book on Hobhouse in this *Journal*, pointed to the issues that Hobhouse was struggling with: "How can one demonstrate that science advances progress while admitting that science rests on assumptions that are culturally relative? How can one ground the notion of progress in the actuality of human purposes in a way that makes development a meaningful idea but avoids teleology? How can one validate the claims of social science as knowledge while repudiating both idealism and positivism?" (84:1009). Any sociologist, humanists included, would do well to try to answer these questions.

Organizations in Modern Life. By Herman Turk. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Inc., 1977. Pp. xxv+283. \$15.00.

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Organizations in Modern Life is an important work in an era of increasing academic specialization. Herman Turk takes advantage of such disciplines as urban sociology, political science, community studies, ecology, organi-

zational sociology, and macrosociology and integrates their results. The main approach, which organizes both Turk's theoretical reflections and the empirical studies he has carried out, is interorganizational. He argues convincingly that the main social actors in modern life are organizations, but the aim of the book is more ambitious than that: "to reformulate broad perspectives on stability and flux, so that they may be applied to all kinds of large and complex social units" (p. ix). The book's breadth and ambitious aims, its interdisciplinary nature, and the demonstration it provides of the utility of the interorganizational approach to large social systems are its basic merits.

A strong point of the book is that theoretical reflections are backed by wide-ranging studies of 130 of the largest (over 100,000 inhabitants in 1960) cities in the United States. The studies included the following organizational properties and their consequences for American metropolises: external linkage, organizational complexity, scale and diversification of the internally regulating and coordinating organizations, organizational representation of solidarity and diffuse consensus, externally provided resources, centralization of the macrosocial unit, availability of internal linkage, and the activation of interorganizational networks. Four main population variables are employed throughout for purposes of control: population size, population density, migration, and socioeconomic status.

Linking general hypotheses and theories with detailed studies is always a difficult task and a formidable barrier for many authors, and Turk does not solve the problem in an entirely convincing way. My greatest reservations are directed at the way he formulates his hypotheses. The author puts them down in the form of sequences of sentences, in which the ones which follow are meant to derive from their predecessors. But this is not always the case. As one reads the book, the question "why" constantly arises. The reflections in chapter 3, entitled "Centralization, Conflict and Decision Networks," are an example. Turk writes: "The greater the organizational complexity, the greater the plurality of interests and standards, the less the centralization. From these postulates follows the proposition: the greater the organizational complexity, the less the centralization" (p. 98).

Why is there less centralization when there is a greater plurality of interests? One could argue that the opposite tendency is likely to occur: greater plurality leads to increased centralization, which is a way of reducing plurality and replacing it with the interests of the whole or the few. From this follows: the greater the organizational complexity, the greater the centralization.

Turk continues: "But the same pluralism induced by organizational complexity that opposes centralization also prevents opposition by the mass, because an organized mass has a plural structure of organizations that is unlikely to acquire the consensus and solidarity necessary to unified opposition. The greater the organizational complexity, the greater the plurality of interests and standards and the more cross-cutting lines of

conflict and accord. The greater this plurality, the less likely is dialectical conflict. The proposition that follows from these postulates is: the greater the organizational complexity, the less likely is dialectical conflict" (p. 98).

Why should there be no dialectical conflict when there is no unified opposition? It seems that dialectical conflict comes into play independently of the presence of unified opposition. The latter only verbalizes it.

On these assumptions (which seem to me false), Turk builds the main propositions of chapter 3. His advantage lies in the fact that his theories are backed by the results of his studies. In the example under discussion, the problem is that he must have reached the conclusions he did because he did not study any centralized interorganizational networks but kept to decentralized ones. His basic assumptions are that decision making is for the most part decentralized and that interorganizational relations tend to be horizontal rather than hierarchical in a modern urban community composed of organizations. These assumptions affect his studies. It is true that Turk analyzed centralized "reform government," but cities having any two of the following attributes were considered municipally centralized: nonpartisan elections, a council elected at large (not by district), and government by a city manager.

These indicators may not be the best way to measure the degree of centralization of decision making. The indicators of decentralization, though different from the centralization indicators, raise similar questions (p. 124). Why does the author state that, according to interorganizational theory, community centralization occurs where organizations are weak and few in number? It seems that centralization occurs where there is power and the will at the top rather than where there is weak opposition at the bottom. And the number of organizations is irrelevant because sometimes a few can oppose centralization more effectively than a large number can. There are many other assumptions and conclusions in the book which raise similar doubts. Unfortunately, empirical study cannot always resolve them.

Another significantly weak point of the book is the incomprehensibly complex sociological jargon it employs. The main proposition in chapter 5 can serve as an example: "The greater the diversification and scale of internal regulating and coordinating organizations or the greater the organizational representation of diffuse consensual solidarity, the more will demand-relevant states of the macrosocial unit (externally defined internal "needs") affect the activation of interorganizational relations" (p. 186). This sentence could not be more complicated, and it is no exception. This is a pity because such writing severely limits the number of people who will read the book.

Organizations in Modern Life is a very ambitious work and contains many interesting and inspiring statements. It is also an example of an analysis which integrates findings from several fields as well as theory with data. But some of its results are doubtful. The book, then, is best

used as a very good point of departure for further discussion rather than as a quotable source of well-established findings.

The Innovative Organization: Innovation Adoption in School Organizations. By Richard L. Daft and Selwyn W. Becker. New York: Elsevier-North-Holland Publishing Co., 1978. Pp. x+229. \$14.95.

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The Innovative Organization is a report of empirical research that attempts to explain differences in organizational innovation as a function of three major sets of variables: the need or incentive for innovation; the mechanisms for bringing innovative alternatives into the decision-making process; and the enabling variables, such as the characteristics of the organization, that increase the probability of decisions that favor adoption of the innovation.

Richard Daft and Selwyn Becker use data from a longitudinal study of 13 high school districts in suburban Cook County, Illinois. The districts, not the schools within the districts, are the unit of analysis. The longitudinal data provide the basis for cross-validation analysis, offsetting some of the obvious limitations associated with analyzing data for only 13 study organizations.

In the analysis, organizational innovation is defined as an educational technique that is new to a group of organizations sharing a common technology. Operationally, innovation was divided into three types—innovations specific to college-bound students, those specific to students terminating their education at high school graduation, and those specific to education administration—each with a single measure of innovativeness.

Based on these three types, the analysis tests hypotheses, using data collected for each of two time periods. When innovation associated only with college-bound students was considered, the analysis revealed that organizations were adopting innovations at different rates; yet the independent variables successfully predicted innovation in both time periods. School districts that had adopted such innovations were located in communities where residents expected high quality and where superintendents and the school board obtained appropriate personnel. Most college-oriented innovations were proposed by teachers and trickled up through the organization instead of being forced upon teachers by the administration. The simple availability of financial resources does not buy innovations directly, but money finances highly professional teachers and a larger support staff.

The adoption of innovations for terminal students is quite different from the adoption of innovations for college-bound students. For this type, the primary incentive seems to be the existence of a large number of students

who could benefit from such innovations. Growth rate appears to be extremely important because it justifies the adoption of innovative programs. Unlike innovations associated with college-bound students, the implementation of new programs for students ending their education with high school originates with administrators rather than with teachers. The nonteaching support staff seems to play similar roles in facilitating the adoption of both kinds of innovation.

Finally, the processes associated with the adoption of administrative innovations are explored and then compared with those associated with the adoption of educational innovations. Analysis reveals that administrative innovations are initiated by administrators and implemented accordingly. Teachers play a relatively minor role in this process. Administrators tend to initiate more innovations in districts with a low professional level among teaching personnel, suggesting a top-down, centralized management process in these districts.

The final three chapters of the book attempt to interpret, review, and translate the empirical findings. Chapter 6 discusses the findings relative to other empirical research on organizational innovation. Chapter 7 presents a revised theory of organizational innovation more consistent with the empirical findings. This revision builds on Cohen, March, and Olsen's "garbage can model" of organizational decision making and Weick's view of educational organizations as loosely coupled systems. Chapter 8 translates the empirical research into specific policy recommendations for the design of more innovative organizations.

This book deserves close and careful reading for several reasons. First, it views innovation as a process composed of different stages and attempts to specify the conditions under which innovation does or does not occur. Specific attention is given to the type of innovation and its relationship to various organizational and environmental factors. Second, the analysis is based on variables that are within the control of management and thus amenable to manipulation and intervention. This is reflected in Daft and Becker's ability to translate research findings into specific strategies for designing more innovative organizations (chap. 8). Third, the book is written in a style that suggests an alternative subtitle—"Intimate Conversations with the Researcher." Throughout the book the reader is given insight into the options that the researchers faced as they confronted problems associated with the theoretical model, the study design, and data collection, as well as with data analysis and interpretation. Although one may not always agree with their decisions, it is helpful to have the benefit of their logic.

The book, however, is not without limitations. The major question is whether the school rather than the school district is the appropriate unit of analysis. Many districts contain more than one high school, and it is quite possible that the degree of innovation may vary among the schools in the district. Unfortunately, the available data did not permit this type of analysis.

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Stress at Work. Edited by C. L. Cooper and R. Payne. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1978. Pp. xii+293. \$23.00.

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This book is the first in a proposed series entitled "Studies in Occupational Stress." In the foreword to the series, its editors, C. L. Cooper and S. V. Kasl, tell us that it will consist of "original research and theory in each of the areas described in the initial volume" and that "these books will appeal to a broad spectrum of readers—to academic researchers and postgraduate students in applied and occupational psychology and sociology, occupational medicine, management, personnel, etc.—and to practitioners working in industry" (p. vii). Judging from *Stress at Work*, the series has the potential to meet these aims, but considerably more work than is seen here will be required on the part of the series editors, and particularly the individual authors/editors, in order to make good on all these claims.¹ The quality of the present volume varies greatly throughout.

Very brief introductory and closing comments by the editors, C. L. Cooper and R. Payne, sandwich 11 original contributions on the complex phenomenon (or phenomena) of job stressors, psychological and physiological stress, and their effects. A useful scheme organizing these contributions into six parts is applied. The four central parts concern the person's environment (three chapters), the person himself (two chapters), the fit of person to job environment (one chapter), and dealing with stressors and strains (three chapters). While this scheme is useful, the various chapters and parts range from very good to poor in meeting their promise, as detailed below.

In addition to the four central parts, there are opening and closing chapters. The opening contribution provides an overview of research results and methods in studying the epidemiology of job stress. It is detailed and scholarly and is of potentially significant use to job-stress researchers. The suggestions for future work in the conclusion of this chapter are especially good—fewer cross-sectional studies, better definition and measurement of stress, and more examination of the total social context—and the arguments for these suggestions are well reasoned. This chapter will be most easily read by a person with some familiarity with the job-stress literature; otherwise, it might be read after some of the other chapters. Unfortunately, much in this first chapter is also covered elsewhere in the book (e.g., it is somewhat grinding to find detailed reviews of work on the well-known Type A "coronary-prone" personality characteristic in three different places). The closing chapter proposes a new epistemology for studying stress at work based theoretically on a "systems" view of stressful events and their contexts and based empirically on a call for more "action" research and more longitudinal studies. The philosophical arguments in this chapter deserve considerable recognition and discussion in the profes-

sional literature, especially because of the sometimes low correlations of stressful environments with measurable outcomes—a fact to which our attention is directed in this and some earlier chapters.

Now for the details on the four central parts. The part on the person's environment has a chapter entitled "Blue Collar Stressors" which seriously departs from the thoughtful, literature-review tone of most of the other material. While it contains a number of apparently useful assertions, no backing is given for most of the "facts." One is left with the feeling, "How did this get in here?" The next chapter on managerial and white-collar stress is more than adequate, and the final chapter on family structure and associated psychological need fulfillment as a help/hindrance in dealing with job stressors is excellent. This latter chapter reports original research and theory—somewhat speculative—which are a rich source of ideas for future psychological and sociological work on the family/job stress complex.

The two chapters in the part focusing on the person are quite adequate. The first reviews a large quantity of work on personality and on social factors affecting a person's reaction to stressors, but much of this material is covered elsewhere in the book (e.g., the Type A personality characteristic). The other chapter, applying learning theory to coping and job-stress reactions, is somewhat novel in the job-stress area and quite valuable, although the examples about work could have been much clearer. The focus on the person is taken to its conclusion in a one-chapter part entitled "Person-Environment Fit and Job Stress," which can be highly recommended for its clarity, scholarliness, and fresh ideas, even if we do not necessarily agree with all of them.

The three chapters in "Dealing with Stressors and Strains" are a disappointment because of their lack of integration with many other themes in the book and their tendency to deviate from some of the scholarly norms of the other material (with little compensation in precise practical import). Also, this part is notable for its failure to cover some expected topics such as relaxation procedures, biofeedback, human potential programs, meditation, etc.

The book has good sections—it must be noted that the contributions by the series editors and by Cooper and Payne number among them. There is much to recommend it, not only to the medical researcher or psychologist with developed interests in stress but also to the social psychologist or sociologist with even vague interests in organizations, job behavior, or adaptation in social environments (and that is most of us). Topics such as role conflict, role ambiguity, and status incongruence are handled well and clearly and are related not only to job stress but also to larger models of organizational behavior. More macrosociological topics such as organizational climate, marriage patterns of executives, and social mobility are given visible coverage. Overall, the book can be useful both to those in the stress field and to social scientists in general if one is willing to separate the wheat from the chaff in reading and if a small but noticeable amount of overlap does not prove to be burdensome.

Sources of Self-Evaluation: A Formal Theory of Significant Others and Social Influence. By Murray Webster, Jr., and Barbara Sobieszek. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1974. Pp. xxi+189. \$15.00.

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Sources of Self-Evaluation essentially concerns an extension of the theoretical program identified as expectation states (hereafter abbreviated as ES) theory as developed by Joseph Berger and others. By connecting it to some of the fundamental concepts and propositions of an "interactionist" theory or perspective, this monograph seeks both to broaden the theoretical range of the ES framework and to test systematically some basic ideas of interactionism. Murray Webster and Barbara Sobieszek initially translate basic interactionist ideas into ES terms and use these to construct a formalized model of the relationship between social evaluations from significant others and self-evaluations. They then report several experiments designed to test various aspects of that model using the standardized laboratory experimental situation of the ES program. As is characteristic of research in this paradigm, Webster and Sobieszek's monograph reveals a deliberate, thoughtful, systematic, and carefully reported line of work, intended to be deductively consistent and empirically cumulative with other work in that program. Therein lie both the strength and the weakness of this work. Basically the book seems to represent a significant addition to ES theory; its contributions to the interactionist perspective and to the study of self-conception (or self-evaluation) are much less clear.

Webster and Sobieszek develop (and test) a variation of ES theory which concerns the fact that social evaluations come *from somebody* and the relative characteristics of such somebodies will affect how we accept their evaluations. They will be variable "significant others," in interactionist terms. The resulting "source theory" (as a framework for predicting who will be effective evaluators and how they will affect our behavior) is not so much a separate theory as a supplemental version of ES theory; and within this social psychological program or paradigm, this seems a valuable modification and expansion.

My criticisms of this book concern its claim to clarify and to test more rigorously the interactionist model of self-conception. The first problem is that the connections between ES theory and "interactionist theory" are not very extensively worked out. They are implied in the opening chapters by cursory discussions of the work of William James, George Herbert Mead, Charles Horton Cooley, and Harry Stack Sullivan on the self, but they are not formally specified. There is no objection here to Webster and Sobieszek describing their conceptualization as "interactionist," which seems an appropriate label if it were elaborated somewhat. Theirs is an interactionism in the tradition of small-group research such as that of Robert Bales or Alex Bavelás. It nonetheless confuses analysis that divergent analytical

conceptions are referenced by a common label, as well as by a common set of theoretical terms, without substantially more explication of the interconnections and divisions. Seemingly, the omission of the modifier "symbolic" before the "interactionist" label here is significant. Interpretive processes have no clearly specified place in their model, being vaguely related and hypothetical constructs which are not directly indexed or studied (in the quasi-behaviorist ES framework). Several basic terms and concepts of traditional interactionism are retranslated and made more precise for inclusion in source theory, generally losing a significant part of their original meaning in the process—for example, Sullivan's version of the "significant other" versus that of Webster and Sobieszek. As translated, these represent literally correspondent but rather anemic versions of their original forms. Adherents of formalizing theory will see this as a plus; most interactionists (including myself) will see it as a minus. Much of the vital content of an interactionist view (conventionally depicted) has been substantially boiled away in the process of purification. I emphasize that the issue involved in this criticism is not blanket dislike for experimentation (as the authors anticipate in their summary); rather, it concerns divergent visions of the essential content of basic interactionist ideas. The differences (and the omissions) need to be addressed more fully and explicitly before such formalizations can provide serious tests of the interactionist perspective (as it is conventionally interpreted).

The second major problem is that *Sources of Self-Evaluation* (as an examination of the interactionist conception of the self) does not deal directly with the analysis of self-conception or self-evaluation—notwithstanding the title. The self-concept is roughly compared with expectation states in chapter 3, but the details of the relationship are not provided. Instead, the focus is on "self-other performance expectations," which are more specific feelings about particular situated dyads. The events of self-conception and self-evaluation are never directly indexed or measured but figure only indirectly and hypothetically in the explanation of other, more directly accessible events. The special difficulty with this is that Webster and Sobieszek do not discuss why such measurements of self-evaluation are omitted, if they should be omitted, or even if they would be sensible within source theory; the idea of self-conception remains a largely implicit thread which runs through the analyses in the book. It thus serves as a ghost that drives the theoretical machinery—unseen, unmeasured, undefined, yet essential in explaining how observable social evaluations are eventually translated into observable acts of compliance (or "yielding to influence"). This suggests why the refutation of the "maximization myth" (i.e., the assumption of a universal esteem-maintenance motive) in chapter 9 is less than compelling. The test of this hypothesis is too indirect and oversimplified to be a very strong one. Because it does not deal more directly with the elements of the hypothesis, it can only speculate about the meaning of the observed findings.

In summary, *Sources of Self-Evaluation* is a substantial and craftsman-like study within the expectations states theory paradigm. The criticism

here concerns what it claims to do. The book is more about sources than about self-evaluation. On the former topic, it provides a useful research report; on the latter, it simply is not, as a review quotation on the dust jacket states, "The best book on the self in this generation."

Childhood Socialization: Studies in the Development of Language, Social Behavior, and Identity. By Norman K. Denzin. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Inc., 1977. Pp. xiii+235. \$12.95.

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Reading *Childhood Socialization* for review has reinforced my belief in the reality of cognitive dissonance. I read this collection of Norman Denzin's essays when it first arrived; I have been carrying the book around with me ever since, trying to decide how to resolve my ambivalence about it. Now, faced with a deadline, I find myself no less ambivalent. Since there is no room in a short review for me to detail all the reasons for my discomfort, perhaps the best thing for me to do is to list what I see as some principal positive and negative features.

First, the good news: In these 10 essays, all written in the early seventies, Denzin simultaneously attacks some hoary shibboleths about socialization and argues for new ways (for sociologists) to look at how children learn to talk and otherwise behave as social beings. He rejects the notion of the child as a passive object in the socialization process; he raises critical questions about current developmental theories in psychology and linguistics as well as in sociology; he argues for the importance of a "naturalistic" account of rule learning and rule modification; he proposes needed changes in educational and child-rearing practice. Denzin is, it seems to me, on the good side of all these issues, and he does demonstrate that children are active participants in structuring their own worlds of learning and doing.

Second, the bad news: In my view, Denzin oversimplifies and frequently distorts the perspectives he attacks, thereby weakening solid arguments against them. I find the description of the "naturalistic" method most unsatisfying because Denzin relies too heavily in interpretation both on his recollection of observed events and on his introspective adult's view of the child's view. Moreover, while he draws heavily on his rich field notes for illustration, many assertions are not documented, and in his proselytizing concern for reform of both theory construction and social practice he sometimes lapses into the same stereotyping and naiveté which he criticizes in others. Finally, the several essays seem to be written for very different audiences, with the consequence that while the essays are generally well written the exposition is frequently too cryptic (note, for example, the wide range of topics "covered" in chap. 4) or banal or even condescending,

as in such statements as "Children are complex beings" (p. 22) or "Children and their caretakers are not passive organisms" (p. 189). Statements like these remind me of a "progressive" school principal lecturing old-fashioned parents at a PTA meeting.

Denzin tells his reader that he will "propose a model of language acquisition and early childhood socialization" which rejects biological determinism, the "deep structural position" (p. 77; he characterizes Chomsky as hypothesizing "that perhaps deep innately biological and cognitive processes shape . . . language acquisition"), and "a strict developmental-chronological age phase model" in favor of a "social linguistic position" with roots in the work of Boas and Sapir (there is no further explication of this genuflection), in the pragmatic social psychology of Mead (and related writings of Blumer, Cooley, and Markey), and in the school of thought known as symbolic interactionism (p. 78). Denzin draws on this earlier literature to derive a model in which, "In the *first phase* of language acquisition, stimulus reinforcement principles operate. In the *second phase* of development, which will be termed *imitation*, the child makes crude subjective links between the stimuli of others and his responses to them" (p. 84). He also concludes that infants "learn a language through repeated exposures to conversation" (an unarguable claim in my view), as do members of preliterate societies (pp. 78, 86). Since all early acquisition is oral, I find this conclusion a curious one. He could have something in mind to the effect that reading adds dimensions to continuing language modification (I am sure this is true); the apparent equation of infants and pre-literates is not, in my view, an informative one. Denzin does have some very nice insights. I sometimes feel that he has them in spite of misreadings of, or simply unfamiliarity with, relevant literatures in linguistics and anthropology.

Denzin characterizes his method as a "naturalistic behaviorism" that entails a "studied commitment to actively enter the worlds of native people and to render those worlds understandable from the standpoint of a theory that is grounded in the *behaviors, languages, definitions, attitudes, and feelings* of those studied" (p. 29). This involves introspective analysis (how this is possible when cultures are unshared is unclear) of all "ethically allowable" (p. 30) data. In Denzin's practice this appears to imply emic interpretation of a complete behavioral record of studied events. His view of an adequate record is, however, quite different from that of many other analysts; it consists, apparently, of retrospectively recording extended interactional events (pp. 34-37; characterization is mine). He does not tell the reader how such post facto records are kept uncluttered by cultural expectations, introspective interpretations, and theoretical predispositions. I find Denzin's discussion of his methods variously confusing and contentious. (How does he know, for example, that the behaviorist-introspectionist's "literary counterparts" are unconcerned about validity [p. 42]?)

Denzin makes some very nice observations about children and their behavior; I found myself responding sympathetically to his discussions—for

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example, of lying (p. 66) and of play as serious preparation for adulthood (chaps. 8 and 9; esp. p. 166). What troubles me is that I find myself agreeing with many of Denzin's observations and conclusions, but unconvinced that they follow from his "data" or that the data are, in spite of his protestations about reliability and validity, sound. Denzin has important things to say; I think his book is interesting and suggestive though flawed in some particulars. I would urge my fellow sociologists to read this book, yet I feel I must ask them to read with cautious skepticism.

The Social Impact of the Telephone. Edited by Ithiel de Sola Pool. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1977. Pp. viii+502. \$15.95.

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The underlying theme of *The Social Impact of the Telephone* is supposed to be the effects of the telephone on social change. The articles are all revisions of papers that were first presented at a conference celebrating the hundredth anniversary of the telephone's invention. The contributors come from a variety of different disciplines, including history, sociology, psychology, political science, urban studies, architecture, and economics. Perhaps because it is so difficult to carry off such an enterprise, the quality of the essays varies from only fair to good. Although Ithiel de Sola Pool has tried to pull the papers together by providing short editor's comments both within and between the five sections of the book, the reader is left with the feeling that there is no real unifying principle beyond the fact that each writer chose his or her topic simply because it somehow involved the telephone. In several instances the impression is given that one is reading Bell Telephone Company propaganda. However, other essays, particularly those by Wurtzel and Turner, Gottmann, Thorngren, and Schegloff, demonstrate more serious scholarship.

The first section, "Alternative Paths of Development: The Early Years," gives somewhat repetitious accounts of the early development of the instrument, describing how it was first used as a novelty and then treated as analogous to the radio. After its value was finally recognized, it spread internationally and was accepted by different sectors of society depending in part on the particular value system of the country that adopted it. Thus, according to the paper by Attali and Stourdze, the present inefficiency of the French telephone system (which they claim to be one of the worst in the world) is understandable in the context of that nation's peculiar ideas about social class and democracy. The second section of the book, "The Telephone in Life," contains accounts of how the telephone has been experienced, both historically and in the present, by different categories of users. An essay by Brooks describes how the telephone was characterized in both fiction and drama during the past century. Wurtzel and Turner's

paper is particularly interesting since they suggest how urban populations have become dependent on the telephone. They analyzed the effects of a fire in Manhattan in 1975 which left a 300-block area without phone service for 23 days. In their interviews they found the existence of what they call "psychological neighborhoods" characterized by symbolic proximity. Unfortunately, their commitment to a closed questionnaire for obtaining data leaves many questions about the nature of such neighborhoods unanswered. The essay by Keller complements the latter study, as she also hypothesized that different kinds of communities have resulted because of dependency on the telephone in certain kinds of interpersonal interactions.

In the third section, "The Telephone and the City," the contributors analyze the effects of the telephone on the development of the city and the unique patterns of urban growth that have characterized the 100 years since its invention. The papers by Gottmann, Abler, and Moyer, in particular, describe how the telephone has fostered both the growth of suburbia and the creation of large urban centers. Gottmann hypothesizes that the development of the skyscraper was due in large part to the kinds of communication networks created by the telephone.

The fourth section, "The Telephone and Human Interaction," contains micro analyses of the kinds of social interactions and conversational structures that exist because the telephone involves non-face-to-face communication. Thorngren analyzes the development of indirect communication networks and describes how they evolved to connect different sectors of the population. Reid compares the effects of different communication channels to show when visual contact is important to the communicative intentions of various kinds of messages and when it is irrelevant. Schegloff's analysis of how identification and recognition are accomplished during conversational openings on the telephone is by far the most technical essay in the book. He describes formal rules for identification and demonstrates, by using seemingly aberrant cases, that they are invariant to all telephone interactions. His presentation is an interesting albeit complex demonstration of several of the methods used in conversational analysis.

The final section of the book, "Social Uses of the Telephone," is the weakest. The essay by Lester is simply an overview of the different ways the telephone is used in counseling and crisis centers. The paper by Rao is similar in that he describes how the telephone has been used in educational environments for learning experiments. Both papers are merely descriptive and lack theoretical insight.

In summary, the book has some interesting parts but does not hold together very well. Nevertheless, Pool does raise some important issues about the effects of the telephone on social change. He discusses what he calls Marx's thesis that "productive technology shapes social relations and men's ideas" and Weber's counterstatement, which "demolished the overly simple notion of a one-way causal process from the material base to social organization and then to the ideological superstructure, but . . . preserved the insight of the close causal linkage among them" (p. 3). Although this

is an oversimplified version of the situation (i.e., Marx postulated a much more complex interrelationship between the means of production and social structure), the book does offer much substance for discussion about the impact of technological innovation on social organization and interaction. Those who have taken the position most strongly advocated by Marshall McLuhan (*Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man* [New York: New American Library, 1964]) and Edward Carpenter (*Oh, What a Blow That Phantom Gave Me!* [New York: Bantam Books, 1972]) about the devastating impact of technology on culture will find ample evidence in this book that the effects are complex and not at all as mechanical as has been postulated. The McLuhan-Carpenter position can be compared with the Whorf-Sapir hypothesis about the verbal channel of communication—language—as having a determining effect on cognition and experience. Recent advances in both psycholinguistics and sociolinguistics (see Michael Cole and Sylvia Scribner's *Culture and Thought: A Psychological Introduction* [New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1974] for an overview) have demonstrated that although language has an important effect it in no way determines how different cultures understand and perceive reality. Likewise, although advances in communication technology do affect patterns of social interaction, they do not determine social structure (see Beryl Bellman and Bennetta Jules-Rosette's *A Paradigm for Looking: Cross-cultural Research with Visual Media* [Norwood, N.J.: Ablex Publishing Corp., 1977]). The fact that this book offers some insight into these questions is alone enough to make it of value in spite of the reservations I have expressed.

Chemistry Transformed: The Paradigmatic Shift from Phlogiston to Oxygen. By H. Gilman McCann. Norwood, N.J.: Ablex Publishing Corp., 1978. Pp. viii+179. \$14.95.

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The origin of modern chemistry is generally traced to the work of Antoine Lavoisier during the latter half of the 18th century. His oxygen theory of combustion lies at the foundation of one of the great revolutions in science. While historians and philosophers of science have long debated the cognitive character of the chemical revolution, its sociological aspects have gone largely unattended. This neglect has now been remedied by *Chemistry Transformed*, H. Gilman McCann's thorough sociological analysis of the acceptance of oxygen theory. Beyond its considerable substantive import, this study is one of the rare attempts by a sociologist to "explain and predict processes involving the content of a science" (p. 2) through a quantitative content analysis of its literature.

McCann organizes his study of the chemical revolution as a test of a theory of scientific revolutions principally derived from the ideas of Thomas S. Kuhn and Warren Hagstrom. Following Kuhn, McCann conceptualizes the replacement of phlogiston by oxygen theory in terms of a paradigmatic shift and spells out the pattern of "conversion" implied by such a cognitive change. Employing Hagstrom's thesis that knowledge is advanced through the exchange of information for recognition, McCann analyzes the impact of the structure of scientific communities on the pattern of acceptance of the new paradigm. Finally, drawing on several historical accounts, he applies the general theory to the specifics of the chemical revolution. McCann concludes his theoretical discussion by advancing 20 propositions about the changing content of the chemistry literature during the late 18th century.

To test these hypotheses, McCann has undertaken a content analysis of chemistry papers published by British and French scientists between 1760 and 1795, before and during the emergence of the oxygen paradigm. The papers of each nation are analyzed separately to provide comparative data for assessing the influence of the social organization of scientific communities. The quantitative data are supplemented by material drawn from various historical studies of the scientific community at the time of Lavoisier.

McCann discusses in detail the trends he found in the number and productivity of scientists; temporal changes in the association between paradigm choice, level of theorizing, and extent of quantification found in the literature; and the influence of such social factors as age, prestige, propinquity, and nationality of the scientists. He finds that virtually all his hypotheses are supported. The French papers offer strong confirmation, while the findings for the much smaller British sample are less consistent. Of particular note, McCann establishes that social factors significantly influence a scientist's use of oxygen concepts. He finds that age has a strong effect on paradigm preference, supporting the often observed, but seldom demonstrated, contention that radical ideas in science find their adherents among the younger generation. Furthermore, the study confirms what historians have long supposed to be the case: the British chemists, as a group, lagged behind the French in accepting the oxygen theory. McCann argues convincingly that this effect of nationality can be attributed to differences in the social structure of the two communities. During this period the fortunes of British science were at a low ebb. Research was left largely to amateur scientists of independent means. In contrast, science had become professionalized in France. Members of the scientific community in that country were tightly controlled through the hierarchical organization of the Académie des Sciences, and ample opportunity existed for younger scientists to train with established scientists and to find financially secure positions for pursuing their research. The differences between the two countries are reflected in the far larger number of French chemists, their greater productivity, and the superior quality of their work. Moreover, the difference in occupational opportunities resulted in a declining average age of

French scientists and an increasing average age of British scientists. It appears that the older age of the British scientists, in part, explains their resistance to Lavoisier's ideas.

The influence of personal contacts in gaining converts also contributed to these national differences. Many of the early supporters of oxygen theory were French colleagues of Lavoisier, while the British community delayed its acceptance, deferring to the opinions of Priestly and Cavendish, who stood firm in their belief in phlogiston. McCann concludes that in general his findings clearly demonstrate the applicability of Kuhn's theory to the chemical revolution.

Unfortunately, McCann stretches the implications of his data too far when he also concludes that his evidence "casts doubt upon 'incremental' or 'conjecture-refutation' views of scientific revolution" (p. 70) and "seem[s] to raise serious doubts as to whether the term 'correct' has a useful meaning in the case of science" (p. 124). To be sure, many historians and philosophers of science have slighted the influence of nonscientific factors on the development of scientific knowledge and it may be that McCann's claims will prove to be valid, but the primary data of this study provide only a limited basis for assessing the epistemology of Kuhn or that of his critics. The demonstration of an association between the time of acceptance and social factors is neither necessary nor sufficient grounds for presuming that the acceptance of a new theory was not based on rational appraisal. Attempts to shed empirical light on the epistemological issues raised by McCann require, at least, close textual analysis of published material and, even better, examination of notebooks, private communications, and diaries to ferret out the thought processes of individual scientists.

But my disagreement on this point should not obscure the great value of this innovative study. It is an excellent example of the contribution that careful use of quantitative methods can make to furthering our understanding of the development of science, and it provides a compelling demonstration of the influence of institutional organization and social attributes of scientists on the advancement of scientific knowledge.

The Alien Doctors: Foreign Medical Graduates in American Hospitals. By Rosemary Stevens, Louis Wolf Goodman, and Stephen S. Mick. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1978. Pp. xvi+365. \$18.95.

Peter Weil

University of Chicago

In what is certainly the most exhaustive study to date of physicians in graduate training from foreign nations, Rosemary Stevens, Louis Goodman, and Stephen Mick observe that while other studies have examined gross structural elements of migration they have not been able to shed light on the process of physician migration "from the first decision to the ad-

justment to the United States" (p. 2). That foreign medical graduates (FMGs) are worthy of study stems in part from their magnitude—in 1973–74 (the year the study began) they constituted one-fifth of all physicians in the United States and one-third of all physicians in graduate training programs. Their numbers in turn suggest additional areas of interest: (1) the U.S. national physician manpower pool and attempts at its regulation; (2) the international "brain drain" phenomenon; and (3) the development of social science theory—particularly in the areas of physician socialization, occupational behavior, and (in the case of some of the sample) description of persons with modern expectations in developing nations.

Despite the myriad of research issues that could be explored, the authors quite sensibly confine their work to the topic of migration, addressing three research questions: "(1) What have been the patterns of recruitment and the expectations of foreign medical graduates in coming to the United States, and how have these expectations been translated into reality? (2) What are the primary roles of FMGs in training in American hospitals? And (3) how do foreign medical graduates expect to utilize their American education in terms of their subsequent location and careers?" (p. 8).

Logically, the three questions correspond to the chronology of career decisions. In regard to pattern of recruitment, the authors state (but do not show empirically) that the decision to migrate is made over a long period of time and that the FMG is in a kind of "double bind." That is, on the one hand the FMG is attracted to the United States for its professional potential for his career; on the other hand he is reluctant to leave his home country because of ties to his family or because of the possibility of missing professional opportunities that become available. This tension between positive and negative, professional and personal or cultural concerns, surfaces again when the FMG decides to remain in the United States or return to the country of medical education (usually the country of birth). The authors attempt to go beyond the prevalent "push-pull" migration theory, which focuses on national differences, and to trace what motivates the individual physician to leave his home country and come to the United States. Indeed, a significant contribution is Stevens et al.'s specification of the motives for emigrating. While FMGs generally share the desire for medical specialization and higher salaries, other factors differ according to when they made their decision to migrate. Thus, for example, physicians who decide to emigrate early in their medical careers are more influenced by their teachers than are persons who decide later (e.g., one year or more after medical school). For them, political and social problems in the country of medical education are important. Ultimately, the decision to migrate is a reluctant one often made "in the face of professional frustration" (p. 58). The authors' conception that an understanding of migration requires knowledge of the stage of the career deepens our comprehension of what brings about this decision in the 5% of all physicians who are trained abroad.

To examine the roles of FMGs in training in American hospitals, the authors selected a comparative group of U.S. medical graduates. Two

themes are juxtaposed in their discussion: first, the apprenticeship nature of graduate medical training, which is at base an informal process, and second, achieving competence in the three areas of professional learning: (1) knowledge, (2) techniques (e.g., learning to conduct proper physical examinations), and (3) behavioral skills and attitudes. After inquiring into the type and frequency of specific duties of the respondents and their scheduled hours, days on call, etc., the authors conclude that FMGs are not "exploited" in the sense of being overburdened. Rather, paradoxically, they are "underused"—particularly in regard to the sociocultural aspects of physician responsibility. This comparison of activities leads to the conclusion that differences between native Americans and FMGs are not attributable to technical competence (for they are given equal clinical responsibility on nights and weekends) but to the FMG being perceived as culturally incompetent. In short, FMGs are "less than full" physicians. But some FMGs—those most able to become assimilated into American culture—are able to move to the more desirable medical school-related, research-intensive, and U.S. trainee-dominated teaching hospitals. For these fortunate few, a graduate experience comparable to that of native Americans is attainable. Indeed, the authors find significant mobility among FMG trainees. To typify them as holding only the residual positions which our own trainees reject, as filling gaps in the U.S. health system, is not exactly correct. Nor are they copies of U.S. trainees. Overall, the type of hospital (major teaching as opposed to less prestigious, limited-affiliation hospitals) determines whether the FMG will be given full or less than full physician status.

There are some surprising results about career plans. Even though we have much information about FMGs, few predictors are unearthed which foretell who will remain and who will return to their homeland. This is especially surprising since we are told in the introduction, "The process of professionalization is inextricably linked with the FMG's role as a potential member of the long-term manpower pool of physicians in the U.S. and with his or her future direction as a migrant. Each dimension is connected to the next" (p. 8). Stevens and her colleagues are able to suggest that "stayers" have careers which are more disorderly. For example, they change specialties more often, and they aspire to positions both like (i.e., private practice) and unlike (i.e., hospital based) their American counterparts'. "Leavers," in contrast, often expect positions at home as teachers.

The study artfully uses social survey techniques to debunk myths and to elucidate differences in a group commonly thought quite homogeneous. The authors conclude that the FMG assumes various roles: ". . . international professional jet setter, lowly exchange student, provider of medical services, recipient of post-doctoral education, immigrant seeking to 'make it' in the U.S., alien regarded as a 'less than full physician.' . . ."

The authors developed their sample with great care: The American Medical Association's physician master file was used to identify interns

and residents in approved training programs in 1973-74. Then a multi-stage probability sample developed by the National Opinion Research Center permitted a representative sample to be drawn from 101 primary sampling units. Stratification variables included (1) training location in one of the eight largest SMSAs or not and (2) country of medical education, divided into five strata—Philippines, India, S. Korea, United States, or other foreign nation. This was done to constrain the numbers of Asians in the sample. Interviews were completed on 690 FMGs, 133 U.S. medical school graduates (a comparison group), and 42 U.S. nationals trained abroad.

On the other hand, methods developed by social scientists to corroborate the reliability and validity of responses were not employed, and the reliance on respondents' obviously exaggerated estimates makes some of the findings suspect. For example, as noted by the authors themselves, their respondents probably gave inflated estimates of their class standing in medical school and the number of hours they worked in their current jobs.

Also, the authors draw some conclusions which are not readily apparent from the data presented and seem to contradict their own interpretations. For example, in discussing the differences in types of personal contacts experienced in the United States, the authors write: "Leavers had more contact with FMGs from the CME [country of medical education] and other FMGs than stayers, and they had less contact with USMGs and American families and had fewer American friends than did stayers. . . . It cannot be determined whether patterns of social contact influenced the decision to remain or return, or if, once this decision has been made, FMGs prepare themselves for their futures by orienting themselves accordingly" (p. 244). In their concluding chapter, the following appears: "Our findings on the social interactions of FMGs with fellow nationals suggest that FMGs make their career decisions first and bolster or rationalize them by their subsequent behavior" (p. 258).

Finally, the absence of statistical tests of difference in the text makes significant differences difficult to ascertain. The authors provide a table for testing percentage differences in the appendix, but this is, at best, exceedingly tedious.

The Alien Doctors will be a useful reference, even though public policy has already been formulated whose purpose, in the authors' words, "is to stem the flow of physician entrants irrespective of their career expectations and to ensure that those entering as exchange visitors remain in the general category of international students with few options to remain in the United States" (p. 275). Concern about the oversupply of American physicians is the publicly acknowledged reason for this decision. Nevertheless, as the authors point out, the many who came in the past decade and a half will be with us for some time as a distinct and identifiable subgroup within the medical profession. Their entry, their training, and their decision to remain form an important social phenomenon.

Scientist as Subject: The Psychological Imperative. By Michael J. Mahoney. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1976. Pp. xiv+248. \$13.50 (cloth); \$6.95 (paper).

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Michael J. Mahoney, a psychologist at Pennsylvania State University, argues that the major contributions to the study of science have been made by sociologists, philosophers, and historians and that these must be supplemented with works by psychologists. We must focus on *homo scientus*, for "any appreciation or improvement of *knowledge* requires an understanding of the *knower*" (p. 29). Unfortunately, our present knowledge of the knower is "nominal" and "fuzzy." It is equally unfortunate that Mahoney does little to rectify this situation. He devotes a great amount of space to criticism of the "storybook" conventional image of the scientist. At the same time, he wishes to convince the reader that the scientist "is a thoroughly fallible human being—capable of bigotry, ambition, and political expedience" (p. xii). I do not find this to be particularly radical, staggering, disorienting, or even unconventional. Mahoney's view that we must remember that scientists are like other humans has been presented before. This position has, for instance, been cogently argued in the works of Alvin Gouldner. I was therefore disappointed to find no reference to Gouldner's work in Mahoney's bibliography of approximately 500 items. The similarity between the basic assumptions of Mahoney and Gouldner can be seen in the following comments: "We must stop exempting ourselves from the well documented limitations of human information processing, and start nourishing *scientalysis*—a critical, constructive, and enduring study of the scientist" (p. 7). "Sociologists must cease assuming that there are two distinct breeds of men, subjects and objects, sociologists and laymen, whose behavior needs to be viewed in different ways. There is only one race of men; it is time we sociologists acknowledged all the implications of our membership in it" (Alvin W. Gouldner, *The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology* [New York: Avon Books, 1970], p. 26).

Mahoney suggests reforms in graduate education, hiring and tenure policies, and the journal publication system. Once again, contrary to his image of his reforms, few will find much that is new or radical here.

The area in which Mahoney could have contributed to our understanding of *homo scientus* was through his own research. He criticizes data on scientists as "weak." These data are mainly based on secondary sources, biographies, and self reports. What we must do, Mahoney believes, is view the scientist as an "experimental subject"; we must conduct "controlled studies" of scientists. Mahoney does refer to a number of studies conducted with his colleagues. In order to examine the influence that citations to one's own publications have on the acceptance of manuscripts

for journal publication, Mahoney sent identical manuscripts to referees. In each case, three fictitious studies were alleged to be "in press." For half the referees, the "in press" references were listed as written by the author of the manuscript. For the other half, they were credited to someone else. The result, according to Mahoney, is that referee recommendations showed that self-referencing enhanced an author's chances of getting published. Self-citation informs the referee that the author is a productive scholar and that his or her prior papers have appeared in respected journals. Mahoney must be given credit for doing to scientists what they have been doing to their subjects for a long time. Deception was also employed in a second experiment in which manuscripts were sent to referees of a "well known" psychological journal. Different results and discussion sections were attached to various versions of the manuscript. The point of this experiment was to investigate the relationship between the theoretical orientation of reviewers and the orientation of the paper they were reviewing. A number of Mahoney's subjects were so irate at having been duped that they requested an investigation by the American Psychological Association.

Although Mahoney criticizes self reports, he does describe a potentially interesting survey of physicists, biologists, psychologists, and sociologists. The problem with this study is that while 100 individuals were randomly selected from each field ($N = 400$), only 82 questionnaires were returned. Five of these had to be discarded. A low return rate is an inherent problem with mailed questionnaires. The researcher must, therefore, take specific steps to increase the return rate. It appears that Mahoney took a number of steps to insure a low return rate. He states that he did not include a postpaid return envelope and that he conducted the survey during the summer months when academics are likely to be away from their organizations. While Mahoney recognizes the "limitations on the generalizability of the obtained results," he argues that the "data are valuable in offering at least a tentative sketch of the issues addressed" (p. 189). Responses (82) from an unknown number of scientists in each of four fields is not sufficient to provide even a "tentative sketch." The book concludes with a 25-page presentation of a sketch of a "theory of thought and belief."

Mahoney has attempted too much in *Scientist as Subject* and has delivered too little. He states that "the present text is therefore not a literature review but rather an invitation to research" (p. 30). Now that Mahoney has invited us to conduct research, a psychologist can make a contribution by actually conducting such research or by presenting a review of our knowledge of *homo scientus*.

American Journal of Sociology

The Emergence of Professional Social Science: The American Social Science Association and the Nineteenth-Century Crisis of Authority. By Thomas L. Haskell. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1977. Pp. xii+276. \$12.00.

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Historians and sociologists now recognize that it is impossible to understand the development of social thought without evaluating the influence of social context, and particularly the shaping force of the institutions within which social thinkers work. Founded in the heyday of liberal nationalism after the Civil War, the American Social Science Association (ASSA, 1865-1909) provided a forum for discussions of the urban-industrial transformation and bridged the transition from amateur to professional social science. Thomas Haskell's ambitious and sophisticated study, *The Emergence of Professional Social Science*, illuminates the relationship of this complex and important organization to the modernization of American intellectual life, even as it perpetuates the progressive bias of some earlier treatments of the ASSA, slights certain ASSA purposes, and distorts the sources of the academic professionalization that ultimately prevailed.

Haskell argues that modern social science rose to its present authoritative status from a 19th-century crisis of authority that had both a social and an intellectual side. Scientifically based positivism, with its emphasis on biological and cultural determinants of behavior, undermined traditional idealist conceptions that had emphasized immanence and free will. The outcome was not the total victory for radical positivism some scholars have assumed, Haskell emphasizes; rather, it was a creative synthesis whereby idealism and positivism converged in a voluntaristic theory of social action that largely discarded explanations rooted in individual potency and yet reserved a sphere for consciously guided social action. Developing a sound theoretical basis for social control depended on a crucial intellectual breakthrough—recognition of the interrelatedness and interdependence of all social phenomena—which Haskell links to the transportation revolution and its disruptive effect on time, space, and capitalist market relations. As autonomous island communities gave way to consolidated, impersonal systems, ordinary people were forced to join intellectuals in acknowledging the potency of social forces. When society itself took on causal significance, the study of society became the province of experts trained in technique and organized in purposeful institutions that could support systematic research and validate often esoteric results. Thus interdependence provided both the occasion and the necessity for professional social science.

The social side of the 19th-century crisis of authority included the decline of the American gentry, whose members once provided authorita-

tive explanations for events beyond the local community. According to Haskell, eastern business and professional elites created ASSA to uphold standards against the onslaughts of secularism and mobility. Their social vision was largely limited to reestablishing the authority of the traditional professions and upholding conservative social views. In the 1870s more-professionalized scientists and university reformers argued for an exclusively professional organization with strong ties to the new, research-oriented university, but the ASSA continued in an activist direction, "spawning" any number of reform organizations. When academic historians and economists separated in the mid-1880s and political scientists and sociologists followed two decades later, an isolated remnant of aging Brahmins was all that survived. The ASSA succumbed to disciplinary professionalization because its members remained too committed to voluntaristic notions of human action and too reformist to be fully professional.

Haskell's approach presents numerous problems. The connections between professionalization and modernization should be pursued with care, for the modernization concept itself is biased in ways that this study clearly reflects. Haskell imposes a rigidly deterministic, norm-attribute model of professionalism that requires acceptance of interdependence as a paradigm—a nonactivist, scholarly orientation toward a reference group of other inquirers ("the community of the competent") who alone are capable of making neutral, meritocratic judgments, and the belief that controversial issues should be avoided as not susceptible to professional treatment. This approach enshrines the liberal-consensus social science dominant in the 1950s as the only possible pattern for social science professionalism; it does not prove its case for the determinants of professional social science, and it does not do justice to the ASSA.

Along with defenders of laissez-faire, ASSA leaders included some of the first Americans to recognize and expose the limitations of English classical economics. For the crucial period from the mid-1880s to the late 1890s, it is simply not possible to distinguish between the ASSA as reformist and emerging academic professionals as dispassionately scientific. The ASSA leaders were not naive regarding causation or blind to interdependence. Rather, the most self-conscious social scientists among them, including Francis Amasa Walker, Frank Sanborn, and Carroll D. Wright, realized with millions of workers, farmers, and small entrepreneurs that the industrial transformation meant a marked increase in *dependence*. These leaders responded to blameless poverty, urban distress, and industrial conflict with a strong sense of the need for social responsibility (as opposed to cultural authority) and for leadership, based on careful investigation and sound theory, in developing dependable public services, welfare systems, and structural reforms to remove basic inequities. Following gentry traditions and the example of the Civil War (much more proximate than the transportation revolution), they believed that social questions should be resolved through legislation, with social scientists functioning as disinterested public servants to inform opinion and guide

debate. (Wright's work in labor statistics and his authorized investigation of the Pullman strike are good examples.) Such men fought the separation of theory from practice and opposed a withdrawal of social scientists to the universities. They emphatically resisted professionalization of social research if that meant removing social questions from public debate.

There were people with identical views in the academic disciplines. Haskell's notion that no substantial ideological differences divided economists in the 1880s is mistaken; it absolutely contradicts evidence of the enormous appeal of socialism for Henry Carter Adams, Richard Ely, and John Bates Clark, among others, and it ignores the reformist commitment to state action that characterized founders of the American Economic Association. The subsequent conversion of these leftists and their conservative opponents to a redefined, corporate liberalism reflects a variety of intellectual currents and political and institutional pressures. Liberalism, while centrist, "normal," and successful enough to be unconscious for many Americans, is no less ideological than are so-called extremist positions to the left or right. So the success of American-style academic professionalism, which Haskell considers predetermined, must in fact be explained as the product of interrelated factors in the American experience, including a strong tradition of laissez-faire government; a concomitant weak tradition of nonpartisan public service; vigorous, class-based efforts toward rationalization that required the services of experts; the decline of the "best men"; the aggressiveness of upwardly mobile, middle-class, college-educated Americans and elite educational reformers who favored the German-university model for the legitimacy and security it could provide; pressure from business leaders who largely capitalized American higher education; the strength of traditional political and religious values that anchored elite academic social scientists to liberalism; and the marvelous capacity of academic professions for disciplining their members.

Social Humanities: Toward an Integrative Discipline of Science and Values. By Raymond D. Gastil. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Inc., 1977. Pp. xvi+314. \$13.95.

Gibson Winter

Princeton Theological Seminary

This volume proposes a discipline of the social humanities to bring together social scientific analyses and evaluative concerns in social criticism and policy. Raymond Gastil's experience with problems of policy had convinced him that the social sciences were proving less than helpful. At the same time, he found some social inquiry so ideologically controlled that it failed to meet scientific standards. His aim is an integrative ap-

proach in which social science and humanistic evaluation can operate in a complementary fashion.

The social scientific model is built up from the interaction of individual entities. These entities or individuals are biological units pursuing their own interests. Gastil views this as a commonsense model, although it is in fact a highly abstract notion. He then follows a systems theory approach to build up a mechanistic model of behavior—biological forces are shaped by biosocial laws and patterns of cultural inheritance. The rationale for the model is that the productivity of isolated entities is low. They enter into transactions to increase their productivity. This is essentially an abstract, economic model of self-interested entities striving to maximize their gains and minimize their losses. In the theory, human developments are abnormal, since they transcend biological imperatives in the interest of distinctively human achievements. This is the framework which provides the connection with ethics and higher values: these humanistic dimensions open the horizon on the “more” in human species attainments. This step to the human presupposes freedom within the systems model—a postulate which the author affirms as a kind of surd. He considers the biosocial system a mechanism which is attained by the sacrifice of freedom, since society has to coerce conformity for the sake of order. On the other hand, humanistic or transcending “man” draws on that freedom to introduce changes in the biosocial order. In the author’s words, “The forms of society and social change result from an interplay of mechanistic man with humanistic man” (p. 82).

The discussion of ethics and humanistic values rests on an additional postulate which is more an assertion than an argued position—the notion that a person who lives beyond mere self-interest makes a more valuable achievement than one who does not. This notion of projecting beyond one’s own interests is the foundation of the basic model for humanistic values. Four regions or value sets are developed around two polarities—action versus control and material versus spiritual. This yields a fourfold table of values which can merely be identified here: utility values, which bear on growth in wealth and technology; a distribution ethic of justice touching on fairness and control over the fruits of one’s efforts; transcendence, which touches on accomplishments beyond biological satisfactions; and moral limits, which bear on respect and reverence for life and individuals. The humanistic analyst has, of course, the problem of weighting these values in dealing with particular issues. Here Gastil indicates four guidelines: probability of general happiness, assessment of inequalities of happiness which may ensue, affirmation of the transcendent nature of man, and recognition of the moral limits. This argument is carefully developed and can only be suggested here. The actual procedure in analysis is one of establishing hypothetical judgments and subjecting them to reality testing by a review of alternatives and past experiences, which leads toward a final judgment and recommendation of a course of action.

After putting this social humanities discipline to work over a range of

materials, the author takes up some specific problems, such as marriage commitment, the situation of American Indians, problems of war, and the meaning of human life for individuals. His discussion of marriage commitment gives useful clues as to how his discipline works. He goes through a biosocial model of marriage, which is based essentially on self-interest and striking a good bargain. He complicates this model with cultural elements such as pursuing economic advantages and avoiding disorders that might be generated through rivalries. Turning to humanistic concerns, he agrees with the notion that expectations in both marriage and career have escalated to the point where most relationships crumble under the burden. If there is a crisis of commitment, and the author believes there is, it cannot be handled on the biosocial level since alternatives seem to be more satisfying. He contrasts the rational-traditional ideal of monogamous marriage with the hedonistic ideal of maximizing physical satisfactions and determines, after working through the model, that sponsors of the society should strive to maintain the rational-traditional ideal of marriage commitment.

Gastil concludes his text with a brief consideration of the need for specialists in this discipline and for the development of institutes to further such work. This is a carefully worked text in a field that needs much more thought—the interplay of societal processes, moral coding, and broader values. In terms of disciplines, it is the problem of the interplay and overlap of social science, ethics, and cultural criticism or of description, prescription, and evaluation.

My reservation about *Social Humanities* is whether the social model undermines the humanistic values to such an extent that the policy proposals become impositions insofar as they bear on anything more than biosocial imperatives. There are no foundations for anything beyond the “possessive individualism” on which the social theory rests. Nevertheless, this is an important effort at integrative work and merits careful reading.

From Ritual to Record: The Nature of Modern Sports. By Allan Guttmann. New York: Columbia University Press, 1978. Pp. viii+198. \$12.95.

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In this slender volume we are presented with a set of spirited essays that define and then comment on certain characteristics of modern sport. As Guttmann sees it, *From Ritual to Record* offers “a systematic and original interpretation of modern sports and a series of speculations about what is and what is not unique about American sports” (p. vii). To this end, he defines sport in its relationship to play, games, and contests; differentiates modern sports from those of primitive, ancient, and medi-

eval societies; comments on the relationship of sport to economic and religious systems; considers what is characteristic of American baseball and football; and, finally, suggests the significance of team (rather than individual) sports to Americans. To uncover such a variety of issues in so brief a work is to ensure an inadequate treatment of some important themes. And yet it is to Guttman's credit that he typically directs us to questions that are both stimulating and important. In this sense, the book is quite successful.

Before turning to the arguments of the individual chapters, I should note three concerns which color the entire volume. The first is Guttman's conscious attempt to rejuvenate American-Canadian work with a healthy dose of European, especially German, scholarship. He feels that Americans have neglected the sociohistorical aspects of sports; hence, this book is presented as a kind of macrosociological history of modern sports. The argument tends to be pitched at the cultural (and to some extent, psychological) rather than social level of explanation. Likewise, the author draws on European traditions in his style of argument. Reminiscent of Huizinga or Caillois, Guttman supports his positions with a veritable barrage of material from history, anthropology, psychology, sociology, and literature—a type of scholarship that incites simultaneous feelings of admiration and discomfort. Second, the book seems concerned with defending modern sport against its leftist, especially Neo-Marxist, critics. While he dismisses the position that organized sport is exploitative and stupefying, he is clearly bothered (as was his theoretical predecessor, Weber) by the possibilities for freedom and emotional vitality in an activity that is becoming progressively rationalized. Finally, Guttman seeks to communicate with the general reader as well as the specialist. While this decision leads to an extremely lively and forthright book, it occasionally causes him to take on dragons that represent simplified versions of the complex issues involved.

After an opening chapter in which he handily distinguishes sports from play, games, and contests, Guttman turns to more empirical pursuits. His second essay, "From Ritual to Record," is an attempt to apply Weber's ideas about the progressive rationalization of societies to the development of modern sports. In this light, Guttman lists seven characteristics that are "distinctive" of modern sports: secularism, equality of opportunity to compete and in the conditions of competition, specialization of roles, rationalization, bureaucratic organization, quantification, and the quest for records. He then illustrates this thesis with materials from primitive, ancient, medieval, and modern societies. Few scholars will object to this list, although they may wish to add a few characteristics of their own (e.g., commercialism or technocratic morality). And yet, Guttman tells us too little about the specifically social conditions which prompted this development (e.g., one wonders why medieval sports entail a kind of cultural regression from those of Greece). He describes how sport pried itself away from a religious framework that circumscribed the meaning of both process and outcome, but he fails to be interested in

the various secular contexts. Surely, Weber would have been curious about the different consequences for sport when it is harnessed to concerns about wealth, power, and prestige. Whatever the criticisms, this is a very thoughtful and thought-provoking essay.

In "Capitalism, Protestantism, and Modern Sport," Guttman continues the Weberian treatment. Here, he responds to the Marxist criticism of sport in capitalist societies and to the Neo-Marxist criticism of organized sport itself. Following Weber, he decries the economic reductionism of the Marxists and points to some important parallels between socialist and capitalist sport. His rejoinder to the Neo-Marxists is less convincing. Their thesis (that organized sport represents a truncated and potentially alienating organization of one's erotic energies) is, as he notes (p. 78), almost impossible to invalidate; and his efforts will persuade few that hold this view. His comments on religion are interesting but rather half-hearted; in fact, he seems somewhat mystified by the relationship between Protestantism and sport. To his credit, however, he does offer an interesting thesis that the sporting ethic in 18th-century England partook of the broader scientific world view. This seems likely, although perhaps all three movements (i.e., Protestantism, science, and sport) participated in an even more general transition toward outwardly directed and externally measured individuality.

The next two chapters are devoted to American baseball and football. His essay on baseball, "Why Baseball Was Our National Game," is stimulating indeed. Disclaiming the uniqueness of the American experience as an explanation, he argues that baseball caught on with Americans because of our chauvinistic desire for our own game, because of the need for an event to mark the changing seasons, and because of the unprecedented opportunities in baseball for quantification and calculation. Football receives less worthy treatment. Guttman gets entangled in an argument about the relationship between aggression in football and interventionist militarism. This leads him to a shaky goal-line defense of the spectator experience in football as "an occasion for the release of dammed emotions in a Saturnalia-like 'time out'" (p. 135), which leads to decreased aggression elsewhere. What this rather unsophisticated view of aggression neglects is the cognitive aspects of the experience (e.g., that football reconciles us to a winners-losers mentality and celebrates aggression as a legitimate way of sorting out human relationships).

Finally, in "Individualism Reconsidered" he argues that Europeans are, in fact, more enthusiastic proponents of individual sports than Americans are. While there are problems in his empirical demonstration (he discusses these with characteristic honesty), his analysis of literary treatments of the individual European sportsman is quite interesting. He suggests that Europeans tend more to understand their sports as an escape from or even protest against an ascriptive social order, while Americans tend to be a bit more gregarious. Again, such formulations are only suggestive; but they direct us to areas of exploration that seem profitable indeed.

Music and the Middle Class: The Social Structure of Concert Life in London, Paris and Vienna. By William Weber. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1975. Pp. 172. \$17.50.

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University of Illinois at Chicago Circle

Contending that historians have neglected cultural activities as a vital source of information about social groups, William Weber has examined the patterns, structures, and development of concert life in London, Paris, and Vienna from 1830 to 1848 (with a glance back at the 18th century), the period that witnessed both a cultural explosion and the emergence of the "classical-music world" of regularly scheduled public concerts, professional orchestras, and virtuoso performers. This music world is still with us today but, in Weber's view, is all but doomed. *Music and the Middle Class* is then prompted by both historical convictions and a personal sense of crisis. With the first there can be no quarrel; the second would be better elaborated or dropped, for it raises too many questions which Weber does not (and cannot, given his subject) answer: Is the classical-music era about to end in these days of live television broadcasts from the Metropolitan Opera, large government grants to symphony orchestras, and considerable private support? Dick Netzer (*The Subsidized Muse* [New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978]) concluded from a review of economic indicators that, on the contrary, the arts are flourishing. For that matter, was this world ever more than the province of a minority? Weber's own evidence tells us that the concert public was small—5,000 at most in attendance at any of the most popular concerts.

Weber's most general objective is to define this concert public. He identifies a "unified elite" public in the making, a public which joined the aristocracy, the erstwhile undisputed leaders of the musical world, and the newly important, newly wealthy upper middle class. Concerts served as a neutral meeting ground which enabled these two groups to mingle but at the same time to avoid the more definite ideological or social commitment required by political alliance or by the more intimate setting of the salon. Yet concerts, especially the management thereof, were also sites of conflict where the aristocracy contended with middle-class aspirants to elite status. Eventually the sometime antagonists joined forces to safeguard the elite status of concerts by restricting access through price structures, closed subscription lists, and other such devices. The rise of the middle class (or parts of it) is hardly a new idea, but Weber presents a wealth of detail on some of the varied means through which that social promotion was achieved. Thus business families favored the popular-music scene where they could use their wealth to good effect to sponsor salon concerts of spectacular (and expensive) soloists. Members of the liberal professions and the bureaucracy, on the other hand, found the

conservative (inhospitable to contemporary music) classical-music concerts more suited to their intellectual skills and pretensions.

To support this general argument Weber discusses, first, the social structure of concert publics and the roles played in each public by different occupational groups, by the two sexes (women organized the popular-music salon concerts, men the more formal classical-music concerts), by the family (salon concerts extended the family circle), and by different patterns of socializing. Second, and to a certain extent cutting across class, family, and occupational lines, were the different "taste publics": high-status classical (the German tradition from Mozart to Beethoven), high-status popular (Rossini, Meyerbeer, and virtuosi such as Liszt), and low-status popular (J. Strauss), in which choral groups had a special function as a locus of political protest. Predictably, the two high-status groups merged, the better to keep their distance from the low-status public. A third theme running through the work is the professionalization of the performance and the management of musical life, which gradually undermined the amateur elite leadership, especially that of women, whose influence was entirely informal.

These numerous subjects and themes are apt to confuse. Even though many of the data are presented in an appendix (number and type of concerts, price structures, titles or occupations of subscribers, occupations of orchestra members), the reader is likely to wander among the multitude of musical organizations, which all seem to have similar names and are difficult to keep attached to the right taste public and to the right city. More problematic are some of the interpretations. For example, given Weber's insistence on the neutrality of the concert site, it does not seem likely that it would serve as a means of recruiting elites, for the very neutrality would work against any effective relationship. On the whole, theory adds little to the work. The concept of modernization is tacked onto the conclusion and leads the author to make claims beyond what his presentation sustains. That these three capital cities had no industry, for example, hardly means, as Weber implies, that they were unaffected by industrialization and therefore somewhat marginal to modernizing forces. Weber also asserts that the growth of the concert world questions the usually posited relation of modernization and industrialization which sees service industries as a late development. But their long traditions make the arts a very special service industry. Weber boxes himself into a position (which he would probably reject) of denying the cultural specificity of music. In any case these and other points need a good deal more thought.

To me, the most interesting aspect of the work is not in the putative relations of middle-class music to modernization (rather vague anyhow) or in the categorization of concert-taste publics, but in the more properly historical analyses where Weber examines the variations in each city on the main theme of the development of the concert world—wealthier London moving fastest into the modern concert world; Paris and Vienna,

though each for different reasons, emerging more slowly from 18th-century patterns. Weber is well aware how indigenous political, social, and cultural traditions weigh on the present, but he also is careful to note how different causes can have similar effects: what the leadership of aristocratic amateurs did in London, the state did in Paris, which had no strong tradition of aristocratic dilettantism in concert life. Weber has a good sense of these different contexts. It is too bad that his organization and his theory obscure the presentation.

The Subsidized Muse: Public Support for the Arts in the United States. By Dick Netzer. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978. Pp. vii+289. \$14.95.

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Beyond its considerable value to social scientists as a gold mine of information and as an analysis of the changing character of artistic patronage, Dick Netzer's *The Subsidized Muse* constitutes for those involved in the "real" world of the arts the most signal policy event of the decade. Among sociologists, those embracing a "production of culture" perspective (see *The Production of Culture*, ed. Richard A. Peterson [Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1976]) will particularly welcome the collection of data from a variety of sources about trends in public subsidies, direct and indirect, as well as the in-depth comparisons of American and British patronage policies, together with a more superficial coverage of the situation in other countries. But Netzer and his sponsor, the Twentieth Century Fund, have also mustered their data to impose upon arts administrators, lobbyists, and government officials a set of controversial guidelines that will inevitably reorganize policy discourse in this area. Since sociologists of the arts, regardless of orientation, must necessarily examine the relationship between the arts and the society that produces them, a relationship in which government will play an ever greater role, a review of this book must consider the origins and context of Netzer's research, the scope of this project, his policy recommendations, and their significance beyond the immediate questions he chooses to address. Netzer gives us much to ponder, not only because of what he includes, but also because of the critical issues he omits or skirts.

Whether the hesitation of Americans to provide governmental support can be explained by suspicions of elitism or subversion, or is merely in keeping with their characteristic reluctance to expand the public sector (chap. 4), in the United States, in contrast with most other liberal democracies, support for the arts has not been taken for granted as a public obligation. The New Deal's legacy is ambiguous, since many of the programs

initiated under its aegis were of an emergency nature—public works programs for destitute artists. Once the economic emergency was past, the programs were dismantled, leaving no permanently institutionalized foundation.

Government intervention in the arts in the post-World War II period coincided with the Cold War, which made cultural exchanges an arm of State Department policy. Not surprisingly, choices of works and artists, literary and other, were likely to be made in terms of their ideological innocuousness. Yet once the idea of public subsidy had been accepted by the leaders of the New Frontier and their Great Society successors, federal support burgeoned. The appropriations for the National Endowment for the Arts alone rose from an average of about \$8 million a year between 1965 and 1970 to more than \$80 million in fiscal 1976 (p. 61), growing the most under the Nixon presidency. Overall, "total direct public support of the arts attained an estimated \$282 million" by calendar 1975, a "more than *thirteen-fold* increase within only a decade" (p. 4).

In the light of past history, it is surprising to find that providing public subsidies for the arts has become a "safe" political stand to take in recent years. As Netzer points out, "In the 1930's, it took courage for a politician to speak out in defense of Federal One [a New Deal program of arts support]; in the 1970's it takes no courage at all for a politician to praise NEA" (p. 62).

This amazing shift in political culture is worthy of more analysis than Netzer devotes to it. For aside from current debates about whether subsidies should go to popular as well as to fine art, to innovative as well as to established institutions, to amateurs as well as to professionals, to participatory as well as to spectator activities (see Paul DiMaggio, "Elitists and Populists: Politics for Art's Sake" in *Working Papers for a New Society* 6 [1978]: 23–31), there are broader issues, of which the principal one is the extent to which, by providing subsidies, government will also come to dictate to recipients the content and form of their art. This specter is raised by the widely publicized experience of authoritarian regimes, where the arts have often been rendered sterile by being turned into handmaidens of political policy and have been made socially "useful" according to rigidly defined criteria. While Netzer points to certain of these problems in his overview of American support of the arts in the past, he seems to believe that the danger is now unlikely, since, as he claims, government interferes less with the arts than do private institutions, especially foundations (p. 38). Governmental arts foundations enjoy an unusual (for America) amount of discretion and are likely to rely on the advice of outsiders to civil service (p. 49), a contention similar to that made by an earlier study also sponsored by the Twentieth Century Fund (William J. Baumol and William G. Bowen, *Performing Arts, the Economic Dilemma* [New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1966]). Netzer recognizes to some extent that seeking outside experts may produce conflicts of interest in personnel of private and public agencies, but our concern should go beyond this. Given the immense impact of governmental support in such fields as science and

education, the consequences of support to the arts are likely to be important (see Michael Useem, "Government Patronage of Science and Art in America," in Peterson, pp. 123-42). The self-imposed limitations of Netzer's study are, in this light, disquieting. He states, ". . . it is essential to consider the optimum level of total direct support of the arts, which is the broadest of all issues on arts policy, if only because the commonly alleged pressing need for a vast increase in that level is a central theme of so much popular discussion" (p. 178). Can this really be "the broadest of all issues on arts policy"? While a review of this book could legitimately explore further the political question which he skirts, I will focus instead on the substance of Netzer's work as stated.

With the growing likelihood of federal support for the arts, the Twentieth Century Fund sponsored, a little over a decade ago, the authoritative work of William J. Baumol and William G. Bowen on the economics of the performing arts. In it the authors argued, *contra* Alvin Toffler's proclamation of a postwar "cultural explosion" (*The Culture Consumers* [New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964]), that the miracle was little more than a mirage, much dissipated as soon as inflation and population increases were taken into account. Despite a booming economy, the arts were in "crisis," or, to be exact, experiencing financial difficulties. Moreover, this state of affairs was by no means temporary; the live performing arts, by their very nature, were destined to atrophy unless the government intervened massively to fill an inevitably increasing "income gap."

But now a different tune is being played. The "go-go years" are a memory, and the decade of Proposition Thirteen is upon us. In the new Twentieth Century Fund study, Dick Netzer tells us that, in spite of the heroic efforts of a mature "arts lobby," the future holds a leveling off rather than mammoth increases in public spending for the arts. As he puts it, "Willy-nilly, government agencies now confront hard choices among claimants and will have to establish priorities, either existentially, as the net (and barely conscious) result of hundreds of individual approvals and rejections, or explicitly, on the basis of forthright policy decisions made in advance" (p. 6). His own preference is, as one might expect from an economist and the dean of the Graduate School of Public Administration of New York University, for the latter course. Yet, as we shall see, his policy recommendations contain certain ambiguities.

To summarize Netzer's recommendations is not an easy task, since the scope of his concerns is broad, including not only the live performed arts, but the visual and literary arts as well as public broadcasting. In general, however, it can be said that he comes close to advocating the Matthew effect, identified by Robert Merton: "For unto everyone that hath shall be given and he shall have abundance: but from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath" (Robert K. Merton, "The Matthew Effect in Science" in *The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations*, ed. Norman W. Storer [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973], pp. 431-59). This is to oversimplify, however, since

Netzer is not simply for supporting all established institutions. In fact, he is hard on some of them, especially those from peripheral regions which have not done all they could to solicit local support or to modernize their fiscal operations. On the other hand, experimentally oriented, innovative groups and individuals will find much to cheer. While European support is much more likely to be directed to established institutions rather than to experimental or innovative individuals, the United States allocates a greater proportion of its funds to innovation (p. 165). This is a pattern which Netzer hopes will be enhanced.

From Netzer's perspective, individual artists and performers merit subsidy precisely because they are geographically mobile and can, therefore, be considered a national rather than a peripheral resource, the case for most cultural organizations. This redistributive side to his recommendations, in spite of being far less substantial in total allocations, may be significant for keeping the arts vital, but the net effect is for greater concentration of the arts. On the whole, his recommendation that federal aid belongs rightfully to those arts and organizations whose impact is national rather than local means that regions that have the greatest density of cultural institutions are favored while other regions must first become more self-sufficient. States with little or no tradition of arts subsidy (the majority), and which have established arts councils merely to absorb federal bloc grants, should be made to prove their commitment by being required to match federal grants before they obtain more funding. At the same time, however, counties which can afford to subsidize the arts and have not done so (e.g., Westchester County), and established institutions which have not seen fit to develop audiences and donors, should be required to make greater efforts as well. For contrary to the Baumol and Bowen contention that for technological and structural reasons the live performed arts are incapable of earning enough to cover their increasing deficits, Netzer argues that in most cases there is room to increase productivity (pp. 30-32); for example, raising ticket prices will increase income without having a major effect on audience size, since the poor do not attend at any rate, and the rich can afford (and are willing) to pay more.

The arts which serve some other purpose than their own are to be excluded from support by arts agencies. These include most amateur performances, architecture predominantly intended to promote city planning, art as therapy, and art in the schools. These, Netzer argues, would be more appropriately dealt with by other governmental agencies, such as HUD and HEW. By eliminating arts involving participatory and educational functions, Netzer comes out on the side of quality (or "standards") and selectivity (even if it means selective support for profit-oriented art), and against subsidies for extrinsic purposes. He is an unusually convincing advocate of this view, arguing that other agencies are far better endowed financially to handle such matters than the arts agencies are.

In the course of his analysis, Netzer attacks the commonly held belief that America lags behind European countries in arts support. In fact, if

to direct subsidies from all governmental sources (municipal, state, and federal) are added *indirect* subsidies via exemptions from taxes on property, income, and donations, as well as unemployment compensation aid to artists and performers, the gap between the United States and Europe is far smaller than is usually believed (p. 52). Indeed, indirect subsidies amount to no less than an additional \$400 million and may run as high as \$800 million annually. To understand how support affects the production, growth, and diffusion of the performed arts, one must realize that all subsidies, both direct and indirect, interact (p. 109). Often their interactions produce unintended consequences: for example, relatively lower admission prices to subsidized theater draw the audience away from commercial theater; the more spectacular symphony orchestras draw away potential publics from other types of ensembles; expectations of subsidies encourage both militancy for higher wage rates by performers, and endowment-dipping by management (p. 109).

When it comes to the visual arts in museums, however, Netzer does not probe the implications of indirect and, therefore, from his earlier stated viewpoint, undesirable subsidies (pp. 5-6). He approves private donations as a way of avoiding monopolistic governmental control (p. 102) and lauds the estimated \$400 million to \$800 million indirect subsidy to the arts (pp. 43-44); yet he does not question the possible interactions between them or their consequences. If he did it would give him reason for concern. What proportion of donations is composed of gifts in kind, such as paintings (often overvalued), given to a museum? Museum people are frequently concerned about such gifts, not only because they are sometimes pressured to accept them, but because works accepted by museums gain in value through their very association with a cultural institution. High valuations entail higher insurance premiums, more elaborate security measures, and, consequently, increased operating expenses. Yet donations in cash for mundane matters such as air conditioning, plumbing, electronic safeguards, and guards' salaries are precisely what private donors are least likely to make and, when provided by municipalities, have been known to rise astronomically as the value of the holdings increases. With all the excellent advice that Netzer gives in other respects, he never suggests a fundamental revision of the tax-exemption system. Perhaps donors should be permitted exemptions only for cash given for prosaic operating expenses rather than for art works, which donors are likely to give for symbolic reasons in any case.

Close examination reveals that Netzer's very definition of art predestines his recommendations. He prefers "noncommercial organizations, particularly those concerned with high culture rather than mass culture, and support of individual artists—poets, sculptors, painters working in art forms for which commercial viability is especially difficult" (p. 12). But it is not merely the lack of a market that should be taken into account. Specifically, the principal criterion for support is that the arts must be judged as "merit-good," and their "production and consumption should

be encouraged by public subsidy simply because they are meritorious rather than because the market alone would not supply enough of them or because income barriers deprive some people of access to them" (p. 16). For these arts provide "external benefits" which people not directly involved, such as future generations, may derive, in much the same way as museums, archives, and libraries provide benefits. Since popular culture is "deliberately evanescent," while fine arts are intended to endure, the former should live from the market, while the latter merit support (pp. 22-23).

The highly disciplined works by Netzer and by Baumol and Bowen are impressive. But in both cases they refuse to deal with an issue which should be absolutely central to their concern: aesthetics. Netzer clearly denies the need, stating that "some of these issues are essentially aesthetic and, as such, are beyond the scope of this book" (p. 1). In a similar vein, Baumol and Bowen assert, "We provide no inspirational message proclaiming the virtues of the live performing arts and their crucial role in the enrichment of human existence. The reader who is not already convinced would surely not be swayed by any report whose focus is on the economics of performance" (p. 14).

Despite their disclaimers, I must take issue with the legitimacy of eschewing aesthetic questions while at the same time making policy recommendations, implicit in the¹Baumol and Bowen study and explicit in Netzer's, regarding aesthetics. In fact, the authors' opinions presuppose the aesthetic evaluations from which their economic counsel derives. Who is to say that American jazz, excluded from consideration by these researchers (although not excluded from support by public agencies at the present time) is either economically viable without some support, or incapable of "enriching human existence," or not of permanent value? Netzer spends many pages justifying the importance of providing aid to the Metropolitan Opera, which he considers a national merit-good, but (one of the few cases fitting the Baumol-Bowen hypothesis) incapable of raising its productivity no matter how ingenious and farsighted its management may be (pp. 112, 123, 129, 190). Yet some critics believe the same organization degenerates at times to a middlebrow level, presenting archaic museum pieces, relics of the social climbing of an earlier age. But even for those of us who appreciate and sometimes enjoy operatic performances, the questions remain. How can one argue that 19th-century opera was less "deliberately evanescent" (pp. 22-23 and above) than any relatively popular art form today? Is not the permanent quality of some art works due as much to the activities and redefinitions of agencies, institutions, and interested individuals, as to the purely intrinsic worth of the art?

Regardless of the incontestable merit of both these books, and the astuteness of their counsel, to avoid "explicit," "forthright" (p. 6) discussion of the bases for their aesthetic preferences—which seem heavily to underlie their suggested strategies—is tantamount to claiming (as some social scientists do) that they are not dealing with ideological questions, when in fact, because of their assumptions, they are. Such a strategy casts a shadow on the value of Netzer's otherwise valuable contribution.

Revolution from Above: Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt, and Peru. By Ellen Kay Trimberger. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1978. Pp. viii+196. \$14.95.

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As a study of social change, Ellen Kay Trimberger's *Revolution from Above: Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt, and Peru* itself mirrors a change taking place in U.S. sociology during the period of writing—the early seventies. Here a young radical addresses a question of political practice in a dissertation for a University of Chicago doctorate in sociology. In this published version she attempts to bridge the epistemological rupture between metaphysical grand theory and dialectical materialism with middle-range concepts, material variables, and empirical methodology.

Trimberger's political question is whether the state can have "progressive" revolutionary potential given the internal and international constraints on modernization in agrarian societies incorporated at later stages in the expansion of world capitalism. The cases studied, listed in the book's subtitle, suggest that "these four revolutions from above have not resolved the technical problem of how to industrialize in a world economy controlled by those nations which industrialized in an earlier era. Nor have they tried to humanize the development process" (p. 167). But Trimberger concludes, "In those countries where the prospects of revolution from below look bleak, radicals and Marxists may have no choice but to support military revolution from above and try to force it in more progressive directions" (p. 173).

Trimberger's academic purpose is to develop a style of analysis, a model of "revolution from above," and concepts of a relatively and dynamically autonomous state as conceptual tools for the examination of this kind of question. She found theoretical work on revolution (citing only Crane Brinton and Lyford Edwards) useless for her purposes, so, "instead of abstractly reviewing the existing literature" (p. vii), she develops an empirical model inductively from facts in published accounts of two cases of revolution from above and tests it on two further cases.

The Meiji Restoration in Japan in 1868 and Atatürk's takeover in Turkey in 1923, then Nasser's regime in Egypt from 1952 to 1957 and the Peruvian military junta from 1968 until 1975, are the cases studied. Readers interested in modernization from above, military dictatorship, and state capitalism, who already know the history from which fragments are abstracted and regrouped in these case studies, and who have confidence in positivist methodology, should find Trimberger's comparative synthesis interesting and instructive. Marxists, to whom Trimberger seems to be addressing her conclusion and also her more recent writing on the Japanese case study, may find some interest in tracing the ideological connection

between the pessimism of her recommendation and the way in which her model and concept construction and "style of analysis" obscure the dynamics of the history she samples, keeping invisible precisely those aspects suggesting quite other and wider choices of action.

Turning first to the model, although her purpose is "to develop *theoretical* generalizations about social *change*" (my emphasis), Trimberger chooses a simple definition distinguishing revolutions by participants and processes "rather than quibbling over alternative ways to define revolution" (p. 2) and rather than addressing theoretically the central characteristics of specific social formations, let alone revolutionary transformation of these relations and thus of the totality. So revolution is here "an extralegal take-over of the central state apparatus which destroys the economic and political power of the dominant social group of the old regime" (p. 2). And its subtype revolution from above has five defining characteristics: it is organized and led by some of the highest military and often civil bureaucrats independently from and often in opposition to mass movements or uprisings, and it is accomplished with very little violence, emigration, or counterrevolution, in a pragmatic step-by-step manner with little appeal to radical ideology. This peaceful pragmatism results from the control from above and the use of the bureaucratic apparatus for "radical" aims.

Trimberger's two main concepts, "the relative autonomy of the state" and "the dynamic autonomy of the state," are explicitly grounded in no theory, such as that of the state as the concentration of class relations. So her state, apart from the bureaucracy, seems to float theoretically above the social formation despite her empirical evidence that state taxation of the peasants, for instance, supported the bureaucrats' modernization programs.

It is this absence of any dialectical relations in a theoretical explanation of the dynamics of capitalist development, together with the unacknowledged presence of the theory and epistemology actually guiding the choice and use of the factors studied which vitiate Trimberger's study and narrow her political choice to support of military bureaucratic control, which she has found to be neither effective nor humane.

The Pity of It All: Polarisation of Racial and Ethnic Relations. By Leo Kuper. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977. Pp. 302. \$17.50.

Ruth Milkman

University of California, Berkeley

Leo Kuper's most recent volume poses a very important question: Under what conditions does violent polarization along racial lines occur, and how can it be avoided? As the wars in Zimbabwe and Namibia and the escalation of racially directed violence in South Africa testify, the problem is not only of academic interest but also of great political urgency. In an era when

the Western press delights in sensationalizing "terrorism" and racial violence throughout Africa, rarely examining its social structural basis, one can only welcome an effort to *account for* violent racial polarization.

In *The Pity of It All* Kuper explores this problem through an ambitious comparison of four African nations which have experienced extreme racial polarization—so extreme as to culminate in "genocidal massacre": Algeria, Burundi, Rwanda, and Zanzibar. In his initial review of the historical development of polarization in each country, Kuper systematically rejects the view that power held by a racial minority can only be wrested from it through violent struggle and that polarization is thus necessary and inevitable, as many social commentators—and many anticolonial leaders—have held.

The most convincing argument in this part of the book is that cases of peaceful decolonization in Africa are abundant. What is very curious, however, is that Kuper does not include such a case in his comparative study. He chooses instead to compare four countries which all experienced severe polarization, in one case (Algeria) during the decolonization process, and in the other three cases in its immediate aftermath. The consequence is that it is impossible to explore systematically the differences between situations leading to polarization and those where it is avoided. Nevertheless, Kuper is surely correct in arguing that it is necessary to develop a theory of polarization, that is, to account for it where it occurs rather than to assume that it was inevitable; and this is what he seeks to do in the rest of the book.

Drawing on rich historical case material from the four countries he has selected, Kuper develops a quite plausible model of polarization. After identifying some salient characteristics of polarizing ideologies, he specifies in detail four key phases in the process of polarization: (1) the geographical extension of violence; (2) the aggregation of persons into clearly demarcated and mutually hostile racial or ethnic groupings, through the establishment of principles of collective guilt and collective responsibility; (3) the routinization of violence; and, finally, (4) the escalation of reciprocal violence through a spiral of actions and counteractions.

Having put forward this analysis of the key elements of the polarization process, Kuper turns to the main problem at hand, namely, explaining why polarization occurs when and where it does. At this point, the influence of his earlier theoretical work on "pluralism" in Africa comes to the fore. Indeed, the theory of polarization elaborated here seems to rest primarily on the proposition that all four of the societies under study are examples of "extreme plural societies," dominated by minority ethnic or racial groups and exhibiting "great discontinuities in culture and structure between the dominant and subordinate sections" (p. 271). Such societies, Kuper concludes, "are specially vulnerable to genocidal conflicts" (p. 278).

The basic problem here is one of presuming what should be explained. Indeed, rather than specifying the reasons that ethnic or racial differences take on such salience as to result in violent polarization in these four

cases, Kuper ultimately argues that the fact that massacres took place means that ethnic and racial divisions must have been deeply embedded in the social structure all along. For example, in discussing the case of Zanzibar, he points out that this nation was noted for its racial harmony prior to 1957; yet a few years after that tensions reached the point of a violent, genocidal conflagration. The explanation Kuper offers is that "... the very rapidity of the polarisation is strong evidence of the significance of the structural factors, and of the reality of deep antagonisms between Mainland Africans and Arabs . . ." (p. 250).

While in the other three cases it is more clear that racial or ethnic tensions did exist prior to the development of violent polarization, it still remains to explain why such tensions existed in the first place—which the theory of pluralism takes as a "given." Moreover, why racial or ethnic tensions sometimes lead to genocidal polarization, as in the cases studied here, and other times do not, is not clear. Again, the negative instances are regrettably outside the scope of Kuper's comparison. A further problem which is left unresolved is to explain variations in the extent and form of polarization. For example, what accounts for the differences between race relations in the United States and in South Africa? One suspects that the answer is that one is a more "extreme" plural society than the other—but this too needs to be explained.

These are the very sorts of problems Kuper poses in rejecting early in the book the view that polarization is inevitable in plural societies of this type. Yet his theoretical framework does not allow him to resolve them satisfactorily here. The end result is that the book has a somewhat moralistic quality (as manifested for example in its title), deploring racial violence but offering no adequate explanation for it. Still, Kuper has posed a very important problem. His documentation of four cases of extreme polarization and his quite useful analysis of the process of polarization is a valuable contribution in its own right.

Social and Political Change in New York's Chinatown: The Role of Voluntary Associations. By Chia-ling Kuo. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977. Pp. xxix+160. \$19.50.

Stephen H. K. Yeh
University of Hawaii

Chia-ling Kuo's *Social and Political Change in New York's Chinatown* is the first comprehensive study of voluntary associations in an American Chinatown. As such, it makes a pioneering contribution to the empirical knowledge of an important dimension of the sociopolitical structure of New York's Chinatown and its relationship with the larger society.

The main contents of the book are well organized according to four phases in the development of voluntary associations in New York's China-

town. In discussing the first phase, Kuo traces the growth of traditional voluntary associations in overseas Chinese communities, both in South-east Asia and in the United States, back to their origins in China. This is followed by a detailed analysis of the origin and development of the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association, the "inner government" of New York's Chinatown, with specific attention to its oligarchy and its power base in the merchant associations or tongs.

Largely as a result of the Anti-Poverty Program, the second developmental phase witnessed the emergence of modern service associations such as the Chinatown Planning Council, the Chinatown Youth Council, and the Chinatown Foundation. Since their purpose is to meet pressing social problems in the community, these associations serve as links between the city, state, and federal governments and the community. However, these service associations have not played an effective role in the provision of health and education facilities and employment opportunities, partly because of inability to exert pressure on the larger political structure and partly because of competition among themselves.

The development of political pressure associations constituted the third development phase. The four major associations in this category are derived from the Asian-American movement and the Unification of China movement, which in turn reflect the prevailing sociopolitical forces of the larger society, including the antiwar movement, the civil rights movement, the student movement, and U.S. foreign policy toward China and Taiwan. The student activists who dominated the political pressure associations brought with them a "cosmopolitan" perspective in the sense that their community concerns were couched in terms of national issues. Therefore, these political pressure associations can be seen as "cultural brokers" bringing into Chinatown the current ideals and ideology of the larger society.

In the fourth and present phase of development, some voluntary associations have become part of national political action coalitions. These coalitions, including the Organization of Chinese-Americans (which led to the formation of the Pacific-Asian Coalition), have a larger power base in many cities throughout the United States and integrate various Asian-American associations into a common organization for a common cause. In affiliation or collaboration with the national associations, the voluntary associations in New York's Chinatown have strengthened their bargaining power with the larger political structures, as evidenced by the appointment of two Chinese to high positions in the New York City government.

The book also has a chapter on the relationship between New York's Chinatown and the larger society. The discussion is divided into three parts. The first considers how young professionals and members of the youth movement formed alliances with blacks and Puerto Rican political activists on the Lower East Side to achieve minor improvements. The second part examines the internal rivalry between several professional and educated groups and the traditional leadership within Chinatown. The conflict among different associations for power or government funds weak-

ens the community's capacity to deal with the larger society. On the other hand, conflict has led to the creation of new institutions that may prove beneficial. In any event, social distance between members of the voluntary associations and the residents has made mobilization of community participation difficult. The third part analyzes Chinatown and the encapsulating political structures. The powerlessness of the community is a result not only of the lack of voting power, materials, and human resources, but also of the vulnerability of city, state, and federal governments to vested interest groups. However, the author is optimistic about the contribution that private foundations can make to effect positive social change in deprived ethnic communities.

The book ends with three hypothetical statements on the role of voluntary associations in communities such as New York's Chinatown: "(1) Voluntary associations are adaptive mechanisms directly responsive to the needs of their members and to the demands of the encapsulating political system, which can either constrain or encourage their actions according to its policy. (2) In a pluralistic society that institutionalizes conflict, voluntary associations with material and human resources and most of whose members possess the political franchise can effect social change and can limit the power of the state. (3) In a pluralistic society that institutionalizes conflict, voluntary associations in isolated, politically disenfranchised, and economically stagnant subcommunities are powerless by themselves to effect social change in local or national institutions that affect them or to limit the power of the state. Change must come from social forces in the encapsulating society or from the initiative of the state or through continued political action based on a nationwide alliance with other voluntary associations with material and human resources and most of whose members possess the political franchise through an appeal to the normative values of political democracy of the encapsulating society" (pp. 149-51). One could easily agree with the first two statements; in regard to the third, perhaps more case studies are necessary, not just in Chinatowns but also in other communities, to elaborate the theoretical proposition and to determine its range of applicability.

Bohemia: The Protoculture Then and Now. By Richard Miller. Chicago: Nelson-Hall, Inc., 1978. Pp. xi+376. \$14.95 (cloth); \$7.95 (paper).

Joseph Damrell
Central Michigan University

In 1830 Victor Hugo assembled a romantic assault force of artists in Paris to assure the success of his play *Hernani*. In the wake of this antibourgeois and anticlassical spectacle came the bohemian tide that has washed over the arid, middle-class cultural wasteland of the Western world for the past 150 years. Hugo's romantic army of artists and social improvisers sought

the destruction of bourgeois life-styles in a tooth-and-nail creative rebellion intended to bring about the "liberation of corpus and consciousness." His banner was passed to a succession of committed, protesting artists: Théophile Gautier, Gérard Nerval, Philothée O'Neddy, and Pétrus Borel (among others), the first "real bohemians." On Doyenné Alfey, Camille Rogier, Gautier, Nerval, and Arsène Houssaye created the "wealthy model"—an "art-sun" radiating creative energy in all directions. This was succeeded by Henri Murger's (*Scènes de la vie bohème*) "poverty model," which became the prototype for generations of bohemians ("Where shall we eat today? 'We'll know that tomorrow'"). Then came the "bohemian international" that ranged from "Frisco" to the depths of the bourgeois empire in France, an embodied spirit of artistic romance that culminated in the Paris Commune in 1871 where it was "drowned in blood" in an orgy of violence unparalleled even by the pogrom against the poor that took place in the 1848 rebellion.

Yet this was not the end of bohemia. It spread again to the centers of trade and invention in the Old and New Worlds, and by 1895 it was again firmly established in Paris—the Paris of Cézanne, Degas, Manet, and Renoir. It reached its apex in the bourgeois bohemia on the eve of World War I in 1914, whereafter bohemians manqués surfaced in Germany and became by mutation from the nature-loving Wandervogel the spine of the Nazi apparatus. Since the SS state, the world has seen the rise and fall of the transitional bohemias of the Harlem Renaissance, the literary wanderers, Mencken's romantic army, the beatniks, and the hippies.

Richard Miller calls bohemia the "nemesis of traditional order," originally arising in response to the contending authority of "baron and abbot, of emperor, pope and monarch." The neo-bohemian life-styles of contemporary youth constitute a special kind of "protoculture," a mutation arising from the long romantic tradition. It stands as a "spirit of liberty impatient of all authority." It opposes the bourgeois mutation, the expediency value of technocratic society (i.e., *Führerprinzip* + technocracy = self-reliant obedience). Proclaiming "Pour tout peindre, il faut tout sentir!" the promise of bohemia is insurrection and, ultimately, freedom from suppression of the aesthetic/spiritual dimension, suppression arising from "the tooth-splitting cherry-stone at the center of everything" (i.e., the profit motive of capitalism).

Since the 19th century there has been a built-in paradox, that of progress and poverty. The bourgeois mentality, concentrating on "the search for safety through money," experiences guilt at the crushing poverty that exists alongside scientific and industrial "progress," a guilt which becomes a fear of insurrection and sexual repression. In the 19th century this was the basis for the white man's manifest destiny, an institutionalized system of repression. In the 20th century, following the "death of man" in World War I (an event preceded by the "death of God" at the hands of science), the second form of institutionalized repression—an even more virulent and dangerous form—emerged as the "Nazi alternative," the aforementioned

technocratic order, which has gained ascendancy in postindustrial society despite the obliteration of specifically Nazi forms.

Richard Miller's book is more than a study of bohemia as an idea and of those artists whose life-styles appear bohemian. It is in addition, through a comprehensive study of the roots of bohemia and of the everyday lives of bohemians in different times and places, an analysis of a generic cultural and historical process of Western civilization—the romantic impulse. *Bohemia* is a work of precisely fused style and substance. At once witty, scholarly, prophetic, intuitive, and excruciatingly rich in historical detail, this book states once and for all the relevance of the bohemian tradition and celebrates the achievements of the “beautiful people” who live, and thereby proclaim, its virtues. More than an antidote to the Nazi death-romance and bourgeois technocracy (Miller's yin and yang of the contemporary Western cultural matrix), today's bohemia is the long-awaited protoculture, the larval form of the coming social reality, the dawn of the new social species—creative, expressive humankind.

As bohemian and historian, artist and protester, Miller is not inclined to partake of functional explanations of bohemia that would render it relatively benign and static, a variation on the status group, subculture, or subterranean tradition themes. Rather, he sees bohemia as a progression of a spontaneous movement resonating at the core of major events, social forms, and moral issues of modern history. By far a superior work to *A Moveable Feast*, Hemingway's self-indulgent reminiscences of Paris in the twenties, and even surpassing the scholarship and analytic astuteness of César Graña's celebrated work on bohemian literati, *Bohemian vs. Bourgeois* (New York: Basic Books, 1964), Richard Miller's *Bohemia* is apt to become a classic in the field. Although his conclusions are not likely to gain wide acceptance, and many sociologists may find his literary-historian style of investigation and analysis a bit high handed, this work is a remarkable achievement, for it brings to the foreground of the times the role of the rebellious young. This book should be read by all who claim to have an explanation for the maelstrom of protest that has enveloped the world.

Profane Culture. By Paul E. Willis. London and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978. Pp. 212. \$13.50.

Will Wright

University of North Carolina

Profane Culture is a study of two marginal groups in England in the late sixties, “cultures” as Paul Willis calls them. The groups are a motorcycle gang and some hippies, and the method could be called naive symbolic interaction; that is, a sociologist leaves the academy and discovers Big Meanings by associating briefly with real people. Clearly identified as an outsider, Willis nevertheless “hung around” with each of the two groups

and got some members to talk into his recorder, primarily, it seems, through his familiarity with and interest in their musical tastes. Indeed the best parts of the book consist of his efforts to explore the dialectic between the cultural self-image of the group and the style of pop or rock music it is committed to. In these sections Willis flirts with the possibility of a serious sociology of culture, an effort to examine systematically, for example, the ways in which daily life situations, class situations, if you will, determine which kind of music is listened to and how it is listened to, and how, in turn, the music influences and shapes the conduct of the daily life situation. Unfortunately, however, this issue is passed over quickly as Willis moves on to the consideration of Culture with a capital C.

The organizing theme of the book is that real, concrete, living and breathing cultures exist among oppressed and deprived people; and that these cultures, because they are real and concrete, are in an important sense more valid and therefore more critical and revolutionary toward the dominant culture than all the ideas and theories of the intellectuals and the radicals. These cultures, the argument goes, represent not only a rejection of many of the values of bourgeois society but also a first-order practicum for academics, more viable than our abstractions, about how the world can be reinterpreted and thus changed. Without any political consciousness or concern, and in spite of their deep-seated ignorance, prejudice, and self-centered smugness, these deprived groups have accomplished a concrete, and therefore admirable, instructive, and even revolutionary, rejection of bourgeois culture. "Still these cultures teach us that revolutionary cultural change will only come from reinterpretations, reformations of consciousness, and fermentation from below around the most trivial, everyday and commonplace items. Such change cannot be simply provided from above, or from ideas. . . . Cultural change must have the profanity and darings of the world, not its ideas. We must listen to the streets before we listen at the towers" (p. 7).

This passage illustrates both Willis's romanticism and his political values and ideas. He likes the bike boys and the hippies, thinking they can "see clearer" and thus point us toward necessary changes. And he dislikes, even holds in contempt, the dominant bourgeois culture, including, it seems, most theorists and intellectuals like himself. Except for these good guy-bad guy distinctions, however, there are no political or economic statements in the book. He seems not to like capitalism, but he says nothing about it except that he does not like the culture it produces. He does not even tell us what is wrong with that culture, he just assumes that we all agree it is awful. Well, it is awful, but I have a harder time with his idea that the disadvantaged, or at least some groups of the disadvantaged, will show us the way with their rough, raw, but concrete cultures. This is a watered-down, romanticized, cultural version of Marxism, and it would be nice if it were true, or even if it could be plausibly argued. But Willis is not interested in treating it as a hypothesis; he takes it as a fact and uses it as a theoretical stance, a righteous grid through which all his observations and experiences are strained. It is almost as though he had to take this radical

and gratuitous theoretical position and force his data to fit it in order to justify his own interest in and admiration for the groups he studied. "The methodological strategy employed can be summed up in one passage. The hippies and bikeboys were in the struggles of the sixties. They were not bystanders. They produced something. We can look at it and learn from it" (p. 7).

Willis raises virtually no methodological issues of any kind and makes no effort to distinguish between descriptive and methodological statements, to consider how or to what degree objective description is possible, to establish his relationship to the data, to indicate what observations were left out and what criteria were used for selection, etc. He seems to think, positively, that his interpretations and selections are directly apparent and incontrovertible. Thus his descriptions abound with value judgments: the bike boys exhibit "manliness" and "frankness," and the hippies have a "richness, complexity, and irony . . . at the heart of the culture." Also he is able to read directly the Great Meanings behind mundane cultural "facts": The bike boys hate drugs and drug takers because they "did not want their consciousness surreptitiously set free from apparent substantiality to slip behind, and question, their reality and ultimately their identity . . ." (p. 15); and the hippies's bad posture "spoke of a kind of stance before existence, an unspoken understanding of the nature of 'reality' and one's own position in the dialectic of determinateness and freedom" (p. 99).

It soon becomes clear that this is not a sociological study at all but an interpretive essay, an effort to make us *perceive* the hippies and bike boys in a certain way regardless of whether it can be demonstrated that they are indeed that way. Except for the pretense of objective sociology, there is nothing wrong with this kind of essay, and it is even possible that such an analysis, though subjective and personal, is in fact perceptive and accurate. In this case, however, Willis's own account contradicts his basic theme, and this is best seen in his treatment of the bike boys' intense racism and sexism. With respect to the "dehumanization of other races," as he puts it, Willis first explains it as necessary to the integrity of the revolutionary culture, and then suggests that "this kind of response to outside groups and strange events is healthier than a 'liberal' one," that is, than "the kind of bloodless humanism, cerebralized compassion, that in the end can be more insulting, and less humanly relevant, than an apparently offensive spontaneous rejection, which at least springs from a secure human base" (pp. 34-35). This same argument would indicate that a Nazi capitalist Germany is healthier than a liberal capitalist Germany, or a liberal capitalist America. Willis essentially apologizes for the racism of his bike boys and then defends it as red-blooded truth, all in the name of his theory, arguing, in effect, that having no allegiance to decent human values is preferable to having such an allegiance but not always acting on it.

With respect to the blatant and vicious sexism of the bike boys (and the hippies as well, though he virtually ignores it), Willis never once recognizes, in spite of the many quotes and descriptions he gives, that this is as

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brutal and cruel a "dehumanization" of others as any racism. He discusses it as an expression of the men's tough masculinity, necessary for their culture, and then dismisses it: "While it was true that girls were dominated, and that there was little tenderness shown toward them, and that sex was treated in a very mechanistic way, there was a form of protection extended towards them. Because of their assumed weakness and lack of real autonomous identity, there was a sense in which the boys would 'look after them' and make sure that they did not come to the harm that they were sometimes threatened with" (p. 28). For Willis, this becomes an example of the essential caring and kindness of the bike boys. And what is even more dismaying is that Willis clearly never interviewed or even spoke to any of the women he characterizes so objectively.

Willis's argument about the valuable revolutionary content of these cultures collapses because he thinks that any rejection of bourgeois values is to be admired and thus cannot distinguish one that is anti-intellectual, tribal, and degrading from one that is political, conscious, and humane; that is, he cannot distinguish fascism from socialism. Like all romantics he is seduced by the apparent strength and confidence of mindlessness and brutality, thinking that it can give us direction and knowledge in a way that reason and thought cannot. And he is theoretically led into this scholarly fanaticism by his uncritical, and Durkheimian, reverence for culture as a thing in itself. For him the world consists of cultures, overriding and transcendent cultures. These are the fundamental entities of social existence which shape and determine all other aspects of social life. In order to be valid and viable, they must be "real," "concrete," and "spontaneous," for the idea that a culture can be based on reason and consciousness, on organizing and struggle, is a contradiction in terms. This is a theoretical position which is not uncommon among symbolic interactionists, since it implies that the culture is objectively there to be studied and that an outsider can observe it directly without serious methodological complexity. It also encourages the studying of individuals as simply participants in and carriers of the culture rather than as theoretically more complete and complex human beings, with specific attitudes, experiences, and structural constraints. This is perhaps Willis's most severe failing. He obviously has his mind made up about the culture and thus is manifestly uninterested in the people he studies, their background, work, families, etc. For him the people only exist with respect to this culture, so that he simply cannot recognize that this culture only exists, and can only be appreciated and understood, with respect to them. Thus he either cannot see, or cannot take seriously, the fact that these cultures are fundamentally compatible with the capitalist economic system, and hence the bourgeois culture, because they do not threaten it. And indeed in the long run they may be more compatible than the liberal culture is because of their fascist directions. Also he cannot see, or even consider, the possibility that these cultures can more easily be understood as desperate efforts on the part of their participants to squeeze themselves into the margins of the dominant culture, by accepting its basic values and rejecting many of the extraneous ones, in a society which essen-





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
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
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
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
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
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
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